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ABSTRACT 
 While startups’ interactions with early potential customers may occur long before 
product creation, entrepreneurs often fail to recognize how these interactions impact 
startup development. My research proposes that early customers are central influences 
and develops a model of customer interactions. More specifically, my dissertation focuses 
on answering: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the 
venture creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the 
type of organization being created? 
 I undertook an inductive, qualitative process study of nine startups located in 
incubators and studied customer interactions in near-real-time. My findings show that 
types of customers and validation received are important during new venture creation. 
First, I introduce a model of self-reinforcing mechanisms - the customer interaction-
validation-spiral - that occurs when startups receive customer feedback. Positive feedback 
is interpreted as justification to move forward in revising the business to meet initial 
customers’ needs and in seeking out additional validation. Over time, other options for 
startups are gradually eliminated, efficiencies gained, and resources allocated to create 
processes and infrastructure that propel startups down a given path. Second, this spiral is 
incorporated into a novel model of customer interactions during the new venture creation 
process that requires multiple levels of validation to be met. 
My contributions refresh existing theories of new venture creation and expand on 
customer-centric, practitioner-based lean startup concepts to demonstrate that customers 
not only provide validation on products and markets, but also on founders’ abilities to 
create fully functioning and productive organizations. Finally, I apply existing literature 
on path dependence to new venture creation and demonstrate that self-reinforcing 
mechanisms and multiple validation stages trigger a narrowing of options available to 
startups, making pivoting more challenging over time. The customer interaction-
validation-spiral offers further insights into path dependence mechanisms, further 
opening the black box of organizational paths. 
 The practical implications of this research help startups understand the importance 
of thoughtfulness in early customer selection. Despite a narrowing development path, 
there is the potential for entrepreneurs to continue to exhibit agency and reflexivity in 
startups’ path formation by regularly reflecting on the results of their actions. 
  
Keywords: startup, customer interaction, validation, path dependence, new venture 




 Much like those who dream of summiting Everest or of starting their own 
business, as far as I can remember, I have wanted to pursue my Ph.D. In a dissertation 
about the new venture creation process, it is only fitting to acknowledge that much like a 
startup, my personal journey as a doctoral researcher involved starts, pivots, and a lot of 
time, patience, and the sharing of wisdom and kindness of those around me. I see this 
journey and the people involved in it as a great gift for my personal and professional 
development. Here, I want to acknowledge those that were part of this personal startup 
journey.  
 First off, I want to thank my advisor, Dr. Darren Meister. Our supervisor-doctoral 
student relationship developed in a unique manner. In the summer of my third year in the 
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me on as a doctoral student – essentially rescuing a “lost sheep.”  
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blessing in disguise. Deciding to work with Darren has been one of the best decisions I 
have ever made and I am deeply indebted to him for putting his trust in me as an 
academic and mentee. Over the past three years, he has demonstrated unwavering support 
as a supervisor and encouraged me to follow through on my desire to pursue an 
unconventional late stage dissertation - a qualitative, cross-disciplinary process study that 
allowed me to investigate a topic that I truly believe in and am passionate about. I have 
had the chance to learn from both his skills as a researcher and as a teacher and, most of 
all, have learned from his thoughtful advice, quick-thinking, and compassion as a mentor. 
I could not have wished for a better doctoral supervisor and hope that this is just the 
beginning of several future conversations and collaborations. 
 I next would like to thank my thesis and proposal committees. First, thank you to 
Dr. Dominic Lim who served on both committees. Your enthusiasm and invaluable 
feedback during the various stages of this dissertation pushed me to think more deeply 
about my work and has been particularly encouraging as I dove headfirst into the 
Entrepreneurship field. A big thanks to the other members of my thesis committee: my 
external examiner, Dr. Scott Ensign who shared much encouraging feedback and pushed 
me to think about how to communicate my work to others; Dr. Johanna Weststar who 
asked perceptive questions and shared valuable feedback on how I might develop my 
research further; and Dr. Mark Zbaracki, whose discerning insight into qualitative 
methodology, theory, and his excellent course on cross-disciplinary research motivated 
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me to pursue a cross-disciplinary research topic. Further thanks to my proposal 
committee members, Dr. Lawrence Plummer and Dr. Rob Mitchell, whose insights early 
in the development of this research helped shape its foundations and allowed for the 
development of a more interesting and relevant dissertation. To all of my committee 
members, I would like to express my gratitude to you for taking the time to read my 
work, reflect on it, and share your insights to help me to grow and develop as a scholar. 
 There are also several other faculty members at Ivey that have played a role in 
enriching my academic journey. In particular, I would like to thank Simon Parker, Eric 
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Rerup, Debbie Compeau, Tony Frost, and Ian Hasse who shared their time, knowledge, 
and support and whose conversations and courses helped shape my experiences at Ivey in 
a very positive way. I am grateful that I have been fortunate to be part of two academic 
‘families’ at Ivey, the Entrepreneurship and International Business departments, and I am 
deeply appreciative of their guidance and warmth throughout my degree.  
 Having been in the program for six years, the list of colleagues and friends that I 
have made in the Ph.D. program is long. It was with their support, intellect, and 
friendship that I was able to remain sane and grow as a person. I am fortunate to have met 
and have a part of my life: Vanessa Hasse, Anna Sycheva, Ramzi Fathallah, Ellen Choi, 
Patrick Shulist, Krista Pettit, Alina Nastasoiu, Jeannette Eberhard, Sara Hajmohammad, 
Majid Eghbali-Zarch, Bassam Farah, Rida Elias, Matt Wong, Felipe Rodrigues, Jeff 
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Schnarr, Meredith Woodwark, Yves Plourde, Clara (Yanfei) Hu, Chethan Srikant, Mazi 
Raz, Matthias Tietz, and several others. Our chats from the old Ivey building to the new 
Ivey building (loft and basement!) provided me with the support and laughter to get 
through the program and I will be forever grateful for your friendships. Furthermore, 
behind the scenes at Ivey, the Ph.D. program office, Information Technology, Library, 
and Maintenance staff were always there with a smile and a solution. Thank you for 
making our lives as doctoral students easier. 
     Outside of Ivey, I have been fortunate to have been inspired by other academics. 
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Finally, the professors and fellow doctoral students at the Great Lakes Entrepreneurship 
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fortunate to benefit from their early stage feedback on my dissertation and am now 
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1.1. Background and Motivation 
“Every week, every time you speak with a potential customer, you learn 
something new. [You ask] do I still feel there’s an opportunity? You’re 
digging in deeper and deeper each time to see how people behave and 
what they want to engage with and you ask the question - is my original 
thinking of the opportunity still the same or has it changed, or is it gone 
altogether?”- Participant Entrepreneur 
“We choose to follow what customers want. [But] the thing is, we built the 
[product web] site for hardcore users, and now we find we are attracting 
casual ones that want certain features. Right now, the system doesn’t allow 
you to change features, so we have to decide whether we want to rebuild it 
or not [for these other potential users].”- Participant Entrepreneur 
Organizations are open systems that encounter uncertainty and risk in the external 
environment (Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 2007; Thompson, 1967). Further 
complexity and ambiguity are experienced by startups that are concurrently creating 
novel products and building a new firm to bring a product to the market (e.g. Gartner, 
1985; Katz & Gartner, 1988; Bhave, 1994; Liao & Welsch, 2008). The founding team 
must develop and establish a business concept, secure finances and other resources, 
design a new product, and distinguish the startup from competition. Concurrently, a 
startup begins interactions with multiple stakeholders, including customers, mentors, 
venture capitalists, industrial networks, professional forums, family and friends, 
competitors, suppliers, and potential first employees (Ozgen & Baron, 2007). Finally, the 
process may involve the setup of equipment and infrastructure to produce a product 
before it is sold to customers (e.g. Bhave, 1994).  
Interactions with external stakeholders have a large role in either clarifying or 
contributing to the ambiguity of the venture creation process. Stakeholders are important 
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sources of information for a startup that can help entrepreneurial founders interpret the 
external world (Stinchcombe, 1965). Such stakeholder relationships hold social capital - 
“resources embedded in a social structure of relationships which are accessed and, or, 
mobilized in purposive actions” (Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001), and having the right social 
capital can facilitate innovation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and create unique 
economic opportunities that can be challenging to replicate in the market (Pirolo & 
Presutti, 2010). On the other hand, these stakeholders may also have different 
expectations and demands. This can create conflict and complexity for the direction the 
business should take (Boyd & Gumpert, 1983; Ozgen & Baron, 2007; Ravasi & Turati, 
2005).  
In this dissertation, I define an interaction as an occasion when two parties 
communicate with or react to each other. I argue that out of all stakeholders of a startup, 
early customers, the potential and actual purchasers and end users of a product or service, 
are essential stakeholders that provide information that contributes to the survival, 
direction, and growth of a startup (Levitt, 1960). Customers have certain values they are 
seeking, and have a self-serving bias (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003) in providing feedback 
to startups about their preferences, their needs, and their contexts (Etgar, 2008). The 
products desired have functional and social-symbolic meanings for the customer and can 
make a new startup see itself as an organization that provides a certain type of product to 
a certain type of customer. Knowing what potential early customers are looking for, their 
demographics, personalities, lifestyles, values, and purchasing habits can help a startup 
develop a customer-focused mission and products that meet these needs. Furthermore, 
having a clear understanding of customers’ needs can create a shared purpose among the 
entrepreneurial project team, increase productivity, and reduce time-to-market (Zhang & 
Doll, 2001).  
On the surface, it may seem obvious that customers play an essential role in the 
development and survival of startups, given that they purchase products and services that 
generate revenue for the business. However, customers have a larger role in influencing 
an organization. For instance, customers can signal organization reputation (Reuber & 
Fischer, 2005) and legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), and influence the 
competitive advantage (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) and survival of an organization 
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(Freeman, 1984). Customers provide divergent thinking from internal product developers 
(Kristensson, Gustafsson, & Archer, 2004), and knowledge of competitors and the 
likelihood of retail channel acceptance (Luo, Kannan, & Ratchford, 2007). More involved 
customers may even act as advocates for the business (Groth, Mertens, & Murphy, 2004), 
or at times, act as partial employees (Ennew & Binks, 1999).  
These early customer interactions also suggest a long-term influence of customers 
in shaping the organization’s development. According to the path dependence literature, 
early organizational features are thought to persist (Sydow, Scheyogg & Koch, 2009). 
Initially, there are several potential outcomes and multiple paths that could be pursued. 
When an early decision is made, it is often considered “insignificant” (Arthur, 1989) or a 
“small event” (Van Driel, 2013), but it can serve as a reference point for later choices and 
sets off a self-reinforcing process that narrows the set of choices for an organization, and 
puts the organization down a particular path (Sydow et al., 2009).  
The early customer interaction can be considered an example of a small event, 
and can trigger a decision that leaves a lasting impression. This is particularly easy when 
customers consistently share new information with startups (Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), 
and when they are involved in co-creating (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). These interactions are 
a two-way street - taking place through shared experiences (Burgoyne, 1995) and a 
willingness of both sides to share creative ideas and experiment repeatedly to reinforce 
learned knowledge and behaviours and impact decision-making (Lévesque, Minniti, & 
Shepherd, 2009). Startups may also build a knowledge base in a certain industry, and 
adapt to share common preferences between a startup and potential early customers 
(Schreyogg and Sydow, 2011). Debate, negotiations, and exchanges with customers and 
other stakeholders can influence startups’ decisions as to whether to solidify or discard 
routines, culture, and goals. Through interaction that involves observations, 
experimentation, and repetition, startups can build relationships, a shared identity, respect 
and trust with their partners (Kelly, Schaan, & Joncas, 2002). The startup becomes 
familiar with customer preferences and contexts (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and increasingly 
tailors products to meet the needs of their “most important” customers. 
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Customer interactions affect not just the product design itself, but also the 
startup’s operations and relationships, including the development process of the 
opportunity, how the startup is managed and operated, its environment and 
entrepreneurial networks (Cope, 2005). These exchanges during the new product 
development part of venture creation can create interpersonal cohesiveness among the 
close-knit team members and prompt the undertaking of activities and formation of 
routines, rather than just observing or learning about them secondhand. More specifically, 
the co-design process creates a system of knowledge use and exchange (Brown & 
Duguid, 2001), shared experiences, and shared attributes that are enacted to help increase 
the likelihood that startups and its potential first customers share a common worldview.  
These intense interactions suggest that the initial path that the startup is on is 
increasingly reinforced as the startup develops. There are complementary effects built 
into the organization’s processes over time, and increased coordination capabilities and 
efficiency to use and exploit what has already been learned from customers (Schreyogg 
and Sydow, 2011). An increased focus of time, attention, and resources on co-design with 
certain customers may also create negative path mechanisms that restrict other options for 
a resource-poor startup.  
Furthermore, early customers may be selected for several reasons, including 
because they are easily accessible, that they provide connections or opportunities to grow, 
may be heavily pursued, or even may just be an opportunity for survival. While a startup 
may aim to court a variety of potential first customers to gain unique information from 
diverse sources of customers (Zogaj & Bretschneider, 2012), it can be challenging to 
juggle ideas from multiple customers (Hoyer et al., 2010). Focusing on a small group of 
early active, dominant customers that act as advocates for the business can be helpful for 
young firms (Groth, Mertens, & Murphy, 2004), but there is also the risk that the 
information they provide is subjective and sparse (York & Danes, 2014). There is 
potential that early decisions, made to meet these customers’ needs, also subject the 
startup to path dependence effects and restrict an organization’s ability to meet the needs 
of the target market in the long term.  
Concepts related to path dependence and the influence of network partners are not 
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new in the entrepreneurship literature. For instance, early alliance partners have been 
proposed as a predictor of the trajectory of startups (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Milanov & 
Fernhaber, 2009), and the reputation of the first partners of venture capital firms has been 
shown to affect a firm’s future development (Milanov & Shepherd, 2013). A firm’s early 
customers may be involved in customizing a firm’s products, and subsequently, affect 
their reputation (Blomqvist, 1997), business strategy and R&D (Herstatt & Von Hippel, 
1992; Ruokolainen, 2008). Through these interactions, startups learn what characteristics 
they possess, what characteristics they would like to possess, and what skills they still 
must develop to subsequently build their business.  
Looking at early customer interactions as triggers of these self-reinforcing 
processes can create a deeper understanding of path dependence mechanisms at play and 
the external stakeholder effect of early customers in the new venture creation process. It 
can also help fill in the gaps in the path dependence literature that look at path formation 
retrospectively and theoretically (e.g. Czaban, Hocevar & Whitley, 2003; Greve & 
Seidel, 2015; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow, Schreyogg, & Koch, 2009; Vergne & 
Durand, 2010), and solidify the importance of putting thought into selecting early 
customers. 
Despite the benefits of understanding early customer interactions in 
entrepreneurial ventures, most of the studies on customers involve more established firms 
and come from the new product development literature (e.g. Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001) or 
various branches of marketing, including relationship marketing (Berry, 1983; 
Gummesson, 1994; Payne & Frow, 2017) and service-dominant marketing literature (e.g. 
Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008). In these fields, customers are seen as active co-creators 
of value, involved in various stages of product development in established organizations 
(Hoyer et al., 2010). Customers are not considered passive buyers that purchase and use 
the products and services offered (e.g. Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008; Prahalad & 
Ramaswamy, 2000; Yi & Gong, 2013), but are known for providing information about a 
problem that needs to be solved (Lengnick-Hall, 1996). Interactions with customers can 
occur long before a product is available to purchase, but also at any stage of the product 
development - from initiation, innovation, and design of products, through to gathering 
resources and processing them to produce a deliverable product for consumption (Chang 
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& Taylor, 2016; Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack, & von Hippel, 2002; Payne et al., 
2008). Initial conditions can impact new venture success (Gao et al., 2010), and ideas 
may even originate from customers, sparking more frequent interactions (Von Hippel, 
2005). These interactions are meant to reduce uncertainty, improve novelty, and improve 
fit between product offerings and the market (Payne et al., 2008; Prahalad & 
Ramaswamy, 2000).  
 There is a growing, but fragmented, body of entrepreneurship literature that refers 
to the role of early customers in new ventures. Topics include the impact of a first 
customer sale (e.g. Rehme & Svensson, 2011; Ruokolainen, 2008), signaling of early 
customers (e.g. Reuber & Fischer, 2005); customers in innovation (e.g. Coviello & 
Joseph, 2012) the formation of relationships with external stakeholders (e.g. Engel, 
Kaandorp, & Elfring, 2017), implications of these relationships (e.g. Yli-Renko, Autio, & 
Sapienza, 2001; Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001), and how they are the starting point 
for customer feedback (Liao & Welsch, 2008).  
 When specifically investigating the early stages of the new venture creation 
process, however, customer interactions are often addressed later or at the periphery in 
the process (e.g. Gartner, 1985; Van de Ven, Venkataraman, Polley, & Garud, 1989; 
Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankellow, & Gibson, 2007). In part, this 
peripheral focus on customers can be attributed to entrepreneurship scholars’ decisions to 
focus on explaining other parts of the new venture creation process, such as the creation 
and discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g. Gartner, 1985; Dimov, 2011) and the 
focus on entrepreneurial growth (e.g. Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Gilbert, 
McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006).  
 Second, it was once thought that entrepreneurs could rely on initial “hunches” or 
entrepreneurial intuition to know what customers wanted (York & Danes, 2014). A 
tension between trying to survive and developing a growing, sustainable business 
originally envisioned by the founders can make it challenging to decide when is the right 
time to reach out to different types of customers to get feedback. 
 Third, empirical studies on the entrepreneurial process itself have been slow in 
appearing in the literature (exceptions exist such as e.g. Brixy, Sternberg & Stuber, 2012; 
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Gruber, 2007; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Marion et al., 2015). This may be associated with 
the challenges in conducting process research and the fluidity and uncertainty 
encountered in the entrepreneurship process. Several theoretical articles and calls for 
process research have been proposed (e.g. Bhave, 1994; Chell, 2013; Cunneen et al., 
2007; Downing, 2005; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Hjorth, Holt, & Steyaert, 
2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011), but the literature on the entrepreneurial process remains 
highly disparate (e.g. Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Zahra, 2007) and still does not necessarily 
identify customers as playing a central role in the new venture creation process. 
 In contrast, recent practitioner-based approaches have emerged in the past decade 
that advocate speaking with customers early and often in the startup development process 
to test out ideas (e.g. Blank, 2007; Blank & Dorf, 2012; Cooper & Vlaskovits, 2013; 
Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011). Emerging around the same time as agile engineering, the lean 
startup methodology and other customer-centric entrepreneurship methods require 
entrepreneurs to develop hypotheses and iteratively build a minimum viable product or 
service to meet early customers’ needs. Assumptions about customers’ values are then 
continuously and rapidly tested with customers, allowing the startup to make corrections 
– pivoting – as needed until the product and market are validated. Entrepreneurs continue 
to adopt the lean startup methodology, learning about it through popular press books (e.g. 
Blank, 2007; Cooper & Vlaskovits, 2013; Furr & Dyer, 2014; Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011; 
Blank & Dorf, 2012), blog posts (e.g. Blank, 2010; Ries, 2008), and in entrepreneurial 
education curricula (York & Danes, 2014).  
 While the lean startup methodology was created using practitioner insights, it has 
ties to agile software development, operations management and organization theory (Furr 
& Dyer, 2014), as well as literatures such as learning from failures (McGrath, 1999), fast 
product innovation (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995); and experimentation in 
entrepreneurship (Shah & Tripsas, 2007; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). In academia, 
references specific to the lean startup methodology have received limited attention but are 
growing (e.g. Fisher, 2012; Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014). Lean startups 
have even become a recurring topic of discussion at major academic management 
conferences in the past couple of years (Clough & Wu, August 2016; Wu & Clough, 
August 2017).  However, while the implications of the lean startup methodology are 
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substantial, both in terms of how entrepreneurs may interact with their early customers 
and how these early customer interactions may shape organizations, further empirical 
research is needed to understand it.  
In sum, past literatures suggest that early in the new venture creation process, 
customers have an effect on the future trajectory of the organization through path 
dependence effects. While there are several studies on the role and impact of early 
customers in established organizations and a slowly growing number of new ventures, 
there are a range of domains – marketing, new product development, new venture 
creation process, and lean startup methodology - that may help explain the role and long-
term impact of early customers’ interactions during the startup development process. 
Refreshing existing theories of new venture creation could account for and make a more 
central argument for customers as an influential stakeholder. It could also clarify how 
traditional models of new venture creation may be affected by or integrated with the 
customer interactions proposed by the lean startup methodology. 
1.2. Objective and Research Questions 
The objective of this dissertation is, therefore, to develop a theory of customer 
interactions during the new venture creation process and to add new insights that focus on 
understanding what types of customer interactions take place throughout new venture 
creation. Given the potential for the long-term influence of early customers, gaining a 
better understanding of customer interactions at different stages of venture creation and 
product development is important to assess the types of early customers that a startup 
should seek out, how customers can influence different stages of the venture creation 
process, and how these interactions can help create a customer-focused mission and 
shared purpose among the entrepreneurial team (Zhang & Doll, 2001). To better 
understand customers’ interactions with the startup during the venture creation process, 
the overarching research question of this study is: 
What is the role of early customers in an innovative startup’s development?  
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 More specifically, I am interested in developing an understanding of when and 
how early customers are involved in the venture creation process and their long-term 
impact on startup development and trajectory, and ask: 
When and how do startups interact with early customers during the venture 
creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the type of 
organization being created? 
 Before going further, I want to set boundaries on this research. First, the 
entrepreneurial process is complex, non-linear, and uncertain (Bhave, 1994; Gartner, 
1985; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). I acknowledge that there are 
several potential stakeholders that impact the venture creation process (Gartner & Carter, 
2003), however, limit this dissertation to potential first customers that are courted by the 
startup, the confirmed first customer that buys the product or service eventually offered, 
and subsequent early customers. Secondly, I focus on innovative startups that are 
developing their own novel products or services and business models, rather than looking 
at startups focusing on franchised businesses or imitation products. This is because I am 
considering customer involvement in the innovation process as a key influencer on 
startup development. Third, I define types of early customers as follows. An early 
customer is any type of customer that a startup may interact with during the venture 
creation process. There are two types of early customers – potential and confirmed 
customers. A potential first customer is a person or organization that a startup is 
considering as a potential purchaser of the goods or services. Having a potential first 
customer implies that no contracts for sale have been made yet, however, interactions 
may have happened. A startup may have several potential first customers. A confirmed 
first customer is the first person or organization with whom a contract for a sale of goods 
or services has been agreed upon. This may be a verbal or physical contract. Fourth, 
given the product, business model, customer segment, and operations of the organizations 
in the study are not yet considered to be confirmed at the start of data collection, I 
specifically refer to the organizations as startups – defined by Blank and Dorf (2012) as 
“a temporary organization in search of a scalable, repeatable, profitable business model” 
(xvii).  
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To address this question, I identify key, defining stages of customer interaction 
during the venture creation process that create path dependence effects. I explored how 
encountering potential early customers could influence the business, creating path 
dependence for the type of organization that the startup will become. In particular, the 
study identified the validation, or affirmation, that potential early customers offer startups 
and that could affect the decisions that entrepreneurs make, where relationships with 
potential customers originated (in the founders’ personal, professional, and external target 
market), the events of each phase of new venture creation, the purpose of interactions, 
and the modes of communication used with customers. It is through understanding when 
and how startups were interacting with potential early customers and when startups were 
most impressionable that founders can gain a better understanding of how to select early 
customers and learn when it is most beneficial to interact with customers.  
To answer the research question posed, I undertook an inductive, qualitative 
process study of startups in Ontario, Canada. Ontario-based entrepreneurs are comparable 
in many ways to entrepreneurs in other major entrepreneurial ecosystems that have access 
to mentorship, high quality education, early-stage government funding, and cutting-edge 
research institutions. I took an iterative process approach to develop theory, following 
methods for inductive research (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to study the entrepreneurial 
process over time (Davidsson, 2005; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Mintzberg, 
1979; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). Process studies are valuable to gain a rich 
understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of startups’ early stakeholder 
interactions (Gioia & Patvardhan, 2012; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 
2013). I focused on customer interactions during the venture creation process and 
collected longitudinal data on nine startups initially located in incubator settings over six 
to seven months. While the startups were not necessarily at the same point in the venture 
creation process when they joined the study, all startups at the start of the study were less 
than two years old and still growing.  
I relied primarily on interviews with entrepreneur participants as the main data 
source. Interviews were designed to gather narrative data, with one retrospective initial 
interview and up to fourteen interviews capturing data in real time. Questions asked in the 
interviews included, “Tell me a story of the startup from the idea to today” and “What 
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types of interactions have you had with customers in the past couple of weeks?” Over 
time, as necessary, I adjusted the protocol to reflect themes that emerged during data 
collection (Spradley, 1979; Appendix A). Eighty-one formal interviews were recorded 
and transcribed with founders, as well as several informal interviews during observation 
periods. To gain other perspectives, additional interviews were conducted with mentors 
and incubator directors. To better understand the general environment of the founder 
participants during data collection, I spent several hours a week in the incubators where 
participants predominantly operated their business during the study period. This allowed 
me to be present for any informal interactions that occurred - to observe meetings, pitches 
to customers and venture capitalists, hear phone calls with customers from the 
participants’ perspectives, and attend industry events and markets, focus groups, and 
retail stores where customer interactions occurred. At least one informal observation was 
noted for each startup. I also collected archival data over time that represented customer 
interactions and how the business was represented (e.g. archived websites over time, 
press statements, news articles, radio shows, online community forums, blogs, social 
media posts, business plans) to triangulate and help to explain events (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
For the within-case analyses, I used narratives to analyze process and construct 
detailed stories to explain what is happening in an organization from a focal actor’s 
perspective. According to the cultural entrepreneurship process, the stories that 
entrepreneurs tell about their business help define a new venture and affect its legitimacy 
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Narratives take into consideration the main subject (the 
entrepreneur or startup), time and context, and the sequence of events and plot, or the 
objective, of the narrative are highlighted. The first stage of data analysis resulted in a set 
of case narratives composed of ordered, raw data (including quotes from interviews, 
archival documents, and field notes; Appendix B). Process maps were also created to 
develop a better understanding of this process (Appendix D).  
I then identified “venture creation stages,” or events, that arose in the startups and 
documented during the study period. I reduced this list to a comprehensive set of 
“typical” venture creation stages using a defined set of criteria. To minimize potential 
issues with retrospective accounts of action (Golden, 1992), I checked accounts with 
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archival data, participants, and multiple founder interviews (where there was not just a 
sole entrepreneur) to help reduce biases. Second, as events are based on participants’ 
perspectives, events noted by founders were considered to be of real significance. Event 
listing matrices (Appendix E) and summaries of the time ordered displays were then 
created (Chapter 4). These stages were refined after discussions with key participants in 
the startups.  
 Focused, shortened narratives identifying and chronicling the customer interaction 
activities for each startup were then constructed and reported in the within-case analysis 
(Chapter 4). This stage of data analysis involved identifying different characteristics of 
customer interactions, such as customer types based on relationships with founders, 
partners, and other stakeholders. The identification of relevant categories of customer 
interactions that affected venture creation was only done after data collection, rather than 
assuming a set of categories in advance or identifying them early in fieldwork. The 
categories identified included: origin of customer relationships (personal network, 
professional network, or the external target market), the communication channels used, 
the purpose of interactions, and the validation received from these interactions. After 
each individual case was well understood, a meta-matrix condensing the data from all the 
cases was created to allow for systematic pattern comparisons and pattern clarification 
across cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Appendix F).  
Data were initially managed in NVivo 11.1.1 for Mac. The initial stages of 
analysis involved coding transcribed interviews to generate a broad assortment of 
categories that the data could be approached from (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The purpose 
of coding the data was to identify concepts that are related to the phenomena of interest, 
help in the identification, clarification, and specification of concepts or subcategories of 
concepts, and in understanding the mechanisms by which early customer interactions are 
influencing startups.  
Over time, subsequent coding was done manually by hand to create a closeness 
and familiarity with the data and to maintain the richness of the qualitative data (Welsh, 
2002). While computer software was helpful in the initial organization of the raw data, 
manual coding of the data allowed me to connect events and ideas that took place over 
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several interviews during the new venture creation process, to not lose sight of the 
context and overall picture of the process, and to compare themes that emerged over the 
new venture creation process across cases (Roberts & Wilson, 2002; Welsh, 2002).  
As coding was a dynamic and iterative process, as new themes emerged and 
concepts and dimensions developed, they were adapted and re-classified over the process 
of data collection and analysis. Note that coding was not done in isolation and that 
existing literature was consulted during the analysis process (Suddaby, 2006). Data was 
used to build and update theory, and while iterating between data and theory, concepts 
were clarified with study participants to ensure that they were properly represented. 
With this dissertation, I address calls for more process research in 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016) and for “demand-side” 
entrepreneurship research (Priem, Li & Carr, 2012) that is focused downstream on 
product markets and consumers to explain manager decisions for value creation. I aim to 
contribute to various literatures, including venture creation and entrepreneurial process 
literature (Eckhart & Shane, 2003; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Hjorth, Holt, & 
Steyaert, 2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Van de Ven, 
Venkataraman, Polley, & Garud, 1989; Wright & Marlow, 2011) and the growing lean 
startup methodology literature (e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; Fisher, 2012; Maurya, 2012; 
Ries, 2011; Wahlen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014). I also frame the research and 
the process of venture creation in a setting of potential customer co-creation/co-
production/co-design, and hence, draw from the venture creation (e.g. Bhave, 1994; Liao 
& Welsch, 2008; Reynolds & Miller, 1992), new product development (e.g. Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Fang, 2008; Joshi & Sharma, 2004; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Zhang & 
Doll, 2001), and the marketing literature in co-production (e.g. Etgar, 2008; Payne et al., 
2008). Finally, I refer to and contribute to path dependence literature (e.g. Arthur, 1989, 
1994; David, 1985, 1986; Boeker, 1989; Sydow & Schreyögg, 2015; Sydow, Schreyögg, 
& Koch, 2009; Vergne, 2013; Vergne & Durand, 2010) to understand the mechanisms of 
narrowing the startup’s path of options. 
Based on this inductive study, I develop a customer interaction model that takes 
place during new venture creation and involves three stages of customer validation that 
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affect entrepreneurs’ decision making. The new venture creation process and parallel 
stages of validation benefit from following the same types of customers throughout the 
new venture creation process. Despite phases appearing in a linear fashion, it is essential 
to note the potential for additional micro stages of validation, back-tracking and repetition 
of phases, and pivoting of paths. However, despite these adaptations, the new venture 
creation phases and main stages of validation tend to occur generally in this order.  
The model suggests that the first positive customer interaction, often taking place 
during the Opportunity Discovery or Opportunity Refinement Phases, creates primary 
validation for a business concept. This creates the first narrowing of the path of 
opportunities that are pursued by the startup. The validation can be verbal, contractual or 
monetary. Primary validation triggers self-reinforcing processes of the startup to seek out 
additional confirmation on the business concept and to develop a product and business 
around this validation.  
The secondary validation takes place just before the end of the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase. It also confirms the product and the business model, but requires 
either monetary or contractual confirmation, or other forms of commitment (such as time, 
feedback on the product or business, other resources or usage of the product) that 
demonstrate interest in the product from a large diversity of customers in the target 
market. Receiving this secondary validation further narrows the path of opportunities that 
can be pursued by the startup. The secondary validation triggers another set of self-
reinforcing processes of the startup to seek out additional confirmation of the business 
concept.  
Finally, in contrast to previous validations, tertiary validation, taking place after 
the founders commit to the business, comes only from receiving monetary or contractual 
confirmation from early customers in the external target market. The focus has moved to 
more operational and tactical activities, such as whether the startup can undertake 
activities to organize and deliver on the business concept to meet customer expectations. 
Therefore, only if the product, business model, operations, and market are established, 
can tertiary validation considered to be achieved.  
Practically, the findings of my research are intended to help startups understand 
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the implications of early customer selection and interaction. This research will also be 
applicable to entrepreneurs and incubators that offer and facilitate entrepreneurship 
training programs and foster entrepreneurial development. Entrepreneurs need to better 
understand the impact of early customers on the venture creation process and the issues 
salient in their minds. Such an approach may then help entrepreneurs optimize early 
customer selection to align with their growth strategy. 
1.3. Organization of Thesis 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the topic of customer interactions during the new 
venture creation process, pose the research question, and propose theory to support the 
question. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the topics that are relevant to my research 
question. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research methodology for this study. 
Chapter 4 then provides within-case analyses for each of the nine startups in the sample. 
Based on the results in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 summarizes cross-case findings. Chapter 6 
explains how validation from early customers promotes self-reinforcing mechanisms 
during a startup’s path formation and a resulting path dependence, and proposes a model 
of customer interactions during the new venture creation process and supporting 
propositions. The findings are discussed, implications are reviewed, and future research 
directions are then proposed in Chapter 7. The appendices include the interview protocol, 
the detailed case studies, event listing matrices and cross-case meta-matrix used for 
analyses, and process diagrams for each startup in the sample. 
1.4. Summary of Chapter 1 
 This chapter introduced the background and motivation for developing a better 
understanding of early customer interactions during the new venture creation process. It 
outlines the concept of path dependence that may be applied to explain the impact of 
these interactions in shaping the organization, and the research question for this 
dissertation: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the venture 
creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the type of 
organization being created? I outline the methods for the inductive, qualitative process 
study undertaken to follow a study sample of nine startups. I also provide a brief 
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overview of the proposed customer interaction model developed from the findings of this 
dissertation. The model includes three stages of validation from customer interactions 
that occur over the new venture creation process, where customers offer different types of 
validation to a startup at each stage, which helps them to justify continuing to develop the 
organization. The chapter then concludes with an overview of how the thesis is organized 
into seven chapters and appendices.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the following literature review, I provide an overview of literature relevant to 
this research on when and how do startups interact with early customers during the 
venture creation process, and how do these interactions create a path dependence for the 
type of organization being created? I first define and review existing literature on 
entrepreneurship and new venture creation (Section 2.1). As background to the impact of 
interacting with and obtaining early customers during development, I review the path 
dependence literature (Section 2.2) as context to better explain the role of early customers 
during the venture creation process. Specifically, this literature helps explain how the 
validation that the startup receives from early customer interactions puts a startup down a 
certain path and shapes the type of startup that is created through sharing knowledge and 
imparting legitimacy on the startup for who they are, why they are qualified, and 
ultimately, the conditions under which they may succeed, including the type of customers 
they have.   
To better understand customer interactions in the literature, I then review 
literatures that explain the role of customer interactions. First, I look to literatures outside 
of entrepreneurship to borrow knowledge from, including the new product development 
(NPD) literature and the customer-centric relationship marketing literature, which contain 
studies on customers’ involvement in product development (Section 2.3). The NPD 
literature typically focuses on more established organizations, often with dedicated 
product development departments. The co-creation and relationship marketing literature 
looks at customers as active co-creators of value during the co-production process and the 
feedback they provide to firms.  
Finally, I review literature on early customers in new ventures (Section 2.4), that 
draws on diverse literature in marketing, organizations, and entrepreneurship. I then 
review practitioner-based literature such as the lean startup methodology that has been 
influencing entrepreneurs since it launched over a decade ago in blogs and popular press 
books (Section 2.5). The literatures reviewed and related to the research question can be 
seen in Table 1.  
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One important point to note is that in conducting an inductive study, I looked at 
the data to see what they reveal about this phenomenon to generate new theory 
accordingly. That is not to say that I entered into this topic blindly, without consulting or 
having an idea of potential literatures I may contribute to (Suddaby, 2006). My goal, 
however, was to follow Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) philosophy where: “the researcher 
begins with an area of study that allows theory to emerge from the data” (12). As a result, 
what is represented in this literature review was developed based on potential themes that 
emerged during early data collection for this dissertation. Also, note that while I 
acknowledge stakeholders – individuals or groups who can affect or is affected by an 
organization’s ability to achieve its objectives (Freeman, 1984; Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, 
Kato, & Amezcua, 2013) - do have an influence as well, customer interactions are the 
focus in this dissertation.  
Table 1. Main Bodies of Literature in this Dissertation 
Literature Sample References 
Venture Creation e.g. Bhave, 1994; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Reynolds & Miller, 1992 
Path Dependence Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1985, 1986; Boeker, 1989; Sydow & 
Schreyögg, 2015; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Vergne, 2013; 
Vergne & Durand, 2010 
Product Development and 
Related Relationship 
Marketing in Established 
Organizations 
from disciplines of: e.g. Strategy and Organization Theory - Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Innovation Management – Veryzer, 1998; Zhang & 
Doll, 2001; Marketing - e.g. Chang & Taylor, 2016; Etgar, 2008; 
Fang, 2008; Payne et al. 2008; Rochford & Rudelius, 1997; 
Operations Management - Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 2005; 
Engineering - Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000; Management Science - 
Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001 
Early Customers in New 
Ventures 
Relationship Marketing: Payne & Frow, 2017; Rehme & Svensson, 
2011; Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001; Ruokolainen, 2005, 2008; 
Ruokolainen & Igel, 2004 
Lean Startup (Practitioner) 
Methodology 
Blank & Dorf, 2012; Andreessen, 2007; Ries, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 
2011; Cooper & Vlaskovits, 2013; Maurya, 2012; Fisher, 2012; 
Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014 
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2.1 Entrepreneurial Process and Venture Creation 
2.1.1. Understanding the Entrepreneurial Process 
 According to Shane and Venkataraman, the field of entrepreneurship involves 
“the scholarly examination of “sources of opportunities [for future goods and services]; 
the processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of 
individuals who discover, evaluate and exploit them” (2000: 218). In cases where 
entrepreneurial activities take place outside of an existing organization, a new 
organization is created concurrently to the development of new products or services.  
This process is new venture creation - “the organizing (in the Weickian sense) of 
new organizations [where] ‘to organize is to assemble ongoing interdependent actions 
into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes’ (Weick, 1979: p.3)” (Gartner, 
1985: 697). The organization may be an independent entity or a joint venture with new 
products, processes, market, or technology acquired, a new market entrant and new 
supply source to customers. The Strategic Planning Institute also included new profit 
centres within an established firm under the term “new ventures,” however, for the 
purpose of this dissertation, I exclude such forms of venture creation and consider them 
to be intrapreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, or corporate venturing (Burgelman, 
1984). Being part of a more established organization may imply the existence of 
bureaucracy, routines, and preconceived ideas, as well as access to knowledge, skills and 
other resources, and legitimacy that new ventures do not have. 
Themes for entrepreneurship research proposed by Gartner over 30 years ago 
(1985) remain relevant in research today, including research on founders of the 
organization, the startup itself, the environment that the startup is in, and the processes 
and activities associated with the startup. In particular, interest in and calls for process 
research that breaks the entrepreneurial effort into specific stages have continued to be 
made since then (e.g. Eckhart & Shane, 2003; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Hjorth, 
Holt, & Steyaert, 2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Van de 
Ven et al., 1989; Wright & Marlow, 2011), and it has been suggested that studying 
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process could help create a unified research domain of entrepreneurship (Low & 
MacMillan, 1988; Moroz & Hindle, 2011; Zahra, 2007). 
There are several ways in which process has been studied in entrepreneurship – 
including the process of discovery (Kirzner, 1973), opportunity (e.g. Alvarez & Barney, 
2007), the use of social networks, cognitive processes of entrepreneurs (e.g. Sarasvathy, 
2006), and the study of contextual or environmental factors (e.g. Gartner, 1985). Creating 
a startup takes time, and process studies help us understand the reality of these events, or 
“a continuous string of changing states of existence categorized into sets of ‘occasions of 
experience’ that can then be classified into distinct processes (Whitehead, 1929)” (Moroz 
& Hindle, 2011: 786). More generally, studying process allows us to see how events 
unfold over time.  
Despite the potential to learn from process studies, models for the entrepreneurial 
process remain fragmented and limited in number (e.g. Moroz & Hindle, 2011). Up until 
2011, Moroz and Hindle found thirty-two models of the entrepreneurial process, where 
only twelve had empirical evidence. The predominant bulk of the studies focused on 
individual entrepreneurs (not the venture organizational level), and only four papers 
converged on conceptualizing the entrepreneurial process, including studies by Gartner 
(1985), Bruyat and Julien (2000), Sarasvathy (2006), and Shane (2003). Furthermore, of 
these four, Gartner was the only one that included the role of innovation in 
entrepreneurship (1985). Bruyat and Julien (2000) and Shane (2003) did not specify 
venture creation as essential to the entrepreneurial process, and Sarasvathy (2006) took a 
different epistemological approach by proposing effectuation as part of the 
entrepreneurial process.  
Fragmentation in the new venture creation literature should not actually be all that 
surprising, however. Entrepreneurship as a field and process is multidimensional 
(Gartner, 1985) and disjointed (Bygrave, 1989), as it is particularly challenging to narrow 
in on a single path that startups may follow (Bruyat & Julien, 2000). While venture 
creation is often depicted as straightforward (e.g. Reynolds & Miller, 1992), in reality, it 
is a complex, non-linear process with a diversity of stages. 
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There is a lot of uncertainty involved (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), particularly 
as emerging organizations tend to be small, fragile and volatile (Katz & Gartner, 1988). 
Differences in gestation periods can mean variability and complexity in the venture 
creation process (Davidsson & Gordon, 2012). Due to high failure rates, a startup that is 
being researched over time may quickly cease to exist, making longitudinal studies risky 
for researchers. Furthermore, longitudinal process research, particularly large-scale ones 
such as the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED; Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & 
Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds, 2007), are limited in number due to a lack of time and 
resources available to conduct process studies (e.g. Langley, 1999; Moroz & Hindle, 
2011).  
Attempting to overcome some these challenges surrounding entrepreneurial 
process research is worthwhile, however, as understanding the process has positive 
practical implications for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial founders undergo a series of 
events to create their new business (Liao & Welsh, 2008), and taking the time to study 
the process of venture creation can help us understand these key events and improve the 
decisions that startups make (Davidsson, 2005).  
2.1.2. Venture Creation 
In venture creation, a business opportunity must be identified, a product or service 
created, a business model developed, information, finances, and other resources must be 
assembled, and operations are undertaken to distinguish the startup from competition. A 
new product or service needs to be marketed, and interactions with multiple stakeholders, 
including customers, suppliers, and potential employees, need to be initiated. 
Concurrently, the startup must develop an organizational business structure, and may be 
dealing with a liability of newness and smallness as it battles to establish legitimacy with 
society and the government (Gartner, 1985). While a startup begins with an idea, the 
process of designing the product involves trial and error learning and actions over time 
(Gartner & Carter, 2003). This process generally means that the final product can vary 
substantially from the initial idea.  
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To better understand the stages of venture creation, I conducted a literature review 
of the venture creation process, including both theoretical and empirical papers (such as 
venture creation - Ardichvilli, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003; general outputs - Sarasvathy, 2006; 
creating a legal entity - Carter, Gartner & Reynolds, 1996; or commercialization – 
Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007). Given the early focus in the new venture creation 
process for this dissertation, studies that only focused late in the venture development 
process (much later than the first customer), or papers that focused on seeking out 
opportunities, but not necessarily the rest of the venture creation process, are not included 
in this literature review.  
In reviewing the literature, certain stages of venture creation are mentioned 
recurrently across papers (Table 2). For this dissertation, I am applying five main phases 
of venture creation: Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity Refinement, Transition, 
Entrepreneurial, and Execute Phases. The process begins with opportunity discovery 
(Phase I), which may be either externally stimulated or internally stimulated. Externally 
stimulated opportunities start with the desire to start a business. Potential entrepreneurs 
then scan the environment for opportunities (opportunistic surveillance; Thompson, 
1967). After recognizing various potential opportunities, one is selected to evaluate and 
potentially pursue (opportunity filtration and selection; Long & McMullan, 1984). In 
contrast, internally stimulated opportunities start with recognizing that there is a problem 
or a need that currently has no solution. This may spark what Cyert and March (1992) 
call a problemistic search, where there is a search for a solution to a problem. Once a 
solution is found, founders may recognize a business opportunity and decide to pursue it.  
In both cases of externally and internally stimulated opportunity recognition, the 
opportunity then needs to be refined to develop a clearer business concept (opportunity 
refinement, Phase II) that takes into account customers’ needs before founders commit to 
creating a product and business (Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankelow, & 
Gibson, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Greenberger & Sexton, 1988). The opportunity discovery 
and refinement phases can last a few weeks to several years prior to either exit or 
initiation of activities to create a business (Brixy, Sternberg, & Stüber, 2012). 
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While opportunity discovery and refinement are key phases of entrepreneurship 
(e.g. Baron, 2006), up until this stage of venture creation, much of the investment by 
founders is intangible, such as their personal time. The creation of an organization is 
often considered more substantial, however, where a structure and organizational 
processes need to be developed (Thompson, 1967) and there is an investment of capital. 
Various authors have suggested there is some sort of transitional phase (Phase III) – 
where commitment to organization creation takes place only when the business concept is 
refined, when resources such as initial funding is obtained, when proprietary technology 
is developed, or once an initial customer, or at least a highly likely potential customer, 
has been secured (Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; 
Gartner, 1985; Greenberger & Sexton, 1988).  The first sale of a startup may be 
considered particularly significant in that it validates the business concept (Block & 
MacMillan, 1985), can help a startup expand their business (Ruokolainen, 2008), by 
demonstrating credibility (Blomqvist, 1997) and reducing perceived risk of the purchase 
for other future customers (Hutt & Speh, 2010). All these transitional activities, however, 
are themselves signals of the potential of the organization and are the result of 
“organizing” and hence, I include all these as part of the venture creation process. 
Subsequently, in the entrepreneurial phase (Phase IV), the startup introduces the 
product to external stakeholders in the wider market for feedback on the product and 
operations (Bhave, 1994). These interactions have been shown to occur at any stage of 
business development, and have varying degrees of outcome success (Bhave, 1994; 
Corbett, 2005; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Greenberger & 
Sexton, 1988).  
Resources and competencies need to be acquired and organized to develop the 
product and organization – including organizing to commercialize the product, 
manufacture, arrange logistics and market it (Baron, 2007; Bhave, 1994; Carter, Gartner, 
& Reynolds, 1996; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; Gartner, 1985; Ucbasaran, 
Westhead, & Wright, 2001). This phase is entrepreneurial, in a sense, because there is 
increased commitment, risk, and interest in exploiting the opportunity.  
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While most models of new venture creation do not explain the final stage, an 
execute phase (Phase V), once the exchange phase is over, the product, business model, 
operations, and market have been established. The ‘temporary organization’ of a startup 
ceases to exist and is replaced by a more established, but still new venture, with a 
“scalable, repeatable business model” (Blank & Dorf, 2012).  
2.1.3. Takeaways from Understanding the Entrepreneurial Process 
In summary, we can see that new venture creation has been a topic of study in 
entrepreneurship for several years now. There is, however, continued opportunity and 
demand for refinement of new venture creation process research and to develop an 
understanding of the process. In particular, studies that acknowledge, integrate and clarify 
exchanges with early customers throughout the venture creation process are limited in the 
new venture creation literature, despite practicing entrepreneurs continuing to consult 
with customers, even if informally, to better understand the problems they encounter and 
their preferences. In the next section, I review customer interactions in other disciplines 
that offer insight into how customers may be involved the new venture creation process. 
2.2. Path Dependence  
From the beginning, startups are complex and uncertain, dealing with discovering, 
assessing and exploiting opportunities during the venture creation process and affected by 
whom is involved (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). According to Stinchcombe, 
“organizational forms and types have a history, and this history determines some aspects 
of the present structure of organizations of that type” (1965: 153). The founding 
conditions of a startup are thought to influence its future direction, including competitive 
intensity (Swaminathan, 1996), managerial values and philosophies, political and social 
processes (Selznick, 1957), growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), and 




Table 2. Conceptualizations of Stages of Venture Creation and the Entrepreneurial Process in the 
Literature 
Authors Stages 
Webster, 1976 Pre-venture (Entrepreneurial search), Hard work (Evaluation, negotiation, 
networks, inventor – prototyping, R&D, financial stress; manufacturer, 
distributor, and venture organization, power play between inventors and 
subordinates), Financial jeopardy (vulnerability); Product introduction 
(critical moment), Rapacity (renegotiation, knothole); Payoff (Success or 
failure) 
Gibb & Ritchie, 
1981 
Acquiring motivation, Finding an idea, Validating the idea, Identifying the 
resources, Negotiating to get into Business, Birth, and Survival 
Galbraith, 1982 Four stage-of-development model – (1) Proof-of-principle stage involving 
developing proprietary technology; (2) Prototype stage where proprietary 
technology is made into a prototype; (3) Model shop stage – models are 
produced and tested; (4) Startup stage where formal production begins and 
firm makes their first sales  
Gartner, 1985 Up to six stages, in no particular order: Locate a business opportunity, 
Accumulate resources, Market products, Develop prototypes and final 
product, Build an organization (including the organizational processes and 
strategy), and Respond to the environmental context, including society and 
the government. These activities do not necessarily include innovation, nor 
are they unique to entrepreneurship. 
Greenberger & 
Sexton, 1988 
(Limited to the decision to create a venture) – Identify an opportunity, 
Believe that one can manage a firm, Possess expertise and control, Develop a 
unique/niche product or process, Decision to initiate 
Katz & Gartner, 
1988 
Gathering information, Creating boundaries that distinguish the organization 
from the rest of the World, Acquiring financial resources, Exchanges with 
external suppliers and customers 
Van de Ven, 
Venkataraman, 
Polley, & Garud, 
1989 
The emergence of a business idea over time, The creation of competencies to 
both innovate and market a product, and Using these competencies to develop 
additional products in the business 
Kazanjian & 
Drazin, 1990 
Four stage model of new venture growth: Conception and Development, 
Commercialization, Growth, and Stability 
Reynolds & Miller, 
1992 
Four stages: Commitment, First hire, First sale, First financing 
Bhave, 1994 Three-stage model: Definition of business concept (internal or external), 
Commitment to venture; Creation of organization; Creation and set up of 
production technology, and Exchange of product with customers and market 
in a non-linear, feedback-driven process 
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Five stages – Search for/generate business ideas, Selection of business 
opportunity, Gathering of information, Formal specification of business, Get 





In no particular order – Activities to be completed in startup are: Organizing a 
team, Preparing a plan, Buying/renting facilities/equipment, Looking for facilities, 
Investing own money, Seeking out funding, Obtaining financial support, 
Developing models and gaining fulltime staff, Applying for licenses or patents, 
Creating a legal entity, Saving money for future investment 
Bruyat & 
Julien, 2000 
Specific stages not defined, however, authors suggest that creative organizing 
individuals are involved in the entrepreneurial process towards new value creation, 
and places the entrepreneurial process within its environment and a specific time 




Opportunity recognition and information search and resource acquisition and 




Perception, Discovery, Creation, lead to development and evaluation. From 
evaluation, either idea is aborted, revised, or a venture is formed (Theoretical) 
Shane, 2003 Entrepreneurial opportunities, Discovery, Exploitation, Execution (including 
assembling resources, organizational design, and strategy) 
Baker & 
Nelson, 2005 
A process model of bricolage for resource-constrained firms – Taking a 
combination of resources available to handle new problems and opportunities and 
continue to seek resources, counteract limitations and generate something from 
nothing, actions are mutually reinforcing, results in outcome of either routinization 
and broad rich markets and growth, or no growth 
Corbett, 2005 (Only opportunity recognition) – Two stages: Discovery (Preparation – deliberate 
and unintended); Incubation; Insight (Eureka!, Problem solved, Idea shared) and 




Inputs, effectual strategy, outputs 
Baron, 2007 Three main stages: 1) Opportunity identification, evaluation; Intentions to 
proceed; assembly of resources; 2) Selecting structural form; product/service 
establishment; initial marketing plans; strategy; 3) Handling conflict; negotiations; 





Table 2 continued (part 3 of 3) 
Cunneen, Mankelow, 
& Gibson, 2007 
(Theoretical) 
Four broad stages: Opportunity recognition (Includes creative activity to 
create a good idea, innovative activity to convert good idea into an 
innovation, and additional activities for pursuing the innovation), 
Opportunity evaluation (on both a commercial and personal level), 
Opportunity development (Includes a detailed situational analysis, 
formulation of mission and objectives, formation of entry strategy, creation 
of a detailed business plan and analysis, and a search for funds), and 
Commercialization (Includes formulating detailed operating plans, 
ensuring initial funding is in place before implementing business and 
operating plans 
Liao & Welsch, 2008 Obtain resources, Develop new products, Seek funding, Do sales, Hire 
employees 
Blank & Dorf, 2012 




Concept/seed, product development – which includes Product 
requirements, Design, Implementation by engineers, Verification (design 
testing and validating), Maintenance, Alpha/beta testing, and Product 
launch (commercialization, including production assumed to follow but not 
explained) 
Chell, 2013 Opportunity recognition/identification, Opportunity formation/ 
development, Opportunity exploitation, Outcome(s) (focus is not 
specifically on venture creation, but the entrepreneurial process) 
 
Founders possess knowledge and experiences prior to startup establishment 
(Reuber & Fischer, 1999). A startup’s past experiences and those of its founding 
members, bring a history and experientially acquired knowledge that allows 
entrepreneurs to develop “insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the 
effectiveness of those actions, and future actions” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 811), particularly 
in an established industry or one in which they have experience. In contrast, if a startup is 
operating in a new industry, particularly early in the startup’s development when they are 
still figuring out and making decisions on its operations, founders may not be in a 
position to build on existing knowledge and may not know what additional information 
they need to collect (Clark & Fujimoto, 1987). This can greatly slow the interpretation of 
new information. Founders are still learning what information is relevant and valuable to 
their startup, and are undergoing a sensemaking process to integrate new knowledge with 
their existing knowledge (Ravasi & Turati, 2005). At this stage, they may be less affected 
by existing biases and routines. 
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While entrepreneurs start with an array of options, over time, a startup’s path 
narrows as they learn more through interactions with these founding conditions and the 
decisions they make as they invest resources, including time and effort, to set up their 
organization. In this section, I review the path dependence literature that can be used to 
better understand the venture creation process and sets the foundation for the theoretical 
context of this dissertation on early customers’ interactions impacting the venture 
creation process.  
2.2.1 Path Dependence – An Overview 
 “History matters” (Notteboom, 1997; Sewell, 1996), “the past affects the future” 
(Sydow, Scheyögg, & Koch, 2009), and “bygones are rarely bygones” (Teece, Pisano & 
Schuen, 1997: 522) are terms used to describe path dependence - how decisions are 
historically conditioned and are often used to describe how organizational features 
developed and persist. The concept of path dependence can be helpful in connecting the 
past, present and future in a more abstract way and are explained in terms of the 
technological, institutional and/or cognitive rigidities it creates (Vergne & Durand, 2011).  
Research on path dependence builds on the seminal work by David (1985) and 
Arthur (1994). David’s research used the QWERTY keyboard technology to explain how 
an inefficient and inferior technological standard was established and persists (1985, 
1986), and Arthur highlighted the role of self-reinforcing mechanisms in path-dependent 
processes that are beyond the control of an agent (1989, 1994).  Initial research focused 
predominantly on technological innovations and how firms are constrained by their 
technologies through path dependence that developed through interrelatedness of 
technologies and gaining economies of scale and increased returns (e.g. Arthur, 1989, 
1994; David, 1985, 1986; Dosi, 1982, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
Today, path dependence draws on the fields of institutional economics (e.g. 
North, 1990), political science (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000), institutionalization 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), and organizational studies (Boeker, 1989; Johnson, 2007; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). There are several studies emerging in this area (e.g. Czaban, 
Hocevar, & Whitley, 2003; Garud & Karnøe, 2001; Greve & Seidel, 2015; Gruber, 2010; 
Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow & 
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Schreyögg, 2015; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Vergne, 2013; Vergne & Durand, 
2010). 
I draw on research by Sydow, Scheyogg, and Koch (2009) and Vergne and 
Durand (2010, 2011) and use Vergne and Durand’s (2011) definition of path dependence 
as “a stochastic process triggered by contingent events and subject to self-reinforcement 
over time, which tightens actors’ choice sets (Vergne & Durand, 2010)” (366). A 
stochastic process has random components and is non-deterministic, in that different 
paths could have been created (Vergne & Durand, 2010: 755).  
The initial choice is considered a “small event,” and serves as a point of reference 
for later choices (Van Driel, 2013). It is generally a chance, unpredictable, or historic 
accident (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). According to Van Driel (2013), “events are not 
necessarily a reaction to an earlier one, but still are influenced by it, in the sense that this 
earlier event makes the later event more likely” (246).  
There is a tapering process in which the choice sets become reduced when early 
events are reinforced (Van Driel, 2013), and when actors becoming more sensitive to 
their initial conditions. Changing to an alternative decision path can requiring a disruptive 
event to reverse the initial choice or can mean encountering uncertain costs though. In 
other words –the event itself is not significant. It is how the actors construct and interpret 
the event that creates its significance (Munir, 2005). This self-reinforcement can result in 
positive outcomes, such as increasing economic returns from positive feedback, but also 
negative outcomes such as the adoption of inferior technologies or processes (Leblebici, 
2013). Eventually, lock-in occurs - “a situation of relatively stable equilibrium, caused by 
path dependence, from which it is difficult to escape without the intervention of shocks 
exogenous to the system” (Vergne & Durand, 2010: 755) – and where a dominant 
decision pattern becomes fixed. 
The two main conditions of path dependence involve contingency and self-
reinforcement. I adopt definitions from Vergne and Durand (2010), where contingency 
“refers to unpredictable, non-purposive, and seemingly random events” and self-
reinforcement is “a set of mechanisms endogenous to a given path that makes it more and 
more dominant over time relative to alternative paths” (Vergne & Durand, 2010: 755). 
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2.2.2. Phases of Path Dependence  
The phases of path dependence have received different labels in the literature. 
Sydow, Scheyogg, and Koch (2009) have defined three distinct stages in the path 
dependence process: the Preformation Phase, the Formation Phase, and the Lock-in 
Phase, while Vergne and Durand (2011) defined the stages as Path Origin, Path 
Development and Path Outcome. Given the similarities of each of the ordered phases, I 
focus on Sydow et al.’s terminology (2009; Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The Constitution of an Organizational Path (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009: 692). 
Reprinted with permission from the Academy of Management. 
 
In the first phase, the Preformation Phase (Sydow et al., 2009), several options 
exist to choose from (Mahoney, 2000). While initially there are many potential outcomes, 
allowing the possibility for multiple paths to be pursued, decisions are open to revision 
and the consequences are not known ahead of time. Furthermore, the previous history of 
the organization, decision makers, and context still matters at this stage, there is no 
significant restriction on potential actions or decisions within an organization. When a 
decision is made, it is initially considered random (David, 1985) and an ‘insignificant 
event’ (Arthur, 1989). At this stage, there is still the possibility of adaptation, however, 
the decision unintentionally sets off a self-reinforcing process. The time of this decision 
is considered a critical juncture, where there is a narrowing of the path options and the 
organization enters into the Formation Phase (Sydow et al., 2009).  
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In the Formation Phase (Sydow et al., 2009), a path is contingently selected, and 
development is nurtured by self-reinforcing processes or feedback loops that promote the 
emergence of dominant actions (Arthur, 1994). Self-reinforcement can be defined as “a 
set of mechanisms put into motion that sustains the contingently selected path” (Vergne 
& Durand, 2011: 371). There are both positive mechanisms that support the path, such as 
increased returns (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Bassani & Dosi, 2001), as well as negative 
mechanisms that eliminate, or make alternative paths less attractive for decision makers 
(Page, 2006).  
While at this stage, the options are narrowing and altering or reversing the initial 
decision may be a challenge, the path still has room to evolve. It is important to note that 
this increased path narrowing is not aimed specifically at achieving increased utility or 
increasing returns for the organization. A focus on utility ignores political processes, 
cognitive biases, and emotional reactions that can affect feedback cycles, and self-
reinforcing mechanisms can also cause alternative paths to be selected out. Furthermore, 
decision makers are still making decisions in a broader context, culture, and institutional 
norms that may influence decision making and reinforce a path (Sydow et al., 2009). 
In the Lock-in Phase (Sydow et al., 2009), there is further constriction on the 
available options. A dominant decision pattern becomes fixed, creating a certain way of 
doing things (Sydow et al., 2009). When lock-in occurs – “an organizational situation that 
can be altered only at a prohibitive cost and in response to strong exogenous pressures 
(e.g. economic crisis, radical technological change, political turmoil” (Vergne & Durand, 
2011: 372). Examples of what contributes to lock-in include an organization’s routines 
being formed and inertia to change begins to take over (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and 
there is conformity to institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). It becomes 
increasingly challenging to simultaneously have a fluid business model and project 
legitimacy to the market, needed to survive. 
Lock-in can be cognitive, normative, and/or resource based (Giddens, 1984).  It 
should be noted that lock-in should not be inherently viewed as resulting in inefficiency 
or market failure (Vergne & Durand, 2011). A lock-in is only considered inefficient when 
better alternatives arise (Sydow et al., 2009). 
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The initial proposal of path dependence by Arthur (1994) included four 
properties: non-predictability, non-ergodicity (several outcomes are possible), 
inflexibility (challenging to change options), and inefficiency (when a path locks an 
organization into an inferior solution). Today, the boundaries on path dependence and 
lock-in have been slightly adapted. Non-predictability is restricted to the beginning of 
path formation. There is the potential for a path to become increasingly predictable, 
however more so towards the end. Total inflexibility of a path may not actually occur, 
and inefficiency only arrives when more efficient options arise (Sydow et al., 2009).  
2.2.3. Potential Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms 
In their theoretical framework paper, Schreyögg and Sydow (2011) suggest four 
mechanisms that act as propagating self-reinforcement of the path dependence process 
and a diminishing scope of action during the Formation Phase: Coordination Effects, 
Complementary Effects, Learning Effects, and Adaptive Expectation Effects. 
Coordination Effects create self-reinforcement when there is an institution, organization 
rule or routine that is adopted that promotes more efficient interactions among actors. 
This decreases coordination costs and makes it easier to anticipate reactions and 
behaviours. Complementary Effects are self-reinforcing when an organization’s practices 
are interconnected in some way, creating synergy (Pierson, 2000). Learning Effects occur 
when there is increased efficiency from an activity being performed frequently, 
developing accumulated skills and allowing for exploitation of learning. This is also 
affected by exposure to information. Finally, the more people that are expected to prefer a 
product, the more attractive it becomes. Adaptive Expectation Effects assumes that 
individual preferences are not fixed, however, will adapt in response to others’ 
preferences and propagate self-reinforcement of a certain path (Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2011). This effect is often tied to the need to end up on a “winning side,” a bandwagon 
effect, and a desire for social belonging, where these effects are seen when an option 
becomes more attractive due to more individuals preferring it (Leibestein, 1950). For 
instance, sometimes organizations see informal diffusion of practices when 
organizational members adopt these practices because they see others doing the same 
(Szulanski, 1996). 
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It is important to note that beyond these effects, there are other effects that could 
influence self-reinforcing processes. For instance, network externalities are self-
reinforcing processes that consider the effect of one user of a good or service on the value 
of that product to other people. The network is generally more valuable as more people 
join (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Today, we see network effects in social media where 
communities are being created (Belvaux, 2011). 
In contrast, a downward spiral effect can take place when inappropriate concepts 
are reinforced. For example, in escalating commitment, an organization does not change 
its path or actions, despite facing an increasingly negative outcome related to a past 
action, decision, or investment (Staw, 1984). This can be particularly dangerous for 
entrepreneurs, as seen in the McMullen and Kier (2016) meta-theoretical process model 
of escalation of commitment based on the 1996 Mount Everest disaster. Even in early 
stages of new venture creation, entrepreneurs may be so persistent and focused on a goal 
that they develop a psychological determinant of time investment, miss out on creating a 
contingency plan, and set themselves up for additional risks and investment in resources, 
time, and reputation. Furthermore, time invested can make it a challenge for individuals 
to back away, should it reflect poorly on them. This reflects escalating commitment 
through a psychological determinant of ego threat (Sleesman et al., 2012).  
2.2.4. Agency and Reflexivity in the Organizational Path 
According to Vergne and Durand (2010), in the absence of exogenous shock, a 
path will persist. This is unsurprising, as path dependence has been described as sticky 
and irreversible (David, 1994). However, such an approach suggests that actors have no 
agency in the process, and it can be impossible to determine whether actors actually act in 
a non-purposive way, given they have aspirations and previous knowledge that can guide 
their decisions. 
Increasingly, alternative studies suggest that actors exhibit agency that affects the 
organizational path, such as context, cognitive frames, emotions, and politics (e.g. Kaplan 
& Tripsas, 2008; Koch, 2011; Thrane, Blaabjerg, & Møller, 2010; Valorinta, Schildt, & 
Lamberg, 2011). For example, Thrane, Blaabjerg, and Møller (2010) consider actors to be 
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proactive and involved in reflexivity - “the ability of actors immersed in specific 
trajectories to observe the results of their actions and deliberately try to alter the 
conditions in which they find themselves” (Araujo & Harrison, 2002: 8).  Garud, 
Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe (2010) suggest that actors have agency and are part of 
emerging path creation. While Garud et al. (2010) see the processes of path dependence 
and path creation as separate activities, Sydow et al. (2009) suggest that both path 
creation and path dependence can occur in a process. 
A proactive nature is prominent in entrepreneurs that are developing a startup. 
Entrepreneurs are creating their own paths and have an “entrepreneurial mindset” 
(McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). Actors are effectuating through complex processes 
(Sarasvathy, 2001), and are able to manipulate self-reinforcing mechanisms and alter 
lock-in situations with creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934). Not all businesses stay 
entrepreneurial, however, as they grow. Gaining a better understanding of the balance and 
transition between path creation and path dependence processes has the potential to help 
us better understand the narrowing of the entrepreneurial path.  
2.2.5. Related Concepts 
Path dependence has been compared with several related concepts. In Table 3, 
brief explanations of each of the related concepts are given. For more detailed reviews, 
see Sydow et al. (2009) and Vergne and Durand (2010).  
2.2.6. Takeaways from the Path Dependence Literature 
 The concept of path dependence has the potential to explain how the initial 
conditions that a startup encounters can impact their future development trajectories. Path 
dependence implies that an initial decision is often considered to be random (David, 
1985) and an ‘insignificant event’ (Arthur, 1989). Researchers have debated in theorizing 
about the path dependence process, and further process studies can help clarify the 
mechanisms and conditions needed to create a narrowing path and trigger events such as 
the critical juncture and lock-in stages (path dependence).  
 This focus on initial decisions is primed to be used to better understand the 
entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurs are constantly making initial decisions. While a 
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decision such as an opportunity to pursue may be well thought through, less attention is 
often paid as to what customer is best to first interact with, how to interact, and what 
should the outcome of the interaction be. Interactions with early customers are often 
those of convenience. However, it is in these moments of early customer interactions that 
founders are receiving feedback, suggestions and validations, that trigger decisions that 
may put them down a certain path and narrow their options. Finally, in path dependence, 
there is a suggested lack of agency, however in reality, entrepreneurs and other 
stakeholders, such as customers, play a substantial role in decision making and 
interactions that affect both these processes.  
Table 3. Related Concepts to Path Dependence 
Concept Explanation 
Imprinting (Bryant, 2014; Burton 
& Beckman, 2007; Gioia et al., 
2010; Johnson, 2007; Marquis & 
Tilcsik, 2013; Schreyogg & Sydow, 
2011; Simsek, Fox, & Heavey, 
2015; Stinchcombe, 1965) 
The process when environmental conditions are imprinted or 
“stamped” on the organization in a brief, sensitive time period. 
These conditions then continue to persist, even if there are 
subsequent significant environmental changes. 
Escalating Commitment (Ross & 
Staw, 1993; Staw, 1976) 
A social mechanism that prevents decision makers from changing 
a course of action, due to fear of losing face or self-justification, 
even if the outcome will be negative.  
Commitment (Staw, 1984) / Sunk 
Cost (Ghemawat, 1991) 
Individuals are committed to the decision made or a resource 
commitment creates an exit barrier from a certain scenario and 
may affect future decisions. 
Structural Inertia (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977, 1984; Levinthal, 
1997) 
Exists in population ecology - During startup creation, the 
establishment of routines can be helpful to suggest accountability 
and reliability of an organization. However, over time, this can 
result in hyper stability, where the organization is unable to adapt, 
even when there is a change in the environment.  
Reactive Sequences (Mahoney, 
2000) 
A chain of modular events where there are singular cause and 
effect relationships – Where event A affects event B, and event B 
affects event C. The pattern of events is not created in advance, 
however, and just seem to propagate.   
Institutionalization (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991; Tolbert & Zocker, 
1996) 
The focus is on the symbolic-normative environment of 
organizations and how it can influence formal/informal 




2.3. Learning from Early Customer Interactions in Established Firms  
 Firms may involve customers and other stakeholders in their various activities 
(Zhang & Doll, 2001). While sales are an assumed interaction that will hopefully occur, 
customer interactions can take place well before with the intention of incorporating 
customer preferences. Furthermore, customer interactions are well researched in 
disciplines involving established firms, including the fields of engineering, new product 
development (NPD), marketing, and innovation. For instance, in the NPD literature, most 
customer involvement is proposed to occur during product optimization (Nijssen & 
Lieshout, 1995), involving the specification, concept design and prototyping stages of 
product development (Kaulio, 1998). In recent marketing literature, customers are 
considered empowered stakeholders that interact with organizations in varying degrees 
(e.g. Hoyer et al., 2010; Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008). In the lead-user design 
methodology, customers are heavily involved in the R&D process (Herstatt & von 
Hippel, 1992; Urban & von Hippel, 1988). Given that tasks of product development, 
manufacturing, and commercialization occur in established firms and in startups, there is 
potential to learn from existing literature on customer interactions.  
Both innovative established firms and startups share similarities in the product 
development process - studied in-depth in the new product development (NPD) literature 
(e.g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Kaulio, 1998; Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001; Zhang & Doll, 
2001). NPD is defined as, “the transformation of a market opportunity and a set of 
assumptions about product technology into a product available for sale” (Krishnan & 
Ulrich, 2001: 1). For example, in a typical NPD process, after a product opportunity is 
identified (Opportunity spotting and selection), the concept is developed, a detailed 
design created, and implementation by engineers typically takes place (Generation of 
Concept and Critical Evaluation of Concept). There is often some sort of verification 
process, including developing a prototype, testing, and validating it with customers 
(Development of Product) before a product is then commercialized and launched 
(Product launch; e.g. Crawford & Di Benedetto, 2000; see Table 4 for a sample of how 
NPD stages are represented in the literature). These similarities allow us to see where 
information from this literature could be applied to startups as well.  
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Table 4. Stages in the New Product Development Process, including the Fuzzy Front End, Across 
Disciplines 
Reference Stages 
Royce, 1970 (Engineering) Software Development – Waterfall of product development 
(Conception, initiation, analysis), Collect system and software 
requirements, Analysis, Program design, Verification (testing), 
Maintenance (operations) 
Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, 1982 
(Booz, Allen, and Hamilton’s 
New Product Process) 
New product strategy, Idea generation, Screening and evaluation, 
Business analysis, Development, Testing and Commercialization 
Rochford & Rudelius, 1997 
(Marketing) 
Idea generation, Screening, Preliminary market analysis, 
Preliminary technical analysis, Preliminary financial analysis, 
Preliminary financial analysis, Market study, Product 
development, In-house product testing, Customer product testing, 
Market testing, Pre-commercialization financial analysis, 
Commercialization 
Kaulio, 1998 (with a focus on 
interactions between customers 
and the design process) 
(Operations Management) 
Specification, Concept development, Detailed design, 
Prototyping, and Final product 
Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998 
(focus is on fuzzy front end, but 
two main stages of entire NPD 
process) (Innovation 
Management) 
Front end [Pre-Phase Zero (Opportunity identification, idea 
generation, market and technology analysis; product strategy 
formulation and developing an understanding of the link between 
the business strategy and NPD – how the product fits into the 
firm’s portfolio of products), Phase Zero (Product concept 
development, identify customer needs, market segments, and 
competitive situations, evaluate technology capabilities and 
requirements, identify core product requirements, test the 
concept, specify resources needed, and identify key risks and 
challenges), Phase One (Feasibility and project planning, 
including identifying key project participants and additional 
functional support needed)], New Product Development 
Execution [Specification and design, prototype test and 
validation, volume manufacturing, market launch] 
Veryzer, 1998 (Innovation 
Management) 
Strategic planning and concept generation, Pre-technical 
evaluation with market and customer needs; Concept revision, 
Technical feasibility examined, Preliminary design and technical 
development, Formative prototype, Lead user testing, Design 
modification, Commercialization 
Crawford & Di Benedetto, 2000 Opportunity spotting and selection, Generation of a concept, 
Critical evaluation of concept, Development of product, Product 
launch 
Koen et al., 2001 (focus on fuzzy 
front end, but three main stages 
of NPD process) (Innovation and 
Technology Management) 
Fuzzy front end (Opportunity identification, opportunity analysis, 
idea genesis, idea selection, concept, and technology 
development), Structured new product and process development, 
Commercialization 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Reference Stages 
Cooper, 2008 
Stage-Gate®: a structured 
process, designed to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
NPD. Stages involve 
information gathering and 
“gates” where deliverables 
must be met and a checklist of 
criteria are checked against 
(Innovation Management and 
Commercial Tool) 
Discovery and creative idea screening, Stage-Gate (Five stages - 
Initial and Comparative Analysis including Scoping, Building a 
business case, development, testing and validation, launch), 
Commercialization and Post-launch review 
 
Krishnan & Ulrich, 2001 
(Management Science) 
Concept development, Supply-chain design, Product design, and 
Production ramp-up and Launch 
Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 
2005 (Operations Management) 
1) Idea generation (Voice of the customer); 2) Business/technical 
assessment (Preliminary); 3) Product/process/service concept 
development; 4) Product/process/service engineering and design; 
5) Prototype build, test and pilot/ramp-up for operations; ending 
with Full Scale production/operations. Note that supplier can 
integrate during any of these stages 
Roper, Micheli, Love, & 
Vahter, 2016 (Design, 
innovation, etc.) 
Identify new products, Prototype development, Final product 
design, Product testing, Production engineering, Market research, 
Developing a marketing strategy 
 
 Before proceeding, however, it is important to acknowledge that there are key 
differences between an established firm and a startup, as these differences may affect the 
customer interaction process during product development and beyond. First, in the 
entrepreneurship process, while entrepreneurs are developing and exploiting an idea, a 
new firm – its structure and processes - is concurrently being created (e.g. Gartner, 1985; 
Katz & Gartner, 1988). A startup’s routines are in development at this time, including 
those for customer involvement in the product development process (Lagrosen, 2005; 
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000), as entrepreneurs are still trying to both recognize and adapt 
their startup to fit within an external environment (Liao & Welsh, 2008). In contrast, 
having existing customers and product lines can often affect product development for an 
established firm’s products. More established firms tend to focus on how a potential new 
product would fit into their existing product portfolio and their existing business 
(Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998). This helps these established businesses to continue to 
serve the needs of existing customers while obtaining new ones, while a startup has a 
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blank slate in terms of defining who they want their customers to be and the type of 
customers that they can attract. 
Finally, startups face several new challenges that involve accessing and 
mobilizing resources, creating a market, establishing a reputation, and organizing the firm 
with the intention to exploit a discovered idea (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). These are 
different struggles than those encountered by more established organizations that often 
have better-funded R&D budgets. Startups also face substantial uncertainty in 
opportunities, affecting not just the product line but also the survival of the business. In 
contrast, new product development in more established firms tends to be associated with 
a goal of increased firm performance and increased efficiency.  
2.3.1. Terminology of Customer Involvement in Established Firms Across Disciplines 
The terminology for customer involvement has evolved across disciplines and 
industries. To create a discussion around customer involvement in product development, 
the NPD, marketing, engineering, and other disciplines have developed terminology such 
as customer participation, defined as “the extent to which the customer is involved in the 
manufacturer’s NPD process” (Fang, 2008), and customer knowledge development, 
defined as “a process of developing an understanding of customer new product 
preferences that unfolds through the iteration of probing and learning activities (Lynn, 
Morone, & Paulson, 1996) across stages of the prelaunch phase of new product 
development” (Joshi & Sharma, 2004: 48).  
 Much can be learned about customer interactions from the field of marketing, 
which is defined as - “the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, 
communicating, delivering and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, 
clients, partners and society at large” (American Marketing Association, 2013). Within 
marketing, the field of relationship marketing is particularly relevant to understanding 
customer interactions (e.g. Berry, 1983; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994; Payne & Frow, 2017; Sheth & Parvatiyar, 2002).  
 Berry (1983) defined relationship marketing as “attracting, maintaining and – in 
multi-service organizations – enhancing customer relationships” (25). The marketing 
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advantage of small firms has been linked to the close relationships between customers 
and the entrepreneurs (Zontanos & Anderson, 2004). Over 30 years later, relationship 
marketing continues to grow as a field, expanding to include dyadic relationships, 
networks, and the interactions between them (Gummesson, 1994). Customer 
management, part of relationship marketing, refers specifically to the management of 
these customer interactions (Payne & Frow, 2017). 
In engineering, quality function deployment involves engineers specifying and 
developing a product concept, designing the product, and producing a prototype and final 
product with the customers’ needs in mind, but does not necessarily consider regular 
customer interaction (Ullman, 1992). In contrast, user-oriented product development 
focuses on user requirements and involves regular interaction and feedback with 
customers throughout the product development process (Rosenblad-Wallin, 1985). 
Concept testing, a term used in the consumer packaged goods industry and industrial 
products, involves the customer even before there was a working prototype. This may 
involve sketches of the product and regular communication (Page & Rosenbaum, 1992). 
Later in the product design process, the term beta testing is used in the consumer goods 
and computer and software industries for customers to test a working prototype (Dolan & 
Matthews, 1993). Methods where customers are more involved and involved early, 
include consumer-idealized design in early stages of product development (Cincianntelli 
& Magdison, 1993), and the lead user method where customers are deeply involved in the 
entire product development process (Herstatt & Von Hippel, 1992). 
2.3.2. Categorizing Customer Interactions in Literature on Established Firms 
I outline four ways customer interactions have been studied in established firms 
that may be helpful in our understanding of customer interactions during the new venture 
creation process. These include: A) when customers are involved; B) what is the purpose 
of these customer interactions; C) how firms are interdependent with customers, and D) 
categorizing customers involved in these interactions.  
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A. When are Customers Involved? 
While customers are generally involved in the marketing and sales stages in 
organizations, they may also be involved in different stages of the product development 
and manufacturing process of established firms (Table 4; e.g. Gerwin, 2004; Hoyer et al., 
2010; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). Looking to the new product development 
literature, this can be as early as idea generation during the fuzzy front end, and through 
the stages of specification, concept development, detailed design, prototyping, and 
development of the final product (Kaulio, 1998). In the fuzzy front end, at the beginning 
of NPD (Koen et al., 2001), an established firm is still forming a vision about the product 
that they may offer and how it fits into their business and the market (Bowen, Clark, 
Holloway, & Wheelwright, 1994). There is uncertainty about technology used, how is it 
changing, and what customers’ wants and needs are under various circumstances (Clark 
& Fujimoto, 1991; Witell, Gustafsson, & Johnson, 2014; Zhang & Doll, 2001).  
Interacting with customers at this uncertain time is challenging but also essential 
for product success. The NPD process involves testing several new ideas, having failed 
attempts, working with customers on product iterations, and often having initial ideas 
differ substantially from final products. Early customer interactions during the ideation or 
prototype and market testing stages can help increase the effectiveness of products and 
financial return (Chang & Taylor, 2016), however, it can be challenging to juggle 
multiple ideas encountered (Hoyer et al., 2010). Furthermore, interaction during the 
development stage can slow speed to market (Chang & Taylor, 2016). Finally, if 
customer interaction only begins during the commercialization stage when the venture is 
established, subsequent changes to the product and business can be expensive. This can 
result in negative perceptions when products need to be adopted after time and money 
have already been invested. 
B. Purpose of Customer Interactions 
Customers are involved in the sharing of information and developing new 
processes and routines that may require increased coordination (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 
2000). One of the main reasons why customer interactions take place before sales and 
marketing efforts is that customer knowledge is a valuable input into innovation 
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processes (Gassmann, Kausch, & Enkel, 2005). While learning of and integrating various 
stakeholders’ needs during NPD can be challenging (Driessen & Hillebrand, 2013), 
expensive (Sawhney, Verona, & Prandelli, 2005) and may affect management’s 
objectives (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003; Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), getting customers 
involved in the product development process can reduce uncertainty and help to achieve a 
fit between product offerings and the market without requiring substantial changes later.  
Furthermore, understanding customer wants and needs has been shown to 
positively impact the success of new products, particularly early in the product 
development process, improve customer awareness about product development (Joshi & 
Sharma, 2004), and ultimately, the success of the firm (Lagrosen, 2001; Von Hippel, 
2001). This includes increasing efficiency - including potential for faster speed to market 
(Fang, 2008; Joshi & Sharma, 2004); reduced risk of product failure (Cook, 2008); the 
potential to explore new uses for existing products and services (Xie, Bagozzi, & Troye, 
2008); and greater effectiveness of products and services in terms of having greater 
novelty and differentiation and likelihood to fit customer needs (Payne et al., 2008; 
Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000).  
 Firms also devote substantial time and effort into collecting customer feedback 
after a product has been created, with the goal of making their company more profitable 
(McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012). This should include both negative and positive feedback 
that is representative of the market’s needs (Nasr, Burton, & Gruber, 2017), and should 
be properly reported to allow companies to learn both about what customers dislike and 
like (Wirtz, Tambyah, & Mattila, 2010). Only then can customer feedback be interpreted 
and converted into practice in an organization (Caemmerer & Wilson, 2010; Markey, 
Reichheld, & Dullweber, 2009). 
 Part of collecting customer feedback requires obtaining information on customer 
satisfaction - the post-consumption evaluation of a product or service by a customer (e.g. 
Farris et al., 2010; Kotler, 1991; Mano & Oliver, 1993; Szymanski & Henard, 2001). 
Pillai and Goldsmith (2006) theorized that while there are measures of customer 
satisfaction in more established firms, that managers’ perceptions of these measures are 
not necessarily accurate. They suggest that calibration is needed between a manager’s 
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knowledge and objective knowledge to ensure that customer feedback information is 
properly understood and used in the firm. Such calibration includes pursing activities that 
improve interpretation of customer feedback, such as having contact with customers, 
feedback from sales people, and high job involvement. 
C. Firm Interdependence with Customers and Co-creation of Value 
Beyond understanding the basic needs of customers, customer involvement with 
firms creates interdependence (e.g. Hoyer et al., 2010; Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 2008). 
This interdependence - “the extent to which the completion of development tasks 
depends on interactions and learning between a firm and customer during the 
development stages (Sobrero & Roberts, 2001; Thompson, 1967) - democratizes the 
product innovation process, empowers customers, and integrates them in the creation and 
selection of new product designs (Von Hippel, 2005). The empowerment of customers 
even increases product integrity – a “clear vision of the product’s intended image, 
performance and fit with corporate competencies and customers” (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1995: 363). This can directly and indirectly influence the outcomes of a firm (Legnick-
Hall, 1996), such as reducing costs and improving product effectiveness, but also 
potentially reducing firm control (Hoyer et al., 2010). 
 Another way of looking at interdependence with customers is to consider co-
creation between customers and a firm, highlighted in the relationship marketing 
literature (Payne & Frow, 2017). Adopting O’Hern and Rindfleisch’s definition of co-
creation: “a collaborative new product development (NPD) activity in which consumers 
actively contribute and select various elements of a new product offering” (2009: 4), 
there has been a shift towards having customers as “active players” in value creation in 
the past twenty years (Payne & Frow, 2017). There are several potential stages of 
customization involving customers, including iterative interactions during the 
development process, joint-problem solving, and after purchase support (Fang, 2008). 
The process involves testing several new ideas, having failed attempts, and often having 
initial ideas differ substantially from final products. There can also be different levels of 
co-creation that demonstrate whether startups are passively or actively integrated into the 
product development process (Zogaj & Bretschneider, 2012).  
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In co-creation, customers are partners that share creative ideas about their needs 
and values that may influence the specifications of a product (Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 
2008; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2003). This forces early customers to be a close part of 
organizational processes (Skaggs & Youndt, 2004; Zien & Buckler, 1997). It should be 
noted that co-creation and the innovation process require trust and transparency (Prahalad 
& Ramaswamy, 2004). In a worst case scenario, customers end up using ideas that were 
co-created to compete with a focal firm (Cook, 2008). To reduce this risk, relationships 
can be built to help foster this trust. For instance, both firms and customers often share 
intellectual property and need to be on the same page in terms of protecting and using it 
(Hoyer, Chandy, Dorotic, Krafft, & Singh, 2010), and startups and customers must be 
willing and able to share their preferences and needs (Etgar, 2008). 
D. Categorizing Customers Involved in New Product Development 
Finally, customers that are highly involved with a firm are categorized in different 
ways (Hoffman, Kopalle, & Novak, 2010) and have different interests and abilities to 
influence an organization (Etgar, 2008; Legnick-Hall, 1996; O’Hern & Rindfleisch, 
2009). This customer heterogeneity should be accounted for during interactions with a 
firm (Hoyer et al., 2010). Customers involved in co-creation have been labeled in several 
ways, including innovators (Moore, 2002), lead users (Von Hippel, 1986), emergent 
consumers (Hoffman, Kopalle, & Novak, 2010), and market mavens (Feick & Price, 
1987; Table 5). Note that despite a focus on specific types of customers, no single lead 
user typically provides a complete idea for a breakthrough product (Lilien et al., 2002). 
Instead, it is usually the accumulation of ideas from inside and outside the company that 
results in a final product. 
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Table 5. Examples of Terms Used in the Academic Literature for Customers Involved in the New 
Product Development Process 
 
2.3.3. Takeaways from Customer Interactions with Established Firms 
 There are several ways in which customer interactions can influence established 
firms, outside of traditional sales and marketing. Interactions throughout the NPD process 
can be beneficial, allowing organizations to better understand the problems and needs of 
potential customers, decrease uncertainty, and increase success of the firm. For example, 
customer interactions can be undertaken to simply understand the problems customers 
encounter and desired features in a product solution, or may involve more frequent and 
intense interactions, involving the co-design of products and becoming user advocates.  
 We can learn from customer interactions and the focus on co-creation with 
customers in established firms, and bring a more customer-centric focus that is lacking in 
the new venture creation literature. Improving understanding of how customer 
interactions influence startups has the potential to be particularly important for startups as 
they establish their market, their reputation, and their business with limited resources and 
no room for error in the product development process. 
2.4. Early Customers and New Ventures  
 While there is much research that references customer interactions in established 
organizations – both young and old – there is a growing, but fragmented, body of 
literature that addresses activities of early customers in new ventures. Note that most of 
this literature focuses on a specific type of customer activity (with the exception of 
Customer Typology Definition 
Innovator Those who are first to adopt new products (Moore, 2002) 
Lead users Those customers that share both their needs and potential solutions that 
may benefit the wider public will have in the future (Lilien et al., 2002; 
Urban & Von Hippel, 1988; Von Hippel, 1986) 
Emergent consumers Customers that offer their opinions early in product development that 
benefit mainstream consumers (Hoffman, Kopalle, & Novak, 2010) 
Market mavens Customers that know a variety of products and where they are available and 
are willing to share market information with others (Feick & Price, 1987) 
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Rehme & Svensson, 2011, that looks at several activities). In this section of the 
dissertation, I briefly introduce these literatures and categorized the topics into: building 
initial relationships with customers (Section 2.4.1); the activities of new venture creation 
that facilitate building these activities (Section 2.4.2); and the implications of the first sale 
by a new venture (Section 2.4.3).  
2.4.1. Building Initial Relationships with Potential Customers 
 Relationship marketing as a discipline is also applicable in new ventures. As 
mentioned in the previous section on established firms, a branch of relationship 
marketing has a specialized focus on customer management, defined by Payne and Frow 
(2017) as the “implementation and tactical management of customer interactions” (12). 
This literature provides context for customer interactions taking place during the initial 
stages of new venture creation, and helps explain relationships between startups and their 
customers that are “constructed around bonds established between networks’ actors 
through personal interactions in which they influence and build opinions of each other” 
(Rehme & Svensson, 2011: 6).  
 Building relationships with potential customers can take several forms – including 
activities such as creating a database of potential customers and targeting them with 
customized one-to-one marketing (Winer, 2001). Several startups today use e-commerce 
websites to navigate the online retail environment and to reduce costs while building 
customer relationships online (e.g. Yoon, Choi, & Sohn, 2008), as well as social media 
(e.g. Sashi, 2012) and online community forums (e.g. Pitta & Fowler, 2005). While there 
are multiple ways to connect with potential customers, it can be more challenging to earn 
their trust and interest in engaging with the unknown startup. To build a network from 
scratch, according to Engel, Kaandorp, and Elfring (2017), there is a need to act 
altruistically and remain open in early networking to attract new customers. This 
approach allows startups to receive potential ideas from customers that they had not 
originally considered, and for them to have a higher chance of learning what problem 
actually needs to be solved. This approach during customer interactions ultimately can 
help develop the trust needed in long-term relationships to build commitment from 
customers (e.g. Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Scarbrough et al., 2013). 
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At their founding, startups are often thought of as not having pre-existing 
relationships (Stinchcombe, 1965; Ostgaard & Birley, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
However, networks and pre-existing relationships of entrepreneurs have been shown to 
play a role in selling to first customers (Rehme & Svensson, 2011), where the scarce 
resources of startups often lead them to use their relationships and network selling 
(Bjerke & Hultman, 2002; Hills et al., 2008).  
 Furthermore, because startups often lack resources and knowhow to develop new 
relationships, they may rely even more on their own networks to understand the market 
(Ostgaard & Birley, 1994). These networks become their most significant knowledge 
source (Johannison, 1990), particularly in the pre-startup phases (Aldrich & Fiol, 1986; 
Davidson & Honig, 2003; Hienerth & Lettl, 2011), as more social ties and interactions 
with customers increase knowledge acquisition (Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001). 
With market activities embedded in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985), when 
startups receive information from their network, firm performance (Brudel & 
Preisendorfer, 1998) and survival (Ingram & Baum, 1997) may be influenced.  
 Social capital can also help an organization to find customers (Birley, 1995; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). The first customer is often acquired through social 
capital – “the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group 
by possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). Furthermore, 
organizations and customers do not just exist in dyads, but are embedded in a social 
context that gives them access to pre-existing social ties, information, resources, and 
support (Jack & Anderson, 2002). 
 On one hand, being embedded in a local ecosystem, with a personal network of 
family and friends and a professional network, creates opportunities for founders. Having 
these networks in entrepreneurial firms may be beneficial, even when the startup lacks 
early credibility (Ruokolainen, 2005, 2008). Family and friends are often easily the first 
accessible test for founders to get feedback on their business model due to their relational 
proximity. Furthermore, if those in the network are representative of, or influential, 
entrepreneurs may already have social capital with their potential target market (Burt, 
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2000). This can allow them to gain even greater access to this market and gain a better 
understanding of the problems faced by this market. This embeddedness also enables 
entrepreneurs to more easily share potential solutions that meet customer needs and to 
build relationships of trust and commitment.  
 This phenomenon of connecting with existing, knowledgeable networks can be 
seen particularly well in peer communities involving lead user innovations. The 
embeddedness of the lead user and lead innovator allows them to obtain evaluations of 
the idea, assess the community for similarities to target market, and get them involved in 
providing feedback. Hienerth and Lettl (2011) suggest that this involvement of the peer 
community in the innovation increases the chance of success in the wider market – in not 
only providing input on the product and social support, but also may provide funds and 
other resources.  
 Because embeddedness shapes the way an event or action is interpreted and acted 
upon (Jack & Anderson, 2002), embeddedness may also become a liability for 
entrepreneurs who are over embedded (Uzzi, 1997). For example, a small firm may have 
a liability of newness and can only maintain a limited number of customer relationships, 
becoming highly dependent on a few customers (Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001). 
When attention and resources are scarce, the ease of relying on social links can restrict a 
startup’s intent to search outside of their personal and professional networks for their 
actual target market. This is particularly an issue when their network may not be an 
accurate representation of the type of customers they wish to obtain in their market. 
2.4.2. Activities of New Venture Creation  
 Throughout the new venture creation process, customer interactions during key 
venture creation activities help founders learn not only about the technology and product, 
but also how to create and operate a business and to develop deeper relationships with 
their customers. This continuous involvement of customers or users in venture creation-
related activities increases the chance of startup success (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 
1998; von Hippel, 2005). Rehme and Svensson (2011) identified five main types of 
activities, four derived from network theory, that need to be managed during different 
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phases of new venture creation between buyers and sellers, and propose that these 
activities between a startup and their first customers take place in a certain order in new 
venture creation (Figure 2):  
• Social activities – These include “developing relationships on different levels 
and for different functions in the dyad, social bonds, and promotions” (Rehme 
& Svensson, 2011: 7). These activities are pinpointed by Rehme and Svensson 
(2011) to take place at the beginning of venture creation.  
Connecting with customers early in the new venture creation process and 
building a relationship with potential customers, through proactively learning 
about their problems and regularly getting feedback during the development 
process, can build the relationship through developing trust (Moorman, 
Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992). It also helps ensure that founders are working 
towards solving a real problem. Building a relationship can take time and 
requires a quality product, but also builds commitment that can help ensure a 
relationship is maintained (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 
1987). While the eventual goal may be to establish visceral relationships 
where the customers identify with the firm and vice versa (Morris, 
Schindehutte, & LaForge, 2002), for most startups, the more pressing goal is 
usually to learn more about customer needs, build, test, and then sell the 
product.  
• Credibility activities – These include activities that build trust in the startup, 
where early and consistent interactions over time facilitate the creation of 
relationships and credibility (Gummesson, 2006; Rehme & Svensson, 2011). 
Credibility activities are related to initial social activities, where relationships 
are being built through showing interest in customers’ needs. Activities such 
as meeting customers face-to-face or building a reputation on online 
community forums are included in these types of activities.  
• Technical activities – These include activities needed to fulfil or surpass 
customer technical requirements and involve the design of the product and 
related business concepts. These exchanges with customers over time also 
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allow relationships and credibility to develop (Teece, 1986).  
• Commercial activities – These activities help get a product to market, 
including managing contracts and payments, pricing the product, negotiations 
with suppliers and customers, and facilitate the gain of sales and contracts that 
offer validation. These activities typically start later in the venture creation 
process. 
• Distribution activities – These activities involve managing the supply chain 
and logistics associated with the delivery of goods to customers and are 
essential for subsequent fulfilment processes (Rehme & Svensson, 2011). 
 To this list of activities, I also add production activities and human resource 
activities. Production activities involve the building of a physical or digital product, and 
may be considered related to technical activities. Production activities, however, involve 
additional challenges around manufacturing, sourcing of materials, and production 
equipment, that are separate from the initial design. Human resource activities involve the 
hiring and management of employees and workers on contract.  
Figure 2. Activities Between Startup and their First Customers Over Time (t). (Rehme and Svensson, 
2011: 8). 
 
2.4.3. External Stamp of Approval - Implications of a First Customer Reference  
 While references involving first customers are limited in the literature, there is 
one particularly relevant term, first customer reference - a formal recommendation by an 
existing customer, or supplier, describing a business, its products and services, its 
qualifications, and dependability (Ruokolainen, 2005; Salminen, 1997). The term 
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customer reference is used predominantly in the industrial marketing literature, involving 
business-to-business transactions, and is meant to act as a strong marketing tool (Rehme 
& Svensson, 2011), using past events to predict the success of future events. More 
specifically, this first customer reference helps the startup expand their business 
(Ruokolainen, 2008), demonstrating that it is a viable alternative to other solutions in the 
market (Ruokolainen & Igel, 2004). 
 There are three outcomes to a customer reference. First, it demonstrates the 
startup’s credibility – “the actor’s perceived ability to perform something he claims to be 
able to do on request” (Blomqvist, 1997: 279), or “how likely customers believe the 
claims that the startup tech companies express” (Ruokolainen, 2005: 6). This leads to a 
reduction in the perceived risk of the purchase – the extent to which a customer or client 
is uncertain about the consequences of an action, like a purchasing decision (Hutt & 
Speh, 1992), and improves the reputation of the startup – “an entity’s willingness and 
ability to repeatedly perform an activity in a similar fashion” (Herbig & Milevicz, 1993: 
18).  
 These components of customer reference suggest that first customer reference is 
viewed predominantly from an external stakeholder perspective. In this case, external 
parties judge the credibility, risk and reputation of the business (and the experiences, 
skills and ability of those in the business), and product functionality and can play a role in 
realizing market potential in certain business sectors.  
2.4.4. Takeaways from Early Customers and New Venture Literature 
 From this brief overview of literature reviewing early customer interactions with 
new ventures, we see that building relationships can be challenging for startups, and due 
to time, attention, and other resource constraints, startups tend to rely on their existing 
networks that the founders are embedded in. While Rehme and Svensson (2011) propose 
the types of activities that customers are involved in, the new venture creation process is 
not always streamlined and these activities to socialize, develop credibility, sell the 
product, commercialize and distribute may overlap, repeat, and may involve several 
informal and formal interactions at different times over new venture creation process.  
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For example, social activities occur throughout venture creation and from the first 
interaction with a potential customer, there is the potential to establish credibility in the 
market, to show that the proposed product is commercially viable (Ruokolainen & Igel, 
2004). This allows the founders to test ideas and can be a make-or-break event for the 
startup (Rehme & Svensson, 2011). Social, credibility, and technical activities often 
begin before this sale, suggesting that building the relationship and input into the product 
and business model design may take place long before this first sale. Commercial and 
logistics activities may mostly occur once sales have started, however customers input 
may influence how they are carried out. 
 Finally, the current literature on the first customer reference offers credibility and 
validation from the external market’s perspective. However, during early stages of the 
development, the startup also needs to internally assess their first customer references to 
see if this is an accurate and ideal direction that they believe that the business should 
pursue. Further clarification is still needed to understand what each customer interaction 
means from a startup’s perspective, and how the startup can decide which customer 
interactions impact a startup’s validation to move forward in the venture creation process. 
 Ultimately, further insight into the impact of the first sale on startups’ 
perspectives is needed. In the next section, I give an overview of the practitioner-based 
literature on lean startup methodology that explains a practitioner-proposed process by 
which customer interactions, including sales, can be used to validate a startup’s product, 
as well as its business model.  
2.5. Practitioner-Based Literature on Customers and Startups 
2.5.1. Influential Entrepreneur Practitioners 
 Today’s entrepreneurs are flooded with available popular press literature that 
explains the entrepreneurial process. The biggest contrasts between these models 
proposed by practitioners and the traditional new venture creation process models in the 
literature are the centrality of interactions with customers in the practitioner models, and 
the testing and required validation from these interactions over time.  
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 One methodology, in particular, has been popularized over the past decade - the 
lean startup methodology - credited to have developed out of entrepreneur-turned-
lecturer, Steve Blank’s first book, Four Steps to the Epiphany (2007). Subsequently, 
entrepreneur, Eric Ries mentioned the term ‘lean startup’ in his blog (2008), which was 
later popularized in his best-selling book, The Lean Startup (2011). Blank’s follow-up 
book co-authored with Bob Dorf, The Startup Owner’s Manual (2012), strongly 
emphasizes what they term the Customer Development process – involving the gathering 
of customer feedback on the product, but also the markets, potential distribution channels, 
the price, and the customer acquisition strategies. The process proposed provided a 
structured way to organize the testing, iterating, modifying and optimizing of these 
factors, with the intention of finding the right business model. Blank and Dorf suggest 
that this is what moves the startup from a more temporary organization into a “repeatable 
and scalable business model” (2012: xxix).  
 In this section, I explain these practitioner concepts. Note that while practitioner 
entrepreneurs continue to adopt these practices, there still is a lack of a consensus on how 
academics reference these terms. Furthermore, testing and reporting the outcome of these 
methods in an academic setting has been slow, despite the methodology being around for 
nearly a decade (with the exception of, for example, Fisher, 2012; Whalen & Akaka, 
2016; York & Danes, 2014). 
2.5.2. The Lean Startup 
 The lean startup and its principles are commonly referenced by today’s 
entrepreneurs and are becoming a growing topic in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g. 
Fisher, 2012; Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014). The lean startup 
methodology was created to speed up the process of getting products to customers, 
shortening development cycles and encouraging entrepreneurs to adopt hypothesis-driven 
experimentation, requiring them to “get out of the office,” testing and getting feedback 
from customers instead of relying solely on intuition.  
 The methodology emerged around the same time as agile engineering and became 
popular in product development as “an incremental and interactive approach to 
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engineering that enables product or service development to iterate and pivot to customer 
and market feedback” (Blank & Dorf, 2012: xv). It requires entrepreneurs to iteratively 
build products or services to meet early customer needs. The ideas are then tested on 
customers to validate it – to make sure they meet the needs of the customer. This in part 
was to reduce waste of resources but also to incorporate planning into the entrepreneurial 
process (Blank, 2013a).  
2.5.3. Practitioner Terminology 
 Given the increasing use of the lean startup approach by practicing entrepreneurs, 
I define related terminology here. This is particularly relevant, as current academic 
literature referencing this methodology has some discrepancies, and academics would 
benefit to be on the same page before studying the topic further. Note that the terms being 
defined are proposed to be measurable by the popular press authors, however, startups 
themselves establish and confirm the metrics desired, as they are involved in interpreting 
the reactions and comments from customers.  
 The terms that are defined are components of the Customer Development Model 
(Blank & Dorf, 2012), which is developed on principles of Bayesian decision making 
(Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983) and requires substantial data to test hypotheses. The 
challenge, however, is in obtaining necessary information in an entrepreneurial 
environment (York & Danes, 2014). Access to customers can be challenging. Due to a 
lack of attention and resources, major decisions may be made based on interactions with a 
limited number of close customers (Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001).  
 Furthermore, biased interpretations of these interactions can be dangerous, 
particularly if the decisions are challenging to reverse. York and Danes (2014) identified 
several biases that can exist when interacting with customers in an entrepreneurial setting. 
These include selection bias, in terms of cherry picking who is talked to (Holcomb et al., 
2009); representativeness bias, when founders try to generalize from a small, non-
random sample; acquiescence bias, when customers tell founders what they think that 
founders want to hear; confirmation bias, where the founder interprets information that 
confirms their prior beliefs; and overconfidence (Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2007), or 
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over-optimism (Kahneman, 2011) that can increase the chance that key information is 
ignored or the dismissal of potential failure (York & Danes, 2014).  
A. Customer Development Model 
 Developed by Blank (2007) and refined by Blank and Dorf (2012), Cooper and 
Vlaskovits (2013) and Maurya (2012), the Customer Development Model outlines the 
process of hypothesis development and testing of assumptions with customers on the 
minimum features of the product, business model, market, value of product, pricing and 
channel strategy.  
The Customer Development Model has four interlocking, circular stages (Figure 3): 
1) Customer Discovery – Involves understanding the needs and problems of customers 
and identifying who these customers are. The vision is usually tested with a very narrow 
customer segment, hypotheses are created, and the solution (problem) is tested in the 
market.  
2) Customer Validation – Involves identifying a scalable and repeatable model by 
creating a map of the steps needed to reach a market and grow the venture. The problem 
and product are a priority to validate at this stage, but assumptions about payment and 
channels may also be validated. Note that it is the Customer Discovery and Customer 
Validation Stages that are studied in more depth in this dissertation. 
3) Customer Creation – Involves creating and driving the demand of the end user by 
increasing marketing effort and creating a marketing strategy. 
4) Company Building – Involves executing what has been learned in the previous stages 
to create an organization (York & Danes, 2014). The venture is formalized and marketing 
efforts are increased. Essentially, once all stages have been completed and 




Figure 3. Customer Development Model. (Blank and Dorf, 2012: 23). The model is non-linear and 
encourages failing early. 
 
B. Product/Market Fit 
 The term product/market fit was popularized in the popular press by Marc 
Andreessen (2007), Sean Ellis (2007), and Steve Blank (2013b). Product/market fit is 
achieved when a product can satisfy a strong market demand – where the demand 
initially comes from early adopters. According to Blank and Dorf (2012), there are three 
factors that need to be confirmed to have achieved product/market fit. First, is there a 
problem or need that is urgent and essential to address? Second, does the proposed 
product solve the problem, or meet customers’ needs at a price that customers are willing 
to pay? Finally, are there enough customers, or a sizable business opportunity?  
C. Minimum Viable Product (MVP) 
 To test product/market fit, there is an expectation that a minimum viable product 
(MVP) exists that can be shown to potential customers. Several definitions of MVP exist 
in the literature and in practice. In their review of the term, Lenarduzzi & Taibi (2016) 
proposed the MVP as an early prototype, physical or digital in nature, having a minimum 
set of technical features that satisfy customers and allows startups to obtain feedback 
from them. Developing it should involve minimal resources and allows for pivots and 
new interactions of the product to be reintroduced and tested on customers (Lenarduzzi & 
Taibi, 2016; Ries, 2009a, 2009b). 
 In contrast, practitioners and educators today see the initial MVP not as a working 
prototype, but merely a description of a problem that they want to solve and a description 
of how they will solve it (Blank & Dorf, 2012; Winkel & Wilcox, 2017). Given I am 
working with a sample of practitioner entrepreneurs, in this dissertation, I adopt a 
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practitioner definition of an MVP as the most basic, understood explanation of a problem 
and solution and specify when a prototype (physical or digital) is available. This 
explanation can be through a word description, or a physical or digital object, and can be 
tested and will receive feedback from potential early adopter customers.  
D. Viability 
 The term viability has several interpretations in the literature. It has been referred 
to as what allows a product to be deployed (Pretorius & Budgen, 2008; Bjork, Ljungblad, 
& Bosch, 2013), and suggests that the MVP is enough to gain feedback (Ries, 2009c; 
Kniberg & Ivarsson, 2012; Mejia & Gopal, 2012; Read, Derrick & Ligon, 2014; Rao, 
2014; Edison, Wang, & Abrahamsson, 2015). Viability may also imply that the MVP 
meets the needs of a core group of early adopters (York & Danes, 2014), that the MVP 
involves profit (Moogk, 2012; Bailetti & Bot, 2013), that it offers both feedback and 
profit (Poole, 2002; Agostinho et al., 2015), or that it delivers customers with value 
(Maurya, 2017).  
E. Pivot 
 According to Blank and Dorf (2012), a pivot is a substantive change in the 
business. This can involve changes to any part of the business, including the product, the 
market, the business model, revenue streams, channels, and other operations.  
F. Validation 
 Validation is perceived as the affirmation that there is customer interest in a 
product. While it is related to customer satisfaction and customer feedback (Section 
2.3.2), validation refers to the startup’s interpretation of customers’ comments. In the 
Customer Development Model (Blank & Dorf, 2012), validation is interpreted differently 
at each stage. In the Customer Discovery Stage, customer interest is confirmed for 
startups with verbal or written affirmations. However, in the Customer Validation stage, 
validation involves testing whether customers would buy a product and “whether there is 
enough of a product/market fit to justify scaling sales and marketing spending” (Blank & 
Dorf, 2012: 280). This includes validating different parts of the business model, but 
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predominantly, the customer market, the product, the channels, and revenue model. 
Based on the metrics set up by the startup, a startup may interpret these insights to decide 
to pivot or proceed during this stage.  
 Despite validation being a commonly used term by practitioner entrepreneurs, the 
term validation, with relation to customers, is still quite new and has been minimally 
referenced in the academic literature to-date. Exceptions exist, such as Olsson and 
Bosch’s conceptual model on developing a better understanding of product features in 
established global software companies (2015). In their paper, the authors advocate for on-
going, continuous and frequent customer validation cycles. These cycles involve 
collecting and interpreting customer feedback measures throughout the product 
development process so that the needs and wants of the larger customer base is 
represented and decisions to move forward are not made based on “gut feelings” alone. 
Subsequent research referencing this model has also involved established software 
product development contexts (e.g. Fabijan, Olsson, & Bosch, 2016; Schön, 
Thomaschewski, & Escalona, 2017), and not entrepreneurial ventures. This suggests that 
there is ample opportunity to explore the concept of customer validation in the startup 
environment in the academic literature. 
 Finally, it should be noted that despite obtaining customer feedback and putting 
effort into gaining a deeper understanding of customer satisfaction, startups may still lack 
complete information (Simon, 1958). Due to time and resource pressures, they may need 
to make decisions under pressure, and have the potential to satisfice, or settle for making 
decisions using “good enough” information (Cyert & March, 1992). As a result, their 
objectivity towards interpreting the situation and validation process may be affected. 
2.5.4. Takeaways from Practitioner-based Literature on Customers and Startups 
 Practitioner methods such as the Lean Startup Methodology and the Customer 
Development Model continue to be adopted by entrepreneurs and introduce the process 
of creating a product in what seems to be a different way than previously explored in the 
academic literatures of new venture creation (e.g. Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007), 
new product development, and relationship marketing (e.g Rehme & Svensson, 2011). 
 59 
However, these practitioner methods remain under tested in an academic setting, and the 
lack of consensus on related terminology in existing academic studies makes it 
challenging to compare and learn from them. Furthermore, the relationship marketing 
literature suggests that customers also influence those activities (Rehme & Svensson, 
2011). While these practitioner models of startup formation focus on achieving 
product/market fit and validating distribution channels and product positioning, they fail 
to explain how customers may play a role in executing later activities of new venture 
creation, including the latter stages of commercialization and exploitation.  
 These practitioner-based models of customer involvement in startups reflect and 
promote the need to better understand customers’ role and influence in startups. Different 
customer activities occur throughout venture creation (Rehme & Svensson, 2011), and 
according to the new product development literature, there is a co-creation process that is 
occurring as organizations attempt to understand customers’ needs and wants (O’Hern 
and Rindfleisch, 2009). Customers have a productive lead role in the innovation process 
and beyond (Lilien et al., 2002; Urban & Von Hippel, 1988; Von Hippel, 1986). This 
leaves an opportunity to learn from these models and the practitioner-based methods and 
explore the potential for a customer-integrated new venture creation process.  
2.6 Takeaways from the Literature Review 
Chapter 2 reviews the multi-disciplinary literature provideing background to the 
research questions posed in Chapter 1 on the role of early customer interactions during 
the new venture creation process. To start, the entrepreneurial process and new venture 
creation literature are reviewed (Section 2.1). New venture creation involves the 
interdependent actions that are undertaken to organize for a new organization (Gartner, 
1985). Over the past 30 years of literature on the topic, the process has been studied 
several times, however, there is still much opportunity and demand for refinement of 
entrepreneurial process research and the chance to create a uniform understanding of the 
process. There is also the need for studies that acknowledge, integrate and clarify the role 
of exchanges with early customers that occur throughout the venture creation process.  
Next, the path dependence literature was reviewed to understand the foundation of 
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how initial conditions and decisions based on these customer interactions and the first 
sale may play a role in influencing startups’ future development trajectories (Section 2.2). 
In early interactions often being considered insignificant, entrepreneurs are receiving 
feedback, suggestions, and validation that trigger decisions that narrow their options and 
may put them down a certain path. Understanding the mechanisms around what triggers 
this path narrowing can help ensure that startups land on an appropriate course.  
Other disciplines, however, have researched different aspects of customer 
interactions in both established firms and new ventures and offer insight into how 
customers may be involved in product development or organization formation. Early 
customer interactions are well documented in established firms in the new product 
development and innovation, marketing, and engineering literature (Section 2.3). For 
example, in the product development literature, customers are shown to be consulted 
during the specification, concept design, and prototyping stages of the product 
development process (Kaulio, 1998), and are particularly involved in concept testing 
(Dolan & Matthews, 1993). Regular probing and learning activities have been developed 
that facilitate the development of knowledge about customers (e.g. Lynn, Morone, & 
Paulson, 1996). Customers may even be involved in the manufacturing process (Fang, 
2008). However, interactions that suggest changes to the business concept during the later 
development and commercialization stages can be more challenging to manage (Chang & 
Taylor, 2016). At this time, the firm is busier and may be locked into certain processes 
that are more challenging to adapt and rework. Nevertheless, even after a product has 
been sold, firms continue to collect customer feedback to estimate customer satisfaction. 
Furthermore, the relationship marketing literature suggests that activities and 
processes with customers are necessary to understand customers’ problems, their needs, 
and what customers value (Berry, 1983; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Payne & Frow, 2017). 
These activities reduce uncertainty (Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), improve customer 
awareness about product development and speed to market (Joshi & Sharma, 2004), and 
reduce chance of failure (Cook, 2008). Certain firms may even have high 
interdependence with customers to democratize the product innovation process (Von 
Hippel, 2005). In these cases, customers may be involved in co-creating a product 
(Blazevic & Lievens, 2008), and in becoming user advocates. 
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If we transfer findings from more established firms’ interactions with customers 
to the venture creation literature, where startups undergo product creation concurrent to 
an organization formation process, we could surmise that frequent customer interactions 
early in venture creation are beneficial to expose founders to divergent ideas and 
preferences of the customers, essential for product development, and development of 
other parts of the organization.  
The question remains, however, as to whether the differences between established 
firms and startups create different effects of customer interactions. For example, 
established organizations often have existing standardized product development 
processes. In contrast, unless founders have previous experience where they owned a 
business before or worked together before, startups still need to create internal processes, 
such as product development, from scratch. Furthermore, established businesses are 
likely to have different constraints than startups – where they already have a certain 
market that they need to continue to meet the needs of and where pursuing an alternative 
market may affect their legitimacy within an existing market. Startups, on the other hand, 
have a clean slate with no defined market or reputation, so to speak, and can use this 
opportunity to test the market while interacting with a breadth of potential customers.  
While startups are known for being agile and being able to test their product early 
and quick, time crunches and lack of resources can make experimentation and survival 
challenging for startups. While additional investigation is needed into the differences 
between customer interactions in established organizations and startups, the NPD and 
marketing literatures demonstrate the general importance of customer interactions during 
product development. 
Looking to the fragmented literature in relationship marketing in new ventures 
(Section 2.4), we see that founders use their existing social networks (e.g. Granovetter, 
1985; Ostgaard & Birley, 1994; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001) and rely in part on 
existing social capital (Birley, 1995) to obtain early customers. Furthermore, initial 
relationships with potential customers can be built by using different communication 
channels (e.g. Winer, 2001; Sashi, 2012; Pitta & Fowler, 2005; Yoon, Choi, & Sohn, 
2008), and using a diversity of activities that involve customer interactions during venture 
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creation. These activities are not only to learn about the technology and product, but also 
to develop deeper relationships and learn how to create and operate a business to meet the 
needs and values of customers (Rehme & Svensson, 2011). Finally, the first customer 
reference is an external stamp of approval for startups – a formal recommendation from 
the first customer that is meant to convey credibility, perceived risk and reputation to 
other customers (Ruokolainen, 2008). 
Finally, what this survey of this literature on customer interactions in new 
ventures lacks is an understanding of how startups internalize these interactions and 
decide to proceed to subsequent steps in the venture creation process. New practitioner-
based methodologies were proposed in the past decade – the lean startup methodology 
and the customer development process - that advocate frequent and early customer 
interactions during the venture creation process (Section 2.5; e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; 
Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2008). While academics are beginning to test these methods in an 
academic setting, reporting of outcomes has been slow (except for e.g. Fisher, 2012; 
Whalen & Akaka, 2016; York & Danes, 2014) and there is not always a consensus on the 
definitions of the terminology (e.g. Lenarduzzi & Taibi, 2016).  
What is particularly unique about these practitioner methodologies are that they 
advocate a validation process with early customers, interpreting their reactions and 
comments and incorporating their feedback into the startup. The challenge is, however, 
that startups are not always able to obtain unbiased information (selection, 
representativeness, or confirmation biases) and may interpret the information with 
overconfidence or over optimism in a false validation (York & Danes, 2014). There is the 
potential for academia to learn from these practitioner models and for a customer-
integrated new venture creation process model that accounts for the importance of these 
interactions for startup development. 
The proposed validation process with customers is particularly interesting because 
startups are making decisions based on this feedback that affects the product and the 
business, and that require investments in resources and the building of relationships, 
infrastructure, and processes. In the meantime, a startup is becoming more and more 
established.  
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 The literature review presented in this chapter sets the foundation for why 
studying the customer interaction process during new venture creation is important. In the 
subsequent sections, the study used to answer the research question of this dissertation is 
presented (Chapter 3). Within-case analyses for each of the nine cases in the study 
(Chapter 4 and Appendices) and a cross-case analysis are presented (Chapter 5). From the 
data, a path analysis was conducted and a customer interaction model during the new 
venture creation process was created that incorporates the self-reinforcing validation 
processes that are triggered from early customer interactions (Chapter 6).   
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3. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
To investigate the research question posed in this dissertation, I undertook an 
inductive, qualitative process methods study of startups. Denzin and Lincoln say that 
qualitative researchers attempt “to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them” (2008: 4). Given that this research question requires a 
process approach to address the effect of early customers on startups over time, 
qualitative research can be helpful in going beyond surface descriptions to use process 
and narrative to explain relationships between events (Van de Ven & Poole, 2002). 
Qualitative research is sensitive to context (Pettigrew, 1992) and how participants 
interpret and describe how events take place in real time. I rely primarily on interviews 
with entrepreneur participants for the main source of data. Additional interviews with 
mentors; observations of meetings, pitches to customers and venture capitalists, and 
industry events; and archival data serve to triangulate and help to explain events (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). A pilot study helped scope this research question and develop the 
methods to investigate it (3.1), and the research context and sample (3.2), data collection 
(3.3), and data analysis (3.4) of the main study for this dissertation are described below.  
3.1. Pilot Study 
A pilot study of four startups was conducted to test the approach to investigate the 
phenomenon of early customer interactions during new venture creation. These startups 
were followed from May to September 2015 (see Table 6 for basic information on pilot 
study startups), and were comprised of young founder entrepreneurs, recent university 
graduates with minimal entrepreneurial experience. This was a convenience sample of 
entrepreneurs that were partaking in a competitive nationwide venture development 
incubator program based in Toronto over seven months (three offsite and four onsite, co-
located). During data collection, I lived in the same dormitory as startups while they were 
in their residency period in the incubator. The founders were mentored by a select group 
of experienced entrepreneurs, academics and business leaders, and had the potential to 
earn funding from venture capitalists. Unique to this program year, the founders did not 
know each other prior to the start of the program. In other words, the entrepreneurial 
teams were formed only once the participants were selected into the program and ideas 
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for a potential startup were decided upon over a two-day time-period. This created a 
controlled environment, where all startups started at the same time, in the same incubator 
setting. Team formation was considered the inception of the startups in the pilot study 
(early February 2015). Data collected started in the post-idea generation stage - where the 
founders already had identified an opportunity and had a vision that solved a customer’s 
problems or needs.  
Table 6. Startups and Entrepreneur Participants for Pilot Study. 
Startup Name and Description1 Main Contact Description # of 
Interviews 
Patient Pharma – A patient-centric prescription 
management software application. 
Masters student in Social 
Sciences (non-business), 
Female, 23-24 years old 
9 
Experience Fast – A business that connected 
businesses with part-time help from accounting, 
human resources and law. 
A recent graduate from a 
Bachelors in Business degree, 
Female, 22 years old 
12 
Citizen Engagement – An online platform that 
allowed citizens and government to engage in two-
way conversations on key issues affecting 
communities. 
A recent graduate from a 
Bachelors in Political Science 
degree, Male, 22 years old 
13 
Friends n’ Activities – An online platform to find 
new friends based on similarities in interests in 
activities, values and personalities. 
A recent graduate from a 
Bachelors in Engineering 
degree, Male, 22 years old 
12 
Note: Interviews with mentors not accounted for in this table. 
The findings of this pilot study are not reported in this dissertation because the 
unique conditions of how startups in this sample were created are less representative of 
startups, even those in incubator programs. Largely due to issues in team dynamics, all 
four of these startups ceased to continue after the entrepreneurial incubator program 
finished. Because of the unique nature of the incubator that the startups were in, there was 
a lack of history between founding team members and a lack of entrepreneurial 
experience in all founders. Founders were attempting to establish routines and procedures 
of the organization from scratch (Stinchcombe, 1965), but also needed to develop a clear 
internal structure, histories of exchange, trust and mutual obligation, interdependence, 
                                                 
1 The actual names of the startups and participants have been changed to maintain their anonymity. 
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shared interests and expectations with co-founders (Blatt, 2009; Kelley et al., 2003), and 
set transparent and clear expectations for each other (Blatt, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) 
to build strong enough relationships to survive.  
Despite issues with the pilot sample startups, there were five main preliminary 
findings in the pilot study which helped refine the main research question in this 
dissertation and develop the methods to investigate it. First, each of the four startups 
chose to interact with potential first customers at different stages of the venture creation 
process. Three of the pilot startups – Patient Pharma, Citizen Engagement, and 
Experience Fast – chose to engage with customers early into venture creation, while the 
startup Friends n’ Activities waited until a working prototype was developed before 
reaching out to customers. This suggests that customer interactions can start as early as 
idea generation, when a business does not actually exist yet. This early in the venture 
creation process, the interaction may have substantial influence on the idea and the 
product development process.  
Second, the pilot startups interacted with customers in varying intensities and 
reached out to their personal and professional networks and external target markets in 
different capacities. They also chose different forms of media for customer interaction 
such as online advertisements, surveys, e-mails, networking events, in-person meetings, 
and focus groups. These choices resulted in the pilot startups being able to collect 
different types of information from different customers. These initial findings suggest 
that there may be an optimal time in venture creation for certain types of customer 
interactions.  
Third, only having an MVP in a description format (nothing physical or digital 
available) was fine during initial stages of venture creation (Ries, 2011). However, as 
time progressed, later interactions with customers increasingly require startups to have a 
prototype to gain more concrete feedback and to demonstrate the startup’s technical 
capabilities in product development. This prototype could then be adapted with customer 
feedback. Furthermore, early interactions that were prompted by a prototype allowed 
startups the opportunity to learn how to deal with external information and improve their 
learning capabilities as they were developing and growing. Waiting too long to produce a 
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prototype meant that the startup developed very insularly without the ability to gain 
adequate customer feedback on the product, and this could restrict its ability to adapt. 
However, three of the four startups struggled with showing or obtaining technical 
expertise and in producing a prototype, making it a challenge for them to get feedback to 
gain commitment from potential customers. This also emphasized, once again, the lack of 
consideration put into creating these founding teams.  
Fourth, early in the new venture creation process, if no customer had been 
secured, there was a willingness to adapt the organization, based on the promise of 
having a paying customer:  
“But in terms of customers changing the direction - it's possible. Like this is a 
way for us to go to market. We might pivot because that's where the money is, 
if they're willing to hire us now, and our product might look different. And 
who we go after in the future may be different. We may no longer want to 
work with EMRs. It might be closed-door pharmacies. It's just who is willing 
to pay. It's that this is the first person willing to pay, so it might be easier.”  
- Founder, Patient Pharma 
As securing a potential first customer was linked to imminent survival of the 
startup (due to factors such as access to resources or legitimacy), there may have been a 
substantial increase in a founder’s drive to adapt a startup’s business concept to meet the 
needs of potential first customers they are pursuing. This may result in the startup being 
less selective, and willing to accept a less ideal first customer, including ones that are 
substantially different from the mass market.   
However, fifth, as the startups received verbal or text-based validation from their 
customer interactions (none of these startups had a sale involving money exchange), the 
founders’ interpretation of this validation pushed them to develop the business concept to 
meet the needs of these early customers offering this non-monetary validation. In the case 
where an initial prototype was available, as well as when the MVP had been refined 
without a prototype, the startups became more resistant to adapting the business.  
These preliminary analyses suggest that earlier interactions of potential first 
customers that provide validations may create a path dependence for the type of 
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organization being created. A startup is constantly bombarded with new information, and 
it is easier to build subsequent knowledge on an existing type of customer or existing 
feedback, rather than learn new information on a new customer market. This then can 
result in the same type of subsequent customer being pursued, even if it is not 
representative of the target market, and a narrowing influence of customers as new 
venture creation progresses. 
Based on these observations from the pilot study, I created a preliminary process 
model on customer interactions (Figure 4) that suggests that customers have less 
influence on both new product development and new venture creation over time.  
3.2. Research Context and Sample of Dissertation 
Based on initial findings from the pilot study, I selected the current sample to 
better explain the interactions with customers at various stages of new venture creation. I 
used theoretical sampling to identify Canadian startups from Ontario to develop a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon. Ontario-based entrepreneurs are comparable in many 
ways to entrepreneurs in other major entrepreneurial ecosystems in that they have access 
to high quality education, early stage government funding, and cutting-edge research 
institutions, as well as mentorship and expertise in creative, information technology, life 
and medical sciences, and finance industries. Startups included in this sample came from 
a range of industries, had a unique product or business model (i.e. not a franchise), and 
interacted with customers in person, the phone, and/or through various Internet-related 
methods (e.g. e-mail, websites, video conferencing, blogs, forums, and social media). 
Note that the term product is used broadly here to refer to physical and digital articles 
and/or services that are manufactured/created/designed for sale purposes. The startups 
were initially located in an incubator setting, suggesting that some type of screening took 
place to validate the business idea and the founders, and that access to mentorship and 
potential funding were available. Such a sample is beneficial to understand as 
increasingly, startups enter incubators, seeking advice. However, despite being told to 
interact with customers as part of their training program, not all startups sought out 
customer interactions in the same way. 
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Figure 4. Initial Proposed Model of Venture Creation Process, New Product Development, and Customer Interactions based on Pilot Study (Adapted 
from Bhave, 1994; Brixy, Sternberg, & Stüber, 2012; Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998). New product development takes place concurrent to 
venture creation. There are three phases of venture creation – Discovery, Opportunity Exploitation, and Entrepreneurial. Early customer 
interaction can take place during any stage of venture creation, however, the influence of early potential customers on startup learning, 
identity formation (not shown), venture creation, and on the parallel process of new product development decreases over time, as depicted 
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To counter some of the issues encountered during the pilot study, the participants 
in the sample were in sales-focused incubator programs (see Table 5 for basic 
information on startups). Having a slightly older, advanced sample (between six to 
twenty-four months old from study initiation) allowed for assessment of startups that 
managed to survive through initial uncertain conditions in their first months, and offered 
the opportunity to follow them into the sales generation phase of their business. Note that 
having a first customer by the end of data collection was not guaranteed. The sample also 
had self-selected founder teams to reduce issues of founder team conflict.  
The number of participant startups was selected based on the longitudinal nature 
of the study (Morse, 2000). Sample size in process studies is based on the number of 
temporal observations, not number of cases (Langley et al., 2013). Therefore, repeated 
interviews of a smaller number of organizations can result in a fairly large number of 
observations. Furthermore, performing longitudinal research on startups at an early stage 
of development can be challenging with high startup failure rates (Patel, 2015).  
As this is a phenomenological study where each participant was interviewed 
several times and there was a large amount of data for each participant, I expected that 
the final study would have data from eight to ten startups to reach theoretical saturation 
(Morse, 2000). To account for dropouts that may occur in a longitudinal study, I pursued 
a sample size of ten to thirteen startups to capture data from participants over time. 
Ultimately, a total of nine startups were included in this study. Having this sample size 
allowed me to capture data of startups that did secure a first customer (considered a 
success case in this dissertation), those that had longer venture creation processes, and 
those that did not find customers, and allowed for reaching theoretical saturation - when 
fresh data “no longer spark[ed] new theoretical insights, nor reveal[ed] new properties of 
these core theoretical categories” (Charmaz, 2006: 113).  
The descriptive profile of the cases and business models of the startups can be 
found in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. Note that additional insights were gained 
informally from additional startups during the study period, however are not included in 
this dissertation.  
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 Startups were not at all the same venture creation stage when they joined the 
study to ensure different stages of venture creation and different types of customers were 
captured in the study. Note that all startups followed were in a growth stage, where some 
were followed from the initial developmental stages where the product was just an idea 
and the startup had no customers, some had a product in the beta-testing stage, and others 
already had a fully developed product or service and had secured their confirmed first 
customer that was willing to purchase their product at a given price. The sample included 
participants that varied in experience as an entrepreneur, educational background, and 
size of team. All participants were under the age of 40. The startups come from a 
diversity of industries. Case study design looking at validity and richness (e.g., Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Jensen and Rogers, 2001; Yin, 2009) suggests that different industries 
should be compared when central industry characteristics differ and the analysis of only 
one industry can influence (bias) the outcome of the study.  
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Table 7. Descriptive Profile of Cases. Note: Interviews with mentors are not accounted for in this table. 
Startup A B C D E F G H I
# Founding Members 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 2
Age of Founders Late 20s Late 20s Mid 20s Early 20s to late 20s Early 20s Early 30s Mid 20s Mid-20s Early 20s
Founder Entrepreneurial 
Experience (Yes/No)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Founder Education 
(Degree)
Masters in Health 
Promotion; Bachelors in 
Health Promotion and a 










Bachelors in Software 
Engineering and 
Computer Science, 
Bachelors in Chemistry 
and Philosophy, 
Bachelors in Political 
Science
Bachelors in Business 
Administration;  














Bachelors in Business 
and Psychology
Bachelors in Media 
information technology, 
interactive media 
design; graphic design 
and automation
Date of Startup 
Establishment 
(Entrepreneur-defined)
May-15 Sep-15 Aug-15 Nov-15 Apr-14 Oct-15 Apr-16 Sep-15 May-15
Industry
Food and Beverage 
(Organic beverage)




Shared economy (Event 
space rentals)
App-based video game 
community
Fin-tech search engine 
/ aggregator






Tech/Non-tech Non-tech Non-tech Tech Tech Tech Tech Non-tech Tech Tech
Type of Process (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 2002)
Teleology Dialectic Dialectic Teleology Teleology Teleology Teleology Teleology Teleology
Number of Interviews 8 6 14 11 7 8 10 6 11
Number of Months 
Followed
7 (+ ongoing) 6 months (to failure) 7(+ ongoing) 7 (+ ongoing) 7 (+ ongoing) 7 (+ ongoing) 7 (+ ongoing) 7 (+ ongoing) 7 (+ ongoing)
 Minutes of Interview 
(Total 4555)
313 525 901 504 502 369 363 291 787
Other sources
Farmers’ market, event, 
social media, website, 
news articles (11)
Social media, website, 
event
Websites; Notes
News articles (3); 
Website, social media











Blogs (18); News articles 
(4); Press release; Online 
community forum; 
Crowdfunding campaigns 
(2); Social media, 
Website; Radio shows (2)
Website
News article (1); 
Television show (1); 
Website; Social media
215122
Pages of Founder 
Interviews
23181145159108182
Yes - DifferentYes - DifferentYes – DifferentYes – Different
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Yes – Similar/ 
Different
Yes - SimilarFounder Experience 









Online Marketplace / 
(Brokerage Model) 
Affiliate Model 








Business Model (Hennart, 
2014 or Rappa, 2010)
Yes – Similar/DifferentYes - SimilarNo
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Table 8. Business Model Families of Startup Sample. 
Communities Markets/Platforms Software Service Physical Product 
E – Software 
application of online 
gaming community 
(Digital) 
B – Community 
makerspace (Physical) 
F – Online loan 
aggregator (Digital) 
D – Web platform for 
renting short term event 
spaces (Digital/Physical) 
H – Mental health 
information platform 
C – Affiliate marketing  
I – Web design 
G – Coffee press 




3.3. Data Collection 
 Data collection extended over seven months and involved interviews, 
observations of activities where customers were discussed or involved, such as meetings, 
documenting changes in websites and media presence over time, collecting archival 
documents from participants, attending industry events where participants were 
partaking, visiting manufacturing facilities and retail stores, and attending focus groups. 
This intense engagement in the field (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Suddaby, 2006) and the 
use of three primary data collection mechanisms helped create a rich understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest. More details on these methods are below. 
3.3.1. Interviews 
My primary method of data collection used semi-structured interviews that were 
designed to gather narrative data (See Appendix A for sample questions). From these 
interviews, 1328 pages of interview transcripts were documented. According to 
Reissman, in a narrative interview, “a speaker connects events into a sequence that is 
consequential for later action and for the meanings that the speaker wants listeners to take 
away from the story. Events perceived by the speaker as important are selected, 
organized, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience” (2008: 3).  
In essence, such interviews capture stories created for a recipient and require them and 
listeners to make sense of past experiences. In this study, interviews were conducted at 
various development phases of the startup, including opportunity discovery, opportunity 
refinement, a transition phase including committing to the business, an entrepreneurial 
phase involving testing, developing and marketing, and an execute phase where there is a 
product and a market identified that is willing to purchase that product. 
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The methodology and questions were based on consulting relevant prior literature 
and through observation of the phenomenon during the pilot study. I took an iterative 
process of collecting and analyzing data, and sought out new participants and follow-up 
based on current participant information and constant comparison of data (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Over time, I adjusted the interview protocol to reflect themes that 
emerged during data collection (Spradley, 1979).  
No startups in the sample were followed during their initial months in real time. 
The first interview with each startup reviewed the events of the previous months. Each of 
the initial interviews lasted 30 to 90 minutes. The interviews were semi-structured and 
became increasingly focused over the course of the study. Questions asked during this 
initial interview included, “Can you tell us something about how this idea for this startup 
came about? Tell me a story of the startup from the idea to today.” Extensive field notes 
were taken as time and context permitted. I also created memos after most interviews and 
asked myself, “What did I learn?” and “How does this interview compare to prior 
interviews?” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2001). To minimize recall bias in these accounts, 
I also collected archival data (explained below; e.g. blog posts, news articles, company 
business plans) to compare with narratives and better understand startup processes. 
Interviews with other informants, such as cofounders and mentors, also reduced potential 
informant bias and added complementary perspectives (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997) 
that triangulated the stories. 
Subsequent interviews were typically shorter, between 15 to 45 minutes, but were 
longer if participants desired to speak longer (up to two hours). The subsequent 
interviews also used semi-structured interview questions, asked to encourage participants 
to share extended accounts of their entrepreneurial experiences. These questions 
included, “When did interactions with early customers occur? Why did you decide to 
interact with early customers at that time? What did you learn from that customer and 
how did what you learned affect your venture creation process? What other activities 
have been occupying your time since we last chatted?” Also, questions around the 
confirmed first customer will be asked when applicable, including, “How did you select 
your first customer? What activities did you do with your first customer, and how did 
committing to this customer change your business?” Questions have also been included 
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in the interview protocol to gain insight into mechanisms for the creation of the 
organization’s path. More detail on this analysis is addressed in Section 3.4 on Data 
Analysis. 
I also asked the participants their plans for customer interactions and in general 
for the coming weeks, and to describe where they think the startup would be in the next 
few years. No precise future timeline is being specified to gain an understanding of how 
founders interpret time in their business. During subsequent interviews, I followed up to 
see what activities and changes in thought took place and questions were adapted as 
necessary.  
A total of 81 formal interviews were conducted with the founders of nine startups 
over the study period. All formal interviews were recorded and transcribed. These 
interviews allowed me to follow up on emerging themes. Informal interviews also were 
conducted when spontaneous opportunities arose for learning more about the 
phenomenon. Interviews were also conducted with mentors when possible. 
3.3.2. Observations 
A lived research experience – a first-hand account and impression of what 
participants go through – can help a researcher with context immersion (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). Throughout my data collection there were several opportunities available 
to better understand the startups and the context that they are involved in through 
observation. Real-time data collection was of particular interest as there was potential for 
distortion of what happens in a startup’s venture creation process during narrative 
interviews. Memory is constructive in nature (Anderson, 1990), and when opinions and 
perspectives are shared, there is the potential for hindsight bias and selection when 
retrospective data is included in a study. 
To better understand the general environment of the founder participants during 
data collection, I spent several hours (three to five days) a week in the incubator where 
participants predominantly operate their businesses. This proximity allowed me to 
become closer with the participants, establish a relationship, and collect near real-time 
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longitudinal data. It also allowed me to develop a certain level of trust to engage 
participants. 
 There were also several one-time opportunities that arose to better understand 
how founders talk about their startups and interact with customers. These included: 
attending customer focus groups, attending incubator-organized pitches to venture 
capitalists and a public audience (presentation decks were collected), participating as a 
potential customer in a social media startup, visiting startups’ manufacturing facilities 
and retail outlets, listening in on sales calls, and attending of industry events where 
customer interactions occur (such as a video game testing event). At least one observation 
was conducted for each startup in the sample (noted in Other Sources, Table 7).  
3.3.3. Archival Physical and Digital Documentation 
Additional startup-owned archival documentation was collected, including 
participant presentations, strategic planning documents, product design iterations, and 
any other relevant internal documents that I was granted access to. These documents 
helped to triangulate what was learned in interviews and observations, and verified 
retrospective accounts from startups. Documentation provided important contextual 
understanding to both the content and pace of the business development process in the 
startup.  
Additional data collected were for visual analysis of startups’ outward-facing 
visual design. Communications and branding included snapshots of the startups’ websites 
and social media (Twitter) feeds over time. These visual data are representative of 
corporate identity, the public image communicated about what is the organization 
(Cornelissen, Haslam, & Balmer, 2007), and corporate identity created by founders, and 
provides information on the startup over time and the shared meaning of what the 
organization represents to potential customers (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). When 
available, news articles and blogs written about the startups were collected. Data were 
also gathered from online community forums such as Reddit.com, where startups sought 
out feedback on their business idea. These forums provided readily accessible, public and 
date-stamped data on interactions with potential customers.  
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3.4. Data Analysis 
 Data for this study contain stories collected over several months from nine 
startups. I will focus on answering the research questions posed through using an iterative 
process, following methods described for inductive research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994). This involves within-case analyses, as well as a cross-case 
analysis. 
 Data analysis was carried out in five main stages. First, I developed a set of 
narratives and process maps that describe the venture creation process, and identified 
venture creation domains where the startups and their customers and potential customers 
interact. Second, data were coded and used to build and update theory, while iterating 
between data and theory to reveal new insights into how customer interaction takes place 
during venture creation. I also used archival data and field notes, in addition to the 
transcribed interviews. The interview protocol was also adjusted as needed and when 
possible, I checked back with study participants to gain their perspective on the findings.  
 Third, these methods were complemented by use of comparative matrices (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994), data structuring techniques also suggested by Gioia, Corey, and 
Hamilton (2013), that provided a visual aid while constructing raw data into themes. 
These included event-listing matrices, summaries of time-ordered displays, focused 
narratives, and other data displays for within-case analyses, and a meta-matrix for the 
cross-case analysis. These data displays were used to answer the first part of the research 
question: When and how are early customers involved in the venture creation process? 
Fourth, based on the cross-case analysis, I answered the second part of the research 
question: “How do these customer interactions create path dependence for the 
organization being created?” Fifth, I conducted a path analysis to understand the 
startups’ paths and used a causal loop diagram to display the process of customer 
interactions during early stages of new venture creation over time. 
3.4.1. Reason for Chosen Analysis Method 
 Before describing these analysis stages, I will explain why this methodology is 
being adopted. Process data is concerned with why and how things are evolving over time 
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(Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013). It deals with 
sequences of events where it can be challenging to identify what are the boundaries of the 
event. As a result, such data are messy and challenging to deal with, as they involve 
multiple levels and different units of analysis, however are often distilled into simple 
linear processes.  
Path dependence has been studied both over time and cross-sectionally. 
According to Vergne and Durand (2011), rather than studying an isolated path, 
interactions between paths and their broader environment should be considered. This 
allows capturing key moments in the founding process, such as decision making and 
interactions with stakeholders, and allows for an agency-based approach (Van de Ven, 
1993; Ruef, 2005). 
To capture decisions made and their implications, an organizational process 
theory needs to take into consideration events and any other actions undertaken. The 
events are recorded in a particular sequence, and the parts that have the most influence 
are likely to become embedded into the organization’s characteristics, actions, and 
processes (Schreyogg, & Sydow, 2011). Garud et al. (2010) suggest longitudinal research 
design should be used to collect ‘real time’ observations as events that create and shape 
paths unfold.  
There are various strategies that can be used to analyze processes. Narratives, in 
particular, can be helpful in constructing detailed stories that help explain what is 
happening in an organization. According to Shaw, Brown, and Bromiley, “when people 
can locate themselves in the story, their sense of commitment and involvement is 
enhanced” (1998: 50). We tend to store and recall information in more of a narrative 
form, rather than a more generic description of events (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), making it 
an easy way for startups and other organizations to reflect on their past, present and 
future efforts together (Bartel & Garud, 2009). Particularly for the concepts in this 
dissertation, collecting and analyzing narrative accounts of the actors involved in decision 
making and iterating between the past, present, and future are a relevant methodology 
(Garud et al., 2010).  
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3.4.2. Explaining Narratives 
A narrative is a sequence of events, connecting cause and effect, as well as stories 
that describe relationships in a process (Bartel & Garud, 2009; Pentland, 1999). In 
addition to a sequence of events over time, narratives have focal actors that narrate the 
stories and experiences of the startups, an identifiable voice that reflects a point of view, 
attitudes, assumptions, and cultural values, and other indicators that help contextualize 
the plot of the narrative (Pentland, 1999).  
Weick (1995) suggests that the sensemaking process involves being both 
retrospective and prospective to develop an understanding of events and idea. Given this, 
I looked at customer interaction narratives of past interactions (termed structured 
narratives), as well as in near real-time to understand how look at how participants define 
problems and may lack a clear plot (termed provisional narratives; Boje 2001; Bartel & 
Garud, 2009).  
Time and context are particularly important, where the sequence of events, plot, 
and generative mechanisms at work portray the different depths of narratives (Langley et 
al., 2013). There is the surface level storytelling of a sequence of events by a narrator; the 
description and translation of a sequence of events, relationships, and actors from a 
particular point of view; a plot – or “conventional theme with which people in a given 
social context can readily identify, enabling them to see actions, events, and 
circumstances as related to parts of a larger whole (Bruner, 1986)” (Bartel & Garud, 
2009: 111); and the deeper generating mechanisms – the underlying structures and 
processes that drive and create patterns in the process (Bartel & Garud, 2009; Pentland, 
1999). 
A challenge in narrative studies is that it is easiest to conduct a shallow analysis of 
the surface level details of participants – answering who (relational information), where 
(contextual information), and when (temporal information describing a sequence of 
events that they see as taking place in a certain way; Bartel & Garud, 2009). Theory 
development however relies on gaining explanations of the generating mechanisms that 
drive the process – i.e. how and why these events unfolded in a certain way. It is the 
understanding of these deep structures that help in developing new theory and practically, 
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help us take action on the customer interaction process (Pentland, 1999).  
Using a narrative method requires acknowledgement that what we are told by 
others is interpretive - a rich story that provides meaning for the events taking place and 
potentially legitimacy to those hearing the story. However, it is also important to 
acknowledge that this story may not actually be a true pattern of events. Hearing a 
narrative, the researcher may become an active co-producer as they translate accounts and 
stories through their own frame of reference (including their belief systems, goals, scripts, 
identities and schemas) and experiences and re-state it from their own perspective (Boje, 
2001). 
 Langley (1999) suggests that multiple strategies are important to develop a deeper 
understanding of process and its mechanisms. For this study, I see narrative strategy 
combining well with visual mapping to organize process data in a systematic way and 
identify phases, events and constructs. Using multiple data sources also help with this 
(Pentland, 1999). Visual mapping provides a way to look at processes over time in a 
visual chronology. Mapping out the process is helpful as an intermediary step to 
developing more abstract theorization on the interactions between the startups and the 
customers. While the process is interpretive (Suddaby, 2006), the methods developed are 
very specific and highly structured, involving comparison of small units of data and 
creating categories and codes for comparison of processes. Using constant comparison, 
data were collected and analyzed at the same time, and theory was built up from a base of 
original data.  
3.4.3. Within-Case Analyses 
 Given the bulk of the data, to be able to properly analyze them, they needed to be 
organized in visual formats that presented the information systematically. The textual and 
visual data displays that have been selected for the analysis made the data easier to digest 
by reducing them to component parts (description) and showing how different 
components fit together (explanation) to be able to draw conclusions. These different data 
displays are explained below, both in the within-case analyses and the cross-case 
analysis. Data displays used are noted in bold and underlined.  
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Part 1. Creating Startups’ Narratives and Process Maps  
 Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that it is important to first become familiar with each 
case to understand case-specific patterns before cross-case comparisons can be made. To 
bring focus on the data, the first stage of data analysis involved the creation of a set of 
case narratives in a standardized format to explain idea generation, founders, startup 
events, founder goals, and customer interaction activities during the study period. These 
cases can be found in Appendix B. The narratives are composed of ordered, raw data 
(including quotes from interviews, archival documents, and field notes) and commentary 
to clarify the case. The goal was to see what founders said about the venture creation 
process, what they did, and when they did it.  
 This stage of data analysis involved identifying who are customers, partners and 
other stakeholders. Through data collection, there were diverse responses in terms of how 
founders referred to who their customers were. Several startups have multiple types of 
customers, varying by factors such as demographics, size, and repeat business. 
Identifying relevant categories of customers could only be done after data collection 
(Table 8, for example), rather than assuming a set of customers in advance or identifying 
them early in the fieldwork.  
 All nine cases have been structured in a similar manner. While the semi-structured 
interview questions were asked in each interview in a similar manner, the level of detail 
available and format of how participants answered the questions differed dramatically 
from participant to participant. Given these are narratives of the founders of startups, one 
of the assumptions I made was that the interactions mentioned are those that the founders 
believed were most important for their startup. Sample terminology used by participants 
are defined in Appendix C. The cases represent all the customer interactions mentioned 
during interviews and in the public locations noted by the participants during the 
interviews, including on online community forums, social media platforms, and websites.  
 The second part involved identifying customer interaction activities by analyzing 
narratives. Process maps were created to help with this. Using Business Process Model 
and Notation software (BMPN.io), detailed process maps of the new venture creation 
process and customer interactions were made. These maps helped create a visual 
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overview of the various stakeholders and interactions that the startup has. The process 
maps can be found in Appendix D.  
 These two types of data displays, narrative cases and process maps, encompass 
the bulk of customer interactions, and sensitized me to potential types of customer 
interaction activities that occurred in the startups in the sample (e.g. interactions on the 
phone, in online forums, through social media, at networking events, etc.).  
 Note that despite regular data collection, there was potential for several customer 
interactions to not be documented (e.g. casual discussions, phone calls, e-mails, and 
interactions deemed not important or forgotten by participants to mention). Therefore, in 
this study, I focus on customer interactions that are exchanges of information between the 
startup founders and potential or realized customers that are salient for the participant at a 
given time point.  
 To try to collect information on the most important customer interactions and to 
minimize issues with retrospective accounts of action (Golden, 1992), combining 
accounts with archival data and multiple founder interviews were used to reduce biases. 
Secondly, for an event to be considered as important, all founders must consider it to be 
of real significance.  
Part 2. Coding Data to Identify Categories 
 As one of the initial stages of analysis, micro-coding was used with the 
transcribed interviews to generate a broad assortment of categories that the data could be 
approached from (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
 The purpose of coding the data was to identify concepts that are related to the 
phenomena of interest (customer interactions), help in the identification, clarification and 
specification of concepts or subcategories of concepts in understanding the mechanisms 
by which early customer interactions are influencing startups. As coding is a dynamic and 
iterative process, as new themes emerged and concepts and dimensions developed, they 
were adapted and re-classified over the process of data collection and analysis, and 
existing literature was consulted (Suddaby, 2006). Codes identified are noted in Table 9.  
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Table 9. Customer and Customer Interaction Information Codes and Definitions. Used in matrices 
for analyses. 
CUSTOMER AND CUSTOMER INTERACTION INFORMATION (Column B in analysis)  
1. Description of Stage for Startup: A shortened summary of the case and detailed process diagram 
2. Type of Customer: A category of customer, based on relationship defined by the founder(s). 
These may include the Founder, Friends and family, Professional network, Early adopters in 
external target market, External target market, Everyone, etc. 
3. Customer Interaction Initiated by: Who initiates the relationship – the Customer, Startup, Other 
4. Information Collection / Marketing and Sales Communication Channel for Customer 
Interaction: The medium through which a message is transmitted to or received from the customer. 
Physical (Earned, In-person, Phone, Newspaper articles, Radio promotions & Paid Ads) versus 
Web/Mobile (Email, Social media, Blogs, etc.) 
5. Distribution Channel of Product: The chain of businesses or intermediaries through which a 
good or service passes before it reaches the end consumer. These include: Direct to end-customer / 
end-user, Direct via marketplace, Direct to customer via intermediary, Direct to retailer, or Indirect 
- Agents, Intermediaries, Brokers, Distributors 
6. Purpose of Early Customer Interaction: The reason for which the early customer interaction 
took place. Tested hypotheses and assumptions on (1) Problem, (2) Product (MVP), (3) Business 
model, or (4) Customer segment; Learned more about problem or customer, etc. 
7. Description of Information Gathered: A representation of what information was collected 
during the customer interaction. For example: Product features, customer interest, etc. 
8. Customer Feedback Impact: The type of effect of the customer interaction and information 
collected on the business. The two potential imacts are: Strategic feedback impact (affecting business 
concept and overall scope and direction of corporation; Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972; Maidique & 
Zirger, 1984; 1985) or Operational/Tactical feedback impact (Affecting the plan of action to employ 
resources, and every day moves to give the organization an advantage; Ansoff, 1988) 
9. Level of Validation Received from Customer: Recognition or affirmation that an aspect of the 
business (problem, product, business model, customer segment, etc.) is valid or worthwhile to 
pursue. Displayed in Chapter 4 in concentric shell circle diagrams, from inside out - Self-
justification, Personal network: Family & friends validation, Professional network, Early adopters 
Target market validation, External target market validation / Media validation, Commitment through 
contract validation, Commitment through money exchange validation 
12. Other Non-Customer Intel Collected During NVC Stage: Other ways in which information 
was collected about the customer, besides a customer interaction. These include: Data analytics, 
Interviews with mentors or investors, Secondary research, etc. 
 The data were initially managed in NVivo 11.1.1 for Mac, and later, hand-coded. 
The use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CADQDAS) is a debated 
topic amongst qualitative researchers (Welsh, 2002). While software can help in making 
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analysis more systematic – facilitating the organizing, manipulating, storing and 
retrieving of data - and is thought by some to add rigour (Richards & Richards, 1991), 
using software for coding has the potential to affect the richness of qualitative data.  
 The reason for this is that one of the goals of qualitative research is to observe the 
perspective of human actors (Roberts & Wilson, 2002). This requires interpreting the 
context, how participants interact with the environment and with each other, and the 
language that they use to express themselves. While categorization is an important part of 
the analysis process, when using CADQDAS, there can be the temptation to create an 
increasing diversity of codes and discrete categories into which data are forced. This can 
over-segment the data, affecting the meaning that would cause the researcher to lose sight 
of the context and the overall picture and may lead to “incorrect” analysis occurring. 
Furthermore, while initial coding is important, it is also important to think about 
connections between themes across data (Welsh, 2002), which can be challenging when 
flipping through windows in CADQDAS programs.  
 CADQDAS programs have the potential to distance researchers from the data 
(Morison & Moir, 1998; Weitzman & Miles, 1995), where researchers may handle a 
fraction of the data set at a time, and where even just reading the data on the screen may 
alienate researcher from the data – ultimately affecting the analysis part of qualitative 
research. As Kelle (1995) says, "the central analytical task in qualitative research—
understanding the meaning of texts—cannot be computerized" (p.3).  
 In contrast, manual coding allows researchers to create a closeness to and 
familiarity with the data. The categorizing and sorting then takes place in different 
displays – matrices, tables and diagrams - are used to summarize data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), It also allows the researcher to acknowledge different ways an idea or 
concept are expressed by participants (Welsh, 2002), and to step back to standardize how 
these concepts may be analyzed and reported across cases.  
 Roberts and Wilson (2002) and Welsh (2002) argue for the supporting use of both 
CADQDAS and manual coding – as done in this dissertation. Software programs are 
useful to systematically explore the data and to find descriptive codes and thematic ideas. 
Memos were written that allowed for data to be connected. However, with process data, 
 85 
the goal was to connect events and ideas that took place over time. Manual handling the 
data was particularly helpful with this. By re-reading the data manually, I was able to 
address how ideas were expressed differently by different participants, think about the 
process that they undertook, and compare themes that emerged over the new venture 
creation process through customer interactions.  
Part 3. Creation of Event Listing Matrices  
 Because this study is process-oriented, I generated a time-ordered event listing 
matrix display for each case (nine total) that allowed for the transforming of data, 
condensing, sorting, and linking it over time (Gheradi & Turner, 2002). For each case, a 
crossing of two lists helped in understanding flow, location, and connection of events. 
The matrices are event listings – a series of concrete events listed over a chronological 
time-period (columns) and sorted into categories (rows; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
 The Event Listing Matrices for each case can be found in Appendix E. Labels 
from these events came from activities that occurred during that chronological time-
period. From the interview transcripts and narratives, I identified venture creation phases 
and stages that arose in the startups that were documented during the study period. I 
defined a venture creation phase as a time-period in which particular activities are 
undertaken to advance the startup and a clear goal is met. A phase is made up of stages. 
The events were also associated with the new venture creation phases and stages noted in 
the literature. Five phases are identified. New time periods (or phases) were defined by a 
significant activity, or shift of activities – a “barometric event” that moves the process 
into the subsequent time-period. I then reduced this list to a comprehensive set of 
“typical” venture creation stages using a defined set of criteria (noted in Table 10).  
The decision rules for data entry into the matrix were clearly defined as follows: 
• Data were described based on data from specific interview transcripts, unless the 
participants said that this was the way it was always done.  
• Secondary data were used to fill in the gaps from the interviews, as well as 
triangulate the information from the interviews. 
• Participants were followed up with to ensure that the events were correctly 
interpreted.  
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Table 10. Definitions of Phases and Stages in New Venture Creation 
PHASE (I to V; Row 1 in analysis), (Based 
on Bhave, 1994; Cunneen et al., 2007) 
NEW VENTURE CREATION STAGE (A to J; Row 4 in analysis) 
I. OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY PHASE - 
First stage of venture formation during which 
business opportunity is recognized (Bhave, 
1994) (A, B, C). Stages G, H, and I (from the 
Entrepreneurial Phase) may also occur in this 
phase. 
(I) - Internally Stimulated Opportunity 
Recognition 
(E) - Externally Stimulated Opportunity Recognition 
A(I) - INDIVIDUAL NEED RECOGNIZED - 
Entrepreneur sees a need that to her/his 
knowledge has no current solution. 
A(E) - DECISION TO START A BUSINESS - 
Entrepreneur's personal and environmental 
circumstances led them to want to start a business, 
before deciding what that business is (Bhave, 1994) 
B(I) - OPPORTUNITY FILTRATION - 
Filtration of opportunities among a group of 
recognized ones (Long & McMullan, 1984) leads 
to... INDIVIDUAL NEED being FULFILLED 
when a solution is identified. 
B(E) - OPPORTUNITIES RECOGNIZED - 
Several opportunities are recognized, and entrepreneur 
conducts a search into how their knowledge, 
experience, skills, and other resources match the needs 
of the market - and they filter opportunities (Bhave, 
1994; Long & McMullan, 1984) 
C(I) - OPPORTUNITY SELECTION (Bhave, 
1994) leads to… BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 
RECOGNIZED - When entrepreneur sees a need 
is widespread and commit to it 
C(E) - OPPORTUNITIES CHOSEN - 
Entrepreneur(s) create a commitment to pursue an 
opportunity (Bhave, 1994) 
II. OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT 
PHASE - During this phase, the venture has 
decided this is an interesting business 
opportunity and plans to define the business 
concept and whether it meets customers' needs 
(Bhave, 1994) (D, E) Stages G, H, and I (from 
the Entrepreneurial Phase) may also occur in 
this phase. 
D - OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT - Idea is adapted and elaborated until BUSINESS CONCEPT is 
IDENTIFIED 
E - BUSINESS CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT - During this stage, effort is put in to clarify business 
concept to achieve fit between customer needs and entrepreneur's perceptions of these needs (Bhave, 1994) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
PHASE (I to V; Row 1 in analysis), (Based on 
Bhave, 1994; Cunneen et al., 2007) 
NEW VENTURE CREATION STAGE (A to J; Row 4 in analysis) 
III. TRANSITION PHASE - During this phase, the 
venture has committed to starting the organization in 
some significant way (Bhave, 1994) (F) 
F - COMMITTED TO PHYSICAL CREATION, INCLUDING ORGANIZING 
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO TRANSFORM BUSINESS CONCEPT INTO 
MARKETABLE PRODUCT - At this stage, the entrepreneur has decided to build an organization 
and product. While testing the market and a minimum viable product may have occurred earlier, at 
this stage, there is an action on the part of the entrepreneur, such as dedicating their full-time to the 
startup or renting a physical work space, that signifies a more dedicated commitment to the business. 
Prior literature suggests that often, but not always, at this stage, that the founder has promises of a 
potential customer/an actual customer (Block & MacMillan, 1985; Bhave, 1994) 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE - During this 
phase, the venture is still being set up, the customer 
segment is being tested, the business model is being 
evaluated, and/or the product/technology 
development is ongoing. While three stages take 
place during this phase (G, H, I), in no particular 
order, these three stages can also take place during 
other phases of the new venture creation process 
G - PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT & RELATED RESOURCE 
ASSEMBLY - Attention towards the development of the 'physical' or digital product takes place 
during this phase, including gathering resources for production technology development, and defining 
specifications, design, prototype or minimum viable product (MVP), manufacturing processes; related 
services and required expertise and knowledge. 
H - ORGANIZATION CREATION & RELATED RESOURCE ASSEMBLY - Attention 
towards the development of the organization takes place during this phase, including gathering 
resources for creating the physical and virtual organization, office facilities and equipment, physical 
structure, organizational processes, organization related software, etc. (Thompson, 1967). Funding 
from investors, grants, banks, also falls under this phase, as it is not necessarily funneled towards 
product or customer development, but may be allocated from the organization. 
I - RESOURCE ASSEMBLY TO DEVELOP CUSTOMERS - Attention towards developing 
customers takes place during this phase, including gathering resources to carry out marketing, sales 
and promotion activities. 
V. EXECUTE PHASE - Once this phase is reached, 
the founders are fairly certain they have established 
their market/business model and focus on growing it 
with sales and marketing efforts (J).  
J - SUBSEQUENT SALES WITH INCREASED MARKETING EFFORTS TOWARDS GOAL 
MARKET AND FORMALIZE BUSINESS. - At this stage, there is a good idea of who the 
customers, business model, and product are and the goal is to increase sales through increased 
marketing and sales efforts. There may or may not have been money exchanged by this stage, but 
there is likely to be some sort of commitment to the business (e.g. through a contract). 
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Part Four. Time-Ordered Display Summary Matrix and Within-Case Analyses 
 To summarize what happened in each main phase, or time-period of new venture 
creation, a summary table, a time-ordered display summary matrix, was created for 
each case. Summary tables were necessary, given the size of these matrices and the 
volume of the data (each event listing matrix in Appendix E spanned several printed 
pages). 
 There were nine time-ordered summary matrices created (one for each case) that 
help interpret the larger, more comprehensive event listing matrix from Part Three. These 
tables are noted in the main body of the dissertation (Chapter 4) and provide an overview 
for how each variable changed over time within the case.  
 These summary tables used the tactics suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) 
to draw conclusions. Two codes included in the original event listing matrices (rows 10 - 
Level of acceptance of customer feedback, and 11 - Subsequent action by startup) were 
excluded from the summary table due to lack of comparable data and repetition.  
Part Five. Written Within-Case Analyses 
  The within-case analyses in Chapter 4 used the topics in these time-ordered 
display summary matrices to create a series of explanations and data displays to better 
understand each case. Shortened, focused narratives were written based on data from the 
time-ordered display matrices that assessed customer interactions in each phase.  
3.4.4. Cross-Case Analysis 
 Textual and visual data displays continued to be important to conduct the cross-
case analysis. A cross-case analysis, involving comparable cases in a meta-matrix (Part 
1), was used to deepen understanding and explanation of a scenario (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Using the within-case analyses that have a standard set of variables, matrices and 
other displays were used to understand each case in depth.  
Part 1. Meta-Matrix 
 After each individual case is well understood, the case-level displays were stacked 
into a partially ordered meta-matrix, where the data from several cases are brought into 
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one big chart, condensing them further using a standardized format that allows for 
systematic comparisons to be made and pattern clarification (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Appendix F). Further analyses were conducted based on what patterns were seen in this 
meta-matrix. 
Part Two. Path Analysis 
Finally, path analysis was undertaken to understand the startups’ paths and 
develop a general model of customer interaction during startup formation. There have 
been different methods proposed to analyze paths. Sydow et al. (2009) suggested that 
there are three main mechanisms that can be identified to map out an organization’s path. 
First, operational rigidity or persistence within an organization are identified. In more 
established organizations, this can be done by looking for practices that are inefficient or 
not as valuable, however this may be challenging in newer organizations. Secondly, self-
reinforcing feedback mechanisms can be identified and reconstructed that may contribute 
to organizational rigidity. Finally, a triggering event, or critical juncture, can be identified 
that facilitates the path building process. 
Similar steps to analyzing paths were also considered by Wenzel et al. (2015) who 
developed four steps to their path biography methodology: 1) Focus on self-reinforcing 
mechanisms; 2) focus on the technical level, organizational level, and level-spanning 
interactions; 3) Consider the interaction between the local information system and global 
environment, and 4) Focus on stabilization and lock-in. 
Finally, Koch (2008) suggests that strategic paths can only be analyzed 
retrospectively, and argues that the analysis of the strategic path needs the strategic 
activities and the agents that reflect on these strategic activities. Narrative interviews are, 
as a result, ideal for this type of analysis. 
While analyzing paths retrospectively is important to gain a fuller picture of 
events over time, collecting narrative data in near-real time, as done in this dissertation, is 
also important to reduce hindsight bias on events recounted by actors. Events that 
influence path dependence may appear as small, contingent, random, or historic accidents 
(Arthur, 1989; Bennett & Elman, 2006; Djelic & Quack, 2007), but are associated with 
initial choices (van Driel, 2013) that may or may not be identified retrospectively. 
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 To identify self-reinforcing mechanisms, Koch (2011) outlines four steps: a) 
identify time-consistent strategic practices or strategic activities; b) identify positive, 
negative, and neutral elements of feedback, and identify at least one positive feedback 
loop that suggests path formation; c) look for changes in the environment that indicate a 
rationality shift – a significant environmental change that creates inefficiencies in the 
strategic pattern (this can be an indication of lock-in); and d) look at whether the 
organization adapted its strategic activities after there was a change in the environment. If 
no changes occurred (indicating a rigidity) or if changes are counterproductive, this 
suggests that lock-in may exist and that it may be challenging to overcome lock-in.  
Two points should be noted for all the path analysis methods on early stage 
organizations. Path analysis is typically done on more established organizations that have 
already experienced lock-in or operational rigidity (Sydow et al., 2009), and already have 
a notable persistence of a trait, even if it is no longer relevant or appropriate to the 
organization.  Given the early life stage of the startups, it is unlikely startups reached 
lock-in, so for this analysis, I focus on the paths that are strategically relevant to the 
organization and aim to focus on identifying the narrowing of their options, rather than 
lock-in.  
As a result, the focus on the path in this dissertation is on:  
1) detecting what initial activities and choices (trigger events) trigger the critical 
juncture, leading from the Preformation Phase (Phase I) to the Formation Phase 
(or the phase of positive feedback as termed by Koch, 2008; Phase II) 
2) identifying potential positive feedback mechanisms (precursors to lock-in and 
path dependence) that result from customer interactions that drive a startup 
towards a narrowing path (Koch, 2008; Wenzel et al., 2015). 
The dissertation analysis reconstructs these self-reinforcing mechanisms leading 
towards the belief that the product, business model and market have been established and 
can be pursued (in other words, leading the startup towards the Execute Phase of new 
venture creation). While in a fine grain analysis, individual startups in the sample have 
diverse outcomes in terms of the customer interactions and how they interpret them, I 
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identify mechanisms in the new venture creation process that should generally apply to 
startups. 
 Finally, to present the model, I used the style of causal loop diagramming 
methods commonly used in system dynamics research to articulate process theories (e.g. 
Perlow et al., 2002; Rudolph et al., 2009) and increasingly used in organizational theory 
literature (e.g. Strike & Rerup, 2016). This overall model considers customer interactions 
during the early stages of new venture creation unfolding over time, and the stage at 
which there is a critical juncture in the organizational path. 
3.5. Summary of the Sample Description and Research Design 
 Chapter 3 describes the sample and inductive qualitative methods used to develop 
a better understanding of customer interactions during the new venture creation process. 
A pilot study helped test the approach to investigate the main research question (3.1). The 
research context and sample was described (nine startups in Ontario-based incubators; 
3.2). Data collection took place through interviews, observations, and archival data (3.3). 
Finally, five stages of data analysis (3.4) of the main study for this dissertation are 
described and justified here. These include developing narratives and process maps, 
coding the data, creating comparative matrices as visual aids when constructing raw data 
into themes (event-listing matrices, summaries of time-ordered displays, focused 
narratives, other data displays for within-case analyses, and a meta matrix for the cross-
case analysis), conducting a path analysis and using a causal loop diagram to display the 
process of customer interactions during early stages of the new venture creation process. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 4, each of the nine cases is individually analyzed (within-
case analyses).  
. 
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4. RESULTS: WITHIN-CASE FINDINGS 
Overview of Analysis 
 Chapter 4 provides the summaries of the within-case analyses for each of the nine 
cases. Note that both Chapters 4 and 5 are densely packed with data and findings. Rather 
than including these chapters in the appendices, these two chapters were included in the 
main body of the dissertation to take readers through the inductive analysis process and 
show the characteristics of customer interactions that emerged from the data, to provide a 
common structure for each case (Chapter 4) so that they can be compared (in Chapter 5), 
and to demonstrate to readers the richness of the cases. In other words, these chapters are 
included in the main body of the dissertation to demonstrate the patterns that emerged in 
customer interactions during each phase of new venture creation (Opportunity Discovery, 
Opportunity Refinement, Transition, Entrepreneurial, and Execute Phases). that triggered 
the theory development presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The basis of analysis for each case 
is described as follows.  
 In Sections 4.1 to 4.9, each of the nine case analyses are presented individually, in 
a standardized format, using a series of text, figures, and tables. The characteristics noted 
were not specifically pre-defined and emerged from the iterative process of going 
between the data during the analysis process and the literature. The analysis of each case 
began with a case study overview (1) of the startup at each phase of the new venture 
creation process. This was followed by a summary of customer interactions (2), where 
customer interactions involved in the startup process were outlined and characterized in 
tables. The next section explains the startup focus (3), defining whether the startup is 
product, organization, or customer-focused during each of the venture creation stages. 
Then, in the customer commitment (4) section, the first customer interaction and first 
customer commitment through contract and/or sale are noted, and the new venture 
creation phase in which these interactions occurred. Next, who initiated customer 
interaction (5) is mentioned, followed by a summary of the communication channels 
(6) used over time. The type of feedback sought (7) by the startup at different phases 
was also noted (strategic feedback, affecting the business concept, or operational or 
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tactical feedback, affecting activities to carry out/create the business concept). Finally, 
the level of validation (8) received was reported, defining when and from whom the 
startup received validation for their idea, product, or business model. Finally, these eight 
characteristics are presented in a summary for each case (9), noting the corresponding 
number of the characteristic in parentheses in bold.  
 For more information on the sample, see Table 7 for a descriptive profile of the 
startups. Also, see Table 9 for an explanation of the customer interaction characteristics 
codes used (in the first column of the following tables), and Table 10 for the definitions 
of phases and stages of the new venture creation process adopted for this analysis. 
Finally, note that much of the “semi-raw” data are available in the Appendices. As noted 
in the methodology section (Chapter 3), as part of these analyses for each of the nine 
startups, I prepared an extensive case narrative with supporting quotes (Appendix B), 
process maps detailing each stage of venture creation during the study period (Appendix 
D), and a detailed event listing matrices of this process study (Appendix E) used to show 
and transform time-ordered data. These three types of data displays allowed me to 
condense, sort, and link data, and to draw conclusions on the process over time (Gheradi 
& Turner, 2002), and allowed me to generate the assessments of customer interactions for 
each startup over time and summary tables of the time-ordered displays in this chapter.  
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4.1. Startup A 
4.1.1. Case Overview 
 Startup A was a beverage company that described their business as: “[we] make 
the best organic [specialty beverage], the only 100 percent certified organic [specialty 
beverage] on the market. We are the only company doing seasonal craft flavours… and 
like a craft brewery – we try to stay small batch” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 
2016). Though the idea arose in 2012, the company was only founded in July 2014.  
 Startup A was founded by two entrepreneurs who were engaged to be married. 
Both founders were very health focused – having met in a fitness facility and having a 
shared interest in physical activity, health and nutrition. After a few years, one founder 
developed health issues, and in researching how she could change her diet to make her 
condition less severe, she discovered consuming fermented foods would be helpful. She 
began creating different types of fermented foods, until finally, she created a delicious 
fermented beverage. She let her family and friends try early versions of it (the Minimum 
Viable Product), and upon receiving positive feedback, the founder and her fiancé saw 
that there was a potential business opportunity to sell the beverage to others (I. 
Opportunity Discovery Phase).  
 In their spare time, the founders continued to test out the beverage with their 
personal and professional networks in the health industry and found that potential 
customers were very supportive of the product. The founders believed that they could 
expand the business further (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase), and decided to commit 
to the business full time. One founder stopped pursuing his Ph.D. and the other decided to 
dedicate more time and effort to improving the product. They had a business logo 
designed for the startup and managed to get their first contract with a health food retailer, 
also a professional contact (III. Transition Phase). Over time, they moved in to a larger, 
22,000 square feet facility to expand production, and started testing distribution options, 
including selling the product themselves at the local farmers’ market and exploring 
distribution options with smaller health food retailers (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase). As 
Startup A’s reputation grew, and knowledge about this fermented beverage grew, the 
startup started seeking out and gaining contracts with specialty supermarket chains, 
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national general supermarket chains, regional organic supermarkets, and distributors. 
While they continued to find customer interest was there, the startup was unable to serve 
all of their needs with their current production facilities. This resulted in them having to 
refrain from taking on larger clients (a nation-wide warehouse retailer and a large 
regional organic food distributor) until they received a loan to create a larger, new 
production facility (V. Execute Phase).  
4.1.2. Understanding Customer Interactions 
 Table 11 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup A, and Table 12 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are 
referenced both in this chapter, as well as the cross-case analysis in the next chapter.  
 Note that the founders of Startup A believed that there were multiple types of 
customers in this startup, including individual end-consumers, the retail stores that the 
beverage is sold through, as well as distributors. The founders initially believed that 
individual consumers were like the professional market that they themselves already were 
a part of: “[the] health conscious yogi type, younger hipsters.” However, they also saw 
the potential to target a wider external target market, including a larger demographic: 
“Really, the big opportunity is middle aged women. And then craft cocktails… I think the 
sky’s the limit there.” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).  
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One founder developed 
health issues and 
experimented with making 
fermented foods that were 
supposed to help. She 
created a delicious 
fermented beverage, and let 
her family and friends try it. 
Upon receiving positive 
feedback, the founder and 
her fiancé (co-founder) saw 
the potential business 
opportunity. 
The founders tested out the 
beverage with their network 
of individuals in the health 
industry to see if they would 




business by putting 
other activities on 
hold, including 
stopping the pursuit 
of a PhD. The 
founders had a 
business logo 
designed, and worked 
towards and 
succeeded in getting 
a contract with a 
health food retailer.  
The founders expanded 
production of the 
product and tested 
distribution options (in 
retail stores and at the 
farmers' market) to see if 
a wider array of 
customers in their niche 
health food market 
would be interested to 
access product. 
Sales efforts increased sales 
in both niche market as well 
as a wider, more 
mainstream retail target 
market through different 
channels - direct to end-






(underlined if >1 
at a time): 
Focus on product (2), 
organization (1), and 
customer (1); N/A (1) 
Focus on customer & 
product (2) together (getting 
customer feedback for 
product improvement at the 
same time) 
Focus on product & 
organization (1) at 
the same time 
Focus on organization 
(1) and customers (3) 
(specifically to increase 
sales and test sales in 
different markets) 
Focus predominantly on 
customers (16), but 
occasionally, a focus on 
product (1) and organization 




Table 11 continued 






















Had end-consumer sales 
shortly after initial 
product was developed 
End-consumer 
sales continued 
during this phase 
Secured first contract 
from retailer 
Continued building of 
contracts with retailers 
and individual end-
consumer sales 
Continued building of contracts with 
retailers and individual end-consumer 
sales 
Type of Customer:  Started with just founder, 
then, expanded to family 
and friends, and then 
professional network (who 
also was representative of 





representative of a 
subset of external 
target market) 
Professional network 
(which was also 
representative of a 
subset of external 
target market) 
Professional network 
and external target 
market 
Professional network and external 




by: (number of 
initiations): 
Startup (2); N/A (3) Startup (2) Startup (1) Startup (3), N/A (1) Startup (10), Customer (4); Media (1); 
Customer & Startup (1); Media & 
Startup (1); N/A (5) 
4.1.6. Information 
Collection and 




(underlined if >1 at a 
time): 





and phone (1) 
Physical, In-person (1); 
Physical, In-person, TV, 
Web – Website and 
Social media (1); 
Physical, In-person, 
meetings, phone, Web - 
email (1); N/A (1) 
Physical - Phone (1); In-person (3); 
Social media (1); Physical, In-person 
& phone (3); Physical, In-person & 
Social Media (1); In-person, phone, 
email, website (2); Social media, 
email, phone (1); Event, phone, email 
(1); Newspaper, social media, blog 
(1); >3 channels (3); N/A (5) 
Distribution 
Channel of Product:  
Direct to end-customer 
(2); N/A (3) 
Direct to end-
customer (2) 
Direct to retailer (1) Direct to end-customer 
(1); Direct to retailer (1); 
N/A (2) 
Direct to end-customer (3); Direct to 
retailer (6); Direct to distributor (1); 
Direct to end customer & retailer (1); 
Retailer & distributor (1); N/A (11) 
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(underlined if >1 
at a time):  
Testing problem (1) and 
customer (1), problem & 
product (1), and product 
(2) (Developing and 
testing) 
Testing product 




model and tested 
customer segment 
(1) 
Testing business model 
& customer segment (2); 
Testing problem, 
product, business model, 
& customer segment  
(and promoting) (1); 
N/A (1) 
Raised awareness (promoting; 5); Tested 
retailer/distributor interest (4); Product & 
customer (2); Tested problem & customer 
(2); Product, business model, & customer 
(1); Problem, product, business model & 





Learned about product 
and generally whether 
people would like it 
Learned people in 
their networks 
liked the way the 
product tasted 




and people liked 
the product 
Learned that both their 
professional network, a 
sample of the external 
target market, and 
retailers liked the 
product 
Learned that individual customers and 
retailers were interested, but that they also 
had customer loyalty and repeat interest. 
To maintain this however, they realized 
they needed to attend to neglected existing 




Strategic - confirmatory 
feedback when just 
founders (3); Strategic 
confirmatory from 
family and friends (1); 
and Operational/Tactical 





Strategic - confirmatory 
(1); Strategic & 
Operational/Tactical - 
confirmatory (2), N/A 
(1) 
Strategic - confirmatory (9); 
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (3); 
Operational/Tactical - not confirmatory 
(1); Strategic & Operational/Tactical - 
confirmatory (3); N/A (6) 
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Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary 




Self-justification initially and 
then expanded to personal 
network (and money 
exchange) and 
Professional/External target 




representative of subset 
of external target 





of subset of external 




and wider external target 
market validation (and 
money exchange and 
contract) 
There continued to be 
professional network and wider 
external target market validation, 
however there was also some 
media validation (4 times), where 
an article, blog, radio feature, etc. 
took place, and continued money 







Secondary research about 
problem and marketing 
company 
None None None Affected by media exposure as 
well as bank offering funding for 
expanding size of production 
facility 
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Table 12. Startup A: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time 
CUSTOMER INTERACTION 
CHARACTERISTICS 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME 
4.1.1. Description of Startup 
Process: 
Phase sequence was a “typical” venture creation process, involving exploring 
an idea, checking for product-customer fit, and developing ways to 
manufacture and expand the business. 
4.1.3. Product, Organization, 
and/or Customer Focus: 
The founders focused on developing the product early, during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). While there were informal interactions with 
family and friends that eventually became first customers, the startup's focus 
on obtaining customers predominantly took place later in the venture creation 
process.  
4.1.4. Demonstrated Customer 
Commitment: 
Initial sales took place during the in the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), 
providing initial validation to the founders. Sales continued during each phase 
and sales to different types of customers (retailers and distributors) expanded 
over time. 
Type of Customer:  In each subsequent phase, founders reached further outside personal network 
to the external target market. Media engagement helped reach the external 
target market during later stages of venture creation. 
4.1.5. Customer Interaction 
Initiated by: 
Until Startup A became more well known in the local community during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase, the startup initiated most customer interactions. 
4.1.6. Information Collection and 
Marketing and Sales 
Communication Channel for 
Interaction: 
Initial customer interactions were simple and done predominantly in-person. 
However, by the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), additional communication 
channels were adopted, including digital ones.  
Distribution Channel of Product:  Over time, as the startup experienced success of sales with individual end-
customers, it first found its first retailer through professional connections 
during the Transition Phase (III) and expanded by reaching out to a wider 
market through retailers and distributors in the Entrepreneurial and Execute 
Phases (IV and V). The retailers and distributors connected with were 
increasingly larger over time. 
Purpose of Early Customer 
Interaction:  
Testing the business model became more important to the founders over time. 
The founders heavily focused on testing the product, problem, and customer 
early in venture creation, but this also continued throughout the phases. The 
purpose moved from developing and testing/learning to testing/learning and 
promoting. 
Description of Information 
Gathered:  
Founders initially relied on feedback from their personal and professional 
networks as validation to start the business - rather than starting with 
discussions with an external target market first. This may have been possible 
because their professional networks and the external target market overlap. 
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DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME 
4.1.7. Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Founders predominantly received strategic confirmation that this was a good business 
concept to pursue early in the process. Activities undertaken to gain Operational/Tactical 
confirmation took place later in venture creation, predominantly in the Entrepreneurial 
and Execute Phases (IV and V). 
4.1.8. Level of 
Validation Received 
from Customer:  
Founders received validation from personal and professional networks (related to 
external target market) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. In subsequent phases, 
validation grew from money exchange and contracts with retailers, and interactions with 
external market, and eventually, also the media. The founders only started reaching 
outside their personal and professional networks in the Entrepreneurial Phase and 
beyond. 
Other Non-Customer 
Intel Collected During 
NVC Stage:  
Funding played a large role in being able to expand production facilities. Without the 
focus on the organization and ability to grow production, the founders held back on 
interactions and potential contracts with customers. Continued reliance on one non-
customer that affected resource access negatively impacted the business - particularly 
when there was no apparent search for a solution outside of that stakeholder. 
4.1.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 As Table 11 and Table 12 suggest, Startup A early in new venture creation was 
predominantly focused on developing the product (product focus), but also took the time 
to verify customer interest and the ability to manufacture the product (organization 
focus). Over time, this focus switched to an organization/product focus and then, during 
the Execute Phase (V), predominantly a customer focus with an increased focus on sales 
(see Figure 5).  
Figure 5. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New 


















III. Transition V. Execute IV. Entrepreneurial 
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4.1.4. Customer Commitment 
 First Customer Interaction and First Customer Commitment through Sale (end-
consumer) for Startup A took place during Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). First 
Customer Commitment Through Contract (retailer) took place during the Transition 
Phase (III). Development and revisions to the organization, product and customer 
interactions took place as mentioned in 4.1.3 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup A. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer) 
 
4.1.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 Startup A initiated customer interactions until the Execute Phase (V), when they 
































E. Develop or 
Revise Organization 
/ Product / Customer 
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4.1.6. Communication Channel 
 Most early communications with customers were in person. It was only after the 
founders had committed to the business (during the Entrepreneurial Phase, IV), when the 
startup began using more communication channels, including phone, email, and social 
media. This was also when the founders began receiving additional levels of validation 
for the startup (see Section 4.1.8). 
4.1.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 Founders began seeking out more operational and tactical feedback after they had 
committed to the business (first in the Entrepreneurial Phase, IV). They however 
continued to seek out strategic confirmation through all phases. 
4.1.8. Level of Validation 
 The founders’ personal and professional network provided enough validation, 
verbally and with early sales in the Opportunity Discovery and Opportunity Refinement 
Phases for them to decide to commit to starting Startup A by the Transition Phase (III). 
Early sales were to family and friends and individuals in the founders’ professional 
network, and continued to provide enough validation to the founders to continue to 
explore the business (see Figure 7). It should be noted that the founders’ professional 
network was part of a subset of their wider target market, the health industry. More effort 
to reach out to the wider external target market took place during the Entrepreneurial 
Phase (IV). 
 Once the founders confirmed they had a product that their target market was 
interested in and had demonstrated the ability to scale sales with retailers and distributors, 
the founders entered the Execute Phase (V). By this time, they had received validation 
from outside of their personal and professional networks, including the external target 
market, media validation, commitment through retailer and distributor contracts, and 
continued commitment from the end-customer with purchases.  
  
 104 
Figure 7. Level of Validation Received by Startup A During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories: I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 








4.1.9. Summary of Startup A 
 Startup A was a beverage company founded in July 2014 (1). The first customer 
interaction and sale itself took place early, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). 
This sale was to family and friends, and the founders said that at this time that selling the 
beverage was just a hobby, “to make some money on the side” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 7 June, 2016; 2). The startup believed their market was health conscious 
individuals, as well as individuals who aspired to be health conscious with a great tasting 
beverage. 
 Startup A was product focused early in new venture creation, eventually shifting 















































the Opportunity Discovery Phase, it was not until the Transitional Phase (III), where the 
first retailer was secured through a contract, that the founders realized that the business 
could grow in value over time (4). It was after this time (in the Entrepreneurial and 
Execute Phases) that Startup A begun to reach outside of their personal and professional 
networks to the wider target market, and started using a larger number of communication 
channels, and explored a more diverse array of distribution channels for the product. 
Startup A initiated customer interactions until the Execute Phase (5).  
 Initial customer communication was in-person, however after the Transition 
Phase, the startup reached beyond their database of personal and professional networks to 
a wider target market through diverse communication methods (6). They also begun 
seeking out more operational and tactical feedback after the Transition Phase (7).  
 While Startup A received validation by having sales early, they expanded their 
business in a step-wise manner, to explore just how large a market they could attract. The 
sales early to family and friends provided good initial validation for interest in the 
product, however later testing with the external target market was needed to see if they 
could continue to grow their market and justify expanding their organization almost 
concurrently (increasing production capacity only once there was a large enough market 
interested in the product; 8).  
 It should be noted however that this step-wise approach to new venture creation 
was possible because of the nature of manufacturing the physical product – i.e. that it 
could be designed, adapted, and produced locally and in small batches. This may not have 
been possible with physical products requiring large setup costs for manufacturing.  
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4.2. Startup B 
4.2.1. Case Overview 
 Startup B was a membership-based physical and digital makerspace, a physical 
location where individuals could gather and share resources, tools and knowledge on 
creative projects, network and build both physical and digital media. The founders called 
it: “a venue for creative makers of all types” (Startup B’s Twitter page, Accessed 1 
March, 2017). The cofounders lived in a mid-sized town, and felt that there needed to be 
more community-based cultural opportunities associated with arts or technology, 
available to local citizens to observe and participate in: “The people who [live here], they 
are the ones who don’t have the benefit of cultural activities that are more long term or 
interesting things that help you feel a sense of belonging in that community. That’s a very 
typical problem in many towns and cities across North America” (Startup B Founder, 
Interview, 6 June, 2016).  
 Startup B was started by two founders with backgrounds in Chemistry and 
Industrial Engineering, and who, at the time of founding, September 2015, were both 
pursuing a Masters in Entrepreneurship. They started the business slowly, conducting 
secondary research on existing makerspaces and the community (I. Opportunity 
Discovery Phase). 
 After learning more about the potential of the business concept, the founders 
decided to test potential customer interest and raise awareness by setting up booths at an 
education networking event, and two different entrepreneurship events. Having received 
positive feedback on the business concept, the founders started to search for a permanent 
business location for the makerspace through their personal network in government, and 
begun planning their first pop-up event – meant to be representative of a minimum viable 
product, for the permanent makerspace (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase).  
 When the founders finish off their Masters degrees in Entrepreneurship, they 
committed full time to Startup B (III. Transition Phase). Not having located a more 
permanent location to start setting up the makerspace, the founders proceeded with 
organizing two sequential pop-up events. The ticket sales however were limited and 
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mostly to their personal network. Despite receiving initial positive verbal feedback during 
the Opportunity Refinement Phase, the founders found they were unable to attract enough 
customers to the events to make them cost-effective. With continued challenges in 
finding a permanent location for the makerspace, Startup B decided to shut down 
operations after six months (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).  
4.2.2. Understanding Customer Interactions 
 Table 13 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup B, and Table 14 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are 
referenced both in this chapter’s within case analysis, as well as the cross-case analyses in 
the following chapter.  
 Note that the founders of Startup B categorized their customers broadly as 
creative, curious individuals of any age or background: “makers [creating a piece of art 
or technology] and people who are dabbling or starting off a new business” (Startup B 
Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).  
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Table 13. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup B  
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 
DISCOVERY PHASE (3) 




IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (5) 
Customer Interaction 
Characteristics 
Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.2.1. Description of 
Phases for Startup: 
The idea to create a 
permanent makerspace came 
from a personal interest. 
While the founders found an 
opportunity, they did not 
fulfill their need at the time 
Founders attended events to gain customer 
feedback about the makerspace. They 
started to search for a location for the 
permanent makerspace, however ran into 
challenges getting commitment on it. 
While waiting, they decided to test their 




degrees and made a 
verbal declaration 
that they were 
committing full-time 
to working on the 
startup 
Most the time in this phase was dedicated 
to developing a pop-up event, meant to 
simulate the makerspace and test customer 
interest. Ticket sales were predominantly 
to family and friends. There continued to 
be challenges in finding a permanent 
location for the makerspace. The founders 





(underlined if >1 at a 
time): 
Thought about the product 
only (1); N/A (2) 
Customers (3); Organization (1); Product 
(1).  





No contracts or sales No contracts or sales No contracts or sales There were sales through the two events 
that the startup held, however these events 
were not representative of the envisioned 
membership-based business model 
Type of Customer:  Founders (3) Family and friends & professional network 
(1); Family and friends & External target 
market (1); External target market (2); N/A 
(1) 
N/A (1)  Family and friends (1); Family and friends, 
professional network, and external target 
market (1); Family and friends, 
professional network, external target 
market, proximal individuals (2); N/A (1) 
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Table 13 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 
DISCOVERY PHASE (3) 




IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (5) 
Customer Interaction 
Characteristics 
Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.2.5. Customer 
Interaction Initiated by: 
No customer interaction 
mentioned (N/A; 3) 




mentioned (N/A; 1) 
Startup (4); N/A (1) 
4.2.6. Information 
Collection and 
Marketing and Sales 
Communication 
Channel for Interaction: 
N/A (3) Physical - In-person (3); Physical - In-
person & Web - Email (1); N/A (1) 
N/A  Physical - In-person & posters (1); >3 
channels (Physical and Web - In-person, 
phone, posters, social media, website) (2); 
N/A (2) 
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
N/A (3) Direct to end-customer, promotion (1); 
Direct to performer for pop-up event (1); 
N/A (3) 
N/A Direct to end-customer (2); Direct to end 
customer & Direct to performer (1); N/A 
(2) 
Purpose of Early 
Customer Interaction: 
(underlined if >1 at a 
time):  
N/A (Founders only 
interacted with each other in 
understanding problem and 
developing the product; 3) 
Tested business problem and product (1); 
problem, product, business model, and 
customer segment (2), tested interest of 
performers in providing entertainment or 
learning experience (1); N/A (1) 
(Developing, testing, and promoting) 
N/A (Developing) Tested assumptions that tickets would sell 
and performers would be easy to find (2); 
Tested interest in product (1); Tested 
interest in product, business model, and 
customer segment (1) (Developing, testing 
and promoting) 
Description of 
Information Gathered:  
Founders gathered 
information that justified 
their own interest in 
pursuing the idea 
Founders found that there were different 
groups that were interested in the business 
concept (2); They received feedback on 
type of activities in the makerspace and 
(1); learned there was more than one type 
of customer (performers and customers; 1); 
It was also tough to find an affordable 
permanent location to operate out of (1) 
N/A Learned what types of event activities were 
of interest to event attendees (1); That a 
full day of events was not of interest (1); 
That tickets were not selling well. 
Founders concluded this had to do with 
marketing (2); That city residents 
(customers) were not actually interested in 
these events (1) 
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Table 13 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 
DISCOVERY PHASE (3) 




IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (5) 
Customer Interaction 
Characteristics 
Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.2.7. Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Strategic confirmatory 
feedback when just founders 
(3) 
Strategic - confirmatory (2); 
Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (2); 
Operational/Tactical - Not confirmatory 
(from a non-customer; 1) 
N/A Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (1); 
Operational/Tactical - Not confirmatory 
(1); Strategic - Not confirmatory (1); 
Strategic, Operational/Tactical - Not 
confirmatory (2) 
4.2.8. Level of 
Validation Received 
from Customer:  
Self-Justification (3) Family and friends justification (1); 
External target market validation (1); 
Professional network and external target 
market validation (1); Family and friends 
& External target market validation (1); 
N/A (1) 
Self-Justification Family and friends validation (2); Family 
and friends and some external target 
market validation (but limited number; 2); 
N/A (1) 
Other Non-Customer 
Intel Collected During 
NVC Stage:  
Relied on secondary 
research to make 
conclusions about 
opportunity (2); N/A (1) 
Only met with city counsellor about 
permanent location for business (1); N/A 
(4) 
N/A (1) Unsuccessful in working with city 
counsellor to secure a permanent location 




Table 14. Startup B: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time 
CUSTOMER INTERACTION 
CHARACTERISTICS DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME 
4.2.1. Description of Startup 
Process: 
The original business concept - a physical makerspace - was discussed and 
emphasized across the phases of venture creation. Due to challenges and 
delays in finding a permanent location, the actions undertaken in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase were directed towards a different business concept - 
pop-up events - meant to represent the startup's minimum viable product 
(MVP), and was used to test and raise interest in the makerspace. From the 
limited interest (and sales) from the pop-up events, the founders concluded 
there was no target market interest in the original business concept, and shut 
down the business. 
4.2.3. Product, Organization, 
and/or Customer Focus: 
The product was the initial focus during Opportunity Discovery (I). While 
customers were a focus in Opportunity Refinement (II), the organization 
being created in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) did not match what was 
discussed originally with customers.  
4.2.4. Demonstrated Customer 
Commitment: 
The lack of early sales or contracts failed to demonstrate customer interest in 
the business concept - a physical makerspace, early during venture creation 
(Phases I to III). Sales that occurred during the Entrepreneurial Phase IV) 
were not related to the original business concept that the founders had 
inquired about during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II).  
Type of Customer:  Over time, the founders interacted with potential customers outside of their 
personal social circle and in the target market. There were also customers that 
may have not necessarily been part of the external target market, but that 
happened to be nearby were attracted to the startup's activities. The customers 
interacted with in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) may/may not have 
been the ones interacted with in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV).  
4.2.5.  Customer Interaction 
Initiated by: 
When customer interaction occurred, it was initiated by the startup. 
4.2.6.  Information Collection and 
Marketing and Sales 
Communication Channel for 
Interaction: 
Customer interactions started in-person, with some email during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). Eventually, in the Entrepreneurial Phase 
(IV), they involved phone, posters, social media, and the website. The 
additional channels were used to promote the pop-up events. 
Distribution Channel of Product:  The distribution channels noted were more representative of the pop-up 
events than of the original business concept, the makerspace. They did not 
change across the phases. 
Purpose of Early Customer 
Interaction: 
The Opportunity Discovery Phase involved developing the product. The 
customer interactions during the Opportunity Refinement Phase informed the 
founders about the interest and preferences in "product" characteristics of the 
permanent makerspace. Commitment to the startup was developing the 
product and business model, which during the Entrepreneurial Phase, were 
developed, tested, and promoted.  
Description of Information 
Gathered:  
Information learned from customers at each phase applied to two different 
business concepts. The founders learned about the potential product/market 





Table 14 continued 
CUSTOMER INTERACTION 
CHARACTERISTICS 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES OVER TIME 
4.2.7. Customer Feedback 
Impact:  
The founders obtained strategic confirmation of the makerspace concept 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (III). However, a different business 
concept was tested and expanded on during the Entrepreneurial Phase - the 
pop-up events. The limited number of ticket sales for the pop-up events and 
the type of customer (mostly family and friends) were not interpreted by the 
founders as strategic confirmation of the business concept. 
4.2.8.  Level of Validation 
Received from Customer:  
Family and friends, their professional network and the external target market 
all provided validation during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (III) for the 
permanent makerspace business concept. However, when it came to spending 
money on a sale of tickets for the pop-up event in the Entrepreneurial Phase 
(IV), family and friends were predominantly responsible for the limited 
number of sales, and limited validation came from the external target market 
(just a few ticket sales). 
Other Non-Customer Intel 
Collected During NVC Stage:  
The founders relied on one specific non-customer stakeholder (a local 
government counsellor) to obtain a permanent office location - an essential 
part of establishing their permanent makerspace. Relying on this stakeholder 
alone, rather than looking for other available locations, had an influence on 
the founders’ inability to find a permanent location for the makerspace, and 
ultimately, their ability to develop and test the original business concept.  
4.2.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 As Table 13 and Table 14 indicate, the focus of Startup B early in new venture 
creation was on developing the product during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). 
While customers were consulted in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) to gain 
feedback about their interest in the makerspace, the pop-up events organized in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase were not necessarily promoted to or attended by the same 
customers consulted with earlier (IV; see Figure 8).  
Figure 8. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New 






















4.2.4. Customer Commitment 
 The First Customer Interaction took place during the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase (II) when the founder obtained positive verbal feedback on the makerspace. 
However the first Customer Commitment through a Sale that took place during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) was for a different product - tickets to a pop-up event that the 
founders thought was representative of the makerspace. Though revisions of the product 
took place for the second pop-up event, the founders received little interest from 
customers and decided to shut down the business (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup B. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer) 
 
4.2.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 The founders initiated all customer interactions, both for the makerspace and the 
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4.2.6. Communication Channel 
 Most early customer interaction took place in person, except when Startup B 
promoted its pop-up events in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). Only then did the startup 
begin to use additional communication channels – both online (social media and their 
website), as well as in person, physical posters and phone calls. These channels were 
accessible to individuals in the founders’ online social network, around the university 
where they put the posters, and individuals that passed by the posters. The channels used 
did not reach far beyond the founders’ personal and professional networks into the wider 
market of “creative individuals” that the founders had initially targeted. 
4.2.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 The founders received strategic confirmation of the makerspace business concept 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). However, the business concept for the 
pop-up events did not receive strategic confirmation during the Entrepreneurial Phase 
(IV). Operational/Tactical feedback was also limited during the Entrepreneurial Phase, 
suggesting that the founders were not able to employ resources well to create an event 
that was of interest to founders.  
4.2.8. Level of Validation 
 The founders relied heavily on self-validation during the Opportunity Discovery 
Phase (I) and the Transition Phase (III) meaning they did not consult with others. While 
they reached out to their personal and professional networks, as well as the 
entrepreneurial external target market at events during the Opportunity Refinement Phase 
(II), the enthusiasm and validation displayed by customers during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase was not experienced during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). This may 
be explained by: The founders only reached out to potential customers in their 
communities and their families and friends in the Entrepreneurial Phase; a different 
product was now being offered that had not been validated earlier; a higher level of 
commitment through payment resulted in less validation during the Entrepreneurial Phase 





Figure 10. Level of Validation Received by Startup B During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-justification; II. 
Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: External Target 
Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: Commitment 
















4.2.9. Summary of Startup B. 
 Startup B was a membership-based physical and digital makerspace established in 
September 2015 (1). Initial customer interactions took place during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase (2), however, no sales or contracts occurred until the Entrepreneurial 
Phase, on a non-representative MVP. The startup categorized customers broadly as 
creative, curious individuals of any age or background. The startup was product focused 
early in new venture creation, eventually shifting to be more organization and customer 
focused (3). While the first customer interactions lead the startup to develop and revise 
the product, subsequent sales were with the pop-up event business model in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (4). The founder initiated all customer interactions (5).  



































 Most customer communication took place in person, except when Startup B 
promoted its pop-up events in the Entrepreneurial Phase (6). While they received 
strategic confirmation of the makerspace concept during Opportunity Refinement, the 
business concept for the pop-up events did not receive strategic confirmation, and limited 
operational and tactical feedback was received at any stage of venture creation (7).  
 The founders relied heavily on self-validation, however, did receive verbal 
validation from their external target market on the makerspace during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase (8). Information about customer interest in the makerspace was 
initially collected during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). While no further 
validation or sales were made with respect to the makerspace, a limited number of tickets 
were sold for individual pop-up events during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). The 
“products” that Startup B was promoting when they spoke with potential customers 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase and during the Entrepreneurial Phases were 
different however. As a result, the initial verbal validation received for the makerspace 
may not be relevant for the pop-up event and the tickets for the event may not have 
provided validation that was transferrable to the originally envisioned business concept – 
the permanent makerspace – that the founders were intent on developing. If this was the 
case, there may be a limit as to how different a minimum viable product (MVP) can be.  
 However, another other issue may be to blame for the limited interest in pop-up 
event ticket sales. The founders promoted the makerspace during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase at events where they were reached a wider audience. However, the 
pop-up events were mostly promoted events in locations that reached their own network 
communities, and they did not necessarily reach out to the wider external target market. 
This may have caused them to reach different customers types in each phase. 
 What this also suggests is that validation from early customer interactions during 
new venture creation is only relevant if a similar product and customer group is validated 
that shares a minimum number of representative characteristics with the future product 
during that phase, and in subsequent phases. Finally, sales late in the venture creation 
process that are predominately to family and friends’ networks and not to an external 




4.3. Startup C 
4.3.1. Case Overview 
 In August 2015, the founder of Startup C started a business that “designed 
software to help realtors get leads [on people interested in buying and selling their 
homes]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016). This software was based on 
software that he had previously developed for another business he had started three years 
ago – an online tutoring marketplace platform that connected university tutors and high 
school students. The premise of the software was that if a real estate agent was able to get 
a lead, they would pay the startup a referral fee.  
 Through personal contacts, the founder learned that most real estate agents were 
not making enough sales in a year. To help combat this issue, the founder thought that 
this software could help them access new leads, but realized that it would only be useful 
if trust was established between all stakeholders for free flow of information to occur: 
“Eighty percent of agents in Canada made less than six sales this year. That means that 
the majority of them cannot make a living based on selling houses. The question is, how 
do I provide [realtors with] more leads of customers with strong intent to buy or sell a 
house in the next few months?… That is the problem we’re solving. Real estate is a 
relationship-driven business [though]. No matter what technology you use, the final thing 
you want to do is to establish trust. So, how you establish trust fast is with that face-to-
face meeting. Technology helps to achieve that goal” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 
June, 2016).  
 This initial idea for real estate lead generation software received little interest (I. 
Opportunity Discovery Phase #1 and II. Opportunity Refinement Phase #1). While real 
estate-related software was the original idea for Startup C, over time, the business 
concept went through several pivots, or adaptations, trialing the same technology in 
different industries and new business models or customers. The initial business idea 
involving obtaining sales leads from others was dismissed altogether based on a lack of 
validation from potential customers of the websites (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase #2 




 Finally, the founder stopped building sites that required convincing others to pay 
him a referral fee and began building websites that provided sales leads for other 
businesses with existing affiliate marketing programs (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase #3 
and II. Opportunity Refinement Phase #3). While the founder unsuccessfully attempted 
one last business concept that created affiliate marketing programs for companies without 
related affiliate marketing programs (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase #4), the success 
received from the partnerships with existing affiliate marketing programs resulted in the 
generation of referral fees from the websites that advertised other company’s products 
and services (Opportunity #3). To expand the business, the founder continued to test and 
develop the affiliate market business model by building websites with affiliate marketing 
links in other industries (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase and V. Execute Phase for 
Opportunity #3).  
4.3.2. Understanding Customer Interactions 
 Table 15 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup C, and Table 16 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are 
referenced in both this chapter’s within-case analysis, as well as the cross-case analyses 
in the following chapter.  
 In the process of determining what was the best business concept to pursue, 
Startup C changed customer segment, industry, and product several times, as well as the 
ways in which they chose to interact with customers.  The time between pivots was short, 
at times a week or less. This was possible because the founder could quickly build a 
website that acted as a minimum viable product, and tested it for responses. 
 With the first business idea, the founder of Startup C focused on real estate agents 
as potential customers of the real estate software he was developing. The intention of the 
software was that if it brought a lead to a real estate agent, they would pay the founder a 
referral fee. Initially, the founder tried to find the leads on his own, however, as time 
progressed, he decided to seek out different types of non-real estate partners that were in 




model, Startup C intended to act as a facilitator to refer the leads to real estate agents. As 
a compensation for the referral, Startup C would offer these partners part of the referral 
fee he believed that he would receive for brokering the relationship: “Funeral directors, 
marriage directors, graduation – there are different service providers that we don’t think 
about being connected to real estate. Which makes sense. They shouldn’t have any 
connection with real estate agents. But those are the people I want to focus on [to 
provide referrals]. I need to do research [on them], and I have to get conclusions” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
 While the founder of Startup C did not specifically refer to the terms, ‘supply-side 
and demand-side customers’, his initial business ideas involved trying to create a 
marketplace for real estate sales leads. In this business, the supply-side customers were 
those individuals or businesses that could provide leads about individuals looking to 
purchase or sell a home. The founder himself also tried to provide these leads at one 
stage, however in different pivots of his business decided to work with real estate 
industry-related partners (e.g. mortgage agents) and non-real estate industry related 
partners (e.g. retirement homes, funeral home directors) that might be aware of 
individuals looking to sell or buy a home. The demand-side customers were the real 
estate agents seeking out leads, and who were willing to pay a referral fee to the supply-
side customers. Startup C planned to take part of that referral fee as their transaction cost. 
 In later business ideas considered during the study period, Startup C still tried to 
get sales leads for real estate agents in different ways, as well as for contractors. 
Afterwards, the founder decided that rather than providing leads for others that had not 
originally sought out these leads, that would instead build a business to provide sales 
leads to businesses that already sought out partners through affiliate marketing programs 
- earning a commission by promoting other business’ products. These partners included 
home owners looking to sell their property, charities, wedding industry companies, 
lawyers, plastic surgeons, and dentists. The first businesses in which Startup C saw 




Table 15. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup C (Note that the phases are denoted as follows: I. 
Opportunity Discovery, II, Opportunity Refinement, III. Transition, IV. Entrepreneurial, V. Execute). There were several business concepts 
explored by this startup. 
PHASE (# 
Stages) 
I.  #1 (3) II. #1 (4) I. #2 (3) II. #2 (2) I. #3 (3) II. #3 (2) III. #3; 1 I. #4 (1) IV #3; 1 V. #3; 1 
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Table 15 continued 
PHASE (# 
Stages) 
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Table 15 continued 
PHASE (# 
Stages) 
I.  #1 (3) II. #1 (4) I. #2 (3) II. #2 (2) I. #3 (3) II. #3 (2) III. #3; 1 I. #4 (1) IV #3; 1 V. #3; 1 
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Table 15 continued 
PHASE (# 
Stages) 
I.  #1 (3) II. #1 (4) I. #2 (3) II. #2 (2) I. #3 (3) II. #3 (2) III. #3; 1 I. #4 (1) IV #3; 1 V. #3; 1 
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Table 15 continued 
PHASE (# 
Stages) 
I.  #1 (3) II. #1 (4) I. #2 (3) II. #2 (2) I. #3 (3) II. #3 (2) III. #3; 1 I. #4 (1) IV #3; 1 V. #3; 1 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary 
































































































































Table 16. Startup C: Changes in Customer Interaction Characteristics Over Time 
CUSTOMER INTERACTION 
CHARACTERISTICS 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.3.1. Description of Startup 
Process: 
Founder kept building MVPs (simple websites) and exposing potential 
customers to them until one resulted in a "sale" (or payment of referral fees, 
noted by funds being exchanged). Only after a payment occurred did the 
founder commit to further developing the business. 
4.3.3. Product, Organization, 
and/or Customer Focus: 
Founder focused on getting customer feedback and product development 
before the Transition Phase. When there was no product/market fit, he 
dismissed the idea and attempted another idea. He only started developing the 
organization (processes for the virtual organization and how to duplicate the 
business in other industries) after he received validation through referral fees.  
4.3.4. Demonstrated Customer 
Commitment: 
Founder kept trying new business ideas until he received a "sale" using 
minimum viable products – simple websites to test the business concept with 
customers (Opportunity Discovery 1, 2, 3, 4 and Opportunity Refinement 1, 2, 
3). Only once a sale occurred did he continue to develop the business further in 
the Entrepreneurial (IV) and Execute (V) Phases. Founder was unwilling to 
commit to starting a business (Transition Phase, III) without knowing there 
was a product/market fit. This was confirmed for them by receiving payment 
of the referral fee. 
Type of Customer:  
For the first business idea, the founder initially interacted with his professional 
network, however quickly progressed with going straight to speaking directly 
with the external target market. 
4.3.5.  Customer Interaction 
Initiated by: 
Though initial customer interest triggered the idea for the business, the startup 
founder initiated subsequent interactions. 
4.3.6.  Information Collection 
and Marketing and Sales 
Communication Channel for 
Interaction: 
While the founder started with physical (in-person meetings and phone calls), 
over time, he gradually sought out more digital/virtual communications with 
customers.  
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
Throughout all phases, the founder preferred to a website business model that 
delivered a product directly to end-customers and involved interaction with the 
end-customers’ own customers. 
Purpose of Early Customer 
Interaction: 
The founder tested the problem, product, business model and customer 
segment throughout phases of new venture creation. Even when there was 
money exchanged (III. Transition Phase), the founder continued to refine tests 
on the same business model, but experimenting with different problems, 
products and customer segments, depending on the industry of the company 
with the affiliate marketing program.  
Description of Information 
Gathered:  
Rather than dismissing an idea upon the first negative reaction from a potential 
customer, the founder tested the idea on related, non-customer stakeholders. 
He was quick to dismiss an idea after this if no validation was received. Once 
there was a sale (in this case, the startup started earning referral fees), the 





Table 16 continued 
CUSTOMER INTERACTION 
CHARACTERISTICS 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.3.7 Customer Feedback 
Impact:  
In the first attempt to start a business, the founder wanted to test strategic and 
operational / tactical feedback. With subsequent business ideas, the founder 
first checked for strategic feedback and interest from customers, and then, once 
confirmed, began experimenting to get operational/ tactical feedback. 
4.3.8. Level of Validation 
Received from Customer:  
Without external target market validation, the founder did not move past the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) with an idea. Money being exchanged was 
a trigger that incentivized the founder to continue to develop the startup.  
Other Non-Customer Intel 
Collected During NVC Stage:  
The founder relied heavily on feedback from mentors, constantly referencing 
discussions with them in our interviews. 
4.3.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 Startup C preferred to develop a minimum viable product and test it quickly with 
customers before committing to it (Table 15 and Table 16). Only once a payment was 
made (a “sale” of sorts, with referral fees from the company offering affiliate marketing 
referral programs), did the founder begin to develop processes for his organization 
(Figure 11). This suggests that the founder only saw payment as validation. 
 
Figure 11. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New 
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4.3.4. Customer Commitment 
 The First Customer Interaction (B) with real estate agents took place during the 
First Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). From there, during the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase (II), the product, customer or organization was developed or revised (E), and 
followed by subsequent customer interactions (F). The idea, product, and/or customer 
may have been revised (E) or dismissed quickly (H). The first Customer Commitment 
through a Sale took place during the Transition Phase (III), when the founder received his 
first referral fee payment from an affiliate marketing partnership (see Figure 12).  
4.3.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 Though initial customer interest in having the founder build a website for them 
triggered the idea for a business to generate real estate leads, Startup C’s founder initiated 
subsequent interactions with customers. 
4.3.6. Communication Channel 
 While the founder started with using physical communication channels (in-person 
meetings and phone calls), over time, he gradually sought out more virtual 
communications with customers. Once the first affiliate marketing-related website 
showed to be effective in earning referral fees, he limited direct communication with 
customers, relying only on data analytics clicks on his webpages and concrete sales for 
indication of how successful the product was. 
4.3.7. Strategic or Operational/ Tactical Feedback 
 In the first attempt to start a business with real estate referrals, Startup C tested 
whether both the business concept and the day-to-day operations of the business were 
feasible (testing strategic and operational / tactical feedback). With subsequent business 
ideas, the founder first checked if the business concept made sense and was of interest to 
customers, then checked to see if it would be feasible to develop the business further. 
Only once the business concept was confirmed did the founder start to refine the websites 




Figure 12. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup C. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer). Note: Additional ‘sales’ related to the affiliate marketing business concept 
took place after the First Customer Commitment through Sale, however, they were not 
included in the diagram to be able to showcase the multiple business concepts explored 
during the study period. 
 
4.3.8. Level of Validation 
 For the first business idea on real estate referral leads, Startup C received some 
verbal validation from his professional network and the target market. However, with 
subsequent ideas, Startup C strictly sought out external target market validation. Without 
external target market validation, the startup did not move past the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase (II) with an idea. Money being exchanged provided incentive to 
continue to develop the startup (see Figure 13). Once the founder realized that there was 
a successful business concept (III. Transition Phase), he continued to test the ability to 
scale his affiliate marketing business by building new websites that promoted affiliate 
partner links and promoted them to the external target markets (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase 
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4.3.9. Summary of Startup C 
 Startup C was initially launched as a lead generation software for real estate (1). 
This initial idea received little interest, and over time, the business concept went through 
several pivots, or adaptations, trialing the same technology in different industries, and 
new business models or customers. Initial customer interactions took place during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase, however, ideas were dismissed if there was no sale by the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase. Only the affiliate marketing business resulted in sales (2).  
 The startup focused on having a product (in MVP format) to test out on customers 
early. Only once there was confirmed interest did an increase focus on developing the 
organization occur (3). The first customer commitment through a sale took place during 
the Transition Phase for the affiliate marketing business (4). While the initial idea was 
triggered by a customer interaction, all subsequent customer interactions were initiated by 
Startup C (5).  
 Startup C’s communications initially took place in person and over the phone, 
however, as new business opportunities were explored, the startup’s founder sought out 
more virtual communications with customer (6). Strategic feedback was sought out on the 
business concepts, and when not obtained, the founder of Startup C was willing to 
dismiss the idea quickly (7).  
 Startup C sought quick validation (8). The founder of Startup C initially spoke 
with potential customers in his professional network in the real estate industry, however 
with subsequent business models, started reaching out to the external target market 
directly to test ideas. He wanted to test ideas early, and did not see verbal confirmation of 
interest as enough validation. Instead, he saw referral fees from the external target market 
as validation to confirm that this was a valid business concept to pursue (validation from 
external target market and money exchange validation). Furthermore, over time, the 
founder moved increasingly from speaking to people in-person or on the phone, to online 
interactions such as web and email, to seeing interactions as visits to the website, detected 





Figure 13. Level of Validation Received by Startup C During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 



































Discovery Phase #1 
I. Opportunity 
Discovery Phase #2 
II. Opportunity 
















Refinement Phase #2 
I. Opportunity 























Refinement Phase #3 
IV. Opportunity 
Discovery Phase #4 
III. Transition 

















4.4. Startup D 
4.4.1. Case Overview 
 First launched in November 2015 under a different name, Startup D was a 
marketplace that facilitated the connection of property owners of available downtown 
rental spaces, or venues (supply-side customers), to consumers needing a short-term 
rental for event purposes (demand-side customers). The founders considered Startup D to 
be part of the sharing economy – a peer-to-peer sharing of access to good and services – 
creating a marketplace akin to the ride sharing service, Uber, and AirBnB, the online 
marketplace and hospitality service.  
 The idea for Startup D arose while the CEO and COO were working in the not-
for-profit sector and were unable to find affordable, interesting venues for events they 
were planning in the mid-sized cities they worked in (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase): 
“Why can’t you rent a vacant space or an underutilized space for a lot cheaper, saving a 
lot of money, and be more interesting, more unique?” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, 
Interview, 2 June, 2016). The founders also had the goal to improve the economic and 
cultural development in mid-sized cities – such as the city from where they originated: 
“What our platform does is, it actually enables cities to increase their cultural and 
economic activity because it allows entrepreneurs to get access to the spaces to bring 
their ideas to life, and allows for those that are looking to put together cultural events to 
actually make it happen instead of going through all sorts of bureaucratic processes. It’s 
sort of like, an engine for community, with the economic development, and that’s the way 
I really see this as making an impact” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 
2016). 
 They reached out to some event planners in their network, potential demand-side 
customers, for their thoughts and found: “During the first months, we reached out to 
some event planners, just hearing feedback from people, [and found they were 
interested]” (Startup D, Interview, 2 June, 2016), and they were then able to work with a 
large local real estate and development company to access over 40 commercial properties 




 Despite having manual matching of supply-side and demand-side customers, in 
their first weeks of operation, Startup D had 44 commercial properties available to rent, 
and approximately 30 individual space owners who successfully leased an underutilized 
space for events that they were holding. A month into operation, Startup D was served a 
cease and desist by the not-for profit organization that regulated the trade of real estate in 
the region – accused of violating the Real Estate and Business Brokers’ Act (III. 
Transition Phase).  
 The founders decided to shut down the website, re-brand, and re-organize how 
they approached the business. Though manual in nature, the initial website, had provided 
validation for them that their business concept had value. The manual process took much 
time however, and they needed to develop an autonomous marketplace platform. 
Concurrent to building the technology, the founders sought out new supply-side 
customers with more unique spaces and partnerships with government agencies that were 
developing regulations for the new sharing economy industry. Because they were known 
in the community, and from media coverage that raised awareness about the startup, they 
continued to be approached by individuals seeking rental spaces for events or individuals 
wanting to rent out a space. This lead to a continuation of manual matching (IV. 
Entrepreneurial Phase). After several delays, the web marketplace platform launched. 
Though there were a few technical issues that had to be worked out, ultimately, it ran 
smoothly. From here, the founders started to see how they could expand the number of 
rental transactions on their site (V. Execute Phase).  
4.4.2. Understanding Customer Interactions 
 Table 17 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup D, and Table 18 is a summary of changes 
in changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. There are two types 
of customers for Startup D – supply-side customers renting out unused spaces, and 
demand-side customers, seeking to rent spaces for events that they are holding. The 
supply-side customers provide the highest level of validation and commitment to the 
startup through a contract, while the demand-side customers commit through money 




Table 17. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup D 









IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
V. EXECUTE 
PHASE (1) 
  Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.4.1. Description 
of Phases for 
Startup: 
Founders could not find 
an easy way to find an 
interesting venues for 
events and wanted to 
help mid-sized cities 
grow 
Checked with demand-
side and supply-side 
customers in their 
network to see if an 
event space marketplace 
would be of interest 
Launch of initial 
website with manual 
matching of demand 
and supply side 
customers. Founders 
served a cease and 
desist by real estate 
board 
The founders continued to build the web 
platform technology, on-boarding supply-
side customers, developing regulations for 
the new industry with government agencies, 
and continued manual matching of demand-
side and supply-side customers through their 
online form. Media coverage also raised 
awareness about startup 










Focus (underlined if 
>1 at a time): 
Product (1); N/A (2) Customers (1); Product 
& Customers (1) 
Product & Customers 
(1); (Organization; 1) 
Product (2); Customer (4); Organization (1); 







None Supply side customer 
commitment through 
contract (1) 
Sales to demand-side 
customers with money 
exchange (2) 
Supply side customer commitment through 
contract (1); Sales to demand-side 
customers with money exchange (2); 
Contract with supply side customer and 
sales to demand side customer (2) 
Supply side customer 
commitment through 
contract (1) 
Type of Customer:  Founders (2); Unknown 
(1) 
Demand-side - Family 




(part of external target 
market) 
Family and friends, 
Professional network, 
External target market 
(1); N/A (1) 
External target market (supply and demand; 
3); External target market (supply - 2); 
External target market (demand - 1); 
Professional network (1); Family & friends 
and professional network (2); Professional 
network & external target market (3); N/A 
(2) 
Family & friends . 
Professional, External 





Table 17 continued 









IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
V. EXECUTE 
PHASE (1) 




N/A (2); Unknown (1) Startup (2) Startup (1); Customer 
(via media; 1);  
Customer - Supply-side (3); Customer - 
Demand-side (1); Customers (Supply and 










(underlined if >1 at a 
time): 
N/A (2); Unknown (1) Physical - In-person (1); 
Physical - In-person, 
phone; Web-email (1) 
Physical - In-person 
event, word-of-mouth, 
phone, newspaper; 
Web - Social media 
messaging, website, 
blog (1); Web - Email 
(1) 
Physical, In-person (1); Physical, In-person 
& website (2); Physical - In-person, phone, 
Web - email (3); Physical - Word-of-mouth, 
newspapers, website (1); Physical - 
newspaper (1); Web - Website (2); Web - 
Advertisements (1); Web - Supplementary 
website (1); N/A (2) 




N/A (3) Direct to end-customers 
with manual matching 
for venues (2) 
Direct to end-
customers with manual 
matching for venues 
(1); N/A (1) 
Direct to end-customer, supply (5); Direct to 
end-customer, demand (1); Direct to end-
customers with manual matching for venues 
(3); N/A (3); Direct via web platform 
marketplace (2) 
Direct via web 
platform marketplace 
(1) 
Purpose of Early 
Customer 
Interaction: 
(underlined if >1 at a 
time):  
Learning about problem 
(1); N/A (1); Unknown 
(1) 
Tested hypothesis on 
problem (1); Tested 




Tested hypothesis on 
problem, product, 
customers segment (1); 
Unintentionally 
testing/learning about 
customer segment and 
business model (with 
customers approaching 
them; (1) 
Unintentionally testing/learning about 
customer segment and business model (with 
customers approaching them; 1); Learned 
more about product (3); Learned more about 
customer segment (3); Promotion of 
business (2); Customers reaching out to 
startup (2); Launch of web platform 
marketplace (1); N/A (2)  
Tested hypothesis 
about adaptation to 
business model, 
promoting and testing 
product, testing 
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IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
V. EXECUTE 
PHASE (1) 




Looked for short term 
rental spaces online and 
found mid-sized cities 
would benefit from an 
event rental space 
business 
Learned there is interest 
from demand side 
customers (event 
planners), and that they 
could gather a lot of 
information from large 
supply-side customers 
Gathered information 
about strong customer 
interest in MVP and 
potential website 
features to include in 
the future. Also learned 
that they were seen as a 
threat by real estate 
board. 
Learned that there is interest in the platform 
from both supply and demand side 
customers, even if manual matching needed 
to take place. Learned how customers 
interacted with web platform (3); Learned 
that coordinating with and bringing in 
features desired by regulatory agency would 
make business operations easier (2); 
Learned that they had an advocate customer 
willing to support the business (2); Learned 
that media could raise awareness and 
interest in startup (1)  
Learned about 




Feedback Impact:  
Strategic - Confirmatory 










Strategic - Confirmatory (5); 
Operational/Tactical - Listened to 
suggestions (2); Operational/Tactical - 
Ignored suggestions (2); Strategic, 
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IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
V. EXECUTE 
PHASE (1) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary 









Professional network & 
















Self-justification (5); Self-justification & 
Single customer (1); Personal network, 
professional network, external target 
market, commitment through money 
exchange (2); Self-justification, personal 
network, professional network, external 
target market, commitment through contract 
(supply-side customers), commitment 
through money exchange (demand-side 
customers) validation (3); + Media (1); 
Personal network & professional network 
validation (1); Self-justification, 
professional network justification, external 
target market (supply-side) non-validation 
(1) 
Self-justification and 






NVC Stage:  




Influenced by real 
estate board's cease and 
desist and media (1) 
Media with newspaper (1); Regulatory body 









SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.4.1. Description of 
Startup Process: 
When they could not find an interesting venue to hold events, the founders came up 
with the idea to build an online marketplace for short-term rentals. After checking 
with potential supply-side and demand-side customers, they launched their MVP 
website and had immediate success. When they were shut down with a cease and 
desist, they took the opportunity to re-build the web platform technology, slowly find 
the ideal supply-side customers, and participated in the co-development of 
regulations on the new industry. Despite a few delays, the web marketplace platform 




The product was a focus of the business - being developed and built through the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), after which it went live. Working with customers, either 
getting supply-side customers’ profiles on the web platform, ongoing manual rentals, 
or getting feedback, was a focus in every stage after Opportunity Discovery (I). 
Developing the organization and its processes was of limited focus for Startup D, 




The founders secured supply-side customers with contracts to be on the web platform 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), and saw commitment with sales to 
demand-side customers during the Transition Phase (III).  Though the web platform 
was not live during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), contracts to have supply-side 
customers on the web platform, and rentals from demand-side customers continued in 
a manual matching process, initiated by the startup’s simple web form.  
Type of Customer:  
The founders were well connected in the community. Initial supply-side customers 
were found through their professional network, and initial demand-side customers 
were found through their personal and professional networks (Opportunity 
Refinement Phase, II). A news article also boosted publicity about the startup, raising 
awareness with the external target market (Transition Phase, III). Even during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), additional publicity and word of mouth increased sales 
transactions on the website.  
4.4.5.  Customer 
Interaction Initiated by: 
While the startup initiated customer interactions in the Opportunity Refinement Phase 
(II), customers began to reach out to them in the Transition Phase (III) and beyond.  
4.4.6.  Information 
Collection and Marketing 
and Sales Communication 
Channel for Interaction: 
Initial communication channels used were in person, or over the phone or email. 
However, by the time the startup entered into the Transition Phase (III), there was an 
increased focus of promoting the startup through social media, online messaging and 
blogs. Media articles also promoted the business. Even when the integrated web 
platform was not live in the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup D had a simple website 
that was live with a web form. Ads were used to continue demand-side customer 
interest to the website at the time. 
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
Until the integrated web marketplace platform was live, customers, both demand-side 
and supply-side would interact with the website form, and there would be manual 
matching of venues. Afterwards,  
Purpose of Early 
Customer Interaction: 
Testing out the problem was concentrated in the Transition Phase and previous 
phases. Testing the product and customer were a focus throughout venture creation 
until the Entrepreneurial Phase. There were also customers promoting Startup D and 
the startup also starting to promote themselves by the Transition Phase.  
Description of 
Information Gathered:  
Information collected reinforces that customers remain interested during each phase 









SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.4.7 Customer Feedback 
Impact:  
In the Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity Refinement and Transition Phase, 
obtaining strategic confirmation takes place. Obtaining operational / tactical 
confirmation takes place from the Transition Phase onward. 
4.4.8. Level of Validation 
Received from Customer:  
The level of validation the founders receive for the startup grew over time. As early 
as the Opportunity Refinement Phase (IV), they already had positive feedback from 
their professional network and some external target market stakeholders. When the 
initial website launched during the Transition Phase (III), there was immediate 
validation from both supply-side and demand-side customers – creating justification 
to continue to build and develop the web platform beyond the MVP. 
Other Non-Customer 
Intel Collected During 
NVC Stage:  
Startup D was heavily influenced by the real estate board’s cease and desist. This also 
motivated their involvement to work with the government on creating regulations for 
the sharing economy. Articles by the media also created promotion for the startup, 
affecting customer interest, and the motivation to have a simple web form online as a 
minimum viable product while the full web marketplace platform was being built. 
The founders also did their own secondary research. 
4.4.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 As Table 17 and Table 18 indicate, the focus of Startup D early in new venture 
creation was on developing the product - developed and built through the Entrepreneurial 
Phase (IV). Working with customers, either getting supply-side customers’ profiles on the 
web platform, ongoing manual rentals, or getting feedback, was a focus in every stage 
following Opportunity Discovery (I). Developing the organization and its processes was 
of limited focus for Startup D, however did take place to improve government regulations 
that would affect operations (Figure 14). 
Figure 14. Product, Organization and/or Customer focus (P, O, or C) of Organization During each 























4.4.4. Customer Commitment 
 Demand-side and supply-side customer interactions with the founders’ 
professional network took place during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, leading to the 
First Customer Interaction. Onboarding of supply-side customers through website 
‘contracts’ (Customer Commitment through Contract) during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase lead to the first sale when the website went live the first time. This 
demonstrating Customer Commitment through a Sale during the Transition Phase. 
Though that version of the website did not stay live for long, revisions to the web 
platform and subsequent customer interactions continued after the initial sales (see 
Figure 15). 
Figure 15. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup D. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 































E. Develop or 
Revise Organization 





4.4.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 While the startup initiated customer interactions in the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase (II), even in the cease and desist, customers began to reach out to them in the 
Transition Phase (III) and beyond. This may have been affected by both increased 
customer awareness about the web platform through word of mouth and being featured in 
different media articles, as well as the founders’ own network in the local community 
spreading the news. While the founders continued to reach out and on-board supply-side 
customers, they did not pro-actively reach out to demand-side customers again until the 
web platform was relaunched (in the Execute Phase, V).  
4.4.6. Communication Channel 
 Initial communication channels used with customers during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase were in person, or over the phone or email. However, by the time the 
startup entered the Transition Phase (III), there was an increased focus of promoting the 
startup through social media, online messaging and blogs. Furthermore, media articles in 
the newspaper also played a role in promoting the business. Even when the integrated 
web platform was not live in the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup D had created a simple 
website with a web form to continue to capture business. Finally, once the site launched, 
the founders posted advertisements. 
4.4.7. Strategic or Operational/ Tactical Feedback 
 In the Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity Refinement and Transition Phases, 
Startup D obtained strategic confirmation, meaning the business concept was confirmed 
by customers before moving forward in the venture creation process. Over time, the 
startup received operational / tactical confirmation, from the Transition Phase onward, as 
they built the web platform, brought on more supply side customers, and negotiated with 
government counsel. The founders did not always accept later suggestions from 
customers, particularly when they were not in line with the original business concept 




4.4.8. Level of Validation 
 The level of validation received for Startup D grew over time. As early as the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (IV), they already had positive feedback from their 
professional network - who also represented a part of the external demand-side target 
market. It should be noted that the founders’ professional network involved individuals 
involved in event planning, and who often struggled to find interesting rental spaces for 
their events.  
 When the initial website launched (the MVP) during the Transition Phase (III), 
there was immediate validation involving contracts and money exchange, from both 
supply-side and demand-side customers respectively – creating validation for the 
founders that the business concept had customers, that if they chose to rebuild the web 
platform, there would likely be demand (see Figure 16). 
Figure 16. Level of Validation Received by Startup D During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract - for 






















































4.4.9. Summary of Startup D  
 Startup D is an event space marketplace first launched in November 2015, and 
then re-launched at the end of 2016 (1). The first customer interactions, both demand-side 
and supply-side, took place during the Opportunity Refinement Phase and included both 
their personal and professional networks (both part of the external target market; 2).  
 Startup D was initially focused on developing the product, and then interacting 
with potential customers. When they were handed a cease and desist, they continued to 
focus on developing the product and building their customer market. There was no real 
focus on the organization during the study period (3). Customer commitment was 
demonstrated by supply side customers (Customer Commitment through Contract) during 
the Opportunity Refinement Phase, with the first demand-side commitment shown 
through a sale during the Transition Phase (4). These commitments were ongoing 
throughout the venture creation process. The startup initiated customer interactions in the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase, however, afterwards, customers started to reach out to 
them (5).  
 Initial communication took place in person, over the phone, or email during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase. However, additional forms of communication, including 
media (traditional and online), were adopted in later stages of new venture creation (6). 
Strategic confirmation on the business concept was received before the Transition Phase, 
and Operational and Tactical Confirmation took place afterwards (7).  
 The level of validation for Startup D grew over time. While they received initial 
verbal validation from their professional network and external target market, once the 
website was launched the first time, they received both commitment through contracts 
and through sales (8). Startup D learned from their simple website – their MVP – that 
they had customers’ commitment beyond verbal validation. They could generate both 
contracts from supply-side customers and money exchanges (sales) from demand-side 
customers in their professional network. Getting this validation early was particularly 
important, given the time it would take to create the actual web marketplace platform that 




 It should be noted that initial supply-side customers were found from the 
founders’ professional network. Due to their extensive involvement in the community, 
Startup D was also able to indirectly raise awareness about the startup with their initial 
demand-side customers, after which word-of-mouth and advertising broadened the 





4.5. Startup E 
4.5.1. Case Overview 
Startup E was founded in April 2014 to develop a mobile phone application (from 
here on noted as “app”) to connect online video game players (also known as “gamers”), 
playing team-based video games. The purpose of the app was to create a friendly 
community and to promote better and repeat interactions between online gamers: “[We 
want to be] creating better online gaming experiences for the end user and for 
connecting them. We want our users to meet new people – our motto is discover, connect 
and engage. It’s not about that one-time connection” (Startup E Marketing Manager, 
Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
Startup E was founded by two cofounders in their early 20s who met at college as 
roommates. They shared a common interest of playing videogames. When they were both 
planning to move out of their residence, they shared a common issue: “We started to 
realize, I was going to go back home, and we weren’t going to have those places to sync 
up our play time as often to knock on the door and say, ‘hey, are you free to play right 
now?’ There are a lot of people in this world that are around the same age, and are 
going to connect the same way we connect. So, how do we find them?” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
 Previously, solutions to finding a gaming partner outside of an online gamer’s 
local social circle involved posting on computer desktop-based website forums. However, 
finding a gaming partner this way was considered time-consuming and did not always 
yield a solution: “People would post on a forum – ‘I’m in EST, I live in Canada, I’m 20, I 
play these games, and like to play them in this way.’ You’d have to search through [the 
posted messages]. It may have taken you weeks before you found someone you were 
interested in playing with. This just didn’t work.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 
2016). Furthermore, in contrast to these computer desktop-based website forums, Startup 
E intended to be a mobile phone app (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). Individuals often 
had their mobile phones with them, and the founders felt that having a mobile-based app 




have their phone – and they don’t need to go to the computer to post something online. 
Or they don’t have to try to figure out a forum. And then you can also get notifications… 
The whole system made sense.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
 The founders developed and promoted their first version of the mobile app on 
gaming blog websites and online community forums associated with playing video 
games. The Alpha version of the app received 300 downloads before it stopped working. 
However, even with this setback of the app not working, the initial downloads offered 
validation to the co-founders that there was a community of gamers interested in their 
app. They decided to develop the second version of the app, Alpha version 2.0 within a 
few months, and it was promoted both by the startup and media in a couple of online 
community gaming forums, in social media, private messaging and blogs. This version of 
the app had 1500 downloads (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase). The founders took this 
as confirmation of the business concept and one founder decided to commit full-time to 
working on Startup E (III. Transition Phase).  
 In the following months, Startup E released three subsequent versions of the 
mobile application, including more stable Beta versions. The app was promoted in news 
articles, the startup’s website, social media, and online community forums. While the 
startup organized an unsuccessful online crowd funding campaign, they received funding 
elsewhere, from a family investor, a local startup accelerator, a university pitch 
competition, and other grants and loans. Because the mobile app had no revenue at the 
time, this funding allowed the founders to continue to improve development of the 
application and engage with potential users (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).  
 With a stable mobile app, the focus of Startup E turned towards attracting more 
users. To do so, they increased engagement of social media, direct messaging (in-app, 
with email, and social media), held in-person gaming events, and engaged affiliate 
partners that regularly interacted with online video game players. These included 
individuals who recorded videos about video game playing and posted them on video 
sharing websites such as YouTube, or streamers - individuals who streamed the playing 




the mobile app and had started to look into ways to monetize the business (V. Execute 
Phase). 
4.5.2. Understanding Customer Interactions  
 Table 19 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup E, and Table 20 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are 
referenced both in this chapter’s within-case analysis, as well as the cross-case analysis in 
the following chapter.  
 It should be noted that the mobile application could be downloaded for free at the 
time of writing, and there was no revenue that was being generated from it. Given that the 
revenue stream for the company had not been determined at the time of writing, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, it is assumed that the users of the application are also 
customers that may, in the future, pay for a product or service.  The terminology of 
demonstrating customer commitment by contract is considered relevant to these users 
because they are downloading software that requires agreeing to certain terms and 
















IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE 
(10) 
V. EXECUTE PHASE (9) 
  Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.5.1. Description 
of Phases for 
Startup: 
Two friends wanted a 
good way to find 
other online gamers. 
Upon not finding an 
existing solution, 
they built a mobile 
phone app that 
served this function. 
Developed and 
promoted first and 
second versions of the 
app and saw customers 
continue to download 
and use app 
Upon seeing the 
success of the app, 
one co-founder quit 
his job and committed 
full-time to the startup 
Despite an unsuccessful crowdfunding 
campaign, the startup received funding 
additional times (from angel investor, 
local startup accelerator, university pitch 
competition, grants and loans). This 
allowed them to continue to develop and 
release the next three versions of the app, 
including the beta version 
An increased focus on attracting 
users, using social media, direct 
messaging (in-app, email, social 
media), affiliate partners 
(YouTube gamers, Streamers), 
and in-person gaming event. 






if >1 at a time): 




Organization (5); Product & customer (5) 







None Customer commitment 
through contract (2) 
None Customer commitment through contract 
(4); Funding from external source (5) 





Founders and family 
and friends (1) 
Founders (1); External 
target market (3) 
Founder (1) Founder, family and friends (1); 
Founder, family and friends, Kickstarter 
funders (1); Founder, family and friends, 
professional network (3); Founder, 
family and friends, professional network, 
early adopters in external target market 
(1); Founder, family and friends, 
professional network, early adopters in 
external target market, external target 
market (3); N/A (1) 
Founder, family and friends, 
professional network, early 
adopters in external target 


















V. EXECUTE PHASE (9) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary Summary 





underlined if >1 
at a time): 
N/A (3) Startup (1); 
Startup/Customer (2); 
N/A (1) 
N/A Startup (6); Startup/Customer 
(4) 
Startup (including affiliate partners; 7); 









(underlined if >1 
at a time): 
Word-of-mouth (1); 
N/A (2) 
Web - Private 
messaging, startup 
website, blogs, online 
community forums and 
promotion, social 
media, mobile app (3); 
N/A (1) 
N/A Physical - In-person, news 
articles (3); Web - website, 
mobile phone app (1); Web - 
Website, social media, online 
community forum, mobile 
phone app (3); Web - 
Kickstarter campaign (1); N/A 
(2) 
Web - Social media posts & Direct 
messaging (1); Web - YouTube videos 
and streaming services (2); Web - Emails 
and survey (1); Physical - In-person 
events & Web - social media (1); Web - 
Email, in-app messaging and social 
media messaging (1); Web - In-app 
private messaging and public posts, 
Social media (1); In-app push 
notifications (one-to-many), personalized 





N/A (3) Direct to end-user (3); 
N/A (1) 




(underlined if >1 
at a time):  
Problem (2); Product 
development (1) 
Tested assumptions on 
problem, developed 
product, online gaming 
community model, and 
customer segment (2); 
Promoted product (1) 
N/A (Product and 
customer 
development) 
Tested ability to crowdfund (1); 
Tested customer interest and 
developed and promoted product 
(4); N/A (5) 
Tested ability to get new users through 
various interaction channels (3); Tested 
and promoting interest in product and 
customer segment (2); Learned customer 
preferences (2); Collected ideas about 
user interactions through data analytics 

















V. EXECUTE PHASE (9) 




N/A (3) 300 downloads of first 
version of app and 
1500 downloads of 
second version of the 
app 
N/A Learned there was interest in 
funding business by external 
non-customer sources (4); 
Learned that marketing was 
important (1); Learned user 
interest and feedback (4); N/A 
(1) 
Learned how to promote business to 
users, including one-to-many social 
media posts and direct messaging, 
incentivizing affiliate partners, events, in-




N/A (3) Strategic - 
confirmatory (3); N/A 
(1) 
N/A Strategic - confirmatory (5); 
Operational/Tactical - 
confirmatory (3); 
Operational/Tactical - Not 
confirmatory (1); N/A (1) 
Strategic - confirmatory (2); 
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (6); 
Operational/Tactical - Not confirmatory 
(1) 

















contract validation (1); 
Self-justification, 












Early-adopters target market 
validation (1); Self-Justification, 
Personal Network validation (2); 
Self-justification, personal 
network, early adopters target 
market validation, external 
target market validation (3); 
Self-justification, personal 
network validation, professional 
network validation, commitment 
through receiving funding (4); 
Commitment through contract 
validation (4) 
Self-justification, personal network 
validation, professional network 
validation; early adopters target market 
validation, external target market 
validation (8); Commitment through 


















V. EXECUTE PHASE (9) 




NVC Stage:  
N/A (3) Media (1); N/A (3) N/A (1) Angel investor funding (3), 
acceptance into startup 
accelerator (1), acceptance into 
entrepreneurship program (1); 
winning university pitch 
competition; and receiving 
grants and loans from various 
organizations suggested investor 
confidence in the startup and 
industry and offered validation 
to startup 
Video bloggers and gaming streamers 








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.5.1. Description of Startup 
Process: 
The MVP, a mobile phone application that created a gaming community was 
developed early, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), allowing the startup 
to quickly gauge whether there was interest from online video game players, their 
external target market. They promoted the application through several online 
avenues, as well as gained media attention, that increased awareness about the 
app. With ongoing funding and user downloads of the app, the founders were 
able to concentrate on developing increasingly better versions of the application, 
gain a better understanding of user preferences and issues, and increasing their 
user base. 
4.5.3. Product, Organization, 
and/or Customer Focus: 
Developing the product was important and ongoing throughout new venture 
creation. The core of customer interactions began once the first version of the 
mobile application was released (in the Opportunity Refinement Phase), and 
continued through to the Execute Phase as the founders wanted to increase users. 
A focus on developing the organization did not take place until the Transition 
Phase, when one founder committed to the startup full time. 
4.5.4. Demonstrated 
Customer Commitment: 
Some informal first customer interactions took place during the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase (I), however the first customer interaction with the mobile 
software application and first customer commitment through contract occurred 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). There was no money exchanged, 
and hence no sale, by the end of the study period. 
Type of Customer:  
Initial interactions were with family and friends during the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase (I), however, by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), 
founders had started reaching outward to the external target market. By the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), exposure to the external target market had grown 
more, fueled by media promotions and user advocates by the Execute Phase (V). 
4.5.5.  Customer Interaction 
Initiated by: 
Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by the startup up until the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). While customers did reach out with feedback for the 
startup, the founders were very proactive in encouraging connections with 
customers. In the Execute Phase, affiliate partners reached out to customers, and 
customers became even more proactive in their interactions with the startup and 
in acting as user advocates to other customers in the online community. 
4.5.6.  Information Collection 
and Marketing and Sales 
Communication Channel for 
Interaction: 
Starting with communication in-person, Startup E quickly moved to other 
communication channels including private messaging, social media, online 
community forums and promotion through blogs. Additional media coverage, as 
well as partnering with affiliate partners (streamers and video bloggers) in the 
gaming industry raised awareness about the mobile application. Startup E also 
started using data analytics to gain a better understanding of the target market 
and its interactions with the website. 
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
Startup E’s mobile application was always distributed direct to end-user, where 
individuals would need to independently download it onto their phone. 
Purpose of Early Customer 
Interaction: 
Early customer interactions during the Opportunity Refinement Phase involved 
developing and testing assumptions on the problem, product and customer 
segment. Later interactions continued to test customer interest, preferences, and 
ways in which to attract customers. The product was promoted from the 








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
Description of 
Information Gathered:  
Information gathered demonstrated that there was strong interest in the application. 
This was initially shown with the number of downloads, and subsequently followed up 
by learning about how to attract new users, and re-engaging with existing users – using 
in-app push notifications, affiliate partners and events.  
4.5.7 Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Strategic confirmation was important throughout the venture creation process for 
Startup E. Operational and tactical confirmation became important in the 
Entrepreneurial and Execute phases.  
4.5.8. Level of 
Validation Received 
from Customer:  
By the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), the founder had received verbal interest 
from their external target market, which was confirmed by downloads of the application 
(equal to Commitment through Contract validation). They also attracted dearly media 
attention. Over time, in later phases, this level of validation continued, and grew as the 
founders developed a professional network in this industry. 
Other Non-Customer 
Intel Collected During 
NVC Stage:  
Non-customer intel included angel investors, the various entrepreneurial programs, and 
grants and loan organizations that offered funding to Startup E and suggested investor 
confidence in the startup. Furthermore, insight from affiliate partners (video bloggers 
and gaming streamers) provided more information about potential customers.  
5.5.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 As Table 19 and Table 20 indicate, throughout new venture creation, developing 
the product was important and ongoing. Furthermore, once the founders had determined 
that they were ready to start development and had created a minimum viable product (a 
simple mobile app) to test on the external target market, interactions with customers were 
ongoing – either to get their feedback on features that they were looking for and issues 
with the software, to increase the number of users, and to move towards the Execute 
Phase, to improve repeat visits to the app. Developing the organization was not a focus 
for Startup E until the Transition Phase, when one of the founders committed to the 






Figure 17. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During New Venture 
Creation in Startup E 
  
4.5.4. Customer Commitment 
 The founders saw themselves and some of their personal network as potential 
customers. While developing the mobile phone application in the Opportunity Discovery 
Phase (I), they likely received some anecdotal insight from family and friends, however 
had noted First Customer Interaction and user downloads, or Customer Commitment 
through a Contract, from their external target market during the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase (II; see Figure 18). 
4.5.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup E up until the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). While customers did reach out with feedback for the startup 
and downloaded the app, the founders were very proactive in encouraging connections 
with customers through various channels – including in-app chats, social media, and 
email. In the Execute Phase, while the startup continued to reach out to engage 
customers, they also had affiliate partners raising awareness about Startup E. After this 
engagement, customers became more proactive in their interactions with the startup, such 




















Figure 18. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup E. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer).   
 
 
4.5.6. Communication Channel 
 Starting with communication in-person during the Opportunity Discovery Phase 
(I), Startup E quickly moved to using communication channels including private 
messaging, social media, online community forums and promotion, and promotion 
through blogs during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). As the startup became more 
well known, additional media coverage, as well as partnering with affiliate partners 
(streamers and video bloggers) in the gaming industry also raised awareness about the 
mobile application (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase and V. Execute Phase). Finally, Startup E 
also started using data analytics to gain a better understanding of the target market and its 

























E. Develop or 
Revise Organization 




4.5.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 Gaining strategic confirmation in the business concept took place during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) when they were receiving downloads for the app. 
While strategic confirmation continued into the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) and in the 
Execute Phase (V), operational and tactical confirmation for how resources are used 
became more important only later in venture creation. For example, Startup E started 
hiring new employees and needed to start engaging and attracting new users. 
4.5.8. Level of Validation 
 During the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), the founders had created their own 
validation, but by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), Startup E had received 
validation from the external target market. This included verbal and text-based interest 
from customers, as well as users’ actions of downloading the application – considered a 
commitment through contract. Startup E had also received validation from the media in 
terms of featuring the startup in articles. This level of validation continued through the 
Entrepreneurial (IV) and Execute Phases (V). Note that as the founders were not initially 
embedded in the industry, their professional network did not provide validation until later 
in venture creation. Also, during the Transition Phase, although there were no explicit 
validations noted during this phase by Startup E, there were ongoing downloads of the 





Figure 19. Level of Validation Received by Startup E During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 









4.5.9. Summary of Startup E 
 Startup E was a mobile phone application to connect online video game players to 
form a community. They were established in April 2014 (1). Early customer interactions, 
outside the founders’ immediate family and friends’ circle, took place during Opportunity 
Refinement, when the first version of the app was released. This was considered customer 
commitment by contract (2). The startup saw their customers as hard-core gamers 
initially, but eventually diversified this to video game players, in general. 
 The initial focus of Startup E was on developing the product, and then interacting 

















































the business did they start considering aspects of the organization (3). While the first 
customer interaction and commitment through contract (or download) took place during 
the Opportunity Refinement Phase, there were ongoing revisions to the product and the 
customers, with subsequent interactions with customers (4). Customer interactions were 
predominantly initiated by Startup E until the Entrepreneurial Phase, when users 
themselves began being more proactive in downloading and advocating for the app. The 
startup also hired affiliate partners that promoted the app (5).  
 Initial customer interactions took place in person, however quickly moved to an 
array of online communication channels including private messaging, social media, 
online community forums, and promotions. The startup also started using data analytics 
to gain a better understanding of the target market (6). Once they received strategic 
confirmation of the business concept during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, they 
began seeking out operational and tactical confirmation during the Entrepreneurial Phase 
(7).  
 The mobile app industry differs from other industries in that the success of an app 
depends on the number of people using it, as well as the amount of time they spend on it. 
The value of the startup comes not just from the individual use of the application, but the 
community created through interactions through the software, and data about the users on 
the software. 
 As a result, app development companies, such as Startup E, with a freemium 
business model (offering limited features and then accessing premium content or features 
through in-app purchases) or free apps with advertising are often encouraged to first build 
a user base and then start monetizing. The main focus of Startup E was on building a 
community of video game players on their website. The creation of this community is 
ideal to build loyalty and a feeling of connectedness to the startup – key features that 
affect the decision to make an in-app purchase (Hsiao & Chen, 2016). Given Startup E 
had not yet started to monetize at the time of writing, it was not yet possible to make 
conclusions as to whether they were able to successfully have customer commitment 




 Furthermore, the creation of a community, attending to the experiences of both 
the potential newcomers and of existing community members are important. Newcomers 
may evaluate whether to join a community based on assessment of the current user base, 
wanting to join communities where they are a good fit. For existing community members, 
they may seek out new members that are like them, and diversity may be considered off-
putting (Kraut & Resnick, 2012). Startup E was particularly concerned that they were 
attracting the right type of customer from the beginning. As they changed their way of 
attracting users (bringing on their affiliate partners), their user based started to change. 
This was initially challenging because the existing community created path dependence, 
where earlier community member users affected the attraction of users that join the 
community later. However, Startup E could create their own path to overcome this issue 
by adapting the app to include ways to identify different types of users, and users could 





4.6. Startup F 
4.6.1. Case Overview  
Startup F was started with the intention of being “a search engine for loans from private 
lending organizations… for loans that are unsecured under $50 grand... in other words, 
a loan marketing agency” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). “Our job is to 
connect borrowers with lenders and basically create value for the borrower through 
getting them connected with cheap, quick, and efficient loans that best match their 
personal needs and financial situation” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016). 
 The idea for Startup F arose in March 2015, when the founder was in the waiting 
room of a doctor’s office and he saw another patient with an emergency medical bill that 
he was unable to pay. Curious about the availability of emergency funding options, when 
the founder got home, he attempted a few web-based searches for personal loans, and 
found no easy way to: 
• search through and aggregate available loans for a particular set of 
circumstances, and to get a quick answer to the loan request from loan providers. 
 This planted the seed of opportunity in the founder’s mind to develop an online 
loan aggregator - a loan search web platform where a loan seeker could perform an online 
search for a loan, and gain access to an array of lenders with competing interest rates and 
terms (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). The idea was: “Why search [for] one [loan] 
when you can search many? That’s kind of our slogan” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 
May, 2016). 
 The founder envisioned that building an online loan aggregator platform would 
require Startup F to sign contracts with several fintech loan providers (supply-side 
customers). These loan providers would be integrated into an online platform to 
streamline the application process for loan seekers (demand-side customers). This would 
mean that when a loan seeker visited the startup’s website, they would complete one short 
loan application with their personal details and the loan amount that they were seeking. 
Their credentials and credit rating would be verified and could be assessed for loan 




 A high level of integration between the startup and the fintech loan providers 
would allow Startup F to immediately report whether the loan seeker was eligible for a 
loan, as well as the loan options and associated terms and conditions available to them. 
Once a loan was selected, the information could be transferred directly to the integrated 
fintech loan providers’ online loan platform – rather than having the loan seeker re-enter 
information on each loan provider’s website. A partnership with Startup F as a loan 
aggregator site would also help fintech loan providers, in a relatively new industry, to 
gain visibility among loan seekers that were not familiar with fintech, and would ideally 
help provide credibility and security to the transaction. 
 To check his assumptions, the founder of Startup F followed up with local 
businesses (intermediaries) who might be interested to offer their customers consumer 
finance loan options in-store, and potential fintech loan providers that he had contacted 
through social media (supply-side customers). Several local businesses were interested in 
the consumer finance options, and eleven fintech loan providers were interested in 
signing onto the platform. Without even consulting a group of demand-side customers 
seeking loans, the founders decided that this validation was enough for him to proceed 
with the business (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase). He started web platform 
development, however encountered several delays in launching due to technical 
differences during the web platform development process and integration with loan 
providers’ online systems (III. Transition Phase). Before launching the web platform, the 
founder continued to test it, both with the lenders and also with family and friends. 
Despite technical and security issues arising, the web platform eventually went live and 
the loan seekers (demand-side customers) attempted the first loans.  
 Advertisements leading up to launch day had managed to attract the attention of 
several loan seekers. However, the founders quickly learned that they had lost several 
customers due to drop off during the application process that resulted in incomplete and 
rejected applications due to loan provider integration issues. Despite this initial setback, 
demand for loans kept growing with news spreading about Startup F with more 
advertising, word-of-mouth, and search engine optimization. Once the site was up and 




the consumer finance partnerships with local businesses that he had originally envisioned 
as a key part of the business (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).  
4.6.2. Understanding Customer Interactions 
 Table 21 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup F, and Table 22 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. These tables are 
referenced in both this chapter, as well as the cross-case analysis in the following chapter.  
 Note that there were three types of customers in Startup F. There were supply-side 
customers - financial institutions offering loans (specifically, emerging fintech loan 
providers that were using technology and innovation to disrupt personal finance), and 
demand-side customers - individuals seeking loans. The third type of customers were 
intermediaries – local businesses through which a loan could be offered in a consumer 
finance transaction. These businesses would include industries such as home renovations, 
veterinarian clinics, dentist offices, and wedding planners – industries where their 
customers might need a short-term loan. 
 Startup F was not worried about the potential to attract loan seekers: “People who 
want money will do anything for it. That’s what we’ve been learning through our market 
research. People want money and they’re going to search, ‘I want money.’ That’s why 
you see the line up at cash money – 550%. And that’s just insane. And people go for it” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). However, once the web platform went live 
in July 2016, Startup F saw that the typical demand-side customer was in a lower income 
bracket than originally anticipated: “[They have] poor credit, which is something I kind of 
expected, but not as much as I’ve seen. I’d say probably about 85 percent of applicants 
are coming from poor credit. Typical age is 30s, equally male and female…. A lot of them 
are coming from Hamilton, Burlington, Brampton. Outside of Toronto” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016). By September 2016, the same tier of customer 
approached the website: “Those with terribly abysmal credit scores – who’ve applied to 
hundreds of places, and have been declined… They troll, and they’re looking for money, 




Table 21. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup F 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 







IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (18) 
  Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.6.1. Description 
of Phases for 
Startup: 
Founder saw another patient 
in a doctor's office was 
unable to pay his bill. He 
searched for online loans, and 
not finding one, he saw a 
business opportunity to create 
a loan marketplace to provide 
loans directly to demand-side 
customers, and via 
intermediary local businesses 
Founder followed up 
with potential fintech 
loan providers (supply-
side customers) and set 





Loan providers (supply-side customers) began to be integrated, the 
platform was tested with family and friends, web platform is launched 
and loan seekers (demand-side) start applying for loans, and news 
about the startup spread with advertising, word of mouth, and search 





Focus (underlined if 
>1 at a time): 
Product (1), Customers - 
Intermediaries (1); N/A (1) 
Organization (1); 
Product & Customers - 
Supply-side (2) 
Product (1) Customers - Demand-side (9); Customers - Supply-side (1); 







None Supply-side customer 
commitment through 
contract (1) 
None Supply-side customer commitment through contract (3); Demand-side 
customer commitment through sale (5); Supply-side customer contract 
and demand side customer sale (1) 
Type of Customer:  Founder (2); External target 
market - Intermediaries (1) 
External target market - 
supply-side (2); N/A 
(1) 
N/A Family and friends - demand-side (3); Early adopters in external target 
market supply-side (1); External target market - Demand-side (4); 
External target market - Supply-side (4); External target market - 
Intermediaries (1); All external markets (3); Rejected external target 





Table 21 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 







IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (18) 
4.6.5. Customer 
Interaction Initiated by 
(number of initiations; 
underlined if >1 at a 
time): 
Startup (1); N/A (2) Startup (2); N/A (1) N/A Startup (14); Customers - Demand-side (1); Customers - Supply-
side (1); Magazine (1); Startup (by having live web platform), 
customer demand-side, customer supply-side (1) 
4.6.6.  Information 
Collection and 
Marketing and Sales 
Communication 
Channel for Interaction 
(underlined if >1 at a 
time): 
Physical - In-person (1); 
N/A (2) 
Web - social media (1); 
Physical - Phone, Web 
- emails (1); N/A (1) 
N/A In-person (including word-of-mouth; 4); Phone (2); Magazine 
(1); In-person, phone, Web - email (1); In-person meeting, 
conference, Web email, social media (1); Phone, web platform, 
email (2); Paid ads (3); Self-published article and press release 
(1); Search engine optimization (1); Web platform and data 
analytics (2) 
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
Direct to marketplace via 
intermediary (1); N/A (2) 
Direct via marketplace 
(2); N/A (1) 
N/A Direct to end-demand-side customer via marketplace (15); 
Direct to end-customer via intermediary (2); N/A (1) 
Purpose of Early 
Customer Interaction: 
(underlined if >1 at a 
time):  
Observed problem (1), 
searched for solutions to 
problem (1), and tested 
assumptions on problem, 
business model and 
customer segment of 
intermediaries (1) 
Tested assumptions on 
problem, business 
model, customer 






Tested assumptions on web platform (2); Tested assumptions 
about supply-side customers (2); Tested assumptions on product 
and supply-side customer segment (2); Tested product and 
business model (1); Tested demand-side interest in marketplace 
(and ability to reach marketplace (4); Tested demand-side 
interest in marketplace and how they interacted with web 
platform (1); Tested ability to handle customer service issues 
(2); Tested interest of intermediaries (2); Tested presence of 





Table 21 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 











Learned there were no other online 
loan search engine marketplaces 
and small business intermediaries 
were interested in a loan search 
engine for their customers 
Learned about interest from 
loan provider (supply-side 
customer) to be part of loan 
search engine marketplace 
N/A Learned that software development and integrating 
multiple business systems involves several unforeseen 
challenges and delays, Learned that not all methods of 
advertising were successful, Learned that there were 
several demand-side customers with poor credit that 
looked for loans, Learned that not all demand-side 
customers completed their applications, found search 
engine optimization was important for online business. 
Learned that there were intermediaries that were willing 
to commit as a customer 
4.6.7. Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Strategic - confirmatory (2); N/A 
(1) 
Strategic - confirmatory 
(2); N/A (1) 
N/A Strategic - confirmatory (4); Operational/Tactical - 
confirmatory (6); Operational/Tactical - not confirmatory 
(5); Operational/Tactical - confirmatory & Strategic - not 
confirmatory (1); N/A (2) 





justification and early target market 
- intermediaries (1) 
Self-justification (1); Self-
justification, early target 
market - supply-side, 
Target market - supply-side 
validation (2); 
Commitment through 
contract validation (1) 
N/A Family and friends validation (3); External target market 
validation - Demand-side (6); External target market 
validation - Intermediaries (2); Limited external supply-
side target market validation (3); Lack of validation - 
Demand-side (1); Media validation (1); Commitment 
through contract validation (3); Commitment through 
money exchange/sale (5); Commitment through contract 




NVC Stage:  
N/A N/A N/A Marketing agent affected advertising (3) and search 









SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.6.1. Description of Startup 
Process: 
From seeing a patient in a doctor’s office unable to pay his medical bill, the 
founder searched for ways to access online loans. Not finding one, he decided 
to create a loan marketplace, where loan seekers could find a variety of loans 
and terms. He partnered with fin-tech loan providers, built a web marketplace 
platform and integrated them the loan providers into the site. When he finally 
launched, even with some issues, there was no shortage of loan seekers.  
4.6.3. Product, Organization, 
and/or Customer Focus: 
The product was a focus throughout venture creation. In contrast, focus on the 
organization was very minimal, only really emphasized during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase. Different customers are connected with (Intermediaries and 
supply-side customers) early in venture creation, and all types of customers 
during the Entrepreneurial Phase. 
4.6.4. Demonstrated 
Customer Commitment: 
The supply-side customers commit through a contract to be integrated in the 
website in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). This continues in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). The founders have demand-side customers seeking 
loans committing through sales – in this case, considered applying and 
successfully obtaining an online loan. 
Type of Customer:  The founder immediately went to the external target market for intermediaries 
and supply-side customers, in the Opportunity Discovery and Opportunity 
Refinement Phases respectively. In the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), he had 
more testing of the interface of the website with his personal network (family 
and friends), and also started interacting with the external target market in the 
supply-side, demand-side, and intermediaries.  
4.6.5.  Customer Interaction 
Initiated by: 
The startup founder initiated interactions throughout the new venture creation 
process. With awareness of the startup through advertisements, search engine 
optimization, word-of-mouth, and media (a magazine article), customers 
started to seek out and contact the startup during the Entrepreneurial Phase 
(IV). 
4.6.6.  Information Collection 
and Marketing and Sales 
Communication Channel for 
Interaction: 
While loan providers were initially contacted over LinkedIn social media, early 
interactions with customers predominantly took place in-person, over phone or 
email. In the entrepreneurial phase however, several communication channels 
were adopted, including: word-of-mouth, the web platform, paid ads, articles, 
press releases, search engine optimization to appear in searches for loans, and 
data analytics.  
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
Initially, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the founder envisioned the 
product to be delivered to the demand-side customer through the marketplace, 
via an intermediary (local business) that offered consumer financing. 
Subsequently, the founder developed a way for supply-side and demand-side 
customers to interact directly via the marketplace, and only re-visited the idea 
of working via intermediaries once the marketplace model was working 
successfully. 
Purpose of Early Customer 
Interaction: 
Developing and testing the problem took place before the Transition Phase, 
when the web platform development began. Afterwards, there continued to be 
tests on assumptions about the customer segments, particularly when the 
segment was not what was expected, and the product, into the Entrepreneurial 








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
Description of Information 
Gathered:  
Throughout the new venture creation process, the founder realized that in such 
a new industry, intermediary local businesses and fin-tech loan providers were 
definitely looking for such a business concept. Furthermore, despite technical 
difficulties with the web platform and integration with the loan providers, the 
individuals seeking loans had particularly poor credit and were motivated to 
find loans that they would not otherwise have access to. 
4.6.7 Customer Feedback 
Impact:  
Before the Transition Phase, the founder of Startup F sought out and received 
strategic confirmation of his business concept. Only once that happened and 
the web platform was being built and launched, in the Entrepreneurial Phase, 
was operational /tactical confirmation sought out as well.  
4.6.8. Level of Validation 
Received from Customer:  
The founder sought out validation from two of the three early target markets – 
intermediaries (during Opportunity Discovery Phase, I), and supply-side 
customers (during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, II). Having received 
several contracts of interested supply-side customers (loan providers; 
Validation through Contracts), the founder assumed that there would also be 
demand-side customers, however did not test their interest until the website 
was launched during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). At that time, he also 
received personal network (family and friend) validation, external market 
validation from all three markets, media validation, and validation through 
contracts and sales (applications form loans).  
Other Non-Customer Intel 
Collected During NVC 
Stage:  
No additional intel was noted except from working with marketing agents and 
a search engine optimization expert that would affect publicity and raising 
awareness about the business. 
4.6.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 The product – the online loan aggregator – was a focus throughout venture 
creation. This was because it was being built from scratch and Startup F needed to reduce 
supply-side customers’ integration issues and to ensure that the website was accessible to 
demand-side customers.  
 Intermediary customers (local business owners) were connected with early in 
venture creation during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). However were not followed 
up with until later, when Startup F could revisit consumer finance models. Supply-side 
customers were reached out to during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) and 
integrated into the web platform. Demand-side customers were only contacted just before 
the web platform launched. Only by the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) were all three 




Figure 20. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New 




4.6.4. Customer Commitment 
 Eleven supply-side customers (loan providers) committed to be integrated in the 
website through a contract during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). This prompted 
the development of the web platform in the Transition Phase (III), integration of supply-
side customers into the website, and advertising to demand-side customers in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase. When the web platform went live, the founders had demand-side 
customers seeking loans, equal to a commitment through sale (see Figure 21). 
4.6.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 Except for a single meeting initiated by a supply-side customer at their offices, 
Startup F’s founder initiated all interactions with supply-side customers and 
intermediaries throughout the new venture creation process. Awareness of Startup F was 
raised through advertisements, search engine optimization, word-of-mouth, and media (a 
magazine article). When the web platform went live, demand and supply-side customers 



















Figure 21. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup F. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer). Note: Additional demand-side ‘sales’ related to additional loans being sought 
out took place after the First Customer Commitment through Sale, however, they were not 
included in the diagram. 
 
4.6.6. Communication Channel 
 Loan providers (supply-side customers) were initially found and then contacted 
over LinkedIn social media. However, subsequent early interactions with customers 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) took place predominantly in-person, over 
phone or email. In the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) however, several communication 
channels were adopted, including: word-of-mouth, the web platform, paid ads, articles, 
and press releases. Other avenues used to learn about and raise awareness with customers 
did not involve direct interaction. These included search engine optimizations to increase 
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4.6.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 Strategic feedback was sought out before the Transition Phase (III). This was 
from intermediaries – who offered their own validation, and from loan providers – supply 
side customers. Both these parties however also had demand-side customers as their own 
current customers and were able to provide some insight about their preferences. Once 
the founder committed to building the web platform, operational and tactical 
confirmation was also sought out. This included integrating lenders and working out 
contract details, learning how demand-side customers interact with the web platform, and 
learning how to handle customer service issues.  
4.6.8. Level of Validation 
 When he started this business, the founder of Startup F did not know anyone in 
the industry except potential demand-side customers that he had received anecdotal 
comments of interest. The founder sought out early validation from the other two of the 
three external target markets before building the web platform. These were intermediaries 
(during Opportunity Discovery Phase, I), and supply-side customers (during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase, II). Having received several contracts of interested 
supply-side customers (loan providers; Validation through Contracts), and verbal interest 
from intermediaries that deal with demand-side customers on a daily basis, Startup F 
assumed that there would be demand-side customers. They did not test demand-side 
customer interest until the website was launched during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). 
By then, the startup had also received personal network (family and friend) validation, 
external market validation from all three markets, media validation, and validation 
through contracts and sales (applications form loans; see Figure 22).  
4.6.9. Summary of Startup F 
 Startup F was a search engine for online loans, established in March 2015 (1). The 
founder interacted first with potential intermediary businesses (small businesses such as 
home improvement stores, that customers may need financing options) in the Opportunity 




Refinement Phase, followed by interactions with potential demand-side (loan seekers) 
customers when the web platform launched in the Entrepreneurial Phase (2).  
 Startup F was equally customer and product focused during the Opportunity 
Discovery and Opportunity Refinement Phases. There was minimal focus on the 
organization, and the main focus was the customer when the web platform was eventually 
launched in the Entrepreneurial Phase (3). Supply side customer commitment was 
demonstrated during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, where loan providers signed a 
contract to be integrated. Demand-side customer commitment came in the form of a sale 
during the Entrepreneurial Phase (4). Customer interactions were initiated by Startup F, 
until the web platform was launched, and customers begun to seek out the startup (5). 
 Initial intermediary customer interactions were in person when Startup F went to 
speak with them, however connections with loan providers were initially over LinkedIn 
social media. Subsequent interactions were undertaken with a diversity of communication 
channels (6). Strategic feedback was sought out before the Transition Phase, and 
operational and tactical confirmation was sought out afterwards (7).  
 Prior to starting this business, the founder of Startup F was not in this industry and 
had no related network. As a result, he decided it was important to validate the external 
target market’s interest in the web platform during Opportunity Refinement before 
proceeding (8). He did not check with demand-side customers until the startup was built, 
however assumed that he was familiar with this market and that receiving validation from 





Figure 22. Level of Validation Received by Startup F During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 















 Furthermore, Startup F was racing to become first in the market as a loan 
aggregator to gain recognition among lenders and individuals seeking loans. Hence, 
rather than ensuring that all technical issues with the web platform were fixed before 
launching, Startup F launched the web platform as soon as possible. Even with issues in 
customers not completing the application, being live allowed Startup F to learn about 
how customers interacted with the web platform, raised awareness with potential 




































4.7. Startup G 
4.7.1. Case Overview 
 Startup G was founded to produce a product that could brew coffee on the go. The 
product had been called several names: a portable travel brewer mug, pressure brewer, 
and a coffee press, with the founder describing the product as: “an all in one pressure 
brewer and travel mug that allows you to brew very high quality coffee and take it with 
you on the go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).  The idea for the product 
arose from the founder’s love of coffee and his experiences operating canoe trips. He 
found that he wanted great coffee on the go, but struggled to find a way to brew it while 
camping.  
 In Summer 2015, as a coffee enthusiast with a Masters in Engineering degree and 
specializing in thermodynamics, the founder realized that he could probably solve his 
own problem: “I was making coffee one day in the lab [with a competing product], and I 
thought, why can’t I just drink out of this? And that’s where it kind of came from. I drink 
coffee every day. I’m in thermofluids. I know what [good coffee] is and how the actual 
brewing works” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).  He developed a 
prototype, and upon the urging of his business course professor, patented the design in 
August 2015 (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). 
 The founder started testing the prototype with his personal contacts. He wanted to 
gain feedback from multiple sources, and started with the university campus and then 
went to local cafes. He also went on the Internet, using various online platforms to learn 
what types of features in a coffee press were important to customers. With frequent 
interactions online, the founder realized how important it was to the community to have a 
leak-proof lid. The last validation received before committing to the business was 
winning an entrepreneurial pitch competition. This further validated the business concept 
and gave Startup G some funding (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase).  
 The founder decided to commit to manufacturing the product, and decided to 
crowdfund the manufacturing of the coffee press by using an online crowdfunding 




campaign, he started coming up with different ways to raise awareness about the product. 
This included contacting blog writers to write about the product, using social media to 
self-promote the business, connecting with radio stations, and continued interactions with 
the online community forum. By the time the crowdfunding campaign started, despite 
some pushback on shipping costs, sales started taking off. The founder also received 
immediate feedback on whether the product would be purchased and continued 
awareness through the online community forum.  
 Several more blog articles were written about the startup (almost 20), as well as 
newspaper articles and another radio spot. The startup was proactive in generating social 
media posts and also started using data analytics to better understand more about visitors 
to his website. When the crowdfunding campaign was finished, they had raised 154 
percent of their original goal.  
 Startup G continued to promote the travel brewer mug after the crowdfunding 
campaign, with more newspaper articles and social media posts. Another crowdfunding 
campaign was started to allow for continued sales while the founder turned his attention 
towards getting the product manufactured. After a successful trip to the manufacturer’s 
factory in China, the manufacturing process was started, and the founder was able to 
focus his attention on discussing distribution opportunities with retailers and distributors 
that had been contacting him from around the world. 
4.7.2. Understanding Customer Interactions  
 Table 23 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup G, and Table 24 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. Note that the founder of 
Startup G started with a target market segment as individual consumers who are like the 
founder – outdoor enthusiasts that enjoy good coffee. While Startup G wanted to partner 
with independent coffee shops, online stores that sold various gadgets and distributors of 





Table 23. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup G 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 
DISCOVERY PHASE (3) 
II. OPPORTUNITY 
REFINEMENT PHASE (4) 
III. TRANSITION 
PHASE (1) 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (12) 
  Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.7.1. Description 
of Stage for 
Startup: 
Founder wanted a coffee 
brewer to take on the go. A 
thermofluids engineer by 
training, he designed a 
prototype and talked with a 
professor about patenting 
the coffee press 
Founder started testing 
prototype with his own 
network, getting feedback 
from online community 
forums, won an 
entrepreneurial pitch 
competition, and met with 
local cafes to test product 




to physically create 
product on larger scale) 
Connected with and featured by several bloggers, local 
newspapers on social media, radio, and online community 
forum to promote product. Visited the manufacturer's 
factory in China and started using data analytics to track 
Kickstarter and Indigogo sales. Co-adapted product with 




Focus (underlined if 
>1 at a time): 
Product (1) Customer (1); Product  
Customer (2); Organization & 
Customers (1) 






None None (Funding through 
entrepreneurial pitch 
competition; 1) 
None Sales through money exchange (5) 
Type of Customer:  Founder (2); Founder & 
Professional network (1) 
Founder, Family and friends, 
Professional network (1); 
Early adopters in external 
target market (1); Investors/ 
Entrepreneurial network (1); 
N/A (café partners; 1) 
External target market 
(1) 
Family and friends, Professional network, Early adopters in 
external target market, External target market (3); External 
target market (2); External target market & Everyone (5); 





Table 23 continued 





REFINEMENT PHASE (4) 
III. TRANSITION 
PHASE (1) 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (12) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.7.5. Customer 
Interaction Initiated 
by (number of 
initiations; underlined 
if >1 at a time): 
N/A (3) Startup (4) Startup (1) Startup (8); Startup & Customer (2); Media & Startup 
(1); Media, Startup, & Customer (1) 
4.7.6. Information 
Collection and 




(underlined if >1 at a 
time): 
In-person (1); N/A (2) In-person (3 - At school, at 
competition, in store); Web - 
Online community forum (1) 
Web - crowdfunding 
platform (1) 
In-person (1; Café); Web - blogs (1); Web - Social media 
(1); Web - Online community forum (1); Traditional - 
Radio & Web - Social media (1); Traditional  - 
Newspaper & Magazine and Web - Blog (1); Traditional 
- Radio and newspaper & web - Cross-promotion of 
crowdfunding campaigns, ads, emails (1); Tradtional - 
Newspapers, posters, Web - social media, paid ads, 
automatic direct messaging, regular messaging, crowd 
funding website (1); Web - Crowdfunding campaign 
website and online community forum (1); Web - Social 
media posts and ads, blog articles, online community 
forum (1); Web - Data analytics (1); N/A (1); Website 
(All) 
Distribution Channel 
of Product:  
N/A N/A N/A Direct to end-customer (5); N/A (promotions or 
otherwise; 7) 
Purpose of Early 
Customer 
Interaction 
(underlined if >1 at a 
time):  
Learned about problem 
and commercial 
potential of invention 
(developing product; 1) 
Tested assumptions about 
product (2); Tested problem, 
product, and customer 
segment (with online forum; 
1); Tested problem, product, 
and develop business model 
(pitch competition; 1) 
N/A (Founder plans to test 
product interest by 
willingness of customers 
to pay during 
crowdfunding campaign; 
1) 
Tested interest in product (3); Tested personal 
promotions of product and segment (1); Tested interest 
of media in product (1); Test model and Test interest of 
partners in product (1); Tested promotions by media and 















IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (12) 




Founder learned what 
features such an 
invention would need, 
how to develop it, and 
that it had potential 
for sales 
Founder learned that there 
was interest in the product 
from customers and that it 
needed to be leak proof, 
that it was possible to 
build a relationship with 
potential customers 
virtually, and that it was a 
quality product that was 
valued by others in the 
entrepreneurship and 
coffee communities 
Learned that they could 




Learned that it was possible to build strong engagement relationship with 
customers in online community forum and in social media, that 
customers were willing to purchase product through crowdfunding 
campaigns without guarantee that it would be made, that it was possible 
to engage media, cafes and other crowdfunding campaigns to promote 











N/A Strategic - confirmatory (5); Strategic - information (1); 
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (2); Operational/Tactical - can be 
adapted (1); Strategic - confirmatory, Operational/Tactical - can be 
adapted (2); N/A (1) 













adopters target market 
validation (1); N/A 
(Investor/Entrepreneur 
validation and partner 
validation; 2) 
Self-justification and 
external target market 
(1) 
Family and friends validation & external target market validation (1); 
Professional network, external target market validation, commitment 
through money exchange (2); External target market validation (1); 
External target market and commitment from money exchange validation 
(1); Media validation (3); External target market & media validation & 
commitment through money exchange (1); Self-justification, family and 
friends, professional network, early adopters target market validation, 
external target market validation, commitment through money exchange 
(2); N/A (1) 
Non-Customer 
Intel: 
N/A Entrepreneurial pitch 
competition 
N/A Blog writers, radio station, newspapers, magazines, cafes, other media 








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.7.1. Description of 
Startup Process: 
The founder had his own need that he wanted to solve and had the expertise to design 
and create a prototype for the product. Upon receiving a suggestion that other people 
would be interested, he started testing the prototype with his own personal network, 
getting feedback in an online community forum, and met with local cafes in person. 
Receiving positive feedback and interest, he decided to crowdfund the manufacturing of 
product, investing substantial time in raising awareness about the product. Successfully 
raising money, the founder turns his attention towards manufacturing and exploring 




The focus of Startup G in new venture creation was first the product (I. Opportunity 
Discovery), then the customer and the organization (II. Opportunity Refinement), the 




While the startup received some funding from an entrepreneurial pitch competition, the 
first sale and continued sales through money exchange took place during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase.  
Type of Customer:  
In the first phase, the founder spoke only to his own professional network, however 
during Opportunity Refinement, he reached outside to three different related categories 
of the external target market to learn more and test interest. It was only in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase that the founder fully interacted with family and friends, his 
professional network, and the external target market. 
4.7.5.  Customer 
Interaction Initiated 
by: 
Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup G across the new venture 
creation process. Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase, did customers reach out to the 
startup.   
4.7.6.  Information 
Collection and 




In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the founder only communicated in person. In the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase, he reached out in-person, in cafes, and in online 
community forums. In the Transition Phase, he reached out to a crowdfunding platform, 
and in the Entrepreneurial Phase, he reached out in-person, through blogs, social media, 
radio, newspapers and magazines, posters, email, advertisements, and direct messaging. 
Data analytics were also used to collect data on visitors to the website. 
Distribution Channel 
of Product:  
The product was meant to be distributed direct to end-customer. 
Purpose of Early 
Customer Interaction: 
Initial focus was on understanding the problem, then testing assumptions about the 
problem, product and customer segment, and then finally, tested interest in the product 
from customers and the advertising campaigns used to promote it. 
Description of 
Information Gathered:  
Founder first learned about essential features of the product, then learned about interest 
in the product, and learned that there would be a way to build a strong engagement 
relationship with online customers and crowdfund the product. 
4.7.7 Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Initial confirmations were predominantly strategic in the Opportunity Discovery and 
Opportunity Refinement Phases. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, strategic confirmation 








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.7.8. Level of 
Validation Received 
from Customer:  
Validation initially started with the founder himself and his professional network 
(Opportunity Discovery Phase). In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, however he 
reached out to a wider group, including an external target market, predominantly 
online. In the Transition Phase, when he committed to the crowdfunding campaign, he 
continued to receive validation from the online external target market. In the 
Entrepreneurial Phase, he worked to gain media attention while building his 
crowdfunding campaign. This eventually resulted in commitment through money 
exchange. 
Other Non-Customer 
Intel Collected During 
NVC Stage:  
In the Entrepreneurial Phase, blog writers, a radio station, newspapers, magazines, 
cafes, other media and crowdfunding campaigns provided validation to the startup. The 
manufacturer provided insight into improving the product.  
4.7.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 Startup G followed a somewhat unique path where customers paid for a product 
before it was manufactured. Crowdfunding made this possible. Startup G’s early focus in 
new venture creation was on developing the product (I. Opportunity Discovery). 
Subsequently, the startup tested customer interest and their ability to create an 
organization (II. Opportunity Refinement), by deciding to raise funds for the product 
manufacturing (III. Transition). Finally, Startup G continued raising funds for and 
promoted the product to the customer and needed to learn how to get it manufactured (IV. 
Entrepreneurial; see Figure 23).  
Figure 23. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Startup During Each Phase of New 






















4.7.4. Customer Commitment 
 While first customer interactions took place during the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase (II), the initial customer commitment through a sale (through the crowdfunding 
campaign) did not take place until the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; see Figure 25). 
However, throughout venture creation, the founder built several public relationships with 
potential customers, seeking out multiple communication channels, but relying 
significantly on the use of the online community forum. 
4.7.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup G across the new 
venture creation process. Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase, once the founder had raised 
awareness about the startup and built relationships with a core group of the external target 
market, did customers reach out to the startup (see Figure 24). 
Figure 24. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup G. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer). Note: Additional sales took place after the First Customer Commitment 
through Sale, however, they were not included in the diagram. 
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4.7.6. Communication Channel 
 In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the founder only communicated in person to 
potential customers about his product. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase however, he 
started reaching out in-person, in cafes and in online community forums. These 
relationships continued to develop over the new venture creation process. In the 
Transition Phase, Startup G decided to start initial sales and fundraising through a 
crowdfunding platform, and in the Entrepreneurial Phase, reached out to potential 
customers in-person, through blogs, social media, radio, newspapers and magazines, 
posters, email, advertisements, and direct messaging – to promote the campaign. Several 
of the people reached were the same ones that were initially connected with during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase. The founder also used data analytics to collect basic data 
on visitors to the website. 
4.7.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 The founder sought out strategic confirmation of the business concept during the 
Opportunity Discovery and Opportunity Refinement Phases. While in the Entrepreneurial 
Phase, strategic confirmation was still important, obtaining operational and tactical 
confirmations became a larger focus for the startup. The focus changed to building 
relationships with diverse customer segments and manufacturing the product.   
4.7.8. Level of Validation  
 Verbal validation initially started with the founder himself and his professional 
network (Opportunity Discovery Phase). In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, however 
he reached out to a wider group, including an external target market, predominantly 
online to receive text-based validation. In the Transition Phase, when he committed to the 
crowdfunding campaign, he continued to receive verbal and text-based validation from 
the online external target market. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, he worked to gain media 
attention while building his crowdfunding campaign. This eventually resulted in 





4.7.9. Summary of Startup G 
 Startup G was founded to produce a portable travel coffee press in April 2016 (1). 
First interactions with potential customers were in the Opportunity Refinement Phase, 
however only when their crowdfunding campaign was launched and completed did 
Startup G have ‘customers.’ At this stage however, while the startup had funding, they 
had still not manufactured the product (2). The startup saw their market as outdoor 
enthusiasts that enjoy good coffee, however, this eventually evolved to include people 
who enjoy good coffee. 
 Startup G initially focused on the product during the Opportunity Discovery 
Phase, then on attracting customers during Opportunity Refinement and beyond. There 
was never a major focus on the organization (3). The first customer interactions too place 
during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, but the initial customer commitment through 
sale (crowdfunding campaign) took place only during the Entrepreneurial Phase (4). 
Afterwards, there were still minor revisions to the product, but it still had not been 
manufactured. Customer interactions were predominantly initiated by Startup G across 
the new venture creation process (5). 
 Initial customer communication channels were in person, in cafes and in online 
community forums. Over time, Startup G started to build sales and fundraising through 
the online crowdfunding campaign, as well as through various channels such as blogs, 
social media, radio, newspapers, posters and email to gain attention for the startup. The 
startup even began using data analytics to learn more about their potential visitors to the 
website (6). Strategic confirmation of the business was obtained before the Transition 
Phase, and Operational and Tactical feedback became more important afterwards (7).  
 Startup G received a diverse array of verbal validation early during the 
Opportunity Discovery and Refinement Phases (8). The founder of Startup G was 
persistent in building relationships and gathering information about an array of his 
external target customers’ needs and wants, much earlier before he started selling the 
product during the Entrepreneurial Phase and before setting up his organization and 
manufacturing process. The founder sought out validation from potential customers early 




target market – online community forums, professional in-person network, and cafes – 
suggesting he was embedding himself in the community. Furthermore, the volume and 
positive nature of the validation for the startup that came from online sources was 
substantial – a market that the founder viewed to be essential for sales. He both built 
relationships, received and shared information online – and matched this with the sales 
channel by which he intended to sell the product. Crowdfunding to sell and raise funds 
required relatively little initial personal capital however, suggesting that personal 
investment in the product, beyond time and expertise, was minimal. 
Figure 25. Level of Validation Received by Startup G During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 















































4.8. Startup H 
4.8.1. Case Overview 
 Startup H was a web platform designed to provide comprehensive, personalized 
resources for mental health - all online – allowing students to connect with online self-
health resources, counsellors or online peers. The founder wanted the business to be: 
“helping students discover and access the mental health resources that are best fitting for 
their individual situation” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 The idea for Startup H arose in June 2015 when the founder realized that many 
individuals, individuals who require it, do not seek out help for improving their own 
mental health. Furthermore, he noticed that there was often a stigma and lack of 
conversation on mental health issues with family and friends: “The idea came from 
learning about my friend’s mental health situations and correlating it with my own. I 
realized that we never really talked about it and [could have] helped each other. We only 
discussed it after the fact” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).  
 When Startup H was founded in September 2015, the initial business model that 
the founder focused on comprised of platform users – university students, and the 
demand side customer that would purchase the software – university counseling service 
offices. While students were not customers of the web platform, their interaction with the 
platform both justified its existence, as well as affected the content on the site.  
 Students would wait weeks before getting access to a counseling appointment. 
The web platform was meant to improve on-campus mental health and alleviate some of 
the backlog that the counseling services department had. It would provide articles on 
mental health, an overview of the on-campus services available to students, and would 
offer online e-counseling services to students (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase).  
 Having received verbal interest from the university, the founder decided to 
explore what features the site could have. To gain an idea of what students would like to 
have access to on the web platform, he spoke with informal faculty mentors that regularly 
dealt with students on campus. (II. Opportunity Refinement Phase). While they suggested 




department, after more reflection, the founder decided to develop a web platform that 
could be used by all users (III. Transition Phase).  
 After building an initial demo website, the founder of Startup H went back to the 
university counselling services to show them it. While he received positive verbal 
feedback, the meeting did not result in a contract. Instead, the university encouraged the 
founder to next pursue partnerships with their e-counseling staff for the website. The 
founder of Startup H saw legal challenges creating confidential channels for e-counselors 
however. This caused Startup H to adapt the web platform again so that instead of e-
counseling, they would provide an online chat service to university students that 
facilitated the search for customized access to resources on mental health. To this, the 
university suggested that their auxiliary staff could offer this chat service, however 
Startup H encountered substantial resistance from the staff, making the online chat 
service challenging to implement. 
 By August 2016, Startup H had pivoted towards an advertising based revenue 
model. Students remained the focal user of the web platform, but the demand side 
customer became psychologists that purchased ad space on the web platform: “Before, 
the school was the customer and students were the users. Psychologists would be 
secondary customers that I would pursue after getting the school [as a customer]. But 
now, the psychologists would be the primary customers. The schools would be a 
marketing channel. And the students would [still] be the user” (Startup H Founder, 
Interview, 16 August, 2016). 
 By January 2017, the founder had moved away from the sole focus of students as 
users, to reach a more general population of users. To do so, he began contacting 
insurance companies as potential customers for his web platform. Furthermore, he began 
to develop a chat bot – a computer program that conducted conversation via text and 
simulated a human conversational partner – that could be integrated into the insurance 
companies’ websites and designed as a tool for their customers to better access 





4.8.2. Understanding Customer Interactions  
 Table 25 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup H, and Table 26 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases. Note that Startup H 
initially pursued universities as customers of the web platform software, then changed to 
have an advertising-based business model with psychologists as customers. Finally, 
Startup H returned back to the original business model, but changed to seeking out 
insurance companies as potential customers.  
4.8.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus?  
 The focus of Startup H early in new venture creation was on obtaining verbal 
validation from the initial customer, a local university counselling services office. The 
startup’s focus was then put on building the product during the Opportunity Refinement 
and Transition Phases. Finally, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, the focus moved to 
finding the right customer adapting the product accordingly. It took a few adaptations to 
find a product (from a web platform with e-counselling, to having a chat function with 
live humans supporting it, to having an automated chat bot) that suited the needs of 
interested customers (from university counselling services to insurance companies; see 
Figure 26). 
Figure 26. Product, Organization and/or Customer Focus of Organization During each Phase of New 






















Table 25. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup H 
PHASE (# Stages) 







IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (16) 
  Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.8.1. Description 
of Stage for 
Startup: 
Founder realized that there were 
limited ways to help people talk and 
learn about mental health on university 
campuses and believed that a web 
platform could be helpful to provide 
customized mental health resources to 
students. He spoke with university 
counselling services as a potential 
customer. 
Considered having 
customized we pages for 
different groups of users and 
spoke with mentors and 
informal counsellors of users 
to learn of user interest 
Founder began 
building a web 
platform 
Founder put prototype online and began to try to 
get commitment from University Counselling 
Services #1, as well as a few more universities. 
Only University #1 offered to act as a pilot for the 
web platform. Also, founder spoke with different 
potential partners - psychologists and health 
researchers, and tried to connect directly with 
student users to get their feedback, but struggled. 
The startup was pivoted twice, once towards an ad-
based business model, selling space to 
psychologists, and secondly, selling software to 






if >1 at a time): 
Customers (1) Product (1); [User 
representative; 1] 
Product (1) Customer (7); Product (3); Customer & Product 
(2); Product & Organization (1); User (1); User & 











Table 25 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 
DISCOVERY PHASE (3) 
II. OPPORTUNITY 
REFINEMENT PHASE (2) 
III. TRANSITION 
PHASE (1) 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (16) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary 
Type of Customer:  Founder (2); Early adopters in 
external target market (1) 
N/A (2 - Interacted with 
representatives of users) 
Founder (1) Early adopters in external target market (university; 
4); External target market (university; 2); External 
target market (university and users; 1); External 
target market (Psychologists advertising; 1); 
External target market (Insurance companies; 1); 
N/A (not customers but: user representatives, users, 




Startup (1); N/A (2) N/A (2 interactions with non-
customers, initiated by 
startup) 
N/A (1 interaction with 
non-customers, initiated 
by startup) 
Startup (12); N/A (4; Interactions not with 
customers but initiated by startup) 







(underlined if >1 at 
a time): 
Physical - In-person meeting (1) N/A (In-person for non-
customer interactions) 
N/A Physical - In-person (5); Web - email (2); Physical 
- In-person and Web - email (1); Physical - Phone 
and Web email (2); Web - Web platform (1); N/A 
(5; Interactions with other stakeholders, used 





Direct to end-customer 
(university) who makes it 
available to users 
N/A N/A Direct to end-customer (university) who makes it 
available to users (8); Direct to end-customer 
(psychologist) who makes it available to users (1); 
Direct to end-customer (insurance company) that 
makes it available to users (1); N/A (5; showing 
product to user representatives, users, health 






Table 25 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 






IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (16) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary 
Purpose of Early 
Customer 
Interaction 
(underlined if >1 at 
a time):  
Tested assumption on 
problem, business model, 
and customer (1); N/A (2) 




Testing interest in product (4); Developed tested promoted new product 
(1); Testing possibility to get more commitment from customer (1); 
Seeking feedback from customer segment (2); developed and tested 
new business models (2); N/A (Interactions with non-customers to test 





Learned about customer 
(university) interest and 
concerns (1) 
Received suggestion 
that mental health 
resources should be 
customized for 
different groups of 
students (1) 
N/A Received positive verbal feedback from university customer (5); 
Received positive verbal feedback from insurance customer (1); 
Received feedback from data analytics on limited traffic (1); N/A (9; 
non-customer interaction that showed user representatives believed 
software was useful, but challenging to gauge user interest, online 
counselling already existed, and potential partners were resistant to 
working with them/unclear on partnership) 
4.8.7. Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Strategic - confirmatory; 
Operational/Tactical - 
some modifications (1) 
N/A (Strategic - not 
confirmatory when 
speaking with user 
representatives) 
N/A Strategic - confirmatory (5); Strategic - Not confirmatory (2); Strategic, 
Operational/Tactical - confirmatory (1); N/A (8; Interactions with other 
stakeholders did not really change plans)  





justification, Early adopter 
target market validation (1) 
Self-justification (2) Self-justification 
(1) 
Self-justification (1); Early adopters target market validation (3); 
External target market validation (2); N/A (10; Lack of validation from 




NVC Stage:  
None Spoke with user 
representatives - 
mentors to student 
users (1) 
None Spoke with user representatives - mentors to student users, non-
university e-counsellors, peer support group, psychologist, and health 








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.8.1. Description of 
Startup Process: 
The founders realized that there was a gap in providing mental health support on 
campus to university students. He approached university counselling services with the 
idea that he would sell them a specially designed special web platform for this purpose. 
Upon receiving verbal confirmation of interest, the founder built the platform. Despite 
several visits to counselling services, they would not commit as a customer, but would 
commit as a pilot location. Furthermore, Startup H faced some resistance from the 
proposed partners that would make this web platform a success. The founder pivoted 
towards an advertising based model and then towards having insurance companies as 




Customers were the initial focus during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. This was 
followed by a focus on the product during the Opportunity Refinement and Transition 
Phases. Finally, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, the founder concentrates on trying to 
get customer commitment and changing to find the right customer, as well as adapting 
the product to meet the needs of the new customers. 
4.8.4. Demonstrated 
Customer Commitment: 
Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) was there customer commitment through a 
verbal contract with the university counseling services. However, this commitment 
involved a pilot relationship, allowing Startup H to test out the software, and was not 
intended to involve payment. 
Type of Customer:  
In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, Startup H interacted with a potential customer in 
the external target market. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, Startup H did not 
interact with customers, nor the users (students) that the customers serviced, but 
interacted with representatives of the users (their faculty mentors). Only once a 
preliminary version of the software was built did Startup H approach potential 
customers again in the external target market (universities, psychologists, and finally, 
insurance companies). 
4.8.5.  Customer 
Interaction Initiated by: 
Customer interactions took place in the Opportunity Discovery (I) Phase and the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) and was initiated by Startup H in all cases. During 
Opportunity Refinement and the Transition Phases, no interactions with customers 
took place, however there were interactions with non-customers (user representatives). 
4.8.6.  Information 
Collection and Marketing 
and Sales Communication 
Channel for Interaction: 
The founder initially approached customers for in-person meetings during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase. By the Entrepreneurial Phase, he was connecting with 
customer in-person, using email, and through the web platform. He was also trying to 
connect with the student users of the web platform using posters, business cards, and 
flyers. 
Distribution Channel of 
Product:  
Initially the web platform would be made available directly to the end-customer 
(university) who would make it available to student users. The same distribution 
occurred when the customer changed to psychologists and insurance companies. 





Table 26 continued 
4.8.4. Customer Commitment 
 The first customer interaction took place during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. 
While the web platform (product) underwent several adaptations, there was no contract or 
sale by the end of the study period (see Figure 27). 
4.8.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 The startup initiated all interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase and 




SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
Purpose of Early Customer 
Interaction: 
Early interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase with 
university customer helped Startup H learn about the customer segment, 
their problems, and interests. Subsequent interactions during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase allowed founders to gain feedback to adapt the 
product, see if it was possible to try to get commitment from customer, 
try out different business models. 
Description of Information 
Gathered:  
Startup H learned the interest of the university and their concerns, 
received suggestions that the mental health resources should be 
customized for different groups, and received positive verbal feedback 
from different potential customers but no confirmation. They also learned 
how to use data analytics to gauge interest by visitors to the website. 
4.8.7 Customer Feedback Impact:  The founder initially got strategic confirmation that it was a good 
business concept from the university during the Opportunity Discovery 
Phase. Additional confirmation was not sought out until two phases later, 
during the Entrepreneurial Phase, where some interactions confirmed the 
strategy and others did not. Operational/tactical confirmation was also 
obtained during this phase. 
4.8.8. Level of Validation Received 
from Customer:  
Besides self-justification throughout the new venture creation process, 
the founder received external target market validation during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase and the Entrepreneurial Phase. This 
validation was verbal only. 
Other Non-Customer Intel 
Collected During NVC Stage:  
During the Opportunity Refinement and Entrepreneurial Phase, the 
founder also spoke with user representatives, mentors that were familiar 




Figure 27. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup H. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product, and C = 
Customer). Note: Additional sales took place after the First Customer Commitment 
through Sale, however, they were not included in the diagram. 
 
4.8.6. Communication Channel 
 Initial interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase took place in-person, 
however in the Entrepreneurial Phase, in addition to in-person interactions with 
customers, Startup H also started reaching out using email and the web platform itself. 
The founder also reached out to users of the platform – students, with business cards, 
fliers, phone, email and in-person meetings. 
4.8.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 The founder received initial strategic confirmation from speaking with university 
counselling services (the first customer) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. No 
feedback from customers was received during the Opportunity Refinement or Transition 
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Phase, as well as some non-confirmatory strategic feedback, and some operational / 
tactical confirmatory feedback such as challenges getting help to implement the online 
chat. 
4.8.8. Level of Validation 
 Early validation came from initial interactions with the early external target 
market during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). After this, the founder spent time 
building the web platform. In the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), he continued to receive 
validation from the early external target market, however no contracts or sales were made 
(see Figure 28). 
Figure 28. Level of Validation Received by Startup H During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 


















































4.8.9. Summary of Startup H 
 Startup H was a web platform designed to provide comprehensive, personalized 
online resources for mental health, founded in September 2015 (1). The startup received 
verbal interest from a potential customer – a university counseling services – during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase, and began developing the web platform to meet their needs 
(2). They continued to develop the website for the university until they decided to pivot, 
first, towards an advertising-based revenue model, and second, towards an insurance 
company as a potential customer.  
 The initial focus of Startup H was on customers, seeing one customer’s interest 
during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. Subsequently, the focus went towards 
developing the product in the Opportunity Refinement and Transition Phases. Finally, the 
focus returned to customers and products during the Entrepreneurial Phase. There was 
limited attention put towards the organization during the study period (3). While the first 
customer interaction took place during the Opportunity Discovery Phase, there was no 
contract or sale by the end of the study period (4). The startup initiated all customer 
interactions (5).  
 Initial interactions during the Opportunity Discovery Phase took place in-person, 
however by the Entrepreneurial Phase, the startup began reaching out using email and the 
web platform itself, as well as connecting with users of the platform on campus with 
business cards, fliers, phone, email, and in-person meetings (6). The founder received 
initial strategic confirmation from speaking with university counselling services during 
the Opportunity Discovery Phase. Some strategic confirmation was received in later 
staged, but there was limited operational and tactical feedback received from potential 
customers (7).  
 Early verbal validation came from interactions with the one potential customer in 
the external target market during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. However, limited 
interaction took place again until the Entrepreneurial Phase, and validation received 
continued to be verbal (8). The founder received no formal commitment from the 
customer however was willing to continue to invest time in product development. While 




a pilot site for free, other potential university counseling services customers did not want 
to have further discussions with Startup H until they saw the success of the first 
university. This meant that there was only verbal external market validation from one 
potential customer. There was no other type of ‘commitment’ to justify continuing to 
develop a product for them. For instance, action that could have displayed interest and 
commitment includes providing support for Startup H to become embedded in the 
ecosystem of counsellors and facilitating connections with student users. For example, 
the student counsellors’ Peer Support Group members were highly resistant to working 
with Startup H, despite being connected to the startup by the university counselling 
services. Furthermore, counselling services appeared to take a very passive approach 
towards promoting the web platform to student users – suggesting a lack of investment of 
time, money, or endorsement from the potential customers and that there was hesitation 
of the market, a potential lack of trust in the product or founder, or a lack of interest, 
despite the founder interpreting the verbal interest as validation. Furthermore, even with 
changing customers (to psychologists and then insurance companies), the founder unable 
to secure a contract or sale, by the end of the study period, and had not finished 





4.9. Startup I 
4.9.1. Case Overview 
 Founder T, originally a freelance writer and competitive athlete, had returned to 
school and learned he was good at website design (I. Opportunity Discovery Phase). He 
met Founder A at a small business summer company program and the pair created a 
partnership for a full suite marketing service company (II. Opportunity Refinement 
Phase). The founders believed that they had a strong partnership from the beginning: “I 
think what brought us together is that both of us work extremely hard and [co-founder A] 
is very talented and I’m talented at what we do. We get along, and we’re friends, though 
[when we met] we weren’t really friends at that point… It’s a great partnership and we 
complement each other very well in that sense” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 
May, 2016).  
They wanted to create “a full suite marketing service that offers tangible results 
doing analytics integration. We connect our clients with the right people so they can 
build the businesses that they want to” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 
2016).  One of the initial goals of the business was to have open communication and 
collaboration with potential customers: “When you deal with your customer, that’s when 
the changes happen. Because if you’re resenting your customer or they’re resenting 
you… there’s a problem. And if there’s miscommunication – anything goes wrong, I’ll 
make a note of it… Our whole business is collaborative and adaptive. Because if there’s 
one thing that’s going on, I want to make sure it’s collaborative and adaptive to run 
smoothly. Some of our worst projects were because we hit roadblocks and I wasn’t able 
to adapt. But now, our goal is to be an integrated process where they give us money and 
we get things done” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). 
 For a year, the founders had been working on Startup I part-time. However, when 
they were accepted into a university-based incubator, as of May 2016, they committed to 
working on the startup full-time (III. Transition Phase). As they pushed to grow their 
business, they relied heavily on personal networks for clients. Even though they wanted 




accepting projects from those that approached them rather than reaching out to customers. 
This proved to be rather time consuming however, as it entailed lots of pre-contract 
interactions that did not always result in a contract and eventual payment. Even once they 
started to reach out to new customers that they were interested to work with, they found 
challenges securing contracts with them. This lead to Startup I revamping their business 
model – where they offered click-and-pay services on the website to minimize back and 
forth communication (IV. Entrepreneurial Phase).  
4.9.2. Understanding Customer Interactions  
 Table 27 describes the characteristics of customer interactions during each phase 
of the new venture creation process for Startup I, and Table 28 is a summary of the 
changes in characteristics of customer interactions across phases.  
4.9.3. Product, Organization or Customer Focus? 
 The initial focus of Startup I was on customers that were approaching the founder 
and developing customized websites (product) for them (I. Opportunity Phase). A 
partnership between the two founders refined the approach of the business towards a full 
suite marketing service, requiring a shift in the organization focus (II. Opportunity 
Refinement). Then, when the founders committed to the business full time when entering 
an entrepreneurship program, they shifted towards thinking about developing business 
processes and the types of customers they would like to work with (III. Transition 
Phase). Finally, they focused predominantly on the customers that were approaching 
them, as well as trying to change to higher-end customers by changing the company 
website to promote more direct interaction, adapting processes for how they dealt with 
customers, and offering higher end services such as in-bound marketing (see Figure 29).  
Figure 29. Product (P), Organization (O) and/or Customer (C) Focus of Organization During Each 




















Table 27. Characteristics of Customer Interactions During Venture Creation Phases of Startup I 





REFINEMENT PHASE (2) 
III. TRANSITION 
PHASE (1) 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
  Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.9.1. Description of 
Stage for Startup: 
Founder T went back to 
school and learned he was 
good at designing websites 
Founder T applies to local city 
small business centre and meets 
Founder A. They create a 
partnership for a full suite 
marketing service company 
Founders committed full 
time to startup 
Founders relied heavily on personal network for 
clients. Even though they wanted to change target 
customer, they took a passive approach to finding 
customers. They eventually re-designed the 
startup's website to require potential customers to 
click-and-pay for services, minimizing client back 




(underlined if >1 at a 
time): 
Customers (2); Product (1) Organization (2) Customer & Organization 
(1) 
Customers (6); Organization (3); Product (2); 
Customers & Organization (1); Product & 







through money exchange 
(2) 
None (But some sales may have 
been ongoing) 
Sale: Commitment 
through money exchange 
(1) (Ongoing sales) 
Sale: Commitment through money exchange (5) 
(Ongoing sales) 
Type of Customer:  Founder (1); Family & 
friends (1); Founder & 
Family and Friends (1) 
Founders (1); N/A (1) Family and friends, 
Professional network, 
External target market (1) 
Founders (1); Friends and family & professional 
network (5); Family and friends, professional 
network, external target market (4); N/A (4) 
4.9.5. Customer 
Interaction Initiated 
by (number of 
initiations; underlined if 
>1 at a time): 
Friend (1); Unknown (1); 
N/A (1) 
N/A (2) Customer (1) Customers (4); Customers & Startup (1); Customer 





Table 27 continued 





REFINEMENT PHASE (2) 
III. TRANSITION 
PHASE (1) 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.9.6. Information 
Collection and 




Physical - In-person? 
(1); Unknown (1); N/A 
(1) 
In-person and email (1); N/A 
(1) 
Physical - In person 
meetings, phone; Web 
- email and ads(1) 
Web - email (2); Physical - in-person, phone, Web - email 
(2); Physical - phone, Web - email (2); Phone, paper 
proposal, web - email (1); Web - Web content on website & 
social media (2); Web - data analytics and email (1); N/A 
(4) 
Distribution Channel 
of Product:  
Direct to end-customer 
(1) 
N/A (2) Direct to end-customer 
(1) 
Direct to end-customer (7); Direct to end-customer via 
website (1); Direct to end-customer via website and social 
media (3); N/A (3) 
Purpose of Early 
Customer Interaction 
(underlined if >1 at a 
time):  
Tested interest in 
product (1); Learned 
about problem and 
customer segment (1) 
Founders got to know each 
other and see if they worked 
well together (Tested product 
and customer and developed 
product and model; 2) 
Tested business model 
to see if product would 
create a profitable 
business and promoted 
product 
Observed how startup got clients (1); Developed and tested 
business models, customer segment, and customer 
commitment (3); Tested ways to connect with new clients 
(2); Tested whether changing online presence would attract 
customers (3); Tested how customers interact with their 
website (1); N/A (4) 
Description of 
Information Gathered:  
Founder was able to 
create websites that 
satisfied customers (2) 
Founders realized they would 
work well together (2) 
Founders found that 
clients kept coming to 
them. 
Found that clients readily approached the startup, but did 
not always accept their proposals and these were not 
always clients that the founders wanted to work with. They 
found waiting for customers to accept proposals was 
important before starting work. The success of the changes 
to the website and process of click-and-pay services were 





Table 27 continued 
PHASE (# Stages) 
I. OPPORTUNITY 




III. TRANSITION PHASE (1) IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL PHASE (14) 
 Summary Summary Summary Summary 
4.9.7. Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Strategic - confirmatory (2); N/A 
(1) 
Strategic - confirmatory 
(3) 
Strategic - confirmatory (1) Operational/Tactical - Confirmatory (2); 
Operational/Tactical - not confirmatory (4); 
Strategic - not confirmed (4); N/A (4) 





justification, Family & Friends 
validation (2); Commitment 
through money exchange (2) 
Self-justification (2); 
Commitment through 
money exchange (1) 
Self-justification, Family and 
friends’ validation, Professional 
network (1); Commitment 
through money exchange (1) 
Self-justification (2); Self-justification, Family 
and friends, professional network validation (1); 
Self-justification, Family and friends, 
Professional network, External target market 
validation (1); N/A (10); Commitment through 




NVC Stage:  








SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.9.1. Description of 
Startup Process: 
An entrepreneur went back to school for web design and later met another 
entrepreneur at a small business centre where they decided to create a full suite 
marketing service company. Working on it part-time while finishing school, a year 
later, they entered an entrepreneurial program and committed full time to the startup. 
Though they wanted to build the business and change the target customer segment 
they were attracting, they had taken a passive approach to finding customers and were 
spending a lot of time with customers before a contract was signed, and sometimes, 
no contract was signed. The founders eventually re-designed the startup’s website so 
that potential customers knew the prices and could just click-and-pay for services 




The initial focus of Startup I was on customers and the product (Opportunity 
Discovery), then on the organization alone (Opportunity Refinement), then on the 
customer and the organization (Transition), followed by the customer, organization, 
and product (Entrepreneurial). 
4.9.4. Demonstrated 
Customer Commitment: 
The first sale as demonstrated through money exchange took place during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase. Regular sales of Startup H’s services continued 
through the Entrepreneurial phase.  
Type of Customer:  
Initial customers in the Opportunity Discovery Phase were family and friends, then in 
the Transition Phase and beyond, customers also came from the founders’ 
professional network and external target market. 
4.9.5.  Customer 
Interaction Initiated by: 
Customer interactions are predominantly initiated by customers (or friends of 
customers/founders). Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase do the founders begin 
initiating customer interactions.  
4.9.6.  Information 




Initial communication takes place in person. By the Transition Phase, the founders 
are using phone calls and email as well, and by the Entrepreneurial Phase, the 
founders are also using social media and data analytics to interact with or better 
understand customers. 
Distribution Channel of 
Product/Service:  
The product is being delivered direct to end-customer throughout venture creation 
until the end of the study period, when it is delivered to the end-customer via the 
website. 
Purpose of Early 
Customer Interaction: 
The initial purpose if customer interactions was to show the problem and test interest 
in the product/service (Opportunity Discovery Phase), then to test the business model, 
product and customer. There was a profitable business (Transition Phase), then 
finally, to test the business model, new ways to connect with clients, and to test how 
potential customers would interact with the website. 
Description of 
Information Gathered:  
Startup H’s founders found that they could create websites that satisfied clients. 
Initially they were proud that clients approached them, and then realized that there 
were issues with that – where they would create proposals that clients would not 









SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGE ACROSS PHASES 
4.9.7 Customer 
Feedback Impact:  
Most of the customer feedback received during the Opportunity Discovery, Opportunity 
Refinement, and Transition Phases were strategic and confirmatory that the business 
concept that Startup H had was working. However, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, 
there was a lack of strategic confirmation as the founders were trying to change the 
business concept and were changing how they worked with customers. 
4.9.8. Level of 
Validation Received 
from Customer:  
The founder received validation during the Opportunity Discovery Phase from family 
and friends and through sales and money exchange. Money exchange continued to 
provide validation, as family and friends and the personal network continued to 
approach the startup. However, sales continued through the Entrepreneurial Phase, as 
the business concept changed, the sales only provided validation of the past business 
concept.  
Other Non-Customer 
Intel Collected During 
NVC Stage:  
No influential non-customers were noted during the study period. 
4.9.4. Customer Commitment 
 The first customer interaction and the first customer commitment through sale 
took place during the Opportunity Discovery phase. Subsequent customer interactions 
continued, while the founders revised the type of organization they would be, the services 
they offered, and the type of customers they served (Figure 30). 
4.9.5. Initiation of Customer Interaction 
 While the initial customer interaction to Startup I was an introduction of a 
potential customer via a friend, most customer interactions were initiated by the 
customer. Only in the Entrepreneurial Phase did Startup I begin reaching out to potential 
customers.  
4.9.6. Communication Channels 
 Initial interactions with customers were predominantly in-person over the phone. 
However, as time progressed, Startup I started communicating more using email, and 






Figure 30. Overview of Customer Interactions for Startup I. Process steps shown indicate the status 
of interactions at the end of the study period. (O = Organization, P = Product/Service, 
and C = Customer). Note: Additional sales took place after the First Customer 
Commitment through Sale, however, they were not included in the diagram. 
 
4.9.7. Strategic or Operational/Tactical Feedback 
 The feedback during the three first phases of new venture creation were strategic 
and confirmatory, suggesting that the web design business concept of the startup was 
established. However, as the founders tried to shift the types of customers they attracted 
and their processes for how they operated, this reduced strategic confirmation. Also, 
because they did not yet have the technology developed, they received mixed 
confirmation on operational/tactical feedback. 
4.9.8. Level of Validation 
 Startup I received their first monetary validation in the Opportunity Discovery 
Phase without reaching beyond their family and friends. They continued to have 
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to receive sales validation. This learning about other customers in the external target 
market non-existent and made it more challenging for founders to mentally change their 
approach to interacting with customers. 
 In the Entrepreneurial Phase, the trigger to finally create the new website and 
adapt towards a more online, technoculture business was triggered by the founders being 
fed up after several months of dealing with the time-consuming processes for customer 
Clients familiar with their old business model continued to pursue them however (Figure 
31). 
Figure 31. Level of Validation Received by Startup I During New Venture Creation. (Where the 
shaded circles represent validation from following categories:  I. Founder – Self-
justification; II. Personal Network: Family and Friends; III. Professional Network; IV: 
External Target Market; V. Media Validation; VI: Commitment through Contract; VII: 


















































4.9.9. Summary of Startup I 
 Startup I was a marketing and website design service established in May 2015 (1). 
The idea for the startup began when a customer first approached the startup during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase (2).  
 Startup I was initially focused on developing products for customers in the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase. While the organization became a brief focus in the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase when a co-founder was added to the business, the focus 
remained predominantly on customers and the product (3). The first customer interaction 
and first customer commitment through a sale took place during the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase (4). From then on, the startup relied on customers approaching them (5).  
 Initial interactions with customers were in person and over the phone, however, as 
time progressed, the startup began using more email, and then, eventually social media 
and their new website (6). Until the Transition Phase, all feedback was strategic. 
Afterwards, they tried to shift the types of customers they attracted, however did not get 
strategic confirmation, nor operational or tactical confirmation (7).  
 Validation was through sales, but predominantly from the founders’ personal and 
professional networks approaching them (8). Despite being a different type of customer 
from what Startup I desired, the ongoing supply of customers that were approaching 
Startup I made it challenging for the founders to pro-actively change their business 
model. This suggests it was possible to receive confirmation from customers too early in 
the process if the founders were unwilling or unable to continue to test out different 
customer segments. This lack of experimentation can make it a challenge to adapt the 
business later not just because it is difficult to start seeking out new customers, but that it 
first requires a shift in mindset that they would need to reach out to customers (founder 
identity/mentally created path dependence). The founders only had so much bandwidth 
and were bogged down with the work from existing customers approaching them, that 
their business processes were only designed to handle these types of customers 
approaching them (organization path dependence). Furthermore, their reputation as a 
marketing firm offering basic services became established over time, based on their 




4.10. Summary of Chapter 4  
 This chapter provided a within-case findings for each of the nine startups studied 
during the study period. The analyses were presented individually, in a standardized 
format, and provided a case study overview (1), a summary of customer interactions (2), 
the startup focus at different phases of new venture creation (3), when customer 
commitment first occurred and the first interaction (4), who initiated customer 
interactions (5), a summary of the communication channels over time (6), whether 
strategic or operational or tactical feedback was received and when (7), and the level of 
validation received from the personal or professional networks of the startup, or the 
external target market, and whether there were any contracts or sales that took place (8). 
Rather than providing additional summaries for each individual case, please refer to the 
ninth (final) section of each analysis for a summary of the each within-case analysis (9).  
 From looking at these characteristics for each of the cases, there were different 
patterns noted for customer interactions in terms of who initiated them, what type of 
customer existed, what type of communication channels were used, whether the feedback 
from customers was strategic or operational or tactical, and at what stages, if at all, 
contracts or sales occurred. In general, from these summaries we can see that an array of 
industries was followed (1). Most startups had their first customer interaction before 
committing to the business during the Transition Phase (III), but this interaction did not 
necessarily result in a sale or a contract (2). They initially started with a product or a 
product and customer focus, and over time, moved towards a customer and/or 
organization focus (3). A first sale occurred in different phases during the study period 
(4), and most startups initiated their own customer interactions throughout the venture 
creation process, with the exception of Startup I (5).  
 Interestingly, even in digital-based startups, most initial customer interaction took 
place in person (6). Strategic feedback was sought out and generally obtained before 
committing to the business in the Transition Phase, affecting the decision to start the 
business and commitment to the business concept. Only afterwards, in the 
Entrepreneurial Phase, did the startup start to seek out operational or tactical feedback 




venture creation, as well as receiving validation through contracts or sales (8). To better 
understand these cases similarities and differences, a more detailed cross-case analysis is 





5. RESULTS: CROSS-CASE FINDINGS 
 Chapter 5 presents the findings of the cross-case analyses that compare the nine 
startups in the sample. Ideally in a cross-case analysis, the similarities and differences 
across cases in the sample are studied to better explain the specific conditions under 
which a finding occurs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Based on the general findings in 
Chapter 4, this chapter explores the first part of my research question: when and how do 
startups interact with early customers during the new venture creation process?  
 Two sections delve deeper into explaining where startups focus attention (towards 
product, organization, or customer) (Section 5.1). Next, I explore the communication 
channels used during new venture creation with different types of customers (family and 
friends, professional network, and/or the external target market) and the validation 
received from these customers at each phase of new venture creation (Section 5.2). The 
characteristics explored here were highlighted in the findings of Chapter 4. 
 As mentioned in the methods section, the cross-case analysis builds on the within-
case analyses (Chapter 4) - developed with a set of variables that emerged inductively 
through coding and data analysis (Table 9), and analyzed using matrices and other 
displays to analyze each case in depth (Appendix E). Then, the case-level displays were 
‘stacked’ in a time-ordered meta-matrix (see Appendix F) that condensed and allowed 
for even more systematic comparison of multiple cases into one big chart, and addressed 
the chronology of each phase of new venture creation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Refer 
to Table 10 for a description of the five phases of new venture creation (the order is 
noted with roman numerals). 
 Before delving into the findings, there are a few points to note about the 
presentation of the findings in this chapter. Much like Chapter 4, Chapter 5 reports 
detailed data and findings. The statements made about the startup events are supported by 
data found in the extended cases (Appendix B). There are several figures (Figure 32 to 
Figure 40) that show a comparison of different startup customer interaction 
characteristics during the new venture creation process. Note that these figures are not 
meant to be interpreted as quantitative measures. For example, looking at the figure of 




(organic beverage) and customers of Startup A initiating customer interactions during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase does not mean that only one customer interaction was initiated by 
Startup A, and one interaction was initiated by Startup A’s customers, but rather, that 
during the participant interviews, founders mentioned or inferred that these types of 
interactions occurred during this time period. Specifically, these charts should be used 
merely to understand and compare relative occurrences of each characteristic or scenario 
mentioned. 
 Another point to note is that founders themselves can be considered a category of 
customer. Founders often start a business trying to solve a problem that they encounter 
themselves, and then, they may reach out to others as potential customers that they 
believe also have the same problem. Information about their personal insights from a 
potential customer perspective have been considered in the following figures: Figure 32 
(product, organization or customer focus) and Figure 33 (purpose of interactions), and 
Figure 35 (level of validation received). Note that founders were not considered as 
customers in Figure 34 (initiation of customer interaction), Figure 35 (validation), 
Figure 36, Figure 37, Figure 38, Figure 39, and Figure 40 (communication channels 
with customer during each phase of new venture creation). 
 Finally, a few last points to note. Not all cases are necessarily discussed in each 
section of these findings chapters. If a startup was not discussed, the reader should be 
assured that data in the sample did not provide relevant evidence for that point. Only four 
of the startups made it to the Execute Phase during the study period. Also, for this cross-
case analysis, the phases analyzed for Startup C were only for the affiliate marketing 





5.1. Focus of Startup During Venture Creation 
 In this section, I aim to develop an understanding of where startups put their 
efforts in each phase of new venture creation. An organization, and particularly a young 
startup, has limited resources and attention (Yli-Renko, Sapienza, & Hay, 2001) and 
where they choose to focus their efforts is informative of the priorities of the founders at 
different phases of new venture creation. 
 As shown in Chapter 4, startups may focus on developing the product 
(specifications, design, manufacturing processes, etc.) and gathering resources for it 
(product focus), or may focus efforts on organization creation, including organizational 
processes, infrastructure, obtaining funding, and human resource/staffing issues 
(organization focus), or towards interactions with customers, including gaining 
information about them, their preferences, and promoting the product to them (customer 
focus). I organize the findings in this section based on the three places startups focus their 
attention over each phase of new venture creation (Figure 32). An explanation of each 
phase of new venture creation is also included. To understand the implications of this 
focus, I then include comparative findings on the purpose of the customer interaction 





Figure 32. Focus of Startups on Developing a Product, Organization or Customer During New 
Venture Creation. Note that the time the participants spent focused on a category during 
a particular phase is presented proportionately. For example, during the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase, Startup A spent approximately twice as much time focused on the 

































































































































































I. Opportunity Discovery Phase II. Opportunity Refinement Phase III. Transition Phase IV. Entrepreneurial Phase V. Execute Phase
Product, Organization or Customer Focus




5.1.1. - I. Opportunity Discovery Phase  
 Products. During the Opportunity Discovery (I) Phase, eight of the nine startups 
focused mostly on products (see Figure 32). Looking at the purpose of the interaction 
(see Figure 33)– All startups were trying to learn about a problem that needed to be 
solved or the product itself, or were starting to develop the product.  
 Customers. Testing the customer segment was the next most frequent activity 
during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (Figure 32). These activities involved speaking 
with customers to learn more about who they were, their preferences, whether they were 
the target market, and obtaining feedback about the product and business. Two-thirds of 
the startups in the sample initiated customer interactions during this phase, and only one 
of the startups in the sample, Startup I (the marketing agency), was approached by 
customers (Figure 34). 
 Founders as Customers: Internally Stimulated Opportunity Recognition. Some 
startups in the sample decided to start a business from a need that they experienced 
themselves (Bhave, 1994). Startups A (organic beverage), B (makerspace), D (online 
event space marketplace), E (app-based gaming community), and G (coffee press) had 
experienced a problem themselves, and thought about developing a product as a potential 
solution. Prior to pursuing the idea, they spoke with no one or only spoke with family and 
friends (Startups A and E), and saw themselves as a potential customer and part of a 
larger customer segment. For example, Startup G, wanted to be able to make good coffee 
while camping, and designed a portable coffee press. He believed that there were also 
other, similar campers and coffee devotees that would also be interested, and the first 
potential customers that he reached out to were in this category of market.  
 Startups that had Externally Stimulated Opportunity Recognition. In contrast, 
Startups C, F and H did not experience the problem themselves. The idea instead came 





Figure 33. Purpose of Interactions for Startup Cases A to I at Each Stage of New Venture Creation. 
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 Organization. In general, gathering resources to build the organization was not 
important to startups in the initial stages of new venture creation – particularly during the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase. The organization was only a partial focus for Startup A 
(Figure 32), relevant as the startup was creating a physical beverage product and needed 
to have a physical space that allowed for product production.  
Figure 34. Stakeholder that Initiated Customer Interactions During New Venture Creation. 
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5.1.2. - II. Opportunity Refinement Phase 
 Customers and Product. By the Opportunity Refinement Phase, an idea has been 
identified and the entrepreneurs test whether there is a market. Products and customers 
were the focus for most startups in the sample during this phase (eight startups, all except 
Startup I, and seven, all except Startups H and I, respectively; Figure 32).  
 The purpose of the interactions during Opportunity Refinement involved the 
customer segment being tested, alongside learning about the problem, developing and 
testing the product (Figure 33). Developing the business model had increased in 
importance from the previous phase. By this phase, all startups had interacted with 
customers, with eight of the nine startups having initiated customer interactions (Figure 
34; all but Startup I).  
 The continued focus of startups on understanding the problem, and developing the 
product during the second phase of new venture creation, suggests that the problem was 
still being validated and that the startup was testing whether the potential product and 
business concept met the potential external target market’s needs and interests.  
 By the Opportunity Refinement Phase, only five of the nine startups in the sample 
had an actual prototype (digital or physical; Table 29; Startup A, Startup C, Startup E, 
Startup G, Startup I, case narratives, Appendix B). Founders without a prototype still 
spoke with customers to share their description of the problem that they wanted to solve 
and the proposed product that they would use to test it. This is in line with a practitioner’s 
view of MVP and is considered an appropriate tool to seek out feedback and requiring 
minimal investment to create (Blank & Dorf, 2012; Winkel & Wilcox, 2017).  
 Organization. The Organization was still not the main focus or priority of any of 
the startups during this phase (Figure 32). The business model was being developed in 
this phase and only a couple of startups (C and E) had started to test theirs with a 





Table 29. New Venture Creation Phase in which Prototype was Created and Validation Received 
Startup and MVP Phase of Prototype Creation Validation Received from Showing 
Prototype 
A – Organic beverage I. Opportunity Discovery Verbal (in-person) and sales 
B – Pop-up events IV. Entrepreneurial Verbal (in-person), limited sales (not 
really an MVP because it was 
different from goal business concept, 
the makerspace) 
C –Websites with 
affiliate marketing 
links 
I. Opportunity Discovery Sales 
D – Web form for 
event space 
marketplace 
III. Transition Verbal (in-person) and sales 
E – App-based online 
gaming community 
II. Opportunity Refinement Verbal (in-person and online) and 
download of app 
F – Online loan 
aggregator 
IV. Entrepreneurial  Sales 
G – Coffee press I. Opportunity Discovery Verbal (online community forum; 
and sales in Entrepreneurial Phase) 
H – Online mental 
health resources 
IV. Entrepreneurial Verbal (in-person) 
I – Marketing agency 
services 
I. Opportunity Discovery Sales 
5.1.3. - III. Transition Phase 
 In the Transition Phase, founders demonstrated commitment to physical creation 
of the startup – described by Bhave (1994) as the phase where founders move beyond 
business concept identification. Commitment to creating the business was shown in a 
variety of ways, including verbal statements demonstrating full-time commitment to the 
business concept (Startup B, C, E, I); putting other career options aside (Startup A); or 
more tangible events such as starting product development in-house (Startup D, F, H,); or 
starting a public campaign to crowdfund the manufacturing of the product (Startup G).   
 Product. Five of the nine startups (Startups C, D, E, F, H, and I) put efforts into 




prototype at this phase (Table 29), however the narrative from this case suggests that the 
startup’s founders were focused on establishing the organization (Figure 32; Appendix 
B2). However, though Startup B was thinking about the product (Figure 32), they were 
not developing it (Figure 33). By this phase, Startup A, Startup G, and Startup I already 
had prototypes that they could use in demonstrations with customers to promote the 
product. Finally, note that while Startup C had an initial MVP that was making money, 
the founder continued to revise it. 
 Organization. All startups except for Startup C and Startup H had considered 
some organizational aspect of their startup by the Transition Phase. One reason for this 
may be that these two startups are somewhat self-sufficient in that: 1) both required no 
additional external expertise to develop their online businesses; 2) besides their 
computers, did not require special equipment or office space; and 3) are not marketspaces 
that require supply-side customers on the website. Their commitment to physical creation 
required time, more than any other resource. 
 Customer. While customer interactions continued to occur during the Transition 
Phase, including some ongoing sales that are not detailed in most of the participant 
narratives during the phase, the startups predominantly focused internally on their own 
ability to develop the product and the organization in this phase (Figure 32 & Figure 
33). This resulted in efforts to develop and test the business model and to test the 
customer segment being reduced.  
5.1.4. IV. Entrepreneurial Phase 
 The Entrepreneurial Phase involves ongoing testing of the customer segment, 
setting up the organization, evaluating and continued development of the model and 
product. From the previous phases, we saw that most founders had started developing the 
product and technology and all began receiving customer feedback much early in the new 
venture creation process. As a result, by the Entrepreneurial Phase, eight of the nine 
startups were in full force to test and promote the product with customers. 
 Customers. By the Entrepreneurial Phase, relatively, more attention and focus of 




interactions, all nine startups in the sample were testing the customer segment in this 
phase (Figure 33). Most of the startups’ business models were also being tested on these 
customers. While all startups were initiating some type of customer interactions by the 
Entrepreneurial Phase, seven of the nine startups now also had customers initiating 
interactions (except Startup B and Startup H; Figure 34). This was also boosted by 
solicited and unsolicited media influence for Startup D, Startup F, and Startup G.  
 Products. The next largest focus of the startup sample was on the product during 
the Entrepreneurial Phase (Figure 32). While development of the product continued by 
six startups, there were activities associated with products that required customer 
feedback, including – testing and promoting the product to customers (predominantly 
through advertising and other outreach). Startup B, Startup F, and Startup H had waited 
until this phase to develop and begin testing their prototypes, and Startup C, Startup D, 
and Startup E continued to refine their products (Table 29; Figure 33). 
 Organization. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, there was an increased focus on the 
organization (six startups, A, B, C, D, E, and I), as they moved towards building a 
physical structure for the organization and the processes of the organization that surround 
production technology (Thompson, 1967).  The organization however was still a less 
important focus for the startups in the sample at this phase. This is in line with Bhave’s 
suggestion that developing stabilizing organization structures and practices takes time, 
and perhaps may indicate that the study period is too short to observe this at this time. 
The focus on the organization however involved setting up production facilities or 
permanent locations to work from or a new web platform, hiring new employees, and 
developing organizational practices. 
5.1.5. V. Execute Phase 
 By the end of the study period, only four startups had reached this last phase: 
Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E. Startups that had reached the Execute 
Phase were meant to have understood their business model, had identified the product 
that meets the needs of the target market. At this stage, there was more of an increased 




 Customers and Product. A large proportion of the startups’ time was dedicated to 
customers – testing the customer segment, but also testing out the product on them and 
promoting the product. By this stage, there was less focus on testing the business model, 
developing the product, or even learning about the problem (Figure 33). Any remaining 
product developments for these startups’ existing products were minor revisions.  
 Organization. The organization was a focus for three of the startups (Figure 32), 
however as mentioned during the Entrepreneurial Phase, this focus is likely to grow over 
time. These startups were still relatively young (less than two years old) at the end of the 
study period, suggesting that there was still ample time to develop these organizational 
structures and processes later down the line.  
5.1.6. Summary of Focus of Startups During New Venture Creation 
 This section delves into where startups focus their efforts during each phase of 
new venture creation. The focus of startups towards customers, the product and the 
organization varied in each phase, as well as the reason for customer interactions. In the 
Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), the startups in the sample generally focused on the 
problem and product. Startup A, Startup C, Startup F, Startup G, Startup H, and Startup I 
were already interacting with customers during this phase, with Startup A, Startup C, 
Startup F, Startup G, and Startup H initiating the interaction. Founders sought out 
interactions with customers to clarify the problem and develop (and learn about potential 
features of) the product as the earliest activities in new venture creation. 
 In the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), startups begun developing the product 
and testing it with customers. By the Transition Phase (III), where startups committed to 
a certain business concept, startups in the sample generally focused internally on 
developing the product and their business model, unless they were still learning about 
customer needs or had ongoing sales. By the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), however, all 
startups changed the majority of their focus to customers - testing the customer segment 
and business model, and testing and promoting the product to them.  
 Finally, only four of the startups (Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E) 




startups were no longer focused on the problem. Instead, they remained predominantly 
focused on interacting with customers, testing and promoting the product. This continued 
customer testing suggests that the startups that had reached the Execute Phase had found 
the right market, but were still testing interest in the product and ways to interact with 
customers, and ways to test the business model.  
 Note that the flexibility of a startup to continue to adjust the business may be a 
virtue of these startups being predominantly digital in nature and having less physical 
infrastructure (Startup C, Startup D, Startup E, Startup F, and Startup H), a product that is 
service-based (Startup I, where the product can be customized for each client), or a 
physical product made in small batches, allowing for minor adjustments in each batch 
(Startup A). Due to the length of the study period for this dissertation, it was not possible 
to see if Startup G (coffee press) or Startup B (makerspace) would be able to take the 
product into the Execute Phase. We can assume that costs associated with tooling the 
manufacturing moulds for the coffee press (Startup G) and changing equipment in a 
makerspace (Startup B) may provide some restriction in making later adaptations to these 
products. Future studies could address this limitation.  
 Finally, note that by the final phase, customers were reaching out to startups as 
much as startups were reaching out to them (Figure 34). This may be due to the efforts 
put in by the founder to build relationships with potential customers and promote 
themselves, but also suggests that this may be an indication of arriving at the Execute 
Phase.  
5.2. Communication Channels and Validation During New Venture Creation 
 Startups used different communication channels to connect with customers 
throughout venture creation. Communication channels help in building relationships, 
which can be tough to do from scratch (Engel, Kaandorp, & Elfring, 2017). These 
channels are used to build trust and commitment (Scarbrough et al., 2013), and need to be 





 In part, the communication channels adopted were affected by startups’ business 
models (see Table 8), the industry they operated in, and the type of customers they 
interacted with. How entrepreneurs make decisions on what communication channels are 
used is outside the scope of this dissertation however, validation received from customers 
are referenced in Figure 35, and patterns of communication channels are noted below 
and referenced in Figure 36, Figure 37, Figure 38, Figure 39, and Figure 40.  
5.2.1. - I. Opportunity Discovery Phase 
 During the Opportunity Discovery Phase, Startups A (organic beverage), C 
(affiliate marketer), E (app-based gaming community), F (online loan aggregator), G 
(coffee press), H (psychology software for universities), and I (marketing company) 
interacted with and received verbal validation from potential customers (Figure 35). All 
of the startups had their initial customer interactions in-person except for Startup C, that 
chose to connect with the external target market directly through online channels – email, 
social media and the website (Figure 36). Startup C also used technology for data 
scrapping to better understand customers and their interaction with the website and was 
able to receive their first contracts with websites that offered affiliate programs this way. 
 Note that while Startup A, as an organic beverage startup, had its first interactions 
in person with family and friends and their professional network, the initial customer 
interactions of several digital startups were also in-person, including Internet-based 
companies, Startup E (app-based gaming community), Startup F (online loan aggregator), 
Startup H (psychology software for universities) and Startup I’s (marketing company) 
and the physical product made by Startup G (coffee press) was going to be mostly 
marketed and sold online. These startups spoke with family and friends (Startup E and 
Startup I), their professional network (Startup G), and reached out to the external target 
market (Startup F and Startup H; Figure 35). Only Startup I had been approached by 
customers (Figure 34), and only Startup A and Startup I had sales during this phase – 




Figure 35. Validation Received from Customers and Media at Each Phase of Venture Creation. Note that the seven categories in roman numerals refer 
to the type of customer: I – Founder, II – Family and friends (personal network); III – Professional network; IV – External target market; 
V. – Media Validation; VI – Commitment through contract; VII – Commitment through payment (or a sale). All commitments besides VI 
and VII are verbal or text-based. 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B B B B
B






























































































I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII.
I. Opportunity Discovery II. Opportunity Refinement Phase III. Transition Phase IV. Entrepreneurial Phase V. Execute Phase




5.2.2. - II. Opportunity Refinement Phase 
 By the Opportunity Refinement Phase (Figure 37), all startups had interacted 
customers in some capacity. Startup A (organic beverage) continued to interact with and 
sell in-person to their personal and professional network. Startup B (makerspace) reached 
out via email but also in-person. They had connected with their target market by setting 
up booths at entrepreneurship events, and had received verbal confirmation from 
attendees that they would be interested in a makerspace. These interactions provided 
validation to the founders to continue the business. Startups G (coffee press) also 
continued to connect with potential customers and to connect to a wider external market 
through online community forums for coffee and hiking. Startup H spoke with mentors of 
the student users of the software in-person. Startup D and Startup I started using email. 
This facilitated obtaining contracts with supply-side customers (Startup D) and continued 
sales with customers in their networks (Startup I; Figure 35).  
 Startup F (online loan aggregator) begun reaching out to lenders (supply-side 
customers) in the external target market via phone, email and Linkedin (social media), 
and was successful in getting contracts established (Figure 35). Startup E (app-based 
gaming community) had built their first version of their application software and had 
started connecting with new and existing users directly through social media, media 
online, digital ads, their application, and online gaming forums. Their downloads of the 
application are considered a contract. Finally, Startup C continued to interact with 
customers and learn about their habits online through their website and data analytics. 
They continued to partner with companies offering affiliate programs (contracts) and 
started making their initial sales to the external target market during the Opportunity 




Figure 36. Communication Channel: I. Opportunity Discovery Phase.  
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Figure 37. Communication Channel: II. Opportunity Refinement Phase. Note that Startup H did not actually interact with a potential paying customer 
(the university counseling services) during this phase. The in-person interaction was with the mentors of potential student users of the 
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5.2.3. – III. Transition Phase 
 During the Transition Phase (Figure 38), only six of the nine startups (Startup A 
– organic beverage; Startup C – affiliate marketer; Startup D – online event spaces 
marketplace; Startup E – app-based gaming community; Startup G – coffee press; and 
Startup I – marketing agency) chose to interact with customers. This phase however is 
defined as displaying increased commitment to creating the startup and is quite short. The 
customer interactions accounted for were specifically linked with tasks that would display 
commitment to the business, including increased effort towards developing the product 
and developing and testing the business model (Figure 33).  
 While Startup A’s interactions remained in-person, they expanded their 
interactions outside of their personal and professional networks to the external target 
market when they committed to the business. This allowed them to also connect with and 
get contracts with retailers and distributors to sell their beverage. 
 Startup C continued to see success in their affiliate marketing websites, prompting 
them to commit to the business. The founder decided to build and test different websites 
and partnerships with affiliate marketing programs using email, various startup websites, 
and data analytics.  
 Startup D moved away from more traditional email and begun connecting with its 
personal and professional, networks and external target market through social media, 
traditional media, media online and its own website. It secured both contracts with its 
first supply-side customers, and sales with its first demand-side customers during the 
Transition Phase, providing validation to the founders to continue the business. 
 During the Transition Phase, one of Startup E’s co-founders committed full-time 
to the business. This allowed them to continue communication with customers using 
social media, online media, the application software and its website, and an online 
community forum. There were ongoing downloads (contracts) of the application software 





Figure 38. Communication Channel: III. Transition Phase. 



















 Startup G continued to reach out and gain validation from potential customers in 
the external target market, committing to the business through deciding to crowdfund 
manufacturing of the coffee press. By the Transition Phase, the founder did not have any 
sales or contracts, however, had become one of the top seven most popular topics on the 
world-wide accessed online community forums for coffee and camping, with potential 
customers in the online forum providing textual feedback and voicing interest in the 
product. Startup I continued to attract the customers from their personal and professional 
networks, interacting with them in-person, on the phone and over email. 
 Startup B, Startup F and Startup H did not connect with customers during the 
Transition Phase (Figure 35). Startup B was looking for a permanent location. Startup F 
was building the software for the online loan aggregator and already had contracts with 
supply-side customers to integrate into the web platform in the previous phase.  
 Finally, Startup H was focused on developing software for the one university 
(potential customer) that they had spoken with. While, they had received no contract or 
sales from the university (Figure 35), this verbal validation provided justification to them 
to continue developing the business. The validation stemmed from their initial 
conversation with the university during the Opportunity Discovery Phase, and the 
discussions they had with the mentors of student users during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase. They had not spoken with student users by this phase, however. 
5.2.4. - IV. Entrepreneurial Phase 
 During the Entrepreneurial Phase (Figure 39), there was a marked increase in the 
variety of communication channels used by the startups. All startups in the sample were 
interacting with potential customers at this stage. Not only did they continuing to test the 
product, the startups had increased promoting and continued to test the business’ business 





Figure 39. Communication Channel: IV. Entrepreneurial Phase. 












































 Startup A (organic beverage) had expanded their communication channels to 
include phone, email, social media and traditional media. This expansion of 
communication channels helped them to promote their product and business during this 
phase, while they expanded the business using retailers and distributors. Sales continued 
to provide validation (Figure 35). 
 Startup B (makerspace) had decided to test out the business concept using a pop-
up event as an MVP. They reached out to the external target market, as well as their 
personal and professional markets in-person, on the phone, on social media, using posters 
(physical ads) and their website. They were however not connecting with the same 
market that had been interested in their makerspace the last time – advertising 
predominantly on campus to only a subset of the external target market. They made 
limited sales to their event, predominantly in their own network.  
 Startup C (affiliate marketer) continued reaching out to customers and learning 
about them through email, their websites and data analytics. Sales continued to provide 
validation. Startup D (online event location marketplace) also continued to grow their 
business, reaching out using multiple communication channels (in-person, phone, email, 
traditional media, digital ads and their website). Despite having issues with setting up 
their technology (See cases, Appendix B), Startup D was still able to attract both supply-
side and demand-side customers to their website, receiving contracts and sales to validate 
their business. Startup E (app-based gaming community) continued to experiment with 
ways to connect with potential and existing users. They started to hold in-person events, 
connected on social media, were featured in traditional media, and had customer 
interactions through the app and on the startup’s website. They also attempted an 
unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign and continued interactions through the online 
community forum with video game players. Ongoing downloads provided validation to 
them on their business model. 
 Startup F’s (online loan aggregator) web platform went live during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase, and the start of sales provided validation for the business. They 
used several communication channels to reach out to their external target market, 




website. To learn more about customer interactions with the website, the startup begun 
using data analytics. To improve online searches for loans, Startup F brought in search 
engine optimization of the website.  
 Startup G (coffee press) had launched their crowdfunding campaign during the 
Entrepreneurial Phase. They adopted multiple communication channels with potential 
customers – including in-person tastings, email, social media, traditional and online 
media, physical and digital advertisements, the original crowdfunding website and cross-
promoted products on the crowdfunding website, their own website, and ongoing 
discussions on the online forum. Once the crowdfunding campaign launched, sales 
provided validation to the startup. Furthermore, the online discussion forum that the 
founder had built a relationship with the community (Opportunity Refinement Phase) was 
the channel through which the startup was able to learn first about issues with the 
crowdfunding campaign and quickly solve them. Furthermore, with the relationships he 
had built with dedicated community members on the forum, the community members 
defended Startup G and advocated for the product. 
 Media also played a role in raising awareness for Startup D, Startup F and Startup 
G, where they were all featured by traditional media during the Entrepreneurial Phase, 
and Startup G was featured by online media (blogs). Properly timing the media attention, 
at a stage when the startup was also promoting sales, boosted the awareness of the startup 
among the external target markets. 
 During the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup H (psychology software for 
universities) had designed and released the first version of the website software. The 
founder begun reaching out again to both potential customers (universities and then later, 
insurance companies) in the external target market by using in-person meetings, phone, 
and email. He also promoted the website using business cards and posters around the 
university campus to try to attract student users. Despite his efforts, pilot university 
would not commit and the other university customers told the founder that they wanted to 
first see demonstrated success of the software with the first pilot university, before they 
would consider a sale. While the founder continued to receive verbal validation from the 




 Finally, by the Entrepreneurial Phase, Startup I (marketing company), had decided 
to start reaching out to their external target market, rather than waiting for customers to 
approach them. They made steps to change their business model, revamping their website 
to have a click-and-pay model to purchase marketing services. What they had hoped was 
that instead of the frequent emails back and forth with clients before a sale took place 
(though this continued to occur), the startup could now aim to connect with customers 
through social media, digital ads and the website. The founders also begun using data 
analytics to better understand how visitors interacted with the website. Meanwhile, sales 
continued to old family and friends - clients in their network that approached Startup I. 
5.2.5. - V. Execute Phase 
 The Execute Phase only had four startups (Figure 40). Though these startups 
continued to promote and test the product and customer segment, their increased focus on 
scaling sales, and not on product development, suggested that they had found the business 
concept and market that worked for them Figure 33 and cases, Appendix B).  
 Startup A (organic beverage) continued to interact with customers in-person, on 
the phone and with email. To reach a wider audience, they connected via social media, 
traditional and online media. Startup C (affiliate marketer) continued the same tactics and 
using the same communication channels of the website and using data analytics as before, 
continuing sales and contracts with affiliate programs. Startup D (event spaces 
marketplace) launched their full web platform and were interacting with customers 
directly through the website now, as well as through email and in-person meetings (for 
on-boarding supply-side customers). All three startups had sales (Figure 35).  
 Finally, Startup E continued to attract customer users to download their app using 
the application software itself, their website, email, social media, and in-person events. 
They also brought in affiliate advertisers - streamers (individuals who played video 
games live online) and video bloggers (individuals who recorded videos about video 
games and video game playing online) - to promote the startup, and started to use data 
analytics to learn how users interacted with the app. By the end of the study period, they 




 Figure 40. Communication Channel: V. Execute Phase. 
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5.2.6. Summary of Communication Channels and Validation Analysis 
 The startups in the sample had substantially different approaches to using 
communication channels and what types of customers were interacted with. Six main 
observations stood out from this analysis. Note that not all startups experienced the same 
trends, and hence, are not mentioned in each section.  
A. Startups that continued to use similar channels throughout new venture creation 
built relationships with similar customers over time. 
 Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E used similar channels to communicate with 
potential customers early and later in the new venture creation process. Right from the 
beginning, they found channels that their potential customers were already using, and 
used the same channels to learn about the problem, to develop the product and model, and 
to test the model and the customer segment. 
 Startup C and Startup E had gone directly to their external target markets online 
(through their website and online community forum, respectively) to receive feedback on 
their businesses in the Opportunity Discovery (I) and Opportunity Refinement (II) 
Phases, respectively, while Startup D, having connections in their external target market, 
was able to speak directly with some potential customers in their personal and 
professional networks, as well as use these channels to connect with the wider external 
target market during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II).  
 These data suggest that using communication channels common to potential 
customers allowed startups to reach their external market early and remain connected 
throughout the new venture creation process. Connecting with the same group of 
customers earlier and later in new venture creation allowed the startups to receive initial 
input from customers and to later be able to follow up with them. These cases suggest 
that reaching out to the external target market to get feedback early in the new venture 
creation process allows startups to incorporate this feedback into the product and business 
model development since they tend to focus on the problem and product development 




 Furthermore, connecting early allowed for the time to develop a relationship with 
these customers that continued throughout the new venture creation process. Building this 
relationship early could suggest that startups were developing trust with potential 
customers and potentially, early commitment. These relationships may even have the 
potential to grow so that customers act as advocates for the startup. For example,  in the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), Startup E built relationships with the community 
members of the forums that they were part of. Having demonstrated their commitment to 
these potential customers early, later, when the startups’ mobile app (product) had 
become more publically visible and had run into some criticisms (for example, technical 
glitches in the application software), the dedicated community members continued to 
support and advocate for the startups.  
 In contrast to Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E, Startup B did not use the same 
communication channels to connect with customers throughout new venture creation. 
Startup B’s founders initially spoke with individuals attending in-person entrepreneurial 
and community university events during the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). The 
potential customers that they connected with gave them verbal validation that their 
business concept (a permanent makerspace) was of interest. During the Entrepreneurial 
Phase (IV) however, the founders of Startup B used different channels (posters, their own 
website and social media) to connect with potential customers while developing, testing 
and promoting their product.  
 Using different channels at each of these phases resulted in the founders 
interacting with different potential customers, and different types of customers, at each 
phase of the new venture creation process. As a result, the feedback that was initially 
received and incorporated into the product could not be tested later with the same 
customers.  
 Though there were likely other factors at play that affected the lack of success of 
Startup B, using the same initial communication channels, and expanding on these 
channels, would have enabled them to connect and re-connect with similar customers 
throughout the new venture creation process – much like Startup C, Startup D, and 




channels would allow the founders to receive feedback continually from the same core 
group of customers, and to build the product and business to serve their needs. This 
would also likely facilitate building the customer relationship.  
B. One communication channel – an online community forum - can be used to build a 
large community of potential customers. 
 While Startup E had aimed to build a community of users, they chose to use a 
variety of communication channels to reach potential users from the beginning, including 
an online community forum. In contrast, Startup G only initially used one communication 
channel – the online community forum –to gain insight about the problem and product 
from initial customers. Both startups were able to build large communities of potential 
customers with an online community forum. This one channel allowed the founder to 
receive feedback and public validation from many potential customers (see case 
Appendix B).  
 When Startup G expanded its communication channels during the Entrepreneurial 
Phase to include an array of promotional techniques of social media, traditional and 
online media, advertisements and crowdfunding, they remained connected to their initial 
group of potential customers by continuing interactions in the online community forum. 
This allowed them to continue the relationships that initially gave them validation (the 
early adopters or product enthusiasts) and build social capital (Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001). 
These initial customers also developed loyalty to the startup, and helped with innovation 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) begun acting as advocate users to defend and promote 
the startup once sales began. Finally, the creation of community that founders are 
involved in can improve chances of success (Hienerth & Lettl, 2011), suggesting that 
communication channels that concurrently build community can be a useful tool for 
startups to efficiently gain social support and interest. 
C. Initially fewer communication channels can be used if startups are already 
embedded in their industries. 
 Ideally, feedback from the external target market would be obtained before the 
product or the organization is built and resources invested. Being embedded in the 




help access this insight (Jack & Anderson, 2002). While Startup D, Startup E, and Startup 
G are somewhat connected with their industries, Startup A and Startup I, in particular, 
received a large proportion of initial customers from their personal and professional 
networks. Startup A’s founders were both part of the health industries, making the 
production and sale of the organic beverage an appropriate fit with their network. With 
the networks that they were part of, the founders of Startup I knew several small 
businesses that were seeking marketing and website services, to the point where for 
several months, they never had to seek out a client.  
 Because they were already embedded in their industries, both Startup A and 
Startup I used a limited number of communication channels before the Transition Phase 
(III), expanding their communication channels only afterwards, when they committed to 
the business. They were also able to delay initial interactions with external target market, 
and leverage existing relationships to get initial feedback and sales validation. Startup A 
did not reach out beyond their personal and professional network before the Transition 
Phase (Figure 35). The founders developed their product entirely on feedback from 
within their network (see Case Appendix B). One co-founder was able to taste test and 
sell the product to personal training clients, and the other was able to find space to make 
and sell the beverage in an organic grocer that she worked with. When they started to 
promote the product to a wider market, including expanding to retailers and distributors, 
they fortunately found that there was wider interest in their product. Their embeddedness 
in the health industry helped them get their initial contracts, and success there, prompted 
them to seek out and helped them obtain subsequent contracts.  
 Startup I used the same communication channels (in-person, email and phone) 
until the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). Early in the new venture creation process, they had 
several customers in their network approaching them, needing websites and marketing 
expertise. During the Entrepreneurial Phase, their increase in communication channels 
was their way of reaching out to a wider target market of customers.  
 As both startups chose to not reach out to a wider audience initially, this delayed 
them from getting feedback from the wider target market because they had pre-existing 




continued to initiate interactions with several individuals in the industry – therefore 
staying in-the-know. However, Startup I only relied on interactions with customers that 
approached them, and hence, lacked the diversity of interactions that Startup A had from 
reaching out. However, when interested to do so later in new venture creation, they were 
still able to use multiple communication channels to reach the wider target market.  
 In contrast, if the startups’ founders are not embedded in their new startups’ 
industries, they could still find ways to embed (Startup G and Startup E seeking out niche 
groups in online communities). For example, Startup G also sought out camping and 
coffee enthusiasts specifically in an online community forum – a forum that he was 
already actively part of and became further embedded in. When he wanted to reach a 
wider market, he begun using social media and advertisements to promote the 
crowdfunding campaigns.  
 Alternatively, a breadth of channels that would connect them with the external 
target market from the beginning of new venture creation could be used. This was seen 
with Startup C and Startup F, where the founders were not initially part of the industries. 
Startup D and Startup E also chose to go beyond their personal and professional 
networks, allowing them to find feedback from their wider external target market early. 
D. Startups sought out validation from a varying closeness of potential customers. 
 During the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), only three startups interacted with 
the external target market, and four had received validation from their personal or 
professional networks. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), startups started to 
validate with the external target market (all except Startup A, Startup H, and Startup I). 
By the Transition Phase (III), all startups except Startup I had received validation from 
the external target market.  
 However, by the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), all nine startups had interacted with 
and received some type of verbal validation from the external target market. By the 
Execute Phase (V), all four startups that reached this final phase had received validation 




 Furthermore, while there were only two startups that had sales in the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase, seven had sales by the Entrepreneurial Phase. All startups that could 
have contracts by the Entrepreneurial Phase (Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, Startup E, 
and Startup F), had secured contracts.  
 These findings suggest that while startups may not initially seek out validation 
from the external target market, these interactions grow over time. By the Entrepreneurial 
Phase (IV), startups will be receiving feedback and validation from potential customers in 
the external target market.  
E. Validation in marketplaces can initially come from supply-side customers.  
 The two marketplaces in the sample are Startup D (event space marketplace) and 
Startup F (online loan aggregator). While Startup D chose to connect with both the 
supply-side and demand-side customers to validate the problem, before the Transition 
Phase (III), Startup F chose to initially only use channels that allowed them to connect 
with the external target market of lenders, supply-side customers.  
 Validation came from the interest in supply-side customers to be on the platform, 
as well as Startup F’s supply-side customers already having tested the demand-side 
customer market with their own current market (in contrast to Startup D’s supply-side 
customers, that may have not rented out their event space before). The continued 
existence and success of these lenders provided some validation for building Startup F. 
When Startup F expanded to use a more diverse array of communication channels after 
the Transition Phase, this allowed the startup to connect with demand-side customers.  
 This suggests that with a marketplace, it may be important to connect with the 
external target market of supply-side customers first, beginning with using channels 
appropriate to reach them. While validation from demand-side customers may be helpful, 
it is more helpful to get feedback on the product and early validation from supply-side 
customers that are already successfully operating in the industries. Receiving this initial 





F. Lack of validation from not connecting with enough customers early with 
communication channels 
 Startup H used the same communication channel to reach their first potential 
customer (universities) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I) and the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; in-person). Only one potential customer was interacted with 
during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I). This customer however had not offered any 
concrete validation (e.g. a contract or a sale). When this initial validation was not 
received, rather than seeking out other validation from other potential customers, the 
startup decided to build the product for the unconfirmed customer. At the end of the study 
period, there was still no sale and the founder decided to pursue other employment for the 
time being.  
 Once Startup H had developed their prototype, the additional communication 
channels noted during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; through the website, 
advertisements, email and phone) were used to connect with additional potential 
university customers and to attract student users to the website. However, by this stage, 
connecting with new customers was not fruitful. While found the product interesting, 
they were unwilling to commit until they saw demonstrated success of the product with 
the initial customer.  
 This suggests that by the Transition Phase (III), when a startup founder should 
demonstrate a commitment to the business, the relationship with the early potential 
customers and their interest in the product should already be somewhat established and 
validated. What this validation is at this stage can vary somewhat, however. While a sale, 
or money exchange is considered the ultimate validation, if that is not possible or 
appropriate with the given business model, the growth of certain startups during the study 
period suggests that contracts (as Startup F had with supply-side customers, before the 
founder chose to build the web platform), a “critical” and “growing” number of 
downloads of an application software (Startup E), or a large amount of publically 
declared interest (Startup G) could suffice in offering validation.  
 While validation is individually defined by each startup, only having verbal or 




at this stage would suggest that the business concept still needs to be further refined and 
tested with potential customers before further promoting the product or developing the 
business more widely. 
5.3. Summary of Chapter 5 – Cross-Case Findings 
 Chapter 5 presents the findings of the cross-case analyses that compare the nine 
startups in the sample. One section delves deeper into explaining where startups focus 
attention (towards to product, organization, or customer; Section 5.1). Next, I explored 
the communication channels used during new venture creation with different types of 
customers (family and friends, professional network, and/or the external target market) 
and the validation received from these customers at each phase of new venture creation 
(Section 5.2).  
 While Sections 5.1.6 and 5.2.6 provide an overview of the main findings in this 
chapter, a few key takeaways can be mentioned from this analysis that play a role in 
initiating the development of theory in Chapter 6. First, from Section 5.1, we see that 
there are different stages of activities that the startups undertake – for example, assessing 
the problem, developing a product to solve the problem, testing it on customers, internal 
development of the organization and its operations, the development of the business 
model, further testing and refinement of the product and the customers – at different 
stages of new venture creation. Throughout the process, startups continued to interact 
with customers, receiving their feedback on both the product, but also on these different 
activities.  
 From Section 5.2, two key points arose from this analysis that move us forward in 
the study. Validation received from customers provided justification to founders to move 
forward with the business or to pivot. Verbal validation from customers early in the new 
venture creation process was important, however, this validation could initially be from 
personal and/or professional networks, and did not need to be in the form of sales or a 
contract. The embeddedness of some startups in their industries suggests that this 
approach is likely more effective if founders have pre-existing connections. However, 




target market, after the founders had committed to building the business, and were almost 
all in the form of sales, or a contract, with the potential of future sales.  
 Looking at the findings of Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 together suggests that 
startups are receiving validation from different types of customers on different activities 
that they should perform throughout new venture creation. Potential customers that are 
interacted with during Opportunity Discovery (I), verify the problem and the initial MVP. 
The startup then starts undertaking activities to develop that product and to proceed with 
the new venture creation process. This is fine, if the early customer is representative of 
the target market, however, if they are not, then the startup ends up building in feedback 
into the business from the initial interactions to meet the needs of the ‘wrong’ type of 
customer.  
  Furthermore, there may be different types of validation needed at different phases 
of new venture creation that put startups down a path to further develop the business – 
impacting product design, to the market, business model, or even the operations 
undertaken later. These concepts are explored in greater depth in the following path 
analysis section that explains self-reinforcing mechanisms at play during early customer 
interactions and the section explaining my proposed model of early customer interaction 





6. TOWARDS A THEORY OF EARLY CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
Chapters 4 and 5 (and cases in Appendix B) were intentionally exploratory in 
nature to gain a better general understanding of how startups interact with early 
customers during the new venture creation process, including the activities undertaken 
and the stakeholders involved. From these chapters, there were two main interesting 
observations. First, if startups were already starting to attract some customers or if they 
were already more developed as an organization, they were more resistant to adapting 
aspects of their business later in the new venture creation process. Second, startups were 
not only interacting with customers throughout venture creation, they used feedback, or 
validation, to understand the problem, develop and test the product and business model 
with customers, and to develop the organization. The findings also imply that there are 
different types of validation received from different types of customers on the product, 
business concept, market, and operations at different phases of new venture creation.  
Based on the patterns of validation received from customers, in this chapter, I set 
the foundations towards developing a theory of early customer interactions and ask the 
question, how do customer interactions create path dependence for the organization 
being created? Drawing on concepts from the path dependence literature, I propose that 
customer interactions are a key part of new venture creation in that they provide 
validation, or feedback, as to whether to progress with the business concept being tested 
or to pivot and change direction. If these interactions take place early in the new venture 
creation process, early customers can influence the path formation that the startup is on. 
However, as feedback is received, decisions and investments in resources made, 
infrastructure established, and options are eliminated for the startup, there is a narrowing 
set of options for the product, market, operations, or business model of the organization 
as new venture creation progresses. It can be challenging or expensive to undo some of 
these decisions, even if customers encountered later in the process suggest changes 
(Appendix B). This narrowing of options suggests that early customers encountered have 
the potential to influence startups long-term, making understanding the mechanisms and 





In the following sections, I develop two integrated models that help explain early 
customer interactions during the new venture creation process. First, I present a model of 
the self-reinforcing process that results from receiving validation during early customer 
interactions (the customer interaction-validation-spiral; Section 6.1), and describe which 
of the mechanisms proposed by Schreyogg and Sydow (2011) may be acting to propagate 
the path dependence process (Section 6.2). I also mention other potential self-reinforcing 
processes that explain the behaviour of some of the startups in the sample (Sections 6.3 
and 6.4).  
 Second, I present a model of early customer interactions during the new venture 
creation process that integrates the customer interaction-validation-spiral model into the 
process of new venture creation (Section 6.5). I explain this model, offering a series of 
propositions on three levels of validation throughout new venture creation (Sections 6.6 
to 6.13). These validation levels have different requirements in terms of what is being 
validated (which concepts and which activities; 1), what is “enough” validation (2), what 
type of customer offers the validation (3), and the impact of the validation (4). With each 
validation level, there is a critical juncture, or a narrowing of options. 
6.1. Proposed Self-Reinforcing Process of Customer Interactions and Validation   
As discussed in the literature review (Section 2.2), Schreyogg and Sydow (2011) 
proposed four mechanisms that act as propagating self-reinforcement of the path 
dependence process. These effects come into play during the Phase II of path dependence 
(see Figure 1), the Positive Feedback Phase, that begins with a critical juncture – “an 
event or decision that triggers a dynamic regime of self-reinforcement” (Koch, 2008; 55). 
Gradually, a dominant solution emerges as more choices are made based on positive 
feedback. Agents, consciously or unconsciously, act upon these mechanisms to reinforce 
the path. In the process, it is possible that agents focus too much or inappropriately on a 
particular pattern of strategic action and reflection. This positive feedback can still lead 
them down a focused path, even if it is not the ‘ideal’ path for the entrepreneurial venture. 
I present a model of the self-reinforcing process that occurs from receiving 




(Figure 41). In this model, the product, business model, operations, and/or market 
concepts are presented to a customer and either is received positively or negatively:  
• In the case of being received negatively, there are two scenarios. First, the 
concept(s) can be revised for improvement, and ultimately presented again to a 
customer. Alternatively, the idea may be dismissed, the entrepreneur decides to 
pivot, and develops resets to develop new business, product and/or market 
concepts from scratch.  
• In the case the concept(s) are received positively by customers, the startup 
receives some type of validation that solidifies these concepts.  
Figure 41. Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral. 
 
This self-reinforcing effect exerts both direct and indirect forms of dependency. 
Once the effect is established, it turns out to be quasi irreversible. In the beginning, it 
only positively affects the product, business model, or market concept. However, 
validation also triggers resources and attention to become allocated towards developing 
processes and infrastructure focused on developing the product, business model, 
organization, or market concept. These investments make it increasingly less possible to 




6.2. Explaining Self-Reinforcing Process of Customer Interactions and Validation: 
Applying Schreyögg and Sydow’s (2011) Mechanisms 
  The customer interaction-validation spiral model represents the self-reinforcing 
mechanism of customer interactions resulting in validation of and solidification of the 
product, business or market concept. While it is possible that any of the four self-
reinforcing mechanisms proposed by Schreyögg and Sydow (2011; see Section 2.2.3 for 
a review) are playing a role in promoting the propagation of the self-reinforcement of the 
path dependence process, the Adaptive Expectation Effects and Learning Effects are 
particularly relevant for considering the effects of other stakeholders, including 
customers, outside of the startup and for considering the effects of repeatedly performing 
an activity. 
Adaptive Expectation Effects are a self-reinforcing effect where others’ 
expectations and preferences influence individual preferences. In this study, I view 
Adaptive Expectation Effects not as an external effect of individual customers seeing a 
product as increasingly attractive due to more individuals preferring it, but that the 
entrepreneur sees a product as increasingly attractive due to more individuals preferring 
it. 
Applying the Adaptive Expectation Effects to the entrepreneur-customer 
interaction setting - founders have their own beliefs and individual preferences about the 
business, and Adaptive Expectation Effects consider how they adapt their individual 
preferences in response to early customers’ preferences. In seeking an appropriate 
customer and finding a product/market fit, entrepreneurs pursue feedback and validation 
that brings them attention and acceptance. Ideas that are not being validated would be 
revised or discarded. As validation is received, however, entrepreneurs are increasingly 
likely to pursue a business concept, resulting in 1) the allocation of limited resources 
towards developing this business concept, and 2) the discarding of alternative options, 
narrowing the range of options and the path for the startup.  
Learning Effects however are also at play – with an increased efficiency from an 
activity being performed frequently, the startup develops and accumulates skills that they 




interacting with the same customer repeatedly versus several different customers in one 
time period. 
As the startup interacts repeatedly with the same customer, they can incorporate 
their initial feedback and seek out additional feedback for revision or validation of the 
product. Each subsequent interaction allows for a relationship to be reinforced with the 
customer and learning more about their needs, getting to a product, business, or market 
concept that is increasingly tailored towards that customer and improving the likelihood 
of validation occurring. 
 In contrast, interacting with several different customers allows for comparison of 
customer preferences. If several customers are interacted with during a certain period of 
time, the startup can compare and contrast their feedback, taking into consideration the 
importance and appropriateness of each customer within their product, business, and 
market concept. Based on this feedback, startups can determine the degree to which the 
concepts are validated or need revisions. 
6.3. Other Self-Reinforcing Process During Early Customer Interactions 
 In addition to path dependence effects, there are other types of self-reinforcing 
effects that are also at play with the customer interactions in this sample. Here, I review 
negative effects (Section 6.3.1) and network effects (Section 6.3.2).  
6.3.1. Negative Effects of Self-Reinforcing Processes 
The effects of self-reinforcing processes are positive if the startup has found product, 
business model, organization, and market concepts that allow the business to be able to 
grow and be executed successfully. However, early validation that is received from a 
customer and that solidifies the concepts are not always beneficial to the startup. If the 
validation is inappropriate for the wider market, if revisions suggested by potential 
customers take the customer away from creating an ‘optimal’ product, business, or 
market concept, or if suggested revisions are not possible to carry out in the organization, 
the startup can reinforce inappropriate concepts, resulting in a downward spiral effect 




 Escalating commitment could be seen with both Startup H and Startup I with two 
different mechanisms. Each time they met, Startup H was promised by the university 
customer that they were interested in the software that they were developing. Having 
committed so much time to this customer, Startup H developed - a psychological 
determinant of time investment. The founder continued to work for months towards 
developing the business model and product for the potential customer without more than 
verbal validation. While the first potential customer was allowing Startup H to run a pilot 
of the software on the students, they did not play further roles in supporting the startup, 
such as promoting the platform to the students or brokering relationships with counsellors 
and the peer support group that were meant to help facilitate the operations of Startup H 
(see case, Appendix B). Furthermore, the startup was unable to gain validation from other 
customers that were waiting to see how the software worked for the first customer. This 
resulted in the startup continuing to invest time to create the product for the initial 
potential university customer: 
“The feedback that I’ve been getting is that everybody is just waiting to see 
how [University Potential Customer #1] is going to do. Once I mention a 
pilot, they’re like, ‘great, yeah.’ They want to know how the metrics are 
before they take a look… So, I’m going to do the pilot. I’m going to focus on 
this, and then, go back or not go back and open up the sales funnel so I’ll 
have a more robust sales pitch that would speed things up on that side” 
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).  
This continued for months:  
“I can’t really just accelerate the process that we have [to get customers] 
until [the software] is more refined” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 16 
August, 2016). 
 In contrast, Startup I experienced escalating commitment through a psychological 
determinant of ego threat (Sleesman et al., 2012). The founders were very proud that they 
had customers approach them, rather than the other way around, however were unhappy 
with the type of customers that they were interacting with. While they could have sought 




“The big thing for us is lead generation. I don’t want to be cold calling 
people. It’s not what [Startup I] is about. I thrive more on connections, 
meeting people, networking events. I know it’s a numbers game and you 
have to keep calling and stuff, but it’s also a matter of reputation 
management too” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
6.3.2. Network Effects - Self-Reinforcing Process of Customer Interactions with Other 
Customers 
 While the effects of customer interactions with the startups are the focus of this 
dissertation, it would be inappropriate to not acknowledge the effects of customers on 
other potential customers and the influence they have on interactions between customers 
and the startup. Note that the customer interaction-validation spiral (Figure 41) is also 
affected by network externalities that may positively increase users or customers in a 
network. Note that network externalities are a self-reinforcing process that consider the 
effect of one user of a good or service on the value of that product to other people, where 
the network is more valuable as more people join (Katz & Shapiro, 1985).  
 For example, for Startup E, each additional user who was seeking someone else to 
play online video games with had the potential to create a bandwagon effect – where 
individuals decide to do something because other people are doing it, even if this was not 
their original intent (Leibenstein, 1950). These types of network effects only come into 
play after a critical mass of users would have been accumulated, similar to what is 
happening in social media platforms (Belvaux, 2011).  
 As a result, when Startup E was just starting off, network effects were not in 
effect. Startup E had to grow to reach critical mass by motivating users to download their 
software application. This was done by offering it free to users and spending time 
developing relationships with them and incorporating their feedback into the application 
software.  
 While it is challenging to identify when that critical mass would have been 
reached, these effects were likely in effect when at the end of the study, the startup had 




100,000 downloads – the fastest growth in downloads in just a few months since the 
application was first launched (see Table 30). During these months, the founders had 
managed to optimize the use of video bloggers and streamers as affiliate partners to 
attract new downloads. The startup also began efforts to reconnect with users who had 
downloaded the application, but had not been returning, by sending push notifications 
through the application. This resulted in an increase in repeat visits using data analytics 
software. 
Table 30. Downloads of Startup E’s Application Software Over Time. 
Date  Concurrent Events Number of 
Downloads/ Users 
August 2014  First release of application 300 
November 
2014 
Second release of application 1500 
June 2016 Video blogging started 7500 
September 
2016 





Experimenting with video bloggers and streamers 19,500 
December 2016 Continued affiliations with video blogging and 
streamers and started using in-app push 
notifications and data analytics (end of study 
period) 
25,000 
March 2017 (Unknown – Outside of study period) 100,000 
 The validation of using the affiliate partners to stimulate app downloads did not 
happen immediately. Instead, after some experimentation and hiring an expert to search 
for affiliates full-time, Startup E began to see the benefits of these partnerships through 
an increase in downloads of the application:  
“In these videos, [the video blogger] talks about the game.  He teaches you 
about new games and how to die and that kind of thing. This game is a 5x5 
game. One team is planting a bomb [in the game] and another team is 




are getting better at the game to be more tactical.  He makes the whole 
video himself.  Every time he does a video, he does something new and a 
different video. Then, he talks about a new feature of the app. He does a 
really good job with what he's doing. 
But it was really hard to convince [the video blogger who posted videos 
about video game playing]. He didn't want to ruin his users’ experience. But 
then he realized that this is something that his users would enjoy.  And after 
his first five hundred bucks he realized holy s***. This is really working [for 
the video blogger to earn referral fees. Then] he continues to put all this 
effort because he can see the reward. The more effort he puts in, the more 
he gets people to convert. Now I look at the results again. Before this got 
huge, it was 1 percent on average the video views were converting. So, 
that's pretty insane” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
 This increase in users was influenced in part by the affiliates’ endorsements 
themselves, as well as the comments made in the comments section on the web platforms 
by viewers (video game players watching these videos). In these comments, viewers 
validated either the affiliate (indirectly validating companies that they support) or Startup 
E. Understanding the causes of the bandwagon effect is, however, outside the scope of 
this dissertation. 
6.4. Summary of Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms and Early Customer Interactions in 
Startups 
 In the previous sections, I presented a model of the self-reinforcing process that 
occurs from receiving validation during early customer interactions – the customer 
interaction-validation spiral (Figure 41). This model outlines what happens when a 
startup tests out different concepts of the startup (the product, business model, operations, 
or market concepts) on potential customers – and what happens if the concept(s) is 




this feedback. The model shows that validation reinforces the concept(s), and a lack of 
validation sends the startup to search for improvements or to pivot (Section 6.1).  
 Over time, self-reinforcing path mechanisms are at play. These include Adaptive 
Expectation Effects (where customers’ expectations or preferences influence the startups’ 
preferences) and Learning Effects (where increased efficiency from performing an 
activity frequently or from an accumulation of skills), as customers interact with a 
startup, offering them information and validation that they are on the right path in 
creating the startup (Section 6.2). Finally, I explain other self-reinforcing processes that 
that are in effect for select startups in the sample, including network effects and 
escalating commitment (Section 6.3).  
 In the next sections, I apply this customer interaction-validation spiral to the 
overall new venture creation process to explain how validation from customers plays a 
role during different times in the new venture creation process. 
6.5. A Model of Early Customer Interaction During New Venture Creation Process  
Overview 
 In most existing models of new venture creation, stakeholders, including 
customers, are placed on the periphery of the process (see Table 2, Chapter 2, for 
examples). This model assumes that (a) customers play a central role in new venture 
creation; (b) startups do interact with customers (interacting defined here in broad terms, 
including interactions of customers with the startup’s website or a monetary transaction); 
(c) customer interactions are acknowledged by startups; and (d) that startups act on these 
interactions with the goal to better improve their product, operations, business model, and 
market concepts. Incorporating these assumptions led to developing a model of the 
customer interaction process during new venture creation, summarized in Figure 42. 
Note that the model does not assume that the startup interprets the interactions in a 
correct or incorrect manner (for example, negative effects of self-reinforcing processes 
occurred with two startups in the sample; see Section 6.3). 
 In Figure 42, the five phases of new venture creation – the Opportunity 




the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), the Execute Phase (V) are noted by the different boxes 
with rounded corners. These phases have been referenced throughout this dissertation and 
are analogous to the new venture creation phases mentioned previously by others (e.g. 
Bhave, 1994; Cunneen, Mankelow, & Gibson, 2007; phases are defined in Table 10).  
 The early customer interaction model is presented as an integral part of the new 
venture creation process, and includes a narrowing path and reduced options for the 
product, market, operations, or business model as new venture creation progresses. The 
model has three different levels of validation from customers that take place in the 
process. These validation levels have different requirements in terms of what is being 
validated (which concepts and which activities; 1), what is “enough” validation (2), what 
type of customer offers the validation (3), and the impact of the validation (4). 
 There are also two customer interaction-validation-spirals included in the model 
(noted by curved arrows are associated with the self-reinforcing processes of customer 
interactions; Figure 41). These spirals represent self-reinforcing processes that promote 
the search for additional validation or revision of their product, operations, business 
model, and/or market concepts. These self-reinforcing processes are triggered by a 
narrowing of options (noted by the three multi-point stars inside thick arrows). After the 
final (third) narrowing of options, the startup enters the Execute Phase (V), where the 
product, business model, operations, and market have been established from the 
validation process, and signify the end of the new venture creation process and the startup 
phase of the organization. While additional searches for validation may occur in the 
Execute Phase and beyond, they are outside the scope of this dissertation. 
 Finally, note that the focus of the startups in the study is to ultimately gain sales 
revenue or users, with several individuals purchasing or downloading their product. 
However, the term ‘sale’ is used loosely to describe a way that a customer parts with 
money, and where part of it ends up in the hands of the startup. This includes physical 
product purchases, as well as affiliate marketing fees earned when a customer clicks on a 
web-link on a website. The early customer interaction model is described in more detail 





Figure 42. Customer Interaction Process During New Venture Creation. Five phases of new venture creation are noted by the different boxes with 
rounded corners. With the customer interaction process, note that the numbers 1 to 3 indicate different paths that can be taken to get to a 
first customer interaction and opportunity recognition. There are three stages of validation as described in the text. Note that the curved 
arrows are associated with the self-reinforcing processes of customer interactions. The multi-point stars inside thick arrows indicate periods 





6.6. Opportunity Discovery Phase and Opportunity Recognition 
  During the Opportunity Discovery Phase, a business opportunity is recognized 
(Bhave, 1994) and activities are undertaken to convert an idea into an innovation 
(Cunneen et al., 2007).  
 With the customer interaction process during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I, 
Figure 42), note that the numbers 1 to 3 indicate different paths that can be taken to get 
to a first customer interaction and opportunity recognition. In Paths 1 and 2 the 
opportunity is internally recognized and in Path 3, the opportunity is externally 
recognized (Bhave, 1994). Note that only startups that undergo Path 1 started developing 
an initial product (not just the MVP) during the Opportunity Discovery Phase. For the 
rest of the startups, this product development started in a later phase.  
 Also, note that product development takes time and rarely takes place in total 
isolation. As a result, there may have been undocumented, casual customer interactions 
occurring (typically family and friends), where founders talked about the idea before they 
acknowledge a first officially noted customer interaction. The paths are distinguished 
however by a clear declaration of the first customer interaction by the entrepreneur 
participants. See Table 31 for which startups in the sample followed each path.  
Table 31. The Path Taken by Startups in the Sample During the Opportunity Discovery Phase. 
Startup A B C D E F G H I 
Path 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 
 In the Opportunity Discovery Phase, the startups were predominantly testing out 
the technical feasibility of the product (Technical Activities), trying to understand the 
needs and wants of customers (Social Activities), and starting to build trusting 
relationships and credibility (Credibility Activities). There were a few sales at this time 
(Commercial Activities) by Startup A and Startup I, but obtaining sales was not the 
predominant focus for the startups. Distribution, production, and human resource 
activities were also not a focus at this time (see Table 32 for examples of activities from 
the sample in each of the five new venture creation phases). Note that not all startups 




6.7. Opportunity Refinement Phase – Primary Validation 
6.7.1. What is Being Validated in the Primary Validation? 
 Emerging from the first customer interaction during the Opportunity Discovery 
Phase and at the start of the Opportunity Refinement Phase, startups in the sample 
focused their attention on learning about the problem and developing the product (Figure 
32 and Figure 33, Chapter 5). The startups received their primary validation from the 
initial customer interaction if the product was of interest to potential customers. All 
startups in this sample would have received this initial validation to justify continuing 
with the new venture creation process (see Table 33 for examples of primary validation 
from each startup). This observation lead to the following proposition: 
P1: Startups seek out confirmation on the problem and product concepts 
during the primary validation. These interactions test a startup’s ability to 
undertake technical activities to develop the product, and to try to 












III: Transition IV: Entrepreneurial V: Execute 
Technical 
Activities 
A – Experimented with 
making fermented 
foods 
B – Developed 
makerspace business 
model 
C- Built affiliate 
marketing based 
custom website 
D – Discovered 
features needed in an 
event space 
marketplace  
E – Developed first 
ideas about gaming 
application software 
F – Thought of features 
for loan search engine 
G – Created design and 
prototype for coffee 
brewer 
H – Thought of 
potential features for 
mental health platform 
I – Founder developed 
technical capabilities 
A – Tested product on 
clients 
B – Received feedback on 
makerspace model at 
events 
C - Continued testing 
interest of affiliate business 
D – Tested interest of 
event marketplace with 
demand and supply side 
customers 
E – Created first version of 
gaming application 
software 
F – Learned about desired 
features of search engine 
from loan providers 
G – Received and 
incorporated feedback into 
product 
H – Thought about design 
of web platform and 
received feedback from 
mentors of student users 
I – Ongoing improvement 
of web building skills 
A – Continued testing 
different flavours 
B – Committed to 
startup by thinking 
more about business 
C – Committed to 
affiliate marketing 
and improved website 
D – Building basic 
web platform 
E – Co-founder 
committed full time 
to working on 
business 
F – Started web 
platform 
development 
G – Built 
crowdfunding 
platform 
H – Begun building 
web platform 
I – Increased 
investment in 
technical equipment 
B – Found pop-up event location 
C – Committed to affiliate marketing by 
building more websites 
D – Received suggestions from 
customers to improve technical 
components and testing of web platform 
with customers. Tested live transaction 
with customers 
E – Continued developing updates to 
software 
F – Continued to improve web platform, 
performing search engine optimizations 
for those searching for loans 
G – Used data analytics to better 
understand traffic on websites and to 
improve it 
H – Prototype was live and begun 
seeking feedback and incorporating 
updates into the website. Increased use of 
data analytics to understand customer 
interaction with web platform. 
Developed chat bot software upon 
request from first university customer 
I – Designed new website involving 
click-and-pay for services. Changed 
services offered. Started tracking visitors 
using data analytics 
A – Developed 
alcoholic beer 
beverage 
D – With initial 
business model 
steady, founders 
were testing a 
new model of 
repeat demand-
side customers 









Table 32 continued (p. 2 of 4) 




III: Transition IV: Entrepreneurial V: Execute 
Social 
Activities 
A – Told family and 
friends about beverage 




G – Spoke with 
professor and decided 
to patent coffee press 
H – Met with first 
university customer 
and gained feedback 
I – Founder had 
customers approaching 
him to build websites 
A – Told personal training 
clients about beverage 
B – Received feedback at 
events about makerspace 
D – Spoke to event 
planners (demand-side 
customers) and property 
owner (supply-side 
customer) 
E – Two versions of 
application went live and 
were promoted to hardcore 
gamers 
F – Started contacting loan 
providers 
G – Started testing 
prototype with personal 
network, local café and 
online community forum 
H – Sought out feedback 
about what student users of 
the website would want 
(but did not talk to the 
users themselves) 
A – Reached out to 
network for contract 
with retailer 
D – Seeking feedback 
on social media 
E – Continued 
interactions on online 
forums 
I – Launched only 
web campaign 
B – Raised awareness about pop-up 
event for the first time 
D – Advertised startup to demand-side 
customers 
E – Continued interactions on online 
forums 
F – Brought loan providers on the web 
platform. Started advertising and testing 
the prototype on family and friends. 
Followed up with businesses about 
consumer finance interest 
G – Used social media to self-promote 
and gain feature on radio show. Ongoing 
interactions with online community and 
emails. Visited local cafes 
H – Unable to access web platform user 
feedback. Spoke with potential 
counsellor partners on the website 
however gained no traction. Met five 
times with first customer and attempted 
meetings with additional university 
customers. Promoted web platform to 
student users. Attempted changing 
customer to insurance companies 
I – Relied on personal network for clients 
A – Promoted at 




D – Continued to 
seek out 
customers 
E – Increased 
promotion of app 
on social media 
and use of 
affiliate partners. 






Table 32 continued (p. 3 of 4) 




III: Transition IV: Entrepreneurial V: Execute 
Credibility 
Activities 
H – First meeting 
helped gain trust with 
potential customer 
B – Gained trust from 
interacting with potential 
customers early 
D – Initial conversations 
with potential customers 
to develop relationship 
E – Initial interactions 
started early in online 
gaming community forum 
F – Early interactions 
with loan providers 
gained trust 
G – Gained trust from 
social interactions by 
establishing early 
interactions 
A – Gained initial 
contract from 
knowing retailer 
E – Continued 
interactions on 
online forums 
D – Newspaper article written about startup. 
Partnered with local government to develop 
sharing economy regulations 
E – Won pitch competitions, grants, and angel 
funding. Continued interactions on online 
forums 
F – Featured in local magazine 
G – Contacted blog writers to be featured on 
several blogs. Received media coverage 
before crowdfunding campaign 
H – Unable to gain credibility from 
interactions with additional customer without 
having sale and demonstrated success with an 
existing customer 
A – Media 
coverage 









A -  Informally sold 
beverage to family and 
friends and at local 
grocer 
C – Made affiliate 
marketing website live 
to test sales and made 
sales 




A – Informally sold 
beverage to personal 
training clients 
C – Found success in 
earning referral fees from 
online retailers with 
affiliate marketing 
programs 
A – Signed contract 
with retailer 
C – Continued to 
earn referral fees 
D – Sales and 
contracts with 
demand and supply 
side customers 




A – Contracts with several retailers 
B – Sold tickets for pop-up event 
C – Continued to earn referral fees 
D – Sales and contracts with demand and 
supply side customers 
E – Held unsuccessful crowdfunding 
campaign 
F- Web platform went live and initial 
transactions took place 
G – Received funding / sales through 
crowdfunding campaigns 
H – Attempted sales with other universities 
counselling services 







Table 32 continued (p. 4 of 4) 




III: Transition IV: Entrepreneurial V: Execute 
Production 
Activities 
A -  Started 
production in 
20'x20' space 
B – Search for permanent 
location 
F – Set up office to work 
from 
I – Part of small business 
centre’s summer program 




A – Moved to 22,000 square 
foot facility 
B – Challenges finding location 
for pop-up event 
C – Committed to affiliate 
marketing by building more 
websites 
G – Visited manufacturer for 
coffee press in China. 
I – Started developing 
processes for interactions with 
clients 
A – Purchase walk-in cooler 
and receive loan to create new 
production facility 
C – Standardized process of 
building and screening 




 Startup I - Meets co-founder  A – Hired employees for 
production 
E – Hired marketing and 
developers 
F – Hires sales employees 
G – Hired employee for team 
A – Hired employees for sales 




  A – Contract with 
retailer 
A – Selling at several retailers 
I – Interest to improve company 
website and designed new 
website that required customers 
to approach website 
A – Selling at several 
supermarkets, own retail store, 





6.7.2. What is ‘Enough’ Primary Validation? 
 Validation is defined as the first affirmation that there is customer interest in a 
product. Primary validation is the first interest shown by customers. It is typically related 
to seeking information about the potential product or business model (Figure 32 and 
Figure 33, Chapter 5) – learning whether the product has features that are of interest to 
customers or if they would consider purchasing it. This feedback on first customer 
preferences would have been received, and often, incorporated into the initial revisions 
(or development) of the business concept.  
 Primary interactions also generally take place in-person, even for technology-
based startups, and are undertaken with potential customers in the founders’ network 
(Figure 36, Chapter 5). The primary validation received was verbal or text-based for all 
startups in the sample. There were also two startups that experienced sales (Startups A 
and I) and one that received contracts (Startup E). However, startups would have needed 
to receive primary validation to justify continuing with the new venture creation process 
(see Table 33 for examples). This observation lead to the following proposition: 
P2: During the primary validation, verbal or text-based validation is 
considered acceptable confirmation to proceed with the new venture 
creation process. 
6.7.3. Who Offers Primary Validation? 
 Before proceeding to further steps in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), note 
that this first customer interaction in the sample was often by chance or convenience. The 
customers that primary validation was predominantly received from were in founders’ 
personal and professional networks (Startup A, Startup E, Startup G and Startup I – that 
reached out during the Opportunity Discovery Phase - I). Startup B and Startup D’s 
professional network that was easy to access and that they sought primary validation from 
was part of the external target market (Appendices B2 and B4). Even the founders of 
Startup C, Startup F and Startup H that interacted with the external target market (Figure 




as adequate for primary validation (Appendices B3, B6, and B8). This observation lead 
to the following proposition: 
P3. Founders rely on chance or convenience to undertake their first customer 
interaction and to obtain feedback for primary validation. This often means 
relying on feedback from their nearby personal and professional networks. 
6.7.4. What is the Impact of Primary Validation? 
 Despite first validations being by chance or convenience, primary validation from 
customers plays a large role in whether startup development continues - validating the 
problem and the potential solution. This primary validation stage also resembles the 
critical juncture in path dependence, moving from the Pre-Formation Phase to the 
Formation Phase (Figure 3, Chapter 2). The critical juncture is a seemingly insignificant 
event (Arthur, 1989), such as casually getting feedback from a customer for the first time, 
but the event can trigger a decision to be made that both narrows the paths or 
opportunities that can be pursued and can trigger self-reinforcing processes that involve 
seeking out future validations for the business concept. This observation lead to the 
following proposition: 
P4. An initial positive customer interaction creates primary validation for a 
business concept. This primary validation is influential as it acts as a 
critical juncture that can narrow the path of opportunities that may be 
pursued by the startup, and triggers subsequent self-reinforcing processes 
where the startup seeks out further validation and develops a product and 
market around this validation. 
6.8. Opportunity Refinement Phase - First Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral 
 After the primary validation, a startup then attempts to better define the business 
concept and determine whether it meets the needs of its target market. The process 
undertaken is the first customer interaction-validation-spiral (Figure 41), described in 




 During the first customer interaction-validation-spiral, parts of the business 
concept (the product, the business model, the operations, or the market) are developed, 
revised, and presented to customers during subsequent interactions. Note that these 
interactions may be with the same customers as in the first customer interaction, or 
different customers that typically share similar characteristics to the first customer. Also 
note that the communication channels for these interactions at this stage remain personal 
– in-person, over the phone and using email (Figure 37, Chapter 5). Startup C, Startup E 
and Startup G, however, did branch out to start using data analytics with their website 
(Startup C), ads and online media articles (Startup E), and interacting publically with 
potential customers in an online community forum (Startup E and Startup G).  
 If the interactions do not receive validation, or if the startup receives feedback to 
change something about part of the business concept, it is revised or discarded. It is 
during this first customer interaction-validation-spiral that without validation, an idea is 
likely to be discarded and the startup will pivot. At this stage, the investment in activities 
are predominantly associated with technical activities such as developing the product, and 
not other aspects of the organization, making adaptations relatively easier than once the 
startup is more invested, or routines have formed. 
 During the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), the focus is mostly on the 
customer and the product still – developing and testing the product on the customer 
segment (Figure 33, Chapter 5). The activities are around understanding the customer 
requirements (social activities), still building trust (credibility activities), and developing 
the product (technical activities). There are minimal commercial activities during this 
phase, although sales were not the main focus. The startups’ focus was instead to learn 
more about the problem and develop the relationship with potential customers.  
6.9. Opportunity Refinement Phase – Secondary Validation 
  If the customer interactions during the latter part of the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase receive validation, this is termed Secondary Validation. At this time, the startup 
begins to gradually increase commitment of resources allocated and dedicates time, effort 




secondary validation from each case can be found in Table 33, Chapter 5). With each 
validation, the founders seek out additional customer interactions to clarify whether they 
have the right market.  
6.9.1. What is Being Validated in the Secondary Validation? 
 For the startups in the sample, by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), it was 
important that strategic feedback of the business concept was received before additional 
investments were made into the business. In Figure 43, we see that all the startups 
interpreted that they had received strategic confirmation of their business concept and the 
overall scope and direction of the organization by the end of the Opportunity Refinement 
Phase (II; Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972). Customer interactions at this time validated the 
product and the customer segments (Figure 32, Chapter 5), and the founders continued to 
develop and test the product and develop the business model (Figure 33, Chapter 5). 
There was also a slight increase in focus on the organization of the startup (Figure 32, 
Chapter 5), but developing operations was still not a major focus for the startup 
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“I liked it. She liked 
it. It was us. And 
then clients liked it. 
These were clients 
from my personal 
training business at 
the time. So we kept 
being told that… 
One guy, he bought 
a litre and said this 
is great! And then 
he gave some to his 
friend, who then 
wanted a litre. Then, 
within a few weeks, 
it was like, okay, 
we’ve hit so many 
max capacities, it’s 
already mind 
blowing. People 
keep saying it’s the 
best. And it wasn’t 
until we got out 
there and had 
people we didn’t 
really know coming 
up and saying this is 
good [that we 
realized we had a 
good product]. This 
is really awesome.” 
(7 June 2016, 
speaking to the past) 
“I think our first customer was [organic stall at farmers’ market]. That’s where our target market was going, so let’s 
create demand. I guess it was good. We were selling out. The market would go from 8 in the morning to 1 but we 
would sell out by 10. Then we made a little more and we sold out at 11. Then more, and we sold out a t12. 
Eventually, we made it through the whole day.” (7 June 2016).  
“We have over 75 retailers now. And that’s always been the goal from day one. To distribute. We started at our 
market. We have a passion form markets… Then we started selling at a few key retailers. We wanted to get it into the 
hands of where our target market shops.” (7 June 2016). 
“We’ve landed our biggest chain. It’s exciting…. They said, everything seems good. And then six weeks go by and we 
didn’t hear back anything. I went and called once or twice a week…. I didn’t want to lose that sale, didn’t want to 
lose that account…. It wasn’t until two weeks ago when I sent them a case with some feature flavours and just saying 
thank you… She contacted us to say, “thanks so much. We’re having a [beverage] party here. Good news. We want 
to let you know that we’re going to list the product” (21 June 2016) 
“We’re throwing an event – it’s going to be an opportunity to say thank you and we’re back, and we have things on 
sale and just to have fun.” (12 July 2016) 
“Just opening the storefront and having that little action there. It’s just going to create a lot of buzz, and we’re 
hoping that will ripple outward through our social media.” (12 July 2016). 
“We partnered up with a brewery and did half our beverage, half beer. And it was delicious. We definitely want to 
distribute it.”  (26 July 2016)  
“[Large warehouse store] contacted us. So, it’s pretty wild… They found us on Instagram… They love the samples 
we sent so it’s on to the next phase of things. But the next phase of things involves us being audited from a third party 
health and food safety organization. I want to wait until we’re in our new facility though, so I was able to stall them. 
Obviously, we can’t supply them now. So, I made it sound like we already had the facility picked out. ‘We’re moving 
in as we speak. So, you want to hold off until we’re up and running? No point in doing it here.’” (27 Oct 2016) 
“We’re excited about our new website. It’s coming. I think we got five blogs written by the marketing firm. They write 
the blogs and it’s just cool.” (27 Oct 2016)l 
“We got the loan. It’s official. We’re good to go. It’s good because we got a lot of money going out to buy the tanks 
and stuff because a lot of things take six weeks to get them in. So, we’re trying to get that place up and running to the 
next phase of things as soon as possible because it’s crazy renting. Making things by hand doesn’t really cut it, 
economy scale wise. This is because demand continues going up and we’ve been waiting to move for a solid year 
now… It’s all kind of coming in a perfect time. We just found out we also got 23 locations of [local supermarket]. 




Table 33 continued (part 2 of 8) 
 
  
Startup Primary Validation Secondary Validation Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities 
B “There was this event. 
This was an example 
where we were able to 
talk to a lot of potential 
customers…. It was to 
raise money for, I think 
it was nutrition or 
learning. It was a 
certain kind of clientele 
we don’t necessarily get 
to meet often… So, we 
discovered that they 
want live music.” (6 
June 2016) 
“We went and talked to 
quite a few people that we 
met at different meetings. 
We basically find people at 
these conferences… It 
attracts certain people who 
are interested in doing 
social activities… The 
discussion on that day was 
women in 
entrepreneurship… So, the 
people we met there, we 
started to talk to them and 
explained to them that 
there’s a venue that we’re 
making… and they were 
interested.” (20 June 2016) 
“The occupancy of the building [for our pop-up event] is supposed to be 100 people… We 
haven’t yet printed any posters and flyers and stuck them anywhere. But we know enough 
people through our Facebook and other channels so that they and their families can come.” 
(21 July 2016) 
“The one thing that we didn’t manage to do that we wanted to do again was go and talk to 
people in the city about the permanent venue. And then we realized that, okay, we can invite 
them for this temporary event, the pop-up event, and they can get a feel for it.” (21 July 
2016).  
“We did our marketing, it seems we were able to reach about 1,100 people of which 
something like 100 commented, were engaged and shared. And then about 20 people showed 
up… Our main learning part was, ‘okay, how do we price things? Do people appreciate 
what we are doing?” (16 August 2016).  
“We had again, a lot of challenge trying to speak to the councilor… We met this councilor 
again at an event. It was very frustrating after four or five times, every time I see her, she 
says, oh, just email me about it again. But then, you know, you email, you call, and she 
doesn’t get back to you.”  (28 Nov 2016) 
“What we are doing now – it’s really on hold. I don’t feel disappointed about putting it on 





Table 33 continued (part 3 of 8) 
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C “So, the greatest thing. I 
can now generate 
revenue for myself. I 
can see what I’m doing 
is working!... In one 
month, I made much 
more than in the past 
eleven months. So, I’m 
quite excited about this 
opportunity to have 
more affiliation 
partnerships. Money is 
a very good validation. I 
think this idea is pretty 
much validated. (24 
October, 2016) 
“This month, I’ve already 
made $2000… I keep 
finding more and more 
partners [and building more 
websites]… So, onboarding 
new partners, optimizing the 
process and making 
money… How can I 
[improve this]? I can use 
heat maps to see where 
people go on a website… I 
can also promote on 
Facebook… Anyhow, I can 
experiment now because I’m 
making money…” (21 
November, 2016) 
“I’m making data-driven decisions – all the great ideas by founders are guesses… What we 
need to do is use data to prove what’s right and what’s wrong… Let’s look at my progress 
right now from the past few weeks. I’ve been making much more value. Last time we chatted, I 
was making $200 a day. Now, I’m making $250-$300 daily profit… And I continue to do 
iterations [and build more sites].” (21 December, 2016) 
D “The first month, [we] 
were reaching out to 
some event planners, 
just hearing feedback 
from people. I was 
asking everyone on 
Facebook… ‘Here’s a 
thing I’ve been working 
on, give me some 
feedback on it.’ And 
some people gave some 
awesome feedback.” (2 
June, 2016) 
“We had gone for a month. 
We had amazing customer 
feedback. We had 33 
bookings in the first couple 
of weeks and like a ton of 
customer feedback from the 
supply and demand side. So, 
it’s like really good. We’re 
getting really excited of 
where we’re going to 
build.” (22 June, 2016). 
“We’ve done a fair amount of exposure from [the article], but the problem is that the timing of 
this we weren’t like live so it didn’t like -- it was kind of like not an awesome timing, to be 
honest [given we’re still building].” (22 June 2016).           
“The ministry said we can work with the Sharing Economy Advisory Committee… so they can 
create the legislation in the near future.” (8 Sept. 2016) 
“We sat down with like nine customers and asked ‘what makes sense? What doesn’t make 
sense? There’s been a lot of very good feedback… But we’re not marketing, we’re waiting to 
make sure everything works transaction wise.” (8 Nov, 2016) 
“Going live [again] was good. Some people were using it which is nice. We have lots of people 
viewing profiles, some people trying to book… But it’s been good… The first day, there were 




Table 33 continued (part 4 of 8) 
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E “We needed to start 
from scratch. And the 
nice thing was, we were 
developing the idea. We 
were reaching out to a 
lot of different gamers 
just on blogging sites, 
[online community 
forum], and whatnot. 
They were really 
interested in what we 
do, though we didn’t 
have a product. We 
ended up getting a 
couple hundred users 
before [the app] broke 
completely. Our site had 
over 300 views at one 
point. I know there was 
a thread that had really 
good traction. At this 
point we had a little bit 
of validation, so we 
said, let’s try again.” (8 
June 2016, speaking 
about the past)  
“We went on [gaming 
platform on computer], and 
we created our own 
[company] community and 
connected with other 
gamers. We started inviting 
people to this group and 
started talking about the 
app with them. And a lot of 
them were like – ‘Hey, I’ll 
meet new friends. Cool.’ So 
we kind of reached out to 
people in different 
communities. Our goal was 
to bring them on, and it was 
kind of spammy in a way. 
But we were really personal 
about it. We customized our 
message. And because we 
would get the random 
person willing to try this, we 
grew to 1500 people.” (8 
June 2016, speaking about 
the past) 
“We launched our Kickstarter, spent a lot of time on it, building it up. And honestly, things 
went well. But they also went terrible. Our challenge was that we spent so much time building 
a great campaign, we forgot about marketing our campaign ahead of time. Lesson learned.” (9 
June 2016) 
“We had 7500 users, we’re still needing more. So we [started using] hashtags.” (9 June 2016) 
“We don’t want to put all our eggs into one basket. If something ever does go wrong with 
Instagram, then we want these other ways working. This one way is working, but we definitely 
don’t want it to be the only way to do it.” (9 June 2016) 
“It’s a daily task talking to people and doing community engagement. It’s quite exhausting in 
terms of how much time it takes up.” (9 June 2016). 
“I said, do you know how many user suggestions we have building up?... We always have 
suggestions coming in. So, if these suggestions come up repeatedly, I just keep track of how 
many repeats occur.” 9 June 2016). 
“With this event, we had really good turnout. People said they’d definitely come out again if we 
held an event. We learned a lot to plan our own event.”  (22 June 2016). 
“We have these Facebook groups that we’re trying to establish relationships… We want to get 
in…. They play a large role in getting people interested. So it involves reaching out to local 
gamers.” (7 July 2016) 
“We’ve been partnering with Youtubers [affiliate partners]. We had this idea a year ago, and 
just couldn’t execute. We tried reaching out to people but people would never get back to us. 
Now we’ve created a budget to do it a bit differently…. At the end of the summer, we still had 
14,000 to 15,000 users. And the basically we brought on this new guy who started looking at 
how to approach them. And he scaled what we were currently doing, basically tenfold. It was 
crazy!... But it wasn’t scaling…. We [realized] we had to pick the right person to be a brand 
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Startup Primary Validation Secondary Validation Striving for Tertiary Validation or Pivoting Activities 
F “I went around this summer and spoke 
to 150 business owners. I chose the 
home reno[vation] industry because 
it’s generally easy to access the 
decision people. And an industry in 
which they would use these types of 
loans. They used to work with banks 
and the banks have jumped all ship… 
So, what have they done? They’ve 
moved over to a consumer finance 
company like Cree Logics or Snap 
Financial… We got a lot of good 
feedback from business owners… And 
speaking to our lenders. These guys – 
they’ve no credibility and no history. 
And the growth – they’ve had 920 
million applications in two years. 
People want money. They’re going to 
search, ‘I want money. Where am I 
going to get my money? That’s why 
you see the line up at cash money. 550 
percent. And it’s just insane. And 
people go for it.” (19 May 2016 – 
speaking about the past) 
“I’m in a fintech cluster group 
on LinkedIn, so I’m in there. 
And I’m working that. I have 
11 lenders. I’ve contracted 
them. So that’s pretty cool. 
Yeah! Awesome! They’re so 
keen. For them, the cost is 
developing the website 
structure. But above and 
beyond that, they pay us when 
they get dispersed loans. So, 
super keen… We’re right 
there, man! We’re right on the 
edge of the cliff! It’s super 
exciting. It’s been a long trip 
over the past year trying to 
get it all put together… As far 
as the lenders go, everyone 
has been quite keen.” (19 May 
2016) 
“We launched, obviously. But the marketing agency that we’re working with to 
do all of our advertising dropped the ball... We gave our lenders the power to 
choose when to call back on information… [This resulted in] a huge drop off 
actually. From those declines, we didn’t get a conversion at all… So, that’s an 
issue, losing money there too. A lot of people are still in the pipeline [that 
applied and were denied]. We’re going to follow up with them and hopefully be 
able to convert a quarter of them.  So, Mondays are exceptionally good for 
loans. On Monday I think I had eight loans for 200 bucks invested.” (29 July 
2016).  
“I think it’s good [we are live]. We’re kind of one conversion for the cost. 
We’re not making money but we’re breaking even… I don’t like it that all the 
lenders aren’t integrated. [But] we can iron them out.” (22 Aug 2016) 
“I did an interview with [magazine]…. It’s been good, a lot of positive 
feedback… We’ve got a number of leads from the city who are interested… 
We’re getting about 45 applications a day….  it’s a volume, right? We receive 
good search volume, we sell out people looking for loans, and we’re an 




Table 33 continued (part 6 of 8) 
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G “Once I got my patent filed, it’s just a 
provisional patent, it’s patent pending, 
but once I got that file, I posted to the 
Reddit forum – I didn’t think I was 
going to get much. All I said was, “hey, 
I came up with this coffee press. What 
do you guys think of this brewing 
technique?” And that kind of blew up. 
That is the 7th most popular post of all 
time on that forum right now (receiving 
478 comments total). They gave me a 
lot of great feedback on my initial 
prototype. They’re the ones that really 
encouraged me to say… no, this is a 
thing you can actually do… At one 
point, I got offered a job at a medical 
device company that makes new 
devices for surgery. And that would 
have been a really great job. But after 
that feedback from the Reddit post, I 
thought, I might as well risk this. This 
is what people want. And I kept going 
for it.” (27 May, 2016) 
“This past month [on the 
forum], I was top 11. Once 
again, 125 comments of this 
post actually got me 200 
email signups in two days…. 
So, you can actually start to 
see a conversion rate… I’m 
feeling pretty good about [it]. 
I have [online community 
forum]. I’m starting to get 
some social media attraction, 
and I’m starting to get some 
blogs and articles written 
about me.” (9 June 2016) 
“It’s pretty hard, especially in Ontario to find companies that are willing to get 
outsourcing to China… When I brought that to Canadian manufacturers, they 
right away said, ‘Oh, we can’t do that. It’s impossible. We can’t do that.’… So, 
constant pushback from them, whereas the Chinese manufacturer…, they say, 
‘Yes it will be hard, there’s going to be some [issues]… but we can work with 
you to figure out some other options.’” (13 June 2016) 
“Day one [of the Kickstarter campaign] was a little crazy. I think in the first 
24 hours, from like 3pm until midnight, we raised over $16,000, which we’re 
kind of expecting.” (28 June, 2016) 
“I’m definitely not a marketing expert at all. I don’t even know basic online 
marketing. It’s just saying, ‘hey, here’s a product. This is what I’ve invented. 
I’m not really sure how to reach different demographics.” 14 July, 2016 
“We ended up with $61,400 [from the crowdfunding campaign]… I’m not too 
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H “My first step was to look through a 
bunch of literature…. That’s when I 
decided, maybe a week or two in, I 
decided to talk to a counselor that I 
had a connection with… They liked it. 
What stood out most from this 
conversation was that we’re going to 
move towards online counseling.” (6 
June, 2016 – speaking about the past) 
“I already had a bunch of 
ideas floating around and it 
wasn’t as distilled as now…. I 
talked to the residence life 
coordinator, the athletic 
director, and different faculty 
staff… They saw the problems 
students were having. I went 
back to the people who I 
thought would be champions 
and potential customers…. So, 
getting the user perspective 
from them and the customer 
perspective… from the 
Associate Director of 
Counseling Services…. It was 
like, ‘Yeah this is great.’ The 
most common thing was, ‘This 
looks really good. It looks 
welcoming, relaxing and 
inviting and it makes you feel 
welcomed.” (6 June 2016) 
“I found that she was very receptive and she liked the idea. She said, ‘I’ll 
contact you at the end of July,’ because there’s so many other people she 
has to go back and talk to… So that’s why it’s taking a long time.” (20 June 
2016) 
“Last time, it was back and forth, ‘Oh, we’re going to do part of it. We’re 
not going to do part of it.’ So, I was waiting to hear back and I met with the 
assistant director of counseling services. She’s saying, ‘Yeah, let’s go 
ahead, and these are the things that we need to figure out. Follow up with 
me by the end of the week and then we’ll talk.’ Initially I was thinking the 
middle of July to pilot. But, she doesn’t really know if that’s possible 
because she has to check with her legal side of things and her boss. There’s 
no telling what their timelines are.” (4 July, 2016) 
“Once I mention a pilot, they’re like, great, yeah. They don’t know how the 
metrics go, so they want to wait to take a look. So, in one way, that’s been a 
hindrance because before the pilot was set in place, it was like, ‘Oh, this 
could be of value to us. I’m going to give it to my team, and then, they’ll take 
a look and we’re going to see if they want to move ahead with this.’ 
Whereas now that the pilot is in place, people are waiting [to see what 
happens].”  (21 July 2016) 
“We’re trying to push towards user adoption… We started posters at the end 
of the term and there hasn’t been significant increase… So, [now we’re 
talking to insurance companies]. I just called and emailed them… They 
immediately were interested and contacted me back, and said, ‘Hey, we’re 
looking to build something similar on our own. We want to know how you’re 
tackling it from an AI side.’… So, that’s why they were interested, and that’s 
probably why they said we were too early stage. I think they thought we had 
































“When we were 
in the Small 
Business Centre 
group last year, 
we were in the 
same group of 
about 20 
people…. I think 
what brought us 
together is that 
both of us work 
extremely hard 
and are very 
talented. We get 
along and we 
are friends. We 
weren’t really 
friends at that 
point, but we 
[co-founders] 
were stronger 
together than we 
were apart… I 
think it’s a great 
partnership.” 
(19 May 2016) 
“A good and diverse range [of customers contacted us]… I’ve never cold called a person in my entire life… [This 
one client], I’ve known him for six years. That’s what I mean. The more I do – I’ve planted so many seeds with 
people. They keep seeing what we’re doing and they’re eventually going to ask [for us to do a site for them]. I could 
easily do six sites for $1000 right now.” (19 May 2016). 
 “Most of the time, we do [websites for] clients for $1000 and we have to scramble to get all of them done. And it 
ends up with us staying for late nights, hurting ourselves, and putting ourselves into a state of duress. I still enjoy the 
grind but it would have been nice to finally have a [bigger] client [to say], ‘Hey, we made it’.” 
“[Founder]’s friend’s dad owns [big potential client’s business], and that fell through. I think they wanted someone 
that would do a website for $500. Then… another proposal went to [big local beverage company] and one to [big 
real estate agent]. The real estate agent would rather give it to us, as [a competing marketing agency] said that they 
would do it for $5000, but he thought [we were going to charge him] $500-$1000. And unfortunately, [big local 
beverage company], we heard from him yesterday. He took what we said back to the other guys we were competing 
against and they undercut us even more.” (7 June, 2016).  
“The big thing for us is lead generation. I don’t want to be cold calling people. It’s not what [Startup I] is about… I 
know it’s a numbers game and you have to keep calling. But it’s also... reputation management.” (8 June, 2016). 
 “When it comes to the [existing] site, it’s good, but it’s not good enough. We’ve learned a lot of stuff since then. And 
we’ve been talking about re-doing it since May… a long time, and last weekend, something just snapped and I started 
working on [the new website]… This is going to be a really nice tool for us… Now every piece on the website has a 
reason and it feels a lot more professional.. It’s going to be a lot easier to have people come to us… I’m waiting for 
the new site to capture the leads.” (6 July, 2016). 
 “I think the problem is [that] those referrals are still not the projects that we want to take on. We want to get [into] 
that bigger atmosphere… Poor people hang out with poor people, or successful business people hang out with other 
successful business people. It’s just the way it works. So, we need to get out of that circle…” (7 September, 2016).  
“[We] can see [visitors’] IP addresses and can see how long they spend on each page and look at every page. I can 
see even where they left or why they were halfway through the checkout with all their information entered, but, 
they’ve left. But I don’t know why, you know what I mean? It could have been that they didn’t want to buy, they had 
second guesses or they didn’t have money, or their kid distracted them and they had to leave.” (Startup I Founders T 




Figure 43. Customer Feedback - Strategic or Operational/Tactical Impact. S-C = Strategic 
confirmation, confirming the business concept and overall scope and direction of the 
business (Ansoff, 1988; Child, 1972; Maidique & Zirger, 1984, 1985); S-NC = Lack of 
strategic confirmation; OT-C = Operational and tactical confirmation, confirming the 
plan of action to employ resources and everyday activities (Ansoff, 1988); OT-NC = Lack 
of operational and tactical confirmation; OT-Adapted = operational and tactical activities 
were adapted; S-Exploratory = new strategic activities were being explored.  
 
 When considering the business concept that needs to be validated, an MVP needs 
to be presented to potential customers by this stage. Not all startups in the sample had a 
developed prototype by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (Table 29, Chapter 5), 
however. Only five of the nine startups in the sample had an actual prototype (digital or 
physical; Table 29; Startup A, Startup C, Startup E, Startup G, Startup I, case narratives, 
Appendix B). Founders without a prototype spoke with customers to share their 
description of the problem that they wanted to solve with a description of the idea for the 
product that they would use to test it.  
 This met the practitioner’s definition of MVP - the most basic, understood 
explanation of a problem and solution; whether through a word description, physical, or 
digital object (Blank & Dorf, 2012). The MVP was tested and could receive feedback 









































































































































from potential early adopters. Even with minimal features and it still being early in the 
new venture creation process, the MVP needed to be a good representation of the final 
product – ensuring that the business concept that was receiving validation was also the 
business concept that would be developed further in the later stages of new venture 
creation. This had been an issue for Startup B, that later in new venture creation had 
changed their MVP and not retested it. This observation lead to the following 
proposition: 
P5. Startups seek out confirmation of the business concept (strategic 
feedback) during the secondary validation (during the Opportunity 
Refinement Phase) using an MVP. The MVP need not be a prototype, 
however, it should be representative of the final product. 
6.9.2. What is ‘Enough’ Secondary Validation? 
 There is however a point where “enough” secondary validation is reached from 
potential customers, and the founders decide to commit to creating a business. This 
signifies entrance into the Transition Phase (III). However, “enough” secondary 
validation was interpreted differently by different startups in the sample. For Startup A 
and Startup I, that validation came from receiving monetary compensation (sales). 
Startups D, E, and F were already receiving contracts (Startup D and Startup F received 
contracts from supply-side customers, while Startup E had users downloading their app, 
requiring an approval to certain terms and conditions). Startup C received contracts from 
companies offering affiliate programs and monetary compensation. 
 Note that Startup B, Startup G, and Startup H did not received contract or sales 
validation in the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). Startup B and Startup G had 
consulted with the external target market however (Figure 35, Chapter 5). Startup B 
spoke with people in-person at a few events about their makerspace concept and Startup 
G had interacted with individuals in an online community forum for coffee and for 
camping. Also, Startup H, who also did not have a contract or a sale by this stage, did not 
speak with customers during the Opportunity Refinement Phase, but had reached out to a 




Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), and considered validation from them to be enough to 
proceed with the business. Startup H received verbal validation from this interaction. The 
differences between these startups are that Startup G was able to reach a large, wider, and 
diverse potential target market through the online community forum in comparison to 
Startup B and Startup H that had reached a smaller group of potential target customers. 
However, all three startups interpreted the validation they received as adequate to proceed 
with committing to the business. 
 From these data, startups are still focused on validating the product and business 
model, making secondary validation share similar characteristics to primary validation. 
However, secondary validation requires a different amount of validation, and is still not 
necessarily focused on the setup of the business. In the secondary validation, there is a 
focus on developing, as well as testing the product and business model out on customers. 
Furthermore, because there is more clarity on the MVPs and business models, secondary 
validation offers more confirmation for startups that are able to produce a more accurate 
version of the product.  
 Some practitioners would argue that by this stage, only Startup A, Startup C and 
Startup I had achieved validation – as they consider a problem is not validated until a 
customer pays to solve it (Winkel & Wilcox, 2017). However, the other six startups in the 
sample had not received payment by the Opportunity Refinement Phase, of which four of 
them did at a later phase (Startup B, Startup D, Startup F, and Startup G).  
 Other practitioners argue that validation can come from cash, but also other forms 
of commitment, such as time, feedback, and usage of a product (Ries, 2009c) that offer 
validation that the direction and goals of the startup match those of the customers. 
Examples of validation that demonstrate commitment included contracts from supply-
side customers (Startup C, Startup D and Startup F), startups starting to obtain users 
through downloads of their application (Startup E), and startups that had received ‘large’ 
amounts of verbal/text-based (often public) validation of interest from a diversity of 
potential customers in their target market and affiliated stakeholders (Startup G – spoke 
with engineers on campus, cafes and coffee roasters, online forum for camping and 




validation were on a growth trajectory at the end of the study period (further details on 
this mentioned below). 
 The remaining two startups, Startup B and Startup H, only received verbal 
validation from a limited number of customers (Startup B and Startup H) and/or from 
channels not specifically used by the target market (Startup B). No other types of 
validation were received that would suggest commitment and interest from customers.  
 Startup B received positive verbal validation from setting up booths at two events 
that had a different purpose than creating a makerspace. Furthermore, the events held 
only had a small segment of their potential market in attendance, as they took place on a 
university campus, yet funders had also hoped to attract the non-university community.  
 Startup H, developing a mental health software that would be purchased by 
universities and used by its students, spoke with only one potential customer, where he 
received verbal validation. He also spoke with the mentors of the users, but was unable to 
access the student users themselves. Both Startup B and Startup H decided to proceed by 
investing more resources into the businesses at this stage to develop the product, 
however.  
 We can compare these two startups, Startup B and Startup H, that later in the 
study still had limited or no customers, with those that did not receive monetary 
compensation but did receive other forms of validation, Startup D, Startup E, Startup F, 
and Startup G. At later stages, Startup D, Startup E, Startup F and Startup G all received 
customers or users. The combination of receiving verbal validation from such a limited 
group of potential customers and not obtaining other types of commitment from 
customers and their related stakeholders (such as contracts, downloads, sharing of 
information, developing relationships), implies that this limited type of validation is 
inadequate to proceed in the new venture creation process. By this phase, startups should 
be receiving some indication that in the future, potential customers would take action to 
support their verbal statements. In other words, the customers needed to be willing to 
“put their money where their mouth is.” This is in line with Winkel and Wilcox’s (2017) 
practitioner teaching suggestion that validation should be received from a variety of 




stakeholders, to using data analytics to collect information about how visitors interact 
with the startups’ website. This observation lead to the following proposition: 
P6. During the secondary validation, startups should receive either monetary 
or contractual confirmation from early customers, or other forms of 
commitment that demonstrate interest in the product from a ‘large’ diversity of 
potential customers in their target market, as confirmation to proceed in the 
new venture creation process. These forms of commitment may include time, 
regular feedback on product and business, offering other resources, and usage 
of a product that offered validation that the direction and goals of the startup 
matched those of the customers.  
 Note that the term ‘large,’ describing the diversity of customers, is subjective and 
will differ based on the type of industry and the market that the startup is in. Large can be 
interpreted as obtaining views that are representative of the diversity of stakeholders, 
customers and otherwise, that need to be appeased for the success of the business 
concept. Having a ‘large’ number also suggests the possibility of having a market beyond 
a single or small group of customers.  
6.9.3. Who Offers Secondary Validation? 
 Note that secondary validation through sales was still possible if startups had not 
reached out to their external target market. This included Startup A and Startup I, that in 
later phases were able to also seek out validation from an external target market that they 
had not obtained by the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). What this means is, that there 
were still startups that were willing to increase commitment, resource allocation, and 
undergo dedicated process and infrastructure development based on personal and 
professional network contacts – without having engaged with the external target market. 
Startup A, however, was already embedded in the industry, perhaps indicating that their 
personal and professional networks could have been representative of the external target 
market. Startup I continued to receive customers as validation of their ability to create a 
product that has demand – even if this was not their ideal target market. This observation 




P7. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), it is still appropriate for a 
startup to receive validation from its personal and professional market if the 
network is representative of its external target market and if a basic level of 
secondary validation reached, as specified in P6. 
6.10. Transition Phase - What is the Impact of Secondary Validation? 
 When secondary validation is obtained, the startups’ founders decide to commit to 
the business in some significant way (see Table 34 for examples of these commitments). 
This signified entering the Transition Phase (III) of the new venture creation process. 
Startups continued to develop the product, and shifted to promoting the product and 
testing the business model on their target market (Figure 33, Chapter 5, and cases in 
Appendix B). This shift in increased commitment resulted from receiving secondary 
validation and ultimately, launched the process into the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). 
 Note that while the entrepreneurs in the sample were more internally focused 
during the Transition Phase (III), those that were communicating with customers also 
started to experiment to gain more insight into customers’ needs and interests and start 
promotion (social activities; e.g. Startup G), to build credibility (credibility activities; 
e.g. Startup E), to continue to improve technical design (technical activities; e.g. Startup 
H), to start to explore how they may sell the product to a more widespread target market 
(commercial activities; e.g. Startup E), to startup displaying their commitment through 
setting up a production facilities (production activities; e.g. Startup A), and to begin 
considering the skills and team needed within the organization (human resource 
activities; e.g. Startup I). This observation lead to the following proposition: 
P8. Customer interactions during the secondary validation stage test whether 
the startup can continue to undertake social and credibility activities to 
develop trust and a relationship with potential customers, and start 
experimenting with other activities (technical, commercial, production, and 





6.11. Entrepreneurial Phase - Second Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral 
 After the Transition Phase (III), the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV) launches directly 
into the second Customer Interaction-Validation-Spiral. Note that this process is similar 
in stages to the first customer interaction-validation-spiral that occurred during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), in that there are revisions to certain business 
concepts, subsequent customer interactions where the concepts are presented, further 
revisions or validations (in this case, tertiary validation), and increased commitment to 
resource allocation towards process or infrastructure development. If it is too challenging 
to proceed, the concept is discarded. With each validation received, the startups seek out 
additional customer interactions to clarify whether they have the appropriate market. 
They also continue to commit resources to develop processes and infrastructure to 
support the business. These activities eliminated alternative options and in confirming 
these options, narrowed the path for the startups. 
 By the Entrepreneurial Phase, there is a certain amount of investment into the 
startup that did not exist during the first customer interaction-validation-spiral. Founders 
have committed to the business by this phase, by declaring commitment, laying out 
funding, time, or other resources. Having been in operation for a short while already, 
certain processes and routines are forming, or have been formed, to meet the needs of the 
target market, and are geared towards producing a validated product from the primary 
and secondary validations. This suggests that the decision to pivot or adapt away from the 





Table 34. Quotes Demonstrating Founders’ Commitment to Startup in the Transition Phase. 
Startup Quote 
A “I had this gut feeling. I thought, I’ll drop out of school and make this happen. So, we had a 
friend draw up a logo. He was a graphic designer… That was our only marketing tool. A 
great looking bottle with a great product. At the time, we had zero Facebook friends. It 
wouldn’t have happened if [co-founder] didn’t have the who’s who in the organic space and 
my connections in the health industry and knowledge in the health space. It was the right time 
right place. A lot going on. Hitting the ground hustling. Asking, ‘hey, do you want to carry 
us?’ And they say, ‘yes, of course! If you’re behind this, of course we will carry this.’” ( 7 
June 2016). 
B “We’re done with the coursework. So, now we have to focus on the business.” (4 July 2016) 
C “[My mentor] – I told him about this and he said drop everything and focus on this to make 
money. And so, I think I’ll focus on this. I like this kind of project. I get so much revenue in 
return.” (24 October 2016). 
D “The idea came out of working in a not-for-profit sector, wanting to do events and being 
really frustrated with expensive venues and just thinking, ‘Why can’t you rent a vacant space 
or an underutilized space for a lot cheaper, saving a lot of money, and be more interesting, 
more unique?’ And then, yeah, the idea kind of sat for a while and then we all kind of got 
together and started working on it.” (02 June 2016) 
E “I was basically doing this every day after work. And that’s when things were picking up. And 
that’s when I decided to leave my job and pursue this full time. I was working for my uncle 
anyway. So, he knew the situation. And he was like, ‘if you come back, you come back.’ I was 
like, good. I’m going to do this [startup]. I have an opportunity here.” (8 June 2016). 
F “Come October, I got into [office space], I talked to the CEO and they gave me an office… I 
threw together a profile on LinkedIn. It was the best $68 I’ve spent. It’s incredible. So 
valuable… Every lending company I could find, I’d search in LinkedIn and on Google.. I’m in 
a fintech cluster group on LinkedIn. So, I’m in there. And I’m kind of working on that. I have 
11 lenders and I’ve contracted them. So that’s kind of where it’s at now. The website’s being 
completed in India. I’ve hired a CTO to help monitor that… Basically, integrating 
everybody.” (19 May 2016) 
G “Hopefully [now, I can start to] leverage Kickstarter. Not only does it give me the funding to 
move forward [with manufacturing], it also gives me the traction to approach these 
distributors to say – hey, I sold x amount in a 30 day campaign. What can you sell to your 
customers? I’ve looked online for distributors. Found one that distributes [competing coffee 
press], but I haven’t really reached out to them. I’m a bit tunnel-visioned towards Kickstarter 
right now.” (27 May, 2016) 
H “Then [after I got that feedback,] I started building. I built a website.” (6 June 2016) 
I “We got accepted into [the full-time summer incubator] with the company I started… When it 
started off, it was interactive because I wanted to build websites. You guys pay me money and 
I’ll build you a better site than you can build yourself. And then it progressed. We can build 
your site, market it, drive traffic to it… So, we’ve really evolved… This summer, it’s proving 
the methods, getting clients on board by the end of summer and basically tracking everything 
so that when I go to future clients and say, look at these numbers, why wouldn’t you want to 





6.12. Entrepreneurial Phase – In Pursuit of Tertiary Validation 
 Note that only four of the nine startups achieved Tertiary Validation during the 
study period (Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E). Therefore, all startups in 
this section are assessed for their attempts towards achieving Tertiary Validation, rather 
than their achievement of Tertiary Validation.  
6.12.1. What is Being Validated in the Tertiary Validation? 
Like with secondary validation, if the customer interactions resulted in tertiary 
validation, the startup increases commitment of resources and dedicates time, effort and 
other resources towards developing processes and infrastructure to developing the 
business (example quotes of attempts to reach Tertiary Validation from each case in 
Table 33). The difference between the secondary and the tertiary validation however lies 
in what is being validated and the concepts being revised. The startups were more 
customer focused than product focused during the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV; Figure 32, 
Chapter 5). This meant there was testing of the customer segment, testing and promoting 
the product, and testing the business model (Figure 33, Chapter 5). Startups continued to 
seek out strategic confirmation, however were also starting to undertake operational and 
tactical activities that needed confirmation from customers to ensure that founders were 
using their resources appropriately (Figure 43).  
 By the Entrepreneurial Phase, the startups in the sample had all developed a first 
(or subsequent) prototype or beta version of their product (Table 29). It should be noted 
that all startups except one (Startup B) tested a similar (though adapted) MVP linked to a 
particular business concept throughout the new venture creation process (Startup C had 
multiple MVPs, but only one progressed to the Transitional Phase, III). Having the same 
MVP throughout the new venture creation phases allowed it to be validated throughout 
the new venture creation process with a particular target market - where primary and 
secondary validation of the business concept would involve the same, increasingly 
developed MVP, so that by the Entrepreneurial Phase, the product would be refined and 




meant the business concept would be confirmed (strategic confirmation), and the startup 
could begin testing more operational and tactical feedback on the business.  
 In contrast, the MVP that was ultimately developed and tested for Startup B 
(individual pop-up events with entertainment and attendee participation) was different 
than the originally envisioned business concept (a membership-based permanent 
makerspace). As a result, the feedback received on the makerspace concept during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) was not necessarily applicable to the pop-up events 
that were created in the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV). 
 Having received positive verbal validation on the business concept for the 
membership-based makerspace, but struggling to develop the product (because the 
founders were unable to find a location), the founders believed the individual pop-up 
events would be able to act as MVPs to test the business concept with potential 
customers. They had not, however, validated interest in the individual pop-up events. 
This resulted in Startup B concurrently developing, testing and promoting the pop-up 
events during the Entrepreneurial Phase (attempting to obtain all three levels of validation 
at once). Not having received the initial validations, the founders had not realized that 
there was limited interest in the popup events (as shown by limited ticket sales), and they 
ended up overinvesting resources into a business that ultimately ceased to exist. This 
suggests that if there is a change to the business model, the validation process should start 
over from the primary validation stage (as seen with Startup C, until they settled on an 
affiliate marketing business). Furthermore, based on the startups in the sample, this lead 
to the following proposition: 
P9. Startups seek out operational and tactical feedback during tertiary 
validation. They already have a prototype and are transforming it into a 
product and creating the organization during the Entrepreneurial Phase.  
6.12.2. What is ‘Enough’ Tertiary Validation? 
 While the goal of validation is to offer “traction” (Ries, 2009c), there are 
differences between levels of validation. Primary and secondary validation offer strategic 




they match customer interest. It is during tertiary validation that startups should be testing 
the viability of the startup’s business model, as well as its ability to deliver on this 
business model.  
 Also, by this stage, while verbal confirmation is beneficial, startups need to start 
to see some type of payment or commitment from customers to feel validated. As 
validations of customer sales, downloads, contracts and public declarations continued or 
were not received in the sample startups (see Table 33 for examples), obtaining 
validation through growing sales (as well as contracts if a marketplace with supply-side 
and demand-side customers) became much more important than verbal validation. Startup 
A, Startup C, Startup D, Startup F, Startup G, and Startup I all had growing sales. 
However, just having some sales were not enough to provide validation by this stage. For 
example, Startup B had some sales, however, they did not seem to be sustainable. 
 For startups that were based around building a community that had not yet 
monetized, such as Startup E, validation was based on gaining a critical number of users 
that allow network effects to come into play (see Section 6.4 for more information on 
network effects). This observation lead to the following proposition: 
P10. During tertiary validation, startups should be receiving either monetary or 
contractual confirmation (with suggested potential of monetary confirmation) from 
early customers, as validation to proceed in the new venture creation process. 
Other forms of commitment on their own are not sufficient by this phase. 
6.12.3. Who Offers Tertiary Validation? 
 By the Entrepreneurial Phase, for the first time, all startups decided to interact 
with the customers in the wider target market to test the customer segment, and the 
business model (Figure 33 and Figure 35, Chapter 5). This is in stark contrast to 
previous phases, where only some of the startups connected with customers outside their 
own network. 
 Note that activities and communication with customers took place across a wider 
number of communication channels than in previous phases (Figure 39, Chapter 5). All 




customers using more traditional methods – in-person, over the phone and email, there 
was an increase in social media usage, traditional and online media articles (solicited and 
unsolicited by founders), and physical and digital ads. The online forums were still 
important to Startup E and Startup G, but they had also attempted both social and 
commercial activities using crowdfunding (successful only for Startup G). Tech-savvy 
startups also attempted to learn more about customers without actually talking to them by 
employing data analytics (Startup C, Startup F, Startup G, and Startup I). Reaching out 
via more direct channels allowed for testing with the intended target market, and to test 
the potential for sales at this time. This observation lead to the following proposition:  
P11. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, validation should be coming from the 
external target market and have a basic level of tertiary validation reached 
(monetary or contract with potential for future payment), as specified in 
P10. 
6.12.4. Impact of Tertiary Validation 
 Upon closer look at the activities undertaken during the Entrepreneurial Phase 
(IV), the startups’ organizations were still being set up. Activities still involved the 
customer segment being tested and developing relationships (social activities and 
credibility activities; Rehme & Svensson, 2011); the product and technology 
development was ongoing (technical activities); and the business model was still being 
evaluated. With almost all startups (except Startup H), having received either sales or 
contracts by this stage (commercial activities), we can see that the startups were 
successful in developing a certain level of trust and credibility with customers. 
 However, in addition to these activities, the startups began seeking out validation 
during customer interactions on whether, beyond a few initial sales, that they could 
deliver on a product to a wider target market. This included testing whether their 
promotional activities could reach a wider target market (social activities). They also 
tested whether they could create operations that allowed them to deliver on the business 
concept to more people. For instance, during the Entrepreneurial Phase, the startup was 




build the product that they promised (technical and production activities), testing whether 
they could obtain contracts and conduct sales activities (commercial activities), testing if 
they could increase operations-based activities such as managing hired employees that 
carry out these activities (human resource activities), and seeing if they could increase 
the startup’s focus on supply chain and logistics that would deliver goods to meet 
customer expectations (distribution activities; Rehme & Svensson, 2011; Table 32).  
 Therefore, while the primary validation, and to a certain extent, secondary 
validation, focused on ensuring the product is of interest to customers and meets the 
preliminary market’s needs (but has not necessarily been created and manufactured yet), 
tertiary validation validates whether startups could undertake activities to build an 
organization to serve a wider, target market. These validations allow founders to test 
whether they have the expertise in house to do these various activities and to answer the 
questions – “Do we know how to design, do we know how to sell, do we know how to 
make strategic decisions, and do we know how to obtain the resources to grow?” This 
observation lead to the following proposition: 
P12. Customer interactions during the tertiary validation stage test whether 
the startup can undertake technical, production, human resource, 
commercial, and distribution activities to organize to become an 
organization. 
6.13. Execute Phase 
 By the Execute Phase (V), the founders believed that they had a product that was 
of interest to their target market, their business model was confirmed, and they had a 
grasp on their operations. The focus at this stage was predominantly on the customer 
(Figure 32, Chapter 5), and on increased sales and marketing efforts to promote the 
startup (Figure 33, Chapter 5).  
 While I have categorized four startups as having reached the Execute Phase (V; 
Startup A, Startup C, Startup D, and Startup E), these startups continued to test these 




tested the customer segment and operations (Figure 33; Chapter 5), and also continued to 
use a breadth of tested and confirmed communication channels (Figure 40; Chapter 5). 
6.14. Summary of Model of Early Customer Interaction 
 In the second half of Chapter 6, I propose and explain a model of early customer 
interactions that integrates the customer interaction-validation-spiral model into the 
process of new venture creation, and offer a series of propositions on three levels of 
validation throughout venture creation (Table 35).  
 Startups interact with customers throughout the new venture creation process, 
however look for different types of validation from customers during the different phases 
of new venture creation as they perform various activities related to building the business. 
Founders use the feedback received to understand customers’ problems, develop and test 
a product and business model, and to develop the organization.  
 There are three levels of validation that startups seek out during their early stages 
of new venture creation. First, primary validation comes from the first interest that is 
shown by early/potential customers. Typically, this takes place during the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase (I) or the Opportunity Refinement Phase (II). Primary validation can 
take place just after the first customer interaction, and involves obtaining confirmation on 
the problem that customers are having and target customer interest in product concept (or 
MVP) (P1). This involves technical activities to develop the product, and social and 
credibility activities to try to understand the needs and wants of customers.  
 Obtaining primary customer validation through verbal or text-based feedback is 
often considered sufficient at this stage, as founders are learning whether the product has 
features that are of interest to customers and if they would consider purchasing it (P2). 
This interaction is often by chance or convenience, and involves people in the founders’ 
personal and professional networks, though sometimes, part of the external target markets 
as well (P3). However, early customer interactions can act as a critical juncture that 
triggers decisions to pursue certain paths, narrows options that can be pursued, and 













P1: Startups seek out confirmation on the problem and product concepts during the primary validation. These 
interactions test a startup’s ability to undertake technical activities to develop the product, and to try to 
understand needs and wants of customers with social and credibility activities. 
P2: During the primary validation, verbal or text-based validation is considered acceptable confirmation to 
proceed with the new venture creation process. 
P3. Founders rely on chance or convenience to undertake their first customer interaction and to obtain 
feedback for primary validation. This often means relying on feedback from their nearby personal and 
professional networks. 
P4. An initial positive customer interaction creates primary validation for a business concept. This primary 
validation is influential as it acts as a critical juncture that can narrow the path of opportunities that may be 
pursued by the startup, and triggers subsequent self-reinforcing processes where the startup seeks out further 
validation and develops a product and market around this validation. 
Secondary 
 
P5. Startups seek out confirmation of the business concept (strategic feedback) during the secondary validation 
(during the Opportunity Refinement Phase) using an MVP. The MVP need not be a prototype, however should 
be representative of the final product. 
P6. During the secondary validation, startups should receive either monetary or contractual confirmation from 
early customers, or other forms of commitment that demonstrate interest in the product from a ‘large’ diversity 
of potential customers in their target market and their affiliated stakeholders, as confirmation to proceed in the 
new venture creation process. These forms of commitment may include time, regular feedback on product and 
business, offering other resources, and usage of a product that offered validation that the direction and goals of 
the startup matched those of the customers. 
P7. In the Opportunity Refinement Phase, it is still appropriate for a startup to receive validation from its 
personal and professional market if the network is representative of its external target market and if a basic 
level of secondary validation reached, as specified in P6.  
P8. Customer interactions during the secondary validation stage test whether the startup can continue to 
undertake social and credibility activities to develop trust and a relationship with potential customers, and 




Table 35 continued 
Level of Validation Proposition 
Tertiary 
 
P9. Startups seek out operational and tactical feedback during tertiary validation. They already have a 
prototype and are transforming it into a product and creating the organization during the Entrepreneurial 
Phase. 
P10. During tertiary validation, startups should be receiving either monetary or contractual confirmation 
(with suggested potential of monetary confirmation) from early customers, as validation to proceed in the 
new venture creation process. Other forms of commitment on their own are not sufficient by this phase.  
P11. In the Entrepreneurial Phase, validation should be coming from the external target market and have a 
basic level of tertiary validation reached (monetary or contract with potential for future payment), as 
specified in P10.  
P12. Customer interactions during the tertiary validation stage test whether the startup can undertake 





 After primary validation, the first customer interaction-validation-spiral takes 
place, as parts of the business concept are developed, presented to customers in 
subsequent interactions, revised and/or discarded. Adaptive Expectation Effects – self-
reinforcing effects where others’ expectations and preferences are influencing individual 
preferences – and Learning Effects – with an increased efficiency from an activity being 
performed frequently (Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011) – are at play, as the startup develops 
and accumulates skills that they can ultimately exploit. 
 In the secondary validation, startups seek out strategic feedback and confirmation 
of their business concept using their MVP (P5). This typically takes place during the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II) and is to ensure that the business concept is validated 
before additional investments are made into the business. Secondary customer validation 
involves obtaining more concrete validation than just the verbal and text-based validation 
received in primary customer validation. Startups should receive either monetary or 
contractual confirmation from early customers, or other forms of commitment that 
demonstrate interest in the product from a ‘large’ diversity of potential customers in the 
target market and their affiliated stakeholders, as confirmation to proceed in the new 
venture creation process (P6). ‘Large’ is self-defined by the startup. These forms of 
commitment may include time, regular feedback on the product and business, offering 
other resources, and using the product.  
 The criteria for who secondary validation is received from also increases, where 
validation should come from individuals who are representative of the external target 
market though may not be the wider target market (P7). The activities that are being 
undertaken involve customers in social and credibility activities to develop trust and a 
relationship, and involve them by experimenting with other activities (technical, 
commercial, production, and human resources (P8).  
 If secondary validation is obtained, the startup enters the Transition Phase (III) 
and commits to starting the business. This results in the additional investment of 
resources to make the product and organization a reality. 
 From the Transition Phase, the startup enters into the second customer 




creation. This is a similar process to the first customer interaction-validation-spiral, where 
concepts are presented to customers, subsequent revisions or validations are received, and 
there is an increased commitment to resource allocation towards developing processes 
and infrastructure for the business. The Adaptive Expectation Effects and Learning 
Effects are still at play, however feedback from customers that deviates from the path that 
the startup is currently on may be increasingly discarded, as the startup is increasingly 
committed to the validated path. 
 Finally, in the Tertiary Validation, startups begin seeking operational and tactical 
feedback when building the product and organization (P9). These include setting up 
manufacturing facilities, developing processes for the way clients are handled, and 
learning how to distribute the product. By this stage, all startups should be receiving 
monetary or contractual confirmation (with suggested potential of monetary 
confirmation) from early customers (P10). Other firms of commitment on their own are 
not sufficient by this phase, and validation should be coming from the external target 
market (P11).  
 Finally, customer interactions during tertiary validation are not just testing a 
product, or an idea of a product. These interactions are testing a startups’ potential to 
build an organization.  Through the social and credibility activities that typically involved 
testing and developing relationships and trust, founders were also engaging with 
customers during technical and production activities – to ensure that the product had 
desired features; during human resource activities – where customers continued to 
interact with the small entrepreneurial team; in commercial activities – where startups 
obtained contracts and conducted sales activities; and distribution activities – where 
supply chain and logistics activities allowed goods to be delivered (P12). 
  In summary, these three levels of validation offer a startup regular reality checks 
as to whether they should move forward and pivot. The first stage of validation is a check 
for interest in an idea, so that an entrepreneur may decide whether to further explore and 
develop the business concept, however, the secondary validation provides more 
confirmation of a market, and achieving the tertiary validation stage suggests that the 




7. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Overview 
 Customers have a central role in clarifying or contributing to the ambiguity of the 
venture creation process. From the literature, we know that customers have certain values 
they are seeking and have a self-serving bias (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003) to share 
feedback about their needs, preferences, and the context they live in (Etgar, 2008). From 
the new product development and relationship marketing literatures on more established 
organizations, we know that customers are not just passive buyers (e.g. Payne, Storbacka, 
& Frow, 2008; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000; Yi & Gong, 2013). They often share 
information that affects new product development long before a product is available 
(Chang & Taylor, 2016).  
 While entrepreneurship literature makes reference the role of early customers in 
new ventures [e.g. topics such as the impact of a first sale (e.g. Rehme & Svensson, 2011; 
Ruokolainen, 2008), their involvement in innovation (e.g. Coviello & Joseph, 2012), and 
the implications of these relationships (e.g. Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001)], in 
studying the new venture creation process, customer interactions have often been placed 
at the periphery of the process or assumed to occur at later stages (e.g. Gartner, 1985; 
Van de Ven, Venkataraman, Polley, & Garud, 1989; Bhave, 1994; Corbett, 2005; 
Cunneen, Mankellow, & Gibson, 2007; Liao & Welsch, 2008; Chell, 2013).  
 In contrast, recent practitioner-based entrepreneurship approaches have emerged 
in the past decade that advocate speaking with customers early and often in the startup 
development process to test out ideas (e.g. Blank, 2007; Blank & Dorf, 2012; Cooper & 
Vlaskovits, 2013; Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011). The lean startup methodology and other 
customer-centric entrepreneurship methods encourage entrepreneurs to develop 
hypotheses and iteratively build a minimum viable product or service to meet early 
customers’ needs. Assumptions about customers’ needs and values are rapidly tested, 
allowing startups to pivot and change their idea as necessary. The focus with these 




not necessarily account for the role of customers in other aspects of creating an 
organization and delivery of a product to the wider market, on a larger scale.  
 The limited integration of domains that address customer interactions – 
marketing, new product development, new venture creation, and the lean startup 
methodology – and the complexity of the entrepreneurial process, give rise to the need for 
more process research (e.g. Cuunneen et al., 2007; Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; 
Hjorth, Holt, & Steyaert, 2015; Moroz & Hindle, 2011) to integrate and address the role 
and long-term impact of early customers’ interactions during the startup development 
process. Specifically, the literature on customer interactions in new ventures lacks an 
explanation of how startups interpret what was gained from these customer interactions 
over time, and how they use this feedback in decisions to proceed with the venture 
creation process.  
 In this dissertation, I placed early customer interactions at the centre of the startup 
process and asked: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the 
venture creation process, and how do these interactions create path dependence for the 
type of organization being created? To answer this question, I undertook an inductive, 
qualitative process study of nine startups.   
 The within-case analyses provided an understanding of customer interactions for 
each of the nine startups in the sample (Chapter 4 and Appendices B, D, and E). Various 
concepts were identified in initial coding of the data (Table 9) that were used to identify 
a summary of customer interactions, the startup’s focus at each phase of new venture 
creation, when customer interactions first occurred, who initiated customer interactions, 
what type of communication channels were used, whether the feedback from customers 
was strategic or operational or tactical, the level of validation received from the personal 
or professional networks of the startup or the external target market, and whether there 
were contracts or sales that occurred.  
 From the within-case analyses, we learned that most startups had their first 
customer interaction before committing to the business during the Transition Phase (III). 
This interaction did not necessarily result in a sale or a contract. These first sales and 




Most of these early interactions were initiated by the startup and even in digital startups, 
first interactions tended to occur in-person. Startups initially focused on a product and 
customer, and eventually moved towards a customer and/or organization focus. They also 
tended to seek out and obtain strategic feedback on the business concept before the 
Transition Phase, and only afterwards, did startups begin to seek out operational or 
tactical feedback.  
 Based on the results in Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 (also see Appendix F for the meta-
matrix), I delved into cross-case findings that address the first part of the research 
question: When and how do startups interact with early customers during the new 
venture creation process? The data suggests that startups undertake different types of 
activities during different phases of the new venture creation process and concurrently, 
undertake customer interactions that can influence these activities. In the Opportunity 
Discovery Phase (I), startups focus on interacting with customers to clarify the problem 
they were experiencing. Startups begin developing and testing the product in the 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), and by the Transition Phase (III), startups commit to 
a business concept. This is when they also commit to the organization. By the 
Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), minimally, a prototype has been developed that can be tested 
widely with customers in the target market. While the business concept, product and the 
market, were validated earlier, at this phase, the startup needs to validate whether they 
can develop an organization, business model, and operations that allow them to deliver 
the product on a larger scale (the operational and tactical feedback; Section 5.1).  
 The analysis also suggests that the communication channels that startups use can 
affect the relationships being built with customers. Startups that continued to use similar 
channels throughout new venture creation were able to build deeper relationships with 
similar customers over time. An online community forum could be used to test a business 
concept on a wide group of dedicated potential customers and get their feedback, and 
concurrently, can be used by startups to build a community of users – and increase 
chances of success. Connecting with several customers early in the venture creation 
process and using the communication channels that the target market uses, allows startups 





 Finally, the cross-case finding suggested that founders interpreted feedback and 
validation from customers as justification to move forward with the business or to pivot. 
Verbal validation was considered adequate before the Transition Phase (III), could be 
from a startup’s personal or professional networks, and did not need to be in the form of 
sales or a contract. Later in new venture creation, however, validation was from the 
external target market, and in the form of sales or a contract, with the potential of future 
sales (Section 5.2). 
 While receiving and reacting to validation itself was not surprising, concurrently, 
resources were being invested to build the startup, and processes and infrastructure were 
being developed that would theoretically be challenging or expensive to undo – even if 
customers encountered later in the process suggested changes (Appendix B). This made 
understanding the mechanisms and implications of receiving validation at each of the 
phases of new venture creation more salient. 
 With the parallels between the new venture creation process and path formation – 
both showing a narrowing set of options for the product, target customer market, 
operations, and business model, I then turned to the path dependence literature to better 
understand these customer validations during a startup’s path formation.  
 In Chapter 6, I proposed a model of the self-reinforcing process that occurs when 
validation is received during early customer interactions – the customer interaction-
validation-spiral. This model outlines what occurs when a startup tests out different 
concepts (the product, business model, operations or market concepts) on potential 
customers, what happens if the concept(s) is positively or negatively received by a 
customer, and how the startup responds to this feedback. The model suggests that 
validation reinforces the concept(s), and a lack of validation sends the startup to search 
for improvements to the concept or to pivot (Section 6.1). 
 There are self-reinforcing path mechanisms at play when customers interact with 
a startup, including Adaptive Expectation Effects (a self-reinforcing effect where early 
customers’ expectations and preferences are influencing the startup’s direction) and 
Learning Effects (where startups have an increased efficiency from performing an 




may encourage startups to adapt their business and validation offer reinforcing 
information and validation that the startup is on the right path. These self-reinforcing 
mechanisms suggest that as a product is refined for a certain market, more validation is 
received that supports a business concept, and as the startup learns more about how to 
deliver that concept and invests more resources into the concept, alternative options 
(adaptations to the business concept or pivoting) it may pursue or pivot to are reduced. 
 Finally, I present a model of customer interactions during the new venture 
creation process with supporting propositions (Section 6.5). I apply the customer 
interaction-validation spiral to explain how validation from customers plays a role during 
different times in the new venture creation process. Note that one of the main goals of the 
new venture creation process is to achieve clarity on and demonstrate ability to organize 
to deliver on the concepts of the product, the market, the business model and their 
operations. 
 There are three levels of validation and two customer interaction-validation-
spirals involved in propelling startups through the phases of new venture creation (Figure 
42). The validation levels have different requirements in terms of what is being validated 
(which concepts and which activities; 1), what is “enough” validation (2), what type of 
customer offers the validation (3), and the impact of the validation (4).  
 Primary validation (predominantly verbal) from a limited number of initial 
customers can be enough to initiate a potential path for the startup to pursue (at the 
critical juncture, in path dependence terms). While there are still several opportunities 
that could be pursued, the first narrowing of the path triggers self-reinforcing processes of 
the first customer interaction-validation spiral. This then promotes the search for 
additional validation or revision of the product and customer market concepts. With the 
search for validation, there is also the push to undertake activities that meet the needs of 
“what customers want,” akin to the adaptive expectation effects. 
 When validation is accumulated, a startup achieves the secondary validation level. 
This level re-confirms the product and the business model but requires additional 
commitment from customers - either monetary or contractual confirmation, or other 




product, or other resources) to demonstrate interest in the product from the wider target 
market. Receiving this additional validation on the business concept, the founders 
become even more committed to the business, further narrowing the path of opportunities 
that the startup can pursue. This may lead to investment of additional resources, and the 
beginning of establishing activities to manufacture, promote, and distribute the product to 
a wider market.  
 As this investment into the startup continues, this can trigger another set of self-
reinforcing processes, the second customer interaction-validation-spiral. In this second 
self-reinforcing process, the startup seeks out additional validation, this time, not only on 
the product and market, but also to test whether it can undertake activities to organize and 
deliver on the business concept to meet customer expectations. In seeking out and 
receiving additional validation, once again, other options are gradually eliminated as a 
growing set of early customers’ expectations and preferences are met, the startup 
becomes more efficient at performing tasks to meet those expectations and needs, 
information is gathered to meet the needs of the current path the startup is on, decisions 
are made to perform certain activities, resources are allocated to the path, and processes 
that support the path are created within the organization.  
 Finally, if the product, business model, operations and market are validated and a 
growing monetary or contractual confirmation is received from early customers in the 
external target market, this demonstrates the existence of a market, and that the startup is 
capable of organizing to be an organization. By this stage, tertiary validation considered 






Table 36. Characteristics of Three Levels of Validation During the New Venture Creation Process 
 Primary Validation Secondary Validation Tertiary Validation 





Business concept and 
product 
Business concept and 
ability to bring product to 




Strategic Strategic Operational and Tactical 





proceed in new 
venture creation 
process 
Verbal / Text-based 
(Monetary or contract 
validation also acceptable 
but rare) 
Monetary, contract, or 
other form of 
commitment indicating a 
‘large’ diversity of 
potential customers. 
Commitment includes 
time, feedback, and use 
of product. 
Monetary or contract 
confirmation (with 
potential for monetary 
confirmation) 
Who validates Individuals often found by 
chance or convenience. 
May be in the personal or 
professional network (but 
may also be in the 
external target market, 
particularly if founders 
have no prior connections 
to the market). 
Personal, professional 
market and the external 
target market 
External target market 
The impact of 
validation 
Creates a critical juncture 
and narrows the path of 
opportunities for the 
startup 
Results in founder 
committing to the 
business (entering into 
the Transition Phase of 
new venture creation) 
Demonstrates that the 
product meets the 
market’s needs, that the 
business model works, 
and that the organization 




tested (Rehme & 
Svensson, 2011) 
Technical, social and 
credibility 
Social and credibility 
(and experimenting with 
technical, commercial, 











7.2. Additional Insights from Inductive Process  
 Several concepts emerged in the development of this model that have theoretical 
implications for our understanding of customer interactions and validation during the new 
venture creation process. Perhaps, most importantly, my analysis reveals not only are 
there different validation levels from customers, they have different requirements to 
achieve validation at progressive stages of new venture creation, including what is being 
validated (which concepts and which activities), what is “enough” validation, the 
closeness of the customer relationship that should offer the validation, and the impact of 
the validation. My research builds on the notion that customers play a central role in 
startup development (e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; Ries, 2011), but suggests that they play a 
deeper role beyond product and market development, by contributing insights that affect 
the creation of the organization as a whole. 
7.2.1. The Central Role of Customers in New Venture Creation 
 My analysis suggests that customer interactions play an integral role in path 
formation during the new venture process. What is surprising, however, is that even 
though there is potential for early customers to be influential, in practice, relatively little 
thought is put into the initial interactions with potential customers, that are often random 
or by convenience. Primary validation, during the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), 
checks for interest in an idea so that an entrepreneur may decide whether to further 
explore and develop the business concept. The customers who decide to provide feedback 
are also potential customers that self-select into the process of offering suggestions about 
the product and business model (Sarasvathy, 2010). What this suggests is that while there 
is a tendency to seek validation from customers throughout new venture creation, that it 
matters who these initial interactions are with, and that they are representative of the 
external target market. This is because their opinions have the potential to be 
incorporated long-term into the product, the business model, and the overall organization. 





  While a startup has five main categories of activities it undertakes during the new 
venture creation process, these activities occur during different phases (Rehme & 
Svensson, 2011). The initial activities are social and credibility building – aimed to build 
credibility and a relationship between the startup and the market – and technical activities 
involved in developing the product. There are potential customer interactions at this stage 
that will ideally offer feedback and suggestions on the product and business model 
(strategic feedback), and whose suggestions would be incorporated into the startup. 
Ideally, these customers would also commit to purchasing the product in the future – 
making reconnecting with the same initial customers throughout the new venture creation 
process important.  
 Meanwhile, the activities for establishing an organization continue to grow and to 
be developed – including ongoing technical revisions to the product, commercial 
activities to produce, market and sell the product, and the logistics needed to get the 
product to customers. Validation is constantly being sought out from customers for these 
operational and tactical activities. These different stages of validation with customers 
reshape the startup from what the entrepreneur envisioned to an organization that both 
parties care about. Ultimately, these customer interactions are validating the whole 
entrepreneurial process of whether the startup has the expertise in house to make strategic 
decisions, to design, sell, and obtain resources, and do what is necessary to grow and 
organize to become a more permanent and stable organization.  
 This primary validation and secondary validation are both strategic, in that they 
confirm interest in the business concept, the product and market, and the overall scope 
and direction of the organization (Ansoff, 1988; Bhave, 1994; Child, 1972; Maidique & 
Zirger, 1984, 1985). However, as strategic validation is received, and the founders 
commit to the organization (Transition Phase), they begin organizing the infrastructure, 
processes, and relationships needed to build the organization, to bring the product to 
market, and to operate the business. This results in startups starting to collect operational 
and tactical tertiary validation from potential customers that facilitates their assessment of 




 Primary and secondary validation, obtained before committing to a business, are 
often verbal or text based, or, through other forms of commitment besides sales or 
contracts (for example, downloading a piece of software, providing feedback, or 
becoming part of an online community), however. This implies that when founders 
commit to an organization, this commitment is often based on the potential of sales, 
rather than demonstrated actual sales. While this might initially be considered a risky, it 
is unsurprising as this uncertainty is an expected aspect of entrepreneurship. Less than 
half of the nine startups in the sample had sales by the time they committed to the 
business in the Transition Phase (III). By the Entrepreneurial Phase (IV), however, six 
had growing sales, one startup had some sales, and one startup had a growing number of 
contracts. Only one startup in the sample had no sales by this time. This suggests that 
there may still need to be a leap of faith that interest will translate to sales or contracts in 
the long run, but that this risk may be minimized by the demonstration of a range of 
alternative forms of commitment. 
7.2.2. Agency, Reflexivity, and the Formation of a Startup’s “Path” 
 As we saw, literature on path dependence can be helpful in explaining how 
customers influence and shape the new venture creation process. The primary validation 
occurs at the critical juncture of the path formation process and triggers the movement 
from the Pre-Formation to the Formation Phase (Figure 3). This stage, and each 
subsequent stage, of validation offers a reality check for the startup, encouraging 
founders to move forward or pivot. The different stages of validation and self-reinforcing 
mechanisms at play narrow the path of options for different concepts of the organization 
in the first versus the second customer interaction-validation-spiral.  
 While the self-reinforcing processes are at play in both customer interaction-
validation-spirals, the ability and willingness of a startup to pivot in the first spiral is 
likely greater than in the second spiral. In the first spiral, there is generally little invested 
beyond the creation of an idea and some time. As seen from the study, confirmation from 
potential customers by this stage are mostly verbal or text-based and there is likely 




 In the second spiral, in addition to resource investment and knowledge gained that 
can facilitate the development of the business concept, there is an interest to carry on to 
customer needs. This may be due to a variety of reasons, from feeling obligated or 
committed to solving their problem, a feeling of sunk cost of investment, or that the 
founders feel that after all this time, they have something to prove to themselves and/or to 
others. The investment of resources in particular may be a restriction, as startups’ 
resource limitations may restrict their ability to make frequent adaptations. Regardless of 
the reason, this suggests that the startup less likely to pivot in the second spiral. 
 Note that I am not claiming that startups reach the lock-in stage of path 
dependence by the end of new venture creation. The young organizations created when 
the Execute Phase has been reached are still much more adaptable than older, more 
established organizations2, and startups are not likely to have experienced lock-in that 
quickly.  
 However, these multiple stages of validation in early customer interactions 
suggest that during the Formation Phase of path dependence (after the critical juncture 
and before lock-in), startups are on a narrowing path (Sydow, Scheyogg, & Koch, 2009) 
and there is the potential for more than one set of sequential self-reinforcing processes. 
This is akin to the first and second spirals that are proposed to take place in sequence in 
this new venture creation process model. The resulting stages of validation contribute to 
the “wave” of options being contemplated and validated or discarded during the 
Formation phase (refer to Figure 3). 
 Finally, this also suggests that while there is escalating reinforcement of the path 
with each sequential self-reinforcing process (for example, from learning more, becoming 
more efficient to serve a certain path, having already adapted to initial potential customer 
needs, and including investments of resources), that as long as a startup is still able to 
pivot, founders retain some agency and reflexivity to observe the results of their actions 
and change their trajectory (Araujo & Harrison, 2002; Garud, Kumaraswamy, & Karnøe, 
                                                 
2 Even lock-in should not be considered totally rigid and should be able to have some variance, according 




2010). It is, however, the early emotional attachment to an idea (Burgelman & Grove, 
1996) that can create inertia to pivot. Founders that have put on emotional blinders 
(Sydow et al., 2009) to early, non-confirmatory validation may find themselves 
developing a product or business model for which there is no market, or operations that 
do not meet the needs of their customers. This tension between path creation and path 
dependence is in line with what has previously been proposed by Sydow et al., (2009), 
and supports the idea that despite self-reinforcing forces involved in a path being created, 
that cognitive rigidity has not set in and entrepreneurs can play a substantial role in 
creating their path.  
7.3. Summary of Contributions  
 This research makes three main contributions. First, I contribute to the literature 
on new venture creation process, by showing that customers play a central role 
throughout new venture creation. Early customer interactions can influence various 
activities undertaken by startups by providing validation for a business concept, or 
incentive to adapt or discard the idea by pivoting. At each phase, the type of customer 
interacted with can therefore be important to consider – in terms of whether they are 
representative of the target market, as well as the type of validation received – whether it 
is verbal, a contract, or sales. Furthermore, by conducting a process research study, we 
gain a better understanding of the entrepreneurial process that is generally considered a 
challenge to study.  
 Second, my research contributes to the growing research on the practitioner 
concepts of lean startups and customer interactions to expand on the idea that customers 
not only provide validation on the product and the market, but also provide validation on 
how a startup develops into an organization and plans to operate in the future. This study 
introduces the idea of different types of validation from customers at different stages of 
new venture creation, what is validated, and the implications of the type of customer 
involved. It also suggests that pivoting, advocated in this practitioner literature, can 
become more challenging over time, as the startup becomes more developed. There is, 
however, still the potential for agency and reflexivity in the path formation process that 




actions and still change their trajectory. 
 Finally, I contribute to the literature on the path formation process by showing 
that validation can act as a trigger for narrowing the path during the Formation Phase of 
path formation. My model of the customer interaction-validation-spiral – the self-
reinforcing process - contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms of path 
dependence.  Finally, my model of early customer interaction implies that there is the 
potential for multiple validation stages where the path is narrowing and evaluated, rather 
than just at the critical juncture (at the end of Pre-formation) and lock-in (at the beginning 
of the Lock-in stage; Sydow, Schreyogg, & Koch, 2009). This offers further insights into 
the mechanisms of path dependence, further opening the black box of organizational 
paths. 
 This study identifies that customer interactions are influential, however, have 
generally been left implicit in the theorizing on the new venture creation process. More 
specifically, my findings suggest the importance of startups putting more thought into 
selecting these early customers for interactions, especially when there are finite resources 
available to court “appropriate” customers. Finally, over time, despite agency and 
reflexivity, the ease with which a startup can pivot becomes more challenging with 
additional investments into the organization, sunk costs, efficiencies, and promises made 
to the market that further commit the startup to continue down a given path.  
7.4. Limitations 
 Despite attempts to capture data in as near-real time as possible, there is the 
potential for retrospective bias when using interviews for data collection with participants 
in a qualitative study. Having a first interview that recaps the story of the startup from 
establishment is essential, and because it is nearly impossible to follow an entrepreneur 
from when they first have an idea (unless you are immersed in an entrepreneurial 
network), this interview will definitely be retrospective. The nature of entrepreneurship 





 To mitigate this retrospective bias, I use several methods of data collection for 
this study, including ‘real-time’ observations of the founders, including: daily work and 
interactions of founders in the incubator, events with customer interactions, attending 
customer focus groups or listening to sales calls, and watching entrepreneurial pitches. I 
also collected blogs, news articles written about the startups, radio and television show 
features on the startups, press releases written by the founders or their external marketing 
team, social media data, images on the startups’ websites, interactions in third-party 
online community forums, public interactions on startups’ websites, internal documents 
(when available), and conducted mentor interviews (when available) to triangulate 
interview data to minimize the potential for retrospective bias in the data. The 
participants were also briefly consulted to ensure that I interpreted the general 
understanding of their events correctly.  
 It should be noted, however, that the goal of this research was to collect narrative 
data. As a result, while the other methods of data collection that confirm the stories of the 
founders are beneficial, ultimately, the goal was to gain the founders’ perspective of the 
startups on how their business progressed. Therefore, the bias that may exist in this 
dissertation is in my interpretation of their narratives and supporting material.  
 Furthermore, as these are interpretive narratives, this study is unable to conclude 
whether the startup’s interpretations of validation were appropriate or not to create a 
successful business. While this was not specifically the goal of the study, the field of 
business is generally performance focused (whether it is revenue, growth, or another 
measure). This leaves room for other future studies, however, that look at organizations 
over a longer period of time, from early startup stage, up until when they are more 
established or when they fail. This would allow for looking at performance measures and 
reducing survivor bias in future studies. 
 Generalizability of findings is always a question when a limited number of cases 
are used. The tradeoff however allows for in-depth and accurate observations of the 
phenomenon of interest. What this means, however, is that these findings are applicable 
to startups in incubator settings, but not necessarily to startups in general. However, 




during the new venture creation process, particularly, in that there may be multiple 
validation stages that need to be evaluated over time and consideration should go into the 
customer interactions pursued. This provides an opportunity for future research to 
determine whether there is a difference between the customer interaction processes of 
startups in incubators and outside of incubators. 
 The presence of these startups in an incubator setting also has implications for 
generalizability. First, the startups in the incubator have been screened for the “potential” 
of their business idea and the founders. Second, by being at this entrepreneurial stage, 
accepted to an incubator, startups are no longer in the Opportunity Discovery Phase (I), 
Opportunity Refinement Phase (II), or the Transition Phase (III), as they have 
demonstrated a commitment to starting a business. As mentioned previously, despite 
attempts to follow startups early, in real-time, it was not possible to follow them from 
conception. As a result, data collected on these earlier phases were retrospective, and may 
have been as far as two years prior or as recent as four months prior to data collection. 
 Accessing startups in early stage incubators is still beneficial for this type of 
research, because they identify startups that have a business concept of interest but may 
not have tested it or may not have done much development of the organization yet. 
However, much can still be learned from startups in incubators. They are all receiving 
similar information in a given ecosystem and were screened by similar criteria, however, 
still behave differently. Furthermore, as the presence of incubators are growing on 
university campuses and in entrepreneurial communities, understanding startups in these 
environments can be beneficial to improve the new venture creation process. 
 Another point to note is that the study groups physical and digital products and 
services under the same category of “product.” There are also different business models, 
including community based networks, creating the potential for differences in how 
customers are interacted with. While this was done intentionally to obtain a diversity of 
industries and to see if a general customer interaction process could be observed, this 
diversity also limits the potential to draw conclusions about customer interactions in a 
specific type of industry. It does, however, present an opportunity for future research on 




7.5. Statement of Reflexivity 
 Willig (2001) suggests that prior experiences and beliefs can shape qualitative 
research. As a result, I present a statement of reflexivity to allow readers to “explore the 
ways in which a researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon, 
and informs such research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999: 228). 
 While today I have a strong fascination with the entrepreneurial process, this was 
not always the case. With the exceptions of childhood baked goods and vegetable stands, 
I have not yet started my own business. My first influential exposure to entrepreneurship 
was in my role as a co-operative education student in Biology at the University of 
Waterloo, working for biotechnology startups in the early 2000s. There, I was exposed to 
challenges of product development and resource constraints of a startup. However, during 
a biotech boom when these types of ventures were well funded and as a student employee 
who was relatively un-invested in the business, I was sheltered from the true implications 
of what happens if a venture fails. The businesses I worked for were a few years old by 
this stage, and already had demonstrated their potential to customers by virtue of being 
medical-related products that aided in the detection of widely occurring chronic diseases, 
such as heart disease, cancer, and HIV.  
 Fast forward to 2004, to my degree in Nutritional Biochemistry and Metabolism 
at the Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts University in Boston. I 
was mostly embedded in learning about the natural sciences, but being in a school of 
applied nutrition, I also learned about small subsistence farmers starting their own 
businesses and the humble origins of large food and agriculture companies such as 
McDonalds, Monsanto, and Nestlé. Later, my career and life took me to Hong Kong for 
my MBA at City University of Hong Kong in 2006, and subsequently, Singapore in 2009 
for work. During my time in Asia, I incidentally met entrepreneurs that had started their 
own real estate businesses, software companies, fashion companies, and their own 
restaurants. Once again, however, I thought little of these encounters from an 
entrepreneurial perspective, but rather, from the innovation process of product 




 Finally, even when I had started my PhD journey, I was still focused on the 
innovation processes in organizations. It was not until a research trip to India, where I had 
the opportunity to interview several entrepreneurs for another study, and in my 
discussions with faculty, that I found that several of the concepts that piqued my interest 
in innovation were not only relevant in startups, but also had additional challenges and 
puzzles that needed to be considered.  
 In undertaking this current study over the past few years, I reflected on my 
previous encounters with entrepreneurial settings, and my level of respect for 
entrepreneurs has ballooned. In the process of this research, I spent several hours with 
entrepreneurs in my sample in their work environments. I developed a relationship and 
rapport with them that facilitated data collection. This extended time together also made 
me feel as though I was going through the entrepreneurial process with them. These 
relationships allowed me to develop an in-depth understanding of the creative nature of 
their work, the uncertainty, frustrations, and unrelenting hours they endured, as well as 
the passion, resourcefulness, and drive they had to persist in the new venture creation 
process. At times, they considered me a “therapist,” of sorts, where they were cued to 
reflect on their customer interactions. This reflection process itself may play a role in 
biasing the data, as not all entrepreneurs take the time to do this without reminders or 
incentives. Therefore, in collecting and analyzing the data in this study, I am certainly 
biased towards the entrepreneurs I have followed. As the readers of this dissertation 
assess my research and findings, they should be aware of these perspectives.  
7.6. Future Research Directions 
 The richness of the cases triggered the potential for future research opportunities 
to explain the long-term implications of early customer interactions in the new venture 
creation process. These include: 
• To start, several propositions related to the customer interaction model were 
proposed in Chapter 6 that could be further tested and their boundary conditions 




• Furthermore, the study further opened the black box of the mechanisms of path 
formation and proposed the potential for multiple levels of validation and self-
reinforcing processes. The tension between the lack of agency often associated 
with self-reinforcing effects, and the agency and reflexivity of entrepreneurs 
makes startups an ideal setting to understand how reflexivity that we do not 
necessarily see in more established organizations may decrease over time. To my 
knowledge, minimal empirical studies exist in this area. 
• The startups in the sample came from several industries. Future studies could 
address the effects of different industries on customer interactions – where for 
example, customers may be more, or less, involved in new venture creation, there 
may be restrictions in the co-creation process (Baqer, 2006; Blazevic & Lievens, 
2008; Payne et al., 2008) due to factors such as knowledge gaps and regulations, 
and where customers may be more challenging to engage.  
• The ongoing search for validation, and the uncertainty involved, makes the new 
venture creation process a sensitive and vulnerable period for startups. Related 
literature on imprinting addresses this sensitive period and suggests effects during 
this period persist, regardless of changes to the external environment (Marquis & 
Ticsik, 2013; Stinchcombe, 1965). It is possible that the entire new venture 
creation process is a sensitive period, or even, just the first sale should be seen as 
a sensitive period for an organization (Carroll & Hannan, 2004). This first sale 
may imprint on a startup, that is optimistic to make a first sale, and making it 
increasingly receptive to external influence (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Given 
these potential effects, confirmed first customers could be seen as having 
substantial, long-term impacts, affecting customization of products or services and 
firm reputation (e.g. Blomqvist, 1997), as well as startups’ emerging business 
strategy, R&D, and technology development (Herstatt & von Hippel, 1992; 
Ruokolainen, 2008). Given the potential persistent effects of a confirmed first 
customer, a future study involving longer observation period is needed to 
understand the long-term effects of imprinting and path dependence, and to 
understand the impact of these early levels of validation on creating scenarios for 




• As the startups are not yet at lock-in, future studies may analyze organizations 
that have made it to a later stage of development to understand the details of how 
and when lock-in occurs. To do so, ongoing data collection of the same startups, 
and other startups can help create a larger dataset with longer time periods. These 
could be used to assess how changes in the global and/or business environment 
may impact the advanced organization, and subsequently, due to lock-in, how 
difficult it is for it to no longer act on these changes, resulting in inefficiencies or 
market failures. 
• Literature suggests that founders’ past experiences bring history to a startup (Fiol 
& Lyles, 1985). This implies a potential difference in path dependence and 
imprinting processes between inexperienced and experienced founders. Future 
studies may acknowledge and compare these concepts in the startups of serial and 
portfolio founders, as well as first-time entrepreneurs (Parker, 2013; Rouse, 
2015). 
• From the data, it appears that developing relationships with potential customers 
from early in the venture creation process creates a community where all stages of 
validation could be obtained. This is particularly salient with Startup G, that did 
not receive a contract or sales until the Entrepreneurial Phase, however sought out 
and received a large amount of textual validation from a diversity of customers. 
The startup was able to build relationships with potential customers from early on 
and received validation in a very public manner in an online community forum. 
This suggests that there is the potential for data involving public declarations and 
communities to increase sales to be further explored. 
7.7. Implications for Practice  
 The process of seeking validation and its long-term implications suggests that 
entrepreneurs should have a more methodical approach to customer interactions and 
review of feedback, even in fluid, early stage environments such as startups. Establishing 
customer relationships should be a main planning issue for startups. Because customer 




using personal networks can help establish initial trust with customers, and they may act 
as referrals to the wider target market (Gruber, 2007). 
 This study also suggests that during new venture creation, it should still possible 
to make strategic choices to change the situation of the startup. Even though the path is 
narrowing, rather than having emotional blinders to undesirable issues (e.g. Sydow et al., 
2009), there is the possibility for entrepreneurs to be more mindful of the customers they 
interact with, and how they interpret their feedback in the grand scheme of getting the 
product, business model, organizational processes and market organized. This may 
require additional reflection when at a critical decision point to determine if information 
received from customers so far are representative of the target market. Mindfulness can 
affect decisions to deviate from paths (Garud & Karnoe, 2001), and being mindful in 
customer selection may remove “autopilot” features in entrepreneurs, where they rely on 
preexisting notions and previous experiences (Gordon & Schaller, 2014).  
 Though the path will have narrowed, startups should be able to overcome the path 
they are on and either exploit or transform emerging strategic opportunities related to the 
product, business model, organizational processes or market with path-breaking changes. 
However, even at such early stages, startups may still be unwilling or unable to do so 
based on normative, resource-based, or cognitive reasons (Rothman et al., 2014). This 
may be due to a developing tension between the path dependence effects that are 
occurring and the agency we typically may see with entrepreneurs to create their 
organizational path. Regular reflection and self-regulation – “a systematic process of 
human behavior that involves setting personal goals and steering behavior towards the 
achievement of established goals” (Zeidner et al., 2000: 751) – are important in 
tempering this.  
 McMullen and Kier (2016) suggest that there are different mindsets that can affect 
susceptibility to escalation of commitment when exploiting an entrepreneurial activity, 
and that opportunities should be pursed with skepticism, or questioning and doubt. 
However, entrepreneurs often face “Stockdale Paradox,” where they continue to hope that 
they will succeed, even if the goal is not possible to achieve. The authors also propose 




set where goals are regularly re-evaluated (Allison, 1971) and contingency plans 
developed to allow for the opportunity to discarded. This is in-line with the importance of 
planning and mindfulness in approaching customer interactions. 
 Given the different levels of validation that push founders to move forward or to 
pivot, the potential implications of these findings for practice are substantial. This 
research helps clarify the impact of early customers on the venture creation process and 
will help incubators and entrepreneurial training programs educate entrepreneurs on the 
importance of regular reflection on customer interactions. Such an approach will ideally 
help entrepreneurs optimize early customer selection to align with their growth strategy. 
 I suggest that mindfulness of entrepreneurs in each interaction with early 
customers can help temper the proposed self-reinforcing effects – both positive and 
negative. Mindful entrepreneurs can nonjudgmentally assess their own processes, 
physical and mental. They can self-reflect on information received from customers and 
other stakeholders, recognize where they may have made mistakes, and use evidence to 
make decisions – making each piece of information received from customers better 
understood and easier to act upon. In incubator settings, this may be triggered by regular 
meetings with mentors, discussion groups with other entrepreneurs, and lessons in 
reflection on customer interactions and other actions undertaken, and their implications. 
 In selecting customers, startups may be mindful in distinguishing how well 
personal and professional networks represent the external target market. While having 
these relationships and knowledge may bring an advantage to these startups to validate 
the business concepts early, it is essential that these startups reach out to the wider 
external target market to continue to test and expand the business. Without doing this, 
there is the potential to have the path dependence based on a non-representative sample. 
The business then may be tailored towards the wrong market. Furthermore, an early, 
unique chance interaction can be risky, where you do not encounter that customer again 
or they are unwilling to commit at a later time. In fact, startups unsure how embedded 
they are in the external target market may consider seeking out external market validation 




professional network. This would reduce the chance of investing in an idea that has not 
received proper validation.  
 Challenges in assessing commitment and validation can also be minimized by 
building and maintaining relationships with the same market segment consistently 
throughout new venture creation. If validation and interest are received early from a 
potential customer, it makes sense to try to encounter that customer later when it comes 
time to make a sale. 
 Also, founders may interpret validation in different ways, but sales are still the 
ultimate validation. If it is not possible to validate by obtaining sales early in the new 
venture creation process, often a challenge with physical products (Startup G) or with 
social networks (Startup E), building a relationship early with customers is beneficial to 
receive multiple perspectives from potential customers. This validation can be accessed 
through several channels – such as downloads of software (Startup E), attendance of 
events, media coverage, and verbal/textual public validation through online messaging 
forums and social media (Startups G and E), and private messaging. Also looking to the 
previous history of the industry and partners (Startup F) can provide some initial 
validation, create embeddedness, trust and commitment.   
 Finally, if a startup still has not received sales or a contract validation by the 
Entrepreneurial Phase, it is likely to continue to face challenges. This suggests that there 
may not be a market for this product, or that this startup is not able to organize to deliver 
the product in a way that is satisfactory to potential customers. 
7.8. Concluding Thoughts 
 It is surprising that customer interactions have predominantly had a peripheral 
role in the new venture creation process literature (e.g. Bhave, 1994; Cunneen et al., 
2007). It was not until the recent emergence of practitioner-based lean startup methods 
(e.g. Blank & Dorf, 2012; Maurya, 2012; Ries, 2011) that early customers became more 
of a central focus in entrepreneurship research. I am also surprised how the mechanisms 
of the early, entrepreneurial stages of forming the organizational path are also often taken 




the various roles that customers play in the new venture creation process and how they 
inform the decisions and activities that founders make to design, sell and obtain resources 
necessary to grow and organize into a more permanent and stable organization. Most 
particularly, I hope that the early customer interaction model and proposed validation 
levels will prompt a better understanding of how founders’ first envisioned ideas are 
transformed into organizations that both startups and their customers care about. I also 
hope that the reviews of the new venture creation literature and the lean startup 
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONS 
Note: not all questions will be repeated in subsequent interviews 
1. General 
• Can you tell us something about how this idea for this startup came about? 
• When you were deciding on what your startup would be, was there any 
discussion on, “who we are not”? Can you describe these discussions? 
2. Agency: The role of founders and owners and image management 
• What do you see your contribution in the project to be/what is the nature of your 
involvement? What are the important actions that you are undertaking during the 
founding of the venture? 
• Does one member of your team in particular impact the direction of the venture? 
• To what organizational peers do you compare your venture/see as competitors? 
• How would outsiders describe your venture? 
3. Informal organization and identity: Central, enduring, distinctive, and dynamic 
organizational elements 
• What types of products/services will/do you offer?  
• What is (are) the most central characteristic(s) of your venture? What do you 
think makes your venture what it is? Which of these characteristics are the most 
enduring and distinctive? What term or metaphor do you think currently best 
describes your venture? 
• Have there been any major shifts in the importance of these characteristics in the 
past week(s)? If so, why? 
4. Early Potential Customers  
• What are the venture’s target customer groups (in other words, who do you see 
as your potential customers) and what value does your product offer them?  
• Do you have an ideal type of customer? 
• When did/will you interact with your first potential customer? What stage 
was/will your business be in in its development? How did the connection 
originate? Why did you decide to have this interaction at this time? What did 
you/do you hope to learn from that customer? What did you do with the 




interaction affect the type of business you are creating? Does this customer meet 
your idea of an ideal customer? Why/why not did this interaction change your 
business?  
• When did you interact with your next potential customer?/What potential 
customers did you interact with since we last met? How did the connection 
originate? Why did you wait until then/why did you interact at that time? Does 
this customer meet your idea of an ideal customer? How is this customer similar 
or different from the other customer(s) you have interacted with? What stage of 
your business were you in? What did you learn from these customers? How did 
their feedback affect the direction you took the business?  
• Did you speak with anyone else, seeking advice about any particular customer? 
If yes, what were their comments? If not, why not? How did you use this 
information? 
• In the case of 2 or more potential customers having been interacted with: Do 
you feel that one of these potential customers is more important to your 
business? Why or why not? 
• What activities have you undertaken with any past potential customers since we 
last talked? 
5. Confirmed First Customer 
- With your confirmed first customer, how did you select them/how did they select 
you? What types of activities did/do you interact on? What did you learn from 
these interactions? At what stage of your business were you when you had your 
first interactions? What stage of your business is your business at now?  
- How did committing to this first customer affect your business? 
6. Other Information 
- What other activities have you done/what else has affected the business since we 
last met? 
- Have you changed any practices or activities in your startup since we last talked? 
If so/if not, why? 
- What other stakeholders have you interacted with? How did this interaction affect 
how you perceived the business? How did this interaction affect your next steps? 
- Have there been any changes in the environment that may affect/have affected 
your business? If so, what are they and why do you thing they matter? 
7. Near Future Focus 
- Do you have any upcoming discussions planned with customers (new and 
ongoing discussions)? How did these connections arise? Do you feel this 




APPENDIX B. DETAILED CASE STUDIES WITH PARTICIPANT 
QUOTATIONS 
Appendix B1. Startup A 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
Though the idea to produce their beverage arose in 2012, the beverage company, 
Startup A, was officially founded in July 2014. The founders described their business as 
follows: “[we] make the best organic [specialty beverage], the only 100 percent certified 
organic [specialty beverage] on the market. We are the only company doing seasonal 
craft flavours… and like a craft brewery – we try to stay small batch” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
1.2. Founders 
Startup A was started by a couple in their 20s, who at the time of company 
foundation were engaged to be married (they subsequently married in late 2016). They 
had met at a fitness facility where they both worked and bonded over shared interests in 
physical activity, nutrition and health. One co-founder, Founder F, had a Bachelors’ 
Degree in Health Promotion and a certificate in food security. In 2012, Founder F was 
diagnosed with an illness that motivated her to make lifestyle changes to her diet. This 
included making the beverage at home for personal consumption. In the meantime, she 
found that she was passionate about creating a beverage that tasted great, used local, in-
season ingredients, and had some health benefits. The other co-founder, Founder M, had 
a Masters’ of Science degree in Health Promotion. He had started his Ph.D. in Health 
Promotion, and had a background in personal training, certified holistic nutrition and as a 
lifestyle coach. Both co-founders had a strong interest in promoting the health benefits of 
the beverage and in supporting the local organic food system and sustainable business 
practices.  
1.3. About the Customers 
 In Startup A, there were multiple types of customers. These included both 
individual consumers and the retailer stores that the beverage would be sold through, as 
well as distributors. In speaking about these businesses: “they are customers now, 
supporters, but also retailers” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
 The individual consumers that the founders were initially targeting were 
individuals that shared similar backgrounds to them - health conscious individuals 




our health conscious yogi type, younger hipsters… They really already know what [our 
product] is. We come from that lifestyle ourselves.” However, they also wanted to target 
a couple of growing demographics that either were looking to incorporate healthy 
beverages into their diet, or individuals seeking to mix this beverage with alcohol: “But 
really, the big opportunity is middle aged women... And then craft cocktails. So, brew 
pubs, riding that craft beer, microbrewery culture. And, we’d have a few strategic 
partners [that may help with that]. I think the sky’s the limit there… [Such as] your local 
organic vegan cafes. So, any place that focuses on local food” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
 Furthermore, there were different types of retail stores that they had as customers. 
Initially, their retail customers were “grassroots, local, specialty grocery store and 
farmers’ market partnerships” and over time, potential customers grew to larger retail 
supermarket chains where they could reach more people. Startup A also talked about 
distributors of their beverage as customers – essentially any organization or individual 




2. STARTUP HISTORY 
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016 
Idea - Founder has Health 
Issues
First Sales to Family & 
Friends
Developed Name and Bottle 
Design
Production Began in 
20' x 20' Space
Taste Testing Began
Production Moved 
to 22,000 sq ft 
Facility
First Retailer Contract Signed
First Official Sale (Farmers' 
Market)
Start of More 
Retail 
Partnerships
First Contract with Specialty 
Supermarket #1
3 Distributors and 75 Retailers
Startup's Retail 
Store Opened
Contract with Specialty 
Supermarket #2
Contract with Regional 
Supermarket #1
Focus on Existing Customers
Increase locations for Regional 
Supermarket #1, Contacted by Warehouse 
Retailer and Large Distributors
Received Loan for New 
Production Facility




2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Founder F experienced health issues. 
 In 2012, Founder F was diagnosed with health issues. To combat her illness, she 
started research into ways she could change her diet to feel better, and learned that 
consuming fermented foods would be helpful. The couple then began experimenting with 
making various fermented products for personal consumption and found that they could 
make a beverage that not only had a pleasant taste but also had health benefits, such as 
being “a source of probiotics that is full of beneficial bacteria” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
2.2.2. Sales of beverage to family and friends as a hobby.  
Personal network. In 2013, the founders began selling small amounts of the beverage to 
family and friends as a hobby while they were both in school. They received positive 
feedback, including that their beverage was “the best” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 
June, 2016). 
2.2.3. Developed name and bottle for product. 
Early 2014 (approximately March 2014), the couple developed a name for Startup 
A and a bottle for the beverage when they decided to explore the possibility of making 
this a business. 
2.2.4. Founder F began new job at organic grocer (Retailer #1) and new production 
location (#1) established. 
 In April 2014, Founder F started a new job managing an organic grocer, based at a 
farmers’ market. With some flexibility in their jobs, and access to a food production 
facility, the couple set up operations for the business in a new 20’x20’ space. While they 
were now making the beverage in a commercial facility, this was still a hobby: “to make 
some money on the side” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). In the meantime, 
Founder M was finishing up his Masters’ degree and was also a personal trainer on the 
side. 
2.2.5. Testing product with Founder M’s personal training clients. 
Professional network and word-of-mouth. 
In-person. By May 2014, Startup A started providing free samples of the beverage to 
Founder M’s personal training clients in exchange for product feedback: “[My personal 
training] clients liked it. They had tried other [specialty beverages] and said this was the 
best. We kept being told that… One guy, he bought a litre and said, this is great! And 
then, he gave some to a friend who said, he wanted a litre. And then, he gave some to his 
friend, who then wanted a litre. And so, within a few weeks, it was like, okay, we’ve hit so 




And it wasn’t until we got out there and people that we didn’t really know were coming 
up to us and saying, ‘this is good! This is really awesome!’ [did we realize we had 
something that might sell].” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). At the time 
however, the business remained a hobby: “We were testing out with clients in May 2014 
or so. And into Fall 2014, and even before that in 2013, we were doing some sales, but it 
was all just a hobby” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
2.2.6. Committed to growing the business – Logo designed and Ph.D. put on hold. 
 Founder M had started his Ph.D. earlier that year, however at the end of 2014, he 
decided to put his studies on hold. With sales going well, he decided to focus on creating 
Startup A with Founder F. They had the logo for the beverage created shortly thereafter: 
“It was this gut feeling. I thought, I’ll drop out of school and make this happen. So, we 
had a friend draw up the [Startup A’s] logo, who was a graphic designer… He drew that 
up and from the start, that was our only marketing tool. A great looking bottle with a 
great product” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
Personal network, in-person. Given their connection with the health industry, the 
couple had a strong professional network in which they could promote the product. To 
start testing interest in the specialty beverage, they decided to test whether it was possible 
to sell the product through retailers and other local businesses that knew them personally: 
“At the time, we had zero Facebook friends… [Starting the business] would not have 
happened without [Founder F’s close network of] who’s who in the organic [food 
industry] and my connections in the health industry and knowledge of the health space. It 
was the right time and right place. We hit the ground hustling [in various local shops and 
markets]. And they said, ‘yes of course! If you two are behind this, of course we’ll carry 
it.’… I think we were ahead of the game with a network of people who knew what they 
were talking about, saying this [beverage] was great. It truly made a difference that we 
had the movers and shakers in the [organic and health food] space saying, ‘yeah, get 
going on this!’ ” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
2.2.7. Moved to second, larger production space (Production Location #2). 
By early 2015, Startup A realized that if they were serious about growing the 
business, they would need to have their own, larger production facility. By March 2015, 
Startup A had found a location and expanded production into a 22,000-square foot space. 
2.2.8. Partnered with Retailer #1.  
Professional network. By April 2015, Startup A had found and initiated their first 
retailer partnership with the organic grocer (Retailer #1; Refer to 2.2.4) that Founder F 
had originally worked at in the local farmers’ market. The partnership was considered a 
great success as the beverage regularly sold out each week: “That’s where our target 
market was going. I guess it was good we were selling out. The market would go from 




a little more, and we sold out at 11. Then we made more and we sold out at 12. 
Eventually, we made it through the whole day” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 
2016). 
 
2.2.9. First farmers’ market booth and first official sale to individual consumer. 
In-person market retail. Startup A had their first official sale to individual consumers in 
May 2015 at their booth in the local farmers’ market. The farmers’ market booth was 
helpful to spread awareness about the specialized beverage, to explain what the product 
was, and to dispel myths about it. The founders would explain the benefits to potential 
customers as follows: “You can drink this as a source of probiotics that is full of 
beneficial bacteria. I’ll give you the whole spiel…” (Startup A Founder, Farmers’ Market 
Visit, 9 June, 2016). 
Unsolicited media. Coincidently, a television talk show that promoted the health benefits 
of the specialty beverage around the same time. This helped boost sales of the beverage: 
“Dr. Oz did an episode on [specialty beverage], maybe two weeks after we started [in 
May 2015]… Essentially, when he says it, they all walk to the health food store and say, 
‘we need this!’ They came flocking. [They] found us on Facebook and said, ‘we want 
[specialty beverage]!’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
Social media. As part of their drive to become more present on social media, Startup A 
set up Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter accounts to post pictures of their product and of 
people with their product at the farmers’ market booth and other places around town.  
2.2.10. Building retailer partnerships.  
Phone, emails in-person meetings, professional network. From June 2015 onward, 
Startup A continued to search for new retailers to sell their product at. The initial goal 
was to partner with grass root retailer places: “chiropractors, medical doctors, yogis, 
holistic nutritionists, food bloggers, farmers’ markets” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 
June, 2016). Some of these were retailers in their network of health professionals that 
both co-founders knew from their previous careers. They specifically chose retail 
locations where they believed the health-conscious individual shopped, and retailers with 
similar views on nutrition and health: “We try to partner up with likeminded people. I’d 
say 80 percent are. 20 percent aren’t…” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
 Startup A was however not limiting themselves to only working with the health 
food market, but also wanted to expand into the mainstream food and beverage markets: 
“Our goal is to get our product on the shelves of anywhere currently selling [specialty 
beverage]. [With large retailers], at the end of the day, they would move a lot of our 
product and they do have our target market. They say they are about what we are about, 
so it only makes sense that they do it. So, I keep calling them… I guess the bigger they 




years old, who doesn’t know what [specialty beverage] is. He’s at this company to help 
them grow, but he wants me to bend over backwards like everyone else has done for him” 
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
2.2.11. Media coverage. 
Blog, radio, television. In June 2015, Startup A started receiving local media coverage. 
They were featured in a blog, local daytime television, and an hour-long local radio show 
(Startup A’s Website).  
Blogs (4), event, newspapers (2), radio and television. The initial media exposure 
sparked a series of media pieces and public exposure that raised awareness about Startup 
A, including: a blog in September 2015, a local organic food event in October 2015, a 
blog and newspaper article coverage in November 2015, a radio feature in December 
2015, a blog in January 2016, a television feature in February 2016, a newspaper article 
in the local paper in March 2016, and a blog article in June 2016 (Startup A’s Website). 
2.2.12.  First contract with Specialty Supermarket Chain #1. 
Phone and email. In February 2016, the startup was contacted by their first potential 
non-independent retailer – a specialty supermarket chain (#1) - that they would consider 
working with as a retail customer. Although the supermarket chain had originally 
contacted Startup A, the startup had a difficult time re-connecting with the supermarket 
after this initial contact. The co-founders tried phone calls and emails to connect with the 
product managers, however they were not getting any response: “It was a very long 
process, starting in, maybe February or March. They had actually contacted us saying, 
‘Hey, we want to hear from you guys.’ And then they said, ‘okay, everything seems good.’ 
Then there was six-weeks where we didn’t hear anything back and I [followed up with] 
calls once or twice a week. At first, I was leaving messages, but I didn’t leave messages 
at the end. I was [also] sending emails and I heard nothing back. It’s like we fell off the 
face of the planet, right?” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
Care package and samples of beverage sent to specialty supermarket headquarters. 
Startup A was persistent in trying different types of messages to reach the company over 
the next couple of months. And then in May 2016, they sent a care package of the 
beverage over to the specialty supermarket chain headquarters with a hand written thank 
you card: “I just didn’t want to lose that sale, didn’t want to lose that account. I knew 
[that if we] landed that sale, we’d start landing other sales. Maybe [competing specialty 
grocery store] would jump onboard… I just kept doing things like calling, saying, ‘Hey.’ 
I remember even leaving one message, just trying to be funny. I said, ‘Hey, you’re in my 
dreams. You’re in my thoughts. Thinking of you guys. We had a great conversation on the 
phone and I’m really looking forward to getting together. I have a few more things I’d 
like to share with you to help move things along if that needs be. But it wasn’t until two 




you card saying, ‘Thanks very much for meeting with us. We’re really looking forward to 
hearing from you.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
 In June 2016, the specialty supermarket chain #1 finally re-connected with Startup 
A. Founders F and M were convinced that this personal touch won them over: “And then 
last week… she contacted us and said, ‘hey, we got [your delivery]. Thanks so much! 
Good news, we want to let you know that we’re going to list the product.’ We [think what 
might have sold them was that we] did a really good phone tasting with them…. So, they 
had our product… And we said, ‘As soon as it’s convenient, let’s get on the phone and 
we’ll do a tasting.’ So, I’d talk about prices, company values, and where we would fit 
with their current company values… We’d try to say, ‘Hey, we have similar values. Let’s 
do this!’ [I thought we had] a really strong sales presentation. We just try to be really 
professional, so that probably has a role… [but it would have been helpful if they’d 
replied with] a few e-mails saying, ‘hey we’re busy. Sorry. We can’t get to you. We’ll get 
to you soon.’ We even had our distributor call and he said there’s still no answer. So, 
maybe it was the little thank you card and the personal touch [that made a difference]. I 
don’t know” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
2.2.13. Built up volume of contracts with small, independent retailers. 
By June 2016, Startup A had seventy-five retailers and three distribution companies 
(Distributors #1, #2, and #3) that their beverage product was distributed through, and 
continued to reach individual customers in person at their weekly local farmers’ market. 
The selection of retailers that Startup A partnered with were smaller, grassroots, local, 
independent specialty grocery stores or farmers’ market partnerships. At this stage, they 
still had not landed a partnership with a larger grocery store chain.  
The distribution companies that they worked with were also small and local. Startup 
A specifically wanted to monitor who their product was distributed to: “All three of our 
distribution companies know they can’t sell to just anybody without my approval…. 
They’re all growing with us. They’re not making much money and I appreciate their help. 
And, I look forward to growing with them and working together on that” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
Phone. Even with this success with independent retailers, Startup A wanted to increase 
its smaller retailer network: “We have to create a really good master list of [potential 
retailers to sell through] – who’s who – and maybe do some calls to ask people if they’d 
like to get ready to carry [the beverage]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
 To facilitate sales with these businesses, they wanted to develop a sales script: 
“I’m hoping to develop a solid sales script. I’m hoping to… get together the sales 
training so we can educate people, hopefully, train them to sell [our product]” (Startup A 




Emails and in-person meetings.  Most of the time, these retailers were corresponded 
with over the phone, email and in-person: “With that e-mail I sent out, we finally got a 
contract from them.” And sometimes clarifying meetings are in person: “My meeting this 
morning was supposed to be about just one of these contracts and they just wanted to go 
over it together” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016). 
2.2.14. Attempted first meeting with National General Supermarket Chain #1. 
Phone. Early June 2016, Founder M had a phone call scheduled with one of the largest 
supermarket retailers in the country. By then however, the product manager had cancelled 
their phone call a few times: “He’s postponed a couple of times. I guess he’s a busy guy” 
(Startup A Founder, Farmers’ Market Visit, 9 June, 2016). 
In-Person. With several cancelled meetings, Founder M ended up visiting the large 
supermarket chain headquarters in person: [The meeting] didn’t happen because he was 
just too busy. So, I called him on the phone, and he basically said, ‘Just got me another 
busy day.’ So, I asked, ‘is it better for me to come in and see you, in person?’ And he 
said, yes. That usually works if you just show up.’ So, tomorrow afternoon I’m just going 
to show up at one and say, ‘let’s meet.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
2.2.15. Search for new production space. 
 Despite having set up a meeting a national general supermarket chain #1 in June 
2016 (see 2.2.14), Startup A realized that they would be unable the needs of such a large 
retailer with their current level of production and current facilities: “So, this meeting will 
happen tomorrow, but just to start this process. We’re not completely ready to produce 
for them… I wouldn’t want to say, ‘Hey, this is [Startup A]. We would like you to carry 
our product, but we can’t quite do it yet. If they’re ready to go, I’d be fearful that they’d 
just reach out to a competitor” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
 The co-founders believed that having a presence of their beverage at a larger 
supermarket chain would gain them legitimacy with other retailers: “I feel like by getting 
in with [a large retailer] in that corporate realm that [other large retailers will say], 
okay, they’re kosher. They’re good. Now, we can take them on [as a supplier]…. I feel 
like right now, we’ve got the best of both worlds. Now, we’ve got our corporate partners. 
We’ve got our grass root partners, and then our values. I feel that it will open up new 
doors” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
 This triggered the goal to increase production by moving into an even larger 
production facility: “[Our goal is to] secure funding, and move into the new space. [We’ll 
be] messing around with new tanks. And then hopefully, we’ll be ready in time [to be 






2.2.16. Calls from local businesses for events. 
Phone. In June 2016, Startup A received several requests from organizations to attend 
holistic nutrition, health or yoga events. They often responded with a positive response: 
“[We get calls for events] all the time. [We] almost always accept. We don’t always 
necessarily go, but we’ll always try to give a coupon, or if there are only a limited 
number of people going to the event, I will just give them a couple of cases [of our 
beverage] and give everybody a free [bottle]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 
2016). 
2.2.17. Retail store at brewery opens. 
In-person storefront. In July 2016, Startup A opened their first retail store attached to 
their current beverage production facility. Located in an up-and-coming neighbourhood, 
they saw this location as an opportunity to “grow and develop alongside the community… 
Just opening the storefront, [it increases] community interaction” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
 The people coming into the store were different than those that they had met at the 
local farmers’ market: “[There were] a lot of new people, which is really surprising. They 
say, ‘oh, I heard about the store, so I thought I’d come in.’ Or maybe they never heard 
about the company but they heard about the store, or they drove by often and they were 
just in the neighbourhood so they’re coming and checking it out… And we also got to 
meet a lot of people who’ve been long time buyers but would never come out to the 
farmers’ market or to an event. They never saw us at all. They just bought their [product 
name] at one of our retailers” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
 The walk-ins were mostly “newspaper readers and older people… I guess I 
always think newspaper readers are the old souls…  They just seem like they’re getting 
their news mainstream… A lot of these people came to us because they had never heard 
about it, or saw it but never had bought it” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
 From their first weekend at the retail store, Startup A’s founders learned: “people 
still don’t know what our beverage is… They still don’t know what it is or what our 
values are. There’s still a lot of room for education. While a lot of [knowledge about us] 
comes from social media, I guess it’s not like everybody is on social media, right? So, I 
just learned a little bit about our customers and what they know and don’t know about 
us” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
 The hope was that their physical presence would also translate to interest online: 
“Just opening the storefront and having that little interaction here, it’s going to create a 
lot of buzz, which we’re trying our hardest to make ripple outward through our social 
media. Kind of send that buzz out there to the [big city] people saying, ‘hey, I think you 




 Founder M also reflected that in-person interactions allowed them to offer 
samples and demos of the product – an important part of their sales pitch to allow curious 
and/or skeptical booth visitors to try the beverage and learn more about it before 
purchasing: “So I think there’ll always be that demo tasting, [and] one-on-one 
interaction where there is the education piece” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 
2016). 
 By October 2016, the storefront was still thriving: “It’s crazy. There are lineups 
at the door on Saturdays, literally. It’s new customers. It’s old people that just really like 
that old school style [that our brand has]…. They come in just to speak to us. It’s so 
cool… And the people that shop at retailers…. They want to come into our shop and 
check it out…. And some of the young dudes would stop by [and ask], ‘Is this a beer 
brewery?’ And we’d tell them no. They didn’t know what [the beverage] was initially, 
and then they bought a ton of it…. It’s [having] the bricks and mortar [that makes a 
difference]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
2.2.18. Customer appreciation event.  
 As they gained more attention, Startup A started worrying that obtaining big 
accounts with large supermarket retailers would create tension with their grassroots, 
local, specialty grocery store and farmers’ market partnerships, as well as the typical, 
independent customer that shops there: “I know that our largest retailer right now, 
[specialty grocery store] aren’t big fans of [larger specialty grocery store]… [They are 
looking for something] just a little more grassroots, a little smaller. Really, they’re 
looking for those local supporters… I feel like getting a new account this big may change 
their perception… [But for me], it was a goal of ours to get those specialty grocery 
stores. I don’t think [our perception] is going to change. I know it changes things on the 
production side [though]” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
In-person event. To ensure that these customers and independent retailers felt that 
Startup A valued them, they held their second annual customer appreciation event at the 
end of July 2016: “So, [the event involves] music and shopping. There are a lot of 
vendors, some of which carry our products, some of which are locally made. [These are] 
really good businesses that share our values in the way we do business and have a 
passion for what we do. They also focus on community and connecting with their own 
values. It’s nice to create a community” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016). 
Posters, radio, postcards, hand-written notes. There were minimal online promotions 
for the event, besides being mentioned on Startup A’s Facebook page. The majority of 
marketing for the event involved posters, radio, postcards in retail sales bags to individual 
customers, and mailed, hand-written thank you cards to their retailer customers: “[We 
are] tossing a postcard in everyone’s bag [that buys something at the farmers’ market]… 




you cards to all of our current retailers, just saying thank you” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 12 July, 2016). 
 Closer to the event, the startup increased their marketing efforts: “We really 
littered the city with ads. I thought we did a really good job of getting [the information] 
out. And I think we got a lot of support from media channels getting a hold of us for the 
event. And we got a free radio ad all week long that someone said they would do for us… 
We posted ads in the sense of [putting up] posters and [handing out] postcards… We 
kind of gave them to each vendor and said, ‘please hand these out to whoever you think 
would be appropriate’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
2.2.19. Potential large Distributor #4 as partner. 
 In July 2016, there was the potential for Startup A to start to work with a large 
organic and natural products distributor (#4). Up until this point, the distributors (#1, #2, 
and #3) that they had been working with were much smaller. However, as per, 2.2.14 
above, the same issue existed – the worry of having a production capacity shortfall – an 
inability to meet the increased production demands in the current production facility that 
these new contracts would require: “Ideally our big distribution company will also start 
September 1st… I’m starting to actually think of how to say, ‘Hey, we won’t be ready for 
September.’ But I think they knew that already” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 
2016). 
2.2.20. Attempted retail partnership with Specialty Supermarket Chain #2.  
 In July 2016, Startup A received confirmation that a large specialty supermarket 
chain #2, with seven locations would carry their beverage. However, they started facing 
issues working with the larger retail chain from the start: “As a small company, it’s tough 
doing business with these elephants. The big guys. They came back with ad demands…. 
They wanted a free fill [to stock the shelves]. And they asked… what’s the discount? It 
was kind of funny. It wasn’t even like, ‘hey we suggest you offer a discount.’ The e-mail 
was one line. They’re very cold I find. There was one sentence saying, ‘What’s the 
discount and what’s the buy in?’… We don’t do that…. I never said we don’t discount, we 
will. But not when you kind of just send one line and ask in an e-mail, right?... That type 
of cold interaction doesn’t help when you’re busy with other things” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 12 July, 2016). 
2.2.21. Increased focus on pairing online social marketing and in-person product 
explanations. 
Social media and in-person. From its founding, Startup A used some social media, 
however continued to use more traditional ways of connecting with customers – through 
their personal network: “Just because everyone clicks on Facebook, I try not to let that 
cloud my vision as to where our business actually is.… [We spread the news about our 




flyers. We’re working with vendors who we know to reach [customers]. [While] social 
media [helps us] really cast a wide net, [potential customers may say], ‘what is this 
thing?’… And [in-person] we can kind of shuffle over to explain what our product is… 
It’s still very much a small business and you still have to get out and do that grass roots 
kind of stuff” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016). 
 While Startup A knew that they could learn about potential customers from social 
media data, they still preferred using traditional methods to reach out to potential 
customers: “[It will be good to have] a little data analysis… It’s easy with them for 
Facebook and social media and website stuff because they have analytic software that 
takes some tallies and comes back [to tell us what] those efforts [mean]. But I think [it 
would be interesting to know the impact of] postcards and things like that [still]” (Startup 
A Founder, Interview, 12 July, 2016). 
 However, late in July 2016, after starting to work with a marketing firm, Founder 
M realized social media could be a valuable tool for the startup: “What I learned through 
all this is how much Facebook truly is a really good marketing tool. The less we promote 
things on Facebook, the less people truly know about it. It’s kind of interesting to know 
that does help. The word does get out… Really, a lot of our loyal customers and people 
that would come out to a grand opening seem to follow us on Facebook or a social media 
of sorts” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
 Posts on social media about their retail store also gained attention in nearby towns 
and the local tourism board. “[People said,] ‘Wow! That’s such a cool concept… We buy 
it here. We’d love to come see the brewery. And then [the local tourism board] actually 
got a hold of us and said, ‘We’d like to put you guys in as a member.’ So, people could 
come and check out our brewery retail location [when they visit the city]. So, that’s pretty 
cool” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
2.2.22. Developed an alcoholic beer beverage with brewery partner. 
 Late in July 2016, Startup A developed a beer beverage to be sold at their 
partner’s brewery. This was to expand into other markets: “we partnered up with a 
brewery and did like a half [specialty beverage] and half beer. And it was delicious… 
We’ve hemmed and hawed about who we really want to partner with… and it comes 
down to values. Just good business people and becoming friends with them” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). 
2.2.23. Product was placed in more mainstream retail locations. 
 By July 2016, Startup A had negotiated with more mainstream retail locations, 
including a university campus, to gain visibility in a wider market: “So, [around] the 
university, and the sports supplement place at the university. We’re going in there 
because of the great foot traffic. And then, also the hospital… they may have like 500 




and out of the place throughout the day. So, a great spot to just have the product placed, 
right?” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 26 July, 2016). This additional increase in sales 
meant that production volume needed to ramp up, and that that it was becoming 
increasingly important for Startup A to find a new production location. 
2.2.24. Purchase of walk-in cooler.  
Phone and email. By September 2016, the startup had a new walk-in cooler that 
facilitated a slight increase in production. Though the space to make the beverage did not 
increase, having the cooler allowed Startup A to produce and store more bottles of their 
product before distribution and to take on new accounts that they had been delaying 
accepting: “Literally, there’s over a hundred people on a waitlist interested to carry our 
product. It’s amazing! But we also need to be organized in doing it… I’m going to 
[follow up] this week. I’ll get to actually call in a few others or just respond to emails.” 
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 September, 2016). 
2.2.25. Participation in charity event.   
In-person. In September 2016, Startup A had a booth at a local charity bike race to 
support the cause and raise awareness about their business.  
2.2.26. Contract with Regional General Supermarket #1. 
 In September 2016 Startup A signed a contract with two locations of a regional 
supermarket – Regional General Supermarket #1: “They contacted us… I was super 
surprised. Apparently, they are keen to do locally made stuff. They have a quicker 
process than [the other large retailer] that we spoke with earlier” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 12 September, 2016). 
 Having finally expanded their retailer portfolio with the addition of this large 
regional retailer, Startup A’s co-founders felt a bit conflicted about how having these new 
partnerships with large retailers would be perceived by their grassroots market and 
partners: “[Some people will say,] wow, those are stores that value good quality 
products, so therefore, yours must be good quality… Maybe at the end of the day, [being 
in these stores] makes it more convenient to buy our products… [But] it’s like selling out. 
I couldn’t see us selling out because always we’re after doing business a different way. 
But sometimes you just have to play ball, right? You have to be offered at [the regional 
general supermarket] because it is convenient, and at the end of the day, there’s a huge 
market out there that only shops at those grocery stores, right?” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 12 September, 2016). 
 This conflict of reaching a more mainstream market also spanned into working 
with larger distributors: “We can deal with the headaches of not always getting our 
products to places. They pay us on time and they allow us to grow. So, they’re more on 




  Despite these worries, Startup A reiterated that it would be okay because they 
would be maintaining their values: “I think as long as we just stay on our marketing path 
and walk the talk, then… it doesn’t matter who we do business with, right?” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 12 September, 2016). 
2.2.27. Slowed down focus on new customers and concentrated on existing ones.  
Phone. By late October 2016, new sales to retailers had slowed and Startup A began 
focusing on following up and making sure recurring customers were satisfied: “There are 
always good people interested who want [specialty beverage]. [We’re focused] on just 
taking care of old customers [now]. Just calling [them to check in]” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 Startup A had accumulated over one hundred retailers as customers and their rate 
of growth had not allowed them to keep an eye on whether customers were satisfied: “We 
are over a hundred stores and I know we are still over a hundred stores because I just 
updated my list last night. But I saw a list on one of our distributors’ [retail store 
locations that they service]. Here we are thinking that we’ve got two downtown [shops] 
and the last time they’ve ordered was June and July…. Handling things over to the 
distributor, I just lose that control that we like to have, the strategic control of partnering 
up with the right [retailers]… So, I’ve got this list with all these people flagged, marked 
in red saying, ‘Call these guys ASAP. Let’s get the product back on the shelves” (Startup 
A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
Founder in-person in-store sampling demonstrations.  Furthermore, with on-boarding 
new retail partners, personalized in-person demonstrations of the product, an important 
part of the business, had been neglected due to a lack of time: “[We have a] demo down 
at this awesome little specialty grocery store, which has a huge following and the product 
is just rocking and rolling down there. We literally started with them last October and I 
think the first words out of my mouth were, ‘We’ll get you a demo really soon.’ And here 
it is a year later, [they’re] finally getting the demo. But the demo… we realized is [an] 
important [use of] our marketing dollars – getting out there and [saying]: ‘Hey, we’re 
[Startup A]. Here, try this.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 However, given their growth, the co-founders needed to start considering 
outsourcing the sample demonstrations to retailers: “Our whole thing used to be [that we] 
would go there and we’d do a nice tasting. It’s like we’d chat, but obviously not 
anymore…. Sometimes it’s an e-mail. Sometimes it’s a phone call to connect with retail 
customers]. So, it’s never really that personal pull anymore. Which, I understand is fine. 
But I still want to try to get out there and meet the owners, meet people, right? I want to 
get out there and let them know who we are… It’s just a game-changer. I don’t think 





 However, the in-person demonstrations by retailers were not successful: “They’re 
very corporate-y in their way of selling to you as a vendor of a product… [But] I got the 
feedback forms, which I was really happy they did, but it seemed that customers had 
simple objections, [and they] didn’t overcome those objections” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
Trained sales representative with similar values. With the importance of demos for 
Startup A, they realized that it was important to either continue to do the demonstrations 
themselves, or to have sales representatives that promoted their beverage product to end 
consumers in a similar way to how they had sold the product: “I’m realizing the 
importance of doing [the demonstrations] ourselves… We actually had one of our 
distributors that had a sales rep that is perfect… She loves our beverage. And I actually 
got to spend face-to-face training time with her…. [She tells customers] the whole spiel 
as it should be said. So, she knows how to do that and she knows the values of the 
company. She’s able to connect with customers… So, right now, we’re essentially just 
paying her cash to do a few demos” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
Email invitation to retailers to visit productions. Startup A wanted to ensure that local 
retailers still felt connected to them: “We just sent out our newsletter yesterday to all of 
our local retailers and said, you’re invited for a brewery tour.’ We wanted to explain why 
we’re different. Not many people responded, but some people came in and we did a tour, 
which was nice… We just got more of a connection [from the visit]” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
Face-to-face interactions and phone. The goal of the startup was to continue to connect 
with customers that held similar values to them: “It’s definitely partnering with like-
minded people and making those connections early while we’re small, having face-to-
face [relationships] so that they know they can rely on us. [They] can pick up the phone 
and talk to us. They can’t do that with [our competitor]. A lot have people have told us 
that and I don’t want to lose that, ever” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 
2016). 
2.2.28. Expanding to gain new customers with Regional General Supermarket #1’s 
different locations. 
In-person and phone. Startup A started seeing success and an increase in sales at the 
two Regional General Supermarket #1’s locations: “They’ve gone from one [order] of 
each flavor to one and a half [orders] of each flavor, to two. And when we did a demo, 
they ordered $2000 worth. Thirty cases last week. So, yeah. They’re rocking and rolling” 
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 With success in Regional General Supermarket #1 (see 2.2.26), they internally 
promoted them to other locations store location: “The other [Regional General 




they told the other location, ‘Hey, you should get on this. It’s awesome. It’s all the rage 
in the town.’ They didn’t know about us. So, I had to go in there this week… and she said, 
‘We’ll carry you. No problem. You should get in with the [broader network of locations 
for the regional supermarket.’” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
2.2.29. Contacted by Nation-wide Warehouse Retailer #1.  
Social media, email, phone. In October 2016, Startup A was contacted by their first 
nation-wide warehouse retail chain, Warehouse Retailer #1. The warehouse retailer had 
hired a social media savvy product manager who was looking for new products for the 
store. She had found Startup A on Instagram: “She’s pretty young and is trying to tell the 
old fogies that run [Warehouse Retailer #1], ‘Here’s what the kids are doing these days.’ 
I went back and forth with her communicating” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 
October, 2016). 
 The warehouse retailer however had different requirements than smaller retailers, 
including the regional and national supermarkets that handled smaller volumes of 
products: “I went back and forth [with the product manager], communicating, ‘hey, 
what’s up?’ They loved the samples that we sent, so it’s onto the next phase of things. But 
the next phase involves us getting an audit from a third-party health and food safety 
organization [which we want to do in our new facility]… So hopefully, [they’re okay with 
waiting], and we’ll have them on the go [as customers in the future]” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 However, Startup A was not concerned as to whether or not they would sign a 
contract wit Warehouse Retailer #1. Even if signing a contract with this large warehouse 
retailer was not a success, the founders believed that the increased rigour in their 
operations would improve their legitimacy with other large retailers: “Even if we don’t 
[have them sign a contract], I’m happy to have done this audit and be ready to approach 
[large nationwide supermarket chain #1]. We’ll be pretty legit for their standards” 
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
2.2.30. Contacted by large regional organic food distributor – Distributor #4. 
Phone. In October 2016, the large regional distributor, Distributor #4, reconnected with 
Startup A after several months. This was the same distributor that Startup A had 
connected with in 2.2.19: “I’m glad they haven’t gotten back to me [before now]. We still 
aren’t ready to work with them” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 To be able to service Distributor #4, Startup A needed to move into their larger 
production facilities. They were however excited to partner with them, as this larger 
distributor would get their product into smaller holistic retailers that share similar values 
to the smaller companies that they already work with: “Small little yoga studios order 
from these guys. Right now, our hardest thing is getting into those small retailers because 




can’t [have such large orders]. So, [working with this big regional distributor] will be 
big [for being able to do that” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 However, by January 2017, the partnership with Distributor #4 still had not gone 
through: “[It’s okay that we’re not working with them because] they don’t pay you for 45 
days, while these other [distributors] are great. Super helpful” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 12 January, 2017). 
2.2.31. Organic certification obtained to work with a competing large organic 
distributor – Distributor #5. 
 As part of their growth efforts to have larger distribution of their product, in 
October 2016, Startup A went to get organically certified in order work with an organic 
distributor – Distributor #5. However, while Startup A still had not moved and were still 
located in their old facilities, they were not be able to produce enough of their product to 
satisfy the volume of product needed for Distributor #5: “We got ahold of [large organic 
distributor]. You have to be certified organic, which kind of prompted us to get certified 
organic…But, I’m asking them to [keep us out of their catalog for now] because we can’t 
supply everybody. I’ve assured our distributors that they will get the green light once we 
start making tons [of the beverage]. They can then go sell it to whoever they really want. 
I’ll even give them wiggle room with wholesale prices… We want to work with [these] 
bigger places” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 Having become organic certified, by January 2017, Startup A was successfully 
partnered with Distributor #5: “they only carry certified organic produce” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 12 January, 2017). Working with this distributor also gave Startup A 
access to other large retailers: “Our distributor set that up, stood aside, and let us give 
our spiel for about 15 minutes and they both loved it” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 
January, 2017). 
 Startup A anticipated that having this partnership would prompt the large regional 
organic distributor, Distributor #4 (as mentioned in 2.2.19 and 2.2.30), to have interest 
again in working with them: “There is demand for us now that we’re with [Distributor 
#5]. [Distributor #4] is going to want us even more so now!” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 12 January, 2017). 
2.2.32. Traditional media coverage. 
Newspaper. In October 2016, the local newspaper featured Startup A for a second time 
as a local entrepreneurial venture. Besides social media, this article was the first publicity 
the startup had received since the summer (2.2.11): “The newspaper is always good. It’s 
word of mouth. We’re really only on social media. We don’t do much marketing other 





2.2.33. Increased used of social media. 
Social media and blogs. By November 2016, Startup A was interested to start to use 
more social media and blogs to promote themselves: “We have five blogs written [about 
us] by the marketing firm… It’s going to be really important for us. And as we grow, 
we’re really going to just hammer our story into the eyes of everybody who steps onto 
YouTube or Facebook. You know, the ads and all that stuff. We really want to let people 
know [what type of company we are]…. It’s just a matter of keeping that artisanal 
farmers’ market vibe, and marketing it. I think it will be really cool to be able to educate 
everybody on that” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
2.2.34. Planning to attend organic conference.  
In-person. By January 2017, Startup A had organized to attend a large organic food 
conference where they would get a lot of exposure to potential retail customers: “It’s 
interesting. I don’t know. I think it’s weird to think of being at an event where there are 
competitors… They’ve got a lot of CEOs and… I know they’re very business-y. But it’s 
kind of cool to [be able to say], ‘hey, here we are.’ Not to be afraid… It’s just going to be 
interesting to be there…. It’s a pretty big conference for [our retail] customers… There’s 
less public [general consumers] there” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
2.2.35. Received loan for new production facility. 
 In January 2017, Startup A received a long-awaited bank loan that would help 
fund their new production facility. When they had first applied for this loan in June 2016, 
Startup A thought that they would easily get funding: “So, securing our funding through 
[the bank]. I keep saying this. But hopefully it happens this week. They want to see the 
marketing plan. So, secure funding, moving into the new space” (Startup A Founder, 
Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
 However, Startup A failed to provide the bank with a business plan and financial 
details from the start and it took Startup A several months to put the necessary paperwork 
together. When Startup A was contacted by the bank about their financial statements in 
late June 2016, they said: “I have the business plan section that the [bank] needs for the 
application for our loan. And they actually called me again, which is funny, as they’ve 
been calling a lot saying, “Hey, where’s your financial statements?” and all that. So, 
they’re really interested also in getting the whole process started…. I’m going to give our 
accountant until the end of today, but I’m assuming that by tomorrow, he’ll have our 
accounting books all ready to go” (Startup A Founder, Farmers’ Market Visit, 9 June, 
2016). 
 However, come July 2016, there were further delays with the accountant in 
getting the finances into the bank. The delay in getting funding affected Startup A’s 
ability to find a larger production location to move into: “There are two pieces, to find the 




of our lack of accounting with financial statements and stuff like that. Those take time 
[for the] accountant to do” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 21 June, 2016). 
 Finally, in October 2016, Startup A sent their financial statements to the bank: “I 
sent off our financial statements, [but the bank wanted some changes]. We’re going to 
have the accountant [get that additional information for the months] which were the 
rocking and rolling months as far as revenue for us. So, we’ll include that into our 
application and we’ll hopefully get our loan. We’re shooting for the full amount from the 
[bank], which is $200,000… It seems like we’ll get the thumbs up to be able to get all the 
funds” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 27 October, 2016). 
 Only in January 2017, was the loan finally approved: “Our accountant is here 
right now and he’s got all the documents for the loan. So, it’s official…. Now, we’re 
trying to get [the new production] place up and running to the next phase of things as 
soon as possible…. I’m working day and night to do that. This is because demand is 
continuing to go up and we’ve been wanting to move for a solid year now. Over a sold 
year. This would help us increase production” (Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 January, 
2017). 
2.2.36. Signed a contract with twenty-three locations of a smaller Regional General 
Supermarket #2. 
Event, phone and email. While Startup A had discussions with Regional General 
Supermarket #2 as early as July 2015 (no event noted), only in January 2017 did Startup 
A finally sign a contract with their 23 locations: “It was July 2015 that they first 
contacted us, we went through the whole process. And now, it’s January 2017. And what 
really kicked it off was that Veg Fest event in November (2015). We had a booth rocking 
line-ups, and there was [the smaller regional supermarket’s managers], higher-ups that 
were checking things out. So, they came over and I did a two-minute spiel, like, ‘We’re 
Startup A. We’re the bomb.’… He emailed us to say, ‘Hey, I heard about you guys.’ [But 
then], we gave him the price and he just kind of hung up the phone… A very cold 
corporate feel. But then, this time around, they answered all my questions” (Startup A 
Founder, Interview, 12 January, 2017). 
2.2.37. Planning for future customers. 
 With funding secured for their new production space in January 2017, Startup A 
decided to refrain from taking on more large customers at the time, and to focus on the 
existing relationships. As they had grown to pursue larger supermarkets, distributors and 
warehouse stores, it was particularly important to Startup A that their smaller, 
independent stores, including natural food stores that were closer to their original vision 
of a customer, did not feel abandoned: “I feel that if we were to continue down that road 
with [large warehouse retailer #1] and [regional supermarket #1], places like [local 




solidifying these [existing relationships] is a lot more important in the next few months to 
come than trying to get our product into [large warehouse retailer #1] or other locations 
of [regional supermarket #1]… I don’t want to be getting more customers if we’re not 
making more [product]. [Our] number one [priority] is getting our distribution 
[organized to meet current customer demand. So for now,] it’s more of the same” 
(Startup A Founder, Interview, 12 January, 2017). 
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. Startup A experienced cross-over between platforms for 
customer interactions predominantly through their presence of being displayed at various 
types of various stores, at the farmers’ market, and through social media. News about 
Startup A took place through word of mouth at other events that they attended, in their 
own social network, social media, several traditional media articles and on television, and 
the fliers that they handed out. From the data collected through interviews and secondary 
materials, there were no additional cross-overs of customer interactions between 
platforms. 
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
From the data collected through interviews and secondary materials, no additional 
stakeholder interactions were noted. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 All major challenges, including challenges of production and connecting with 
potential customers are detailed above. From the data collected through interviews and 
secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted. 
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING 
 By early 2017, Startup A had transitioned to their new manufacturing location. 
Their retail store was still in operation and they continued to ramp up production to serve 




Appendix B2. Startup B 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
 Startup B began in October 2015 as “A venue for creative makers of all types.” 
(Startup B’s Twitter page, Accessed 1 March 2017). The co-founders had lived in a town 
with a population of approximately 100,000 people. They felt that in North American 
mid-sized towns, such as theirs, that there were not enough community-based cultural 
opportunities, associated with the arts or technology, available to local citizens to both 
observe and to participate in: “The people who [live here], they are the ones who don’t 
have the benefit of cultural activities that are more long-term or interesting things that 
help you feel a sense of belonging in that community. That’s a very typical problem in 
many towns and cities across North America” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 
2016).  
 To counter the lack of culture, Startup B wanted to create a membership-based 
cultural makerspace – a physical location where individuals could gather, and share 
resources, tools, and knowledge on creative projects, network and build both physical and 
digital media. The space would include: 
• A café with co-working and community spaces, and would facilitate unscheduled 
and informal activities for members, including scheduled workshops for members. 
• Digital media and other tools which the members could use to create creative 
media. 
• Studio place for technological experimentation, hardware development and 
prototyping ideas across a wide variety of topics: “[It] could be a software. It 
could be baked goods and it could be something made out of wood or metal [that 
customers create]. It could be artistic or it could have commercial value. We 
could also provide advice on how they scale [a business] up and distribute it… 
We encourage all the people who come to Startup B to look at things on a 
commercial and industrial scale” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).  
 This makerspace, as defined by the founders, would ideally produce innovative 
ideas/products: “We want to turn [Startup B] into something that would consume 
innovative makers and produce innovative makers… We need to give you the venue. We 
need to give you some coaching and training, and then, also, the digital tools” (Startup B 
Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). While the founders of Startup B expected that some 
individuals would come in to use the space solely for personal enjoyment, they also 
expected that others would use the space to produce products for commercial sale or to 




transactions occur: Let’s say we are the facilitator. Currently, we’re soliciting end-users 
and consumers” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 While creating a more permanent makerspace was the main goal of Startup B, 
throughout their first year of operation, they organized two pop-up events to simulate 
their future space and test it as a MVP. The pop-up events were meant to raise awareness 
about Startup B, as well as demonstrate to potential investors the interest in such a 
business. After just over a year of operations and two pop-up events, Startup B’s co-
founders learned that while there were many people who expressed interest in a 
makerspace, their attendance at the two events they organized did not demonstrate that it 
would be sustainable to continue operations. Furthermore, the lack of funding to start the 
initiative and a desire of the co-founders to have a steady income proved to be a major 
obstacle to Startup B’s success. Startup B was closed for business in November 2016. 
1.2. Founders 
 The founders were two Masters students in their late 20s who met while 
completing an Entrepreneurship program. Co-founder K had a background in chemistry 
and experience in a community centre environment and Co-founder S has a background 
in industrial engineering and audio and video recording and self-publishing of written, 
audio and video media. Both co-founders were pursuing Startup B part-time while 
finishing their Masters’ degree until June 2016, after which they committed full-time to 
the startup until closing the business. 
1.3. About the Customers 
 The customers of Startup B were categorized broadly as creatively, curious 
individuals of any age or background: “makers [creating a piece of art or technology] 
and people who are dabbling or starting off a new business” (Startup B Founder, 
Interview, 6 June, 2016). While the makerspace would to be open to anyone who wanted 
to come in and use the space, the founders of Startup B voiced that they welcomed more 
affluent individuals who would might consider paying for access to the space as 
customers: “[People who are affluent are] especially people we would like to bring in 
because they are so influential and can spend money to support the community” (Startup 




2. STARTUP HISTORY 






2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Founding Startup B. 
 Startup B was founded in October 2015 when the co-founders felt that they were 
not enough community-based cultural opportunities in town and that they wanted to 
create a physical location and make tools available to members of the community to 
engage in creative activities. They decided that this could be a membership-based 
makerspace. 
2.2.2. Booth at networking and education event. 
In-person. In February 2016, Startup B secured a booth at their first public education 
community event. Their presence at the event was to raise awareness about their business 
and to gain some customer insight about whether a makerspace would be of interest to 
residents in the city: “We were able to talk to a lot of potential customers… at this event... 
It was a certain kind of clientele that we don’t necessarily get to meet often. People in 
their 40s, 50s, and 60s who are a bit affluent and involved in their community…. We had 
a sheet of paper and were asking people to write down… one idea of what they’d hope 
they would be able to do there or see [at our makerspace]. And that’s when… we had an 
overwhelming number of people come independently [to] tell us they want live music of 
different genres from around the world” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
2.2.3. Attended an event for women in entrepreneurship. 
In-person. In March 2016, the co-founders attended an event on women in 
entrepreneurship. Once again, they used this event exposure to promote Startup B: “We 
explained to them that there’s a venue that we’re making and if they’d like to come and 
make a program or a workshop, [we would welcome them]... The people who came 
around… [were excited about] being part of making [things]” (Startup B Founder, 
Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
2.2.4. Search for a permanent business location. 
 In May 2016, to find an affordable business location for the makerspace which 
met their threefold criteria of location, accessibility, and size, Startup B approached their 
local city council to enquire about the possibility of renting a commercial rental property 
from the city’s portfolio of old or abandoned downtown buildings. Their sales pitch to the 
council was a claim that they could improve the cultural environment of the community: 
“We’re talking to the city and trying to reclaim old buildings or abandoned buildings…. 
We met with the city councilor [to discuss] where is the best location… If it’s owned by 
the city,… we can pay [them] rent” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). While 
Startup B wanted to work with the government, they did not see them as a customer: 




with goals that they have, and the hopes that they have for the city’s…. cultural plan” 
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
Personal network. The search for a permanent location for their makerspace continued 
into the summer. The founders followed up with a local government council contact from 
their professional network in June 2016 to see if she could help them to secure a 
permanent location: “We’ve known her from before. She just sent us an email yesterday 
saying, ‘Let’s meet up this weekend. I want to find out how I can help you.’” (Startup B 
Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). However, by July 2016, Startup B was still trying to 
connect with their contact to locate a suitable permanent location that satisfied their 
criteria: “[Our timeline to find a location is] one month. We’ll move in. Whatever the city 
is giving us, we’ll take it” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016).  
2.2.5. Started planning first pop-up event. 
 Concurrent to searching for a permanent location, in May 2016, Startup B began 
planning their first pop-up event to raise awareness about their future makerspace. 
 Given the time it was taking to secure a permanent location, Startup B decided to 
organize their first event in a temporary location in July 2016: “We do need to start 
planning those popup events…”(Startup B Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). The goal 
was to create an event that demonstrated what the purpose of their future space would be: 
“We only provide you the platform and the amenities. It’s up to you to complete the rest 
of the event and complete the design” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).   
 The event was going to be held in a temporary location and would involve a day 
of cultural workshops including music and crafts, facilitated by individuals within the 
founders’ personal networks: “Those people [conducting activities in the pop-up event] 
are basically a group [found] from our network of friends and family, but also through 
places like [local incubator], [university department], and our alumni. We have a group 
of friends who just love to make, create and show” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 6 June, 
2016). 
 While organizing the pop-up event, the search for a more permanent location was 
put on hold. Given the challenges that they were facing in connecting with the local city 
council, the founders of Startup B thought that the event could be helpful in 
demonstrating the benefits of these types of cultural centres to the local city council: “The 
one thing that we didn’t manage to do was go talk to people at the city about the 
permanent venue. We’ve realized that maybe we can invite them to this temporary event 
though so they can get a feel for it” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). Such 
an event would demonstrate to the city council that Startup B had identified that there 
was interest in a makerspace and what potential customers of the makerspace would 
want: “[We want] to be able to articulate, ‘Hey, in the past year, we didn’t just sit around 
and daydream.’ We talked to all these people. We did all the research. We’ve built all 




learned] customers want primarily a venue where they can experience something live and 
active” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).  
 Furthermore, Startup B realized that they needed to first demonstrate some 
success in their business to gain access to external funding opportunities such as 
government grants: “These funding opportunities are coming up that we want to apply 
to… [But] people aren’t willing to give seed money so you can go do your research and 
prove that there’s a market that you can address. They want you to do that on your own 
terms, on your own expense. You comment not about what you’re going to do but what 
you have done” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). Success at the pop-up event 
would help demonstrate local citizens’ interest in having a makerspace in the city. 
2.2.6. Held information booths at student entrepreneurship events. 
In-person - Public booth at events. In June 2016, Startup B set up booths at two 
entrepreneurship events catered towards students at the local university. Attending these 
types of events was important to Startup B to publicize information about their permanent 
makerspace and their pop-up events: “How do people find out [about us]? Well, that’s 
where we are – going out to other places, talks, people who are conducting events. We go 
there, we meet people, we do an activity with them, and then we bring them in [to our 
events]… [We] signed up to have a booth and just talk to people who came by…. We met 
exactly the same kind of people [as we had expected would be interested in our mission] 
– students who are interested to volunteer, run a workshop, or do something in the 
future” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
 At these events, Startup B sought out feedback from attendees as to what would 
be of interest to them in a makerspace: “That’s why we keep talking to our customers 
early on. We talk about co-creation because if I have to make all the decisions for all the 
possible circumstances the customers are going to be in, it’s going to be too difficult” 
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
 From these events, Startup B discovered that there were two distinct groups of 
people who could be potential consumers of their makerspace: individuals that would be 
interested to learn a topic, and individuals who would like to both demonstrate or teach a 
topic: “People want to learn and absorb, and [there are people who] want to showcase 
and be recognized... They should be able to feel that they have the ability to quickly flip 
back and forth between these two modes” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).  
 The founders however did not find all feedback received from potential customers 
as valuable. They distilled the information that they found was useful to them, and 
dismissed suggestions that they felt were inappropriate for their goals. For example: “[At 
one event, I spoke with someone] very young and he was worried. [He said,] ‘oh, if you 
bring really old people, it’s not going to be so cool.’… We noticed that yes, if you are 




think about young people as noisy and a nuisance. But I think there is a way in which we 
can transfer knowledge and stories and improve [interactions between these groups]” 
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
Email. At the events, Startup B collected email addresses of people who approached their 
information booth to follow-up contact later: “[We had someone say], I’ll sign up for 
your mailing list, and, I’ll e-mail to ask about how I can actually participate as a person 
doing an activity” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016).  
2.2.7. Full-time commitment to startup. 
 In July 2016, the founders finished their Masters’ degree and committed working 
on Startup B full-time. 
2.2.8. Found a pop-up event location. 
 By mid-July 2016, Startup B had settled on a location and a series of activities for 
their pop-up event taking place at the end of July 2016: “The idea is to have different 
things happening at the same time. In the morning, there’s a movie and yoga at the same 
time. Then, there’s lunch and a music workshop, and also generic stuff you could go 
around and play with, like board games. We’ll have some kind of public art project, and 
then later in the afternoon we’re having different workshops. We’re also going to have 
open mics or karaoke…. And in the evening, we’re also going to have live music” 
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
Personal network. To determine what types of activities would be appealing to potential 
customers attending the pop-up event, Startup B conferred with their personal network as 
to what they, as users of a makerspace, would like to see: “We were usually just asking 
our friends what they’d like to see, what intrigued them. And when we went around, we 
would look at events to see what was interesting” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 
2016). 
2.2.9. Started ticket sales. 
Website and personal networks. Just over a week before their pop-up event in July, the 
founders of Startup B had finished planning the pop-up event and had set up an online 
store on Startup B’s website to purchase tickets. However, there were limited ticket sales 
as Startup B had still not promoted the event. The founders however did not see the lack 
of advertising as a hindrance to the success of the event though: “If you do marketing – 
people remember it only if it is within the week or week and a half [of the event] because 
there’s so much being pushed through social media channels that your advertisement 
gets pushed under all other stuff that comes up” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 
2016). 
Social media, flyers and posters. Startup B thought that they would still have time to 




website [to advertise]... We haven’t yet printed any posters and flyers and stuck them 
anywhere…. We should also probably put up… a sandwich board… But we know enough 
people through our Facebook and other channels so they and their family can come…. 
With the groups of people who I know. When one member has something that’s going on. 
Everyone else will support it” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
Personal network. The founders also expected that people in their personal network 
would want to attend: “We’re not starting to [try to] sell tickets for an event, without all 
the [events] in place…. So far nobody has bought tickets yet, [but] we hope that our 
friends will buy [tickets]” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). However, while 
relying on their personal network, would grant Startup B some immediate and easily 
attained sales, the founders realized that this was not sustainable if they wanted to attract 
attendees outside of their personal network: “Whenever we have done [an event] 
previously, we were able to organize within days… So, there’s always somebody in the 
network who has enough capacity and is interested. So, our main concern might be, 
‘How do we get the message out to people who are not in our network?’ I am concerned 
that it would end up as a party with my 100 closest friends on Facebook” (Startup B 
Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
2.2.10. Challenges organizing the first pop-up event last minute.  
In-person. Having organized the first pop-up event so quickly, several of the tasks were 
rushed. For instance, performers for the pop-up event were found last minute, by chance, 
while walking down the street: “We listened to a musician playing on the street… we 
started talking to him and it turns out he’s been a music teacher, recently retired and has 
been performing” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). Also, while Startup B 
had wanted to have local businesses selling items at the event, they did not have enough 
time to arrange it: “If we had more time, we would love to talk to local businesses in 
town… If they came and put up a booth and provided samples of their product, then 
people who came to the event would know how to navigate to their business” (Startup B 
Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
Phone. Furthermore, Startup B learned that coordinating getting both vendors and 
customers to an organized, professional event was more challenging than they had 
realized: “There are so many complexities and moving pieces to put together. 
Individually, none of these things were hard to organize. Call up a food vendor. Call up a 
musician. But to put it all in place in one venue at the same time was difficult when you 
don’t have the venue settled and you don’t have the audience settled. If we had one 





2.2.11. First pop-up event and lessons learned. 
In-person observations and discussions. When the pop-up event took place at the end 
of July 2016, the co-founders observed the actions of the attendees to learn what the 
potential customers of their makerspace would be interested in: “Our main learning was 
how do we price things and do people appreciate what we are doing?... The [people] who 
came, came only for a few specific things that they liked and [left]” (Startup B Founder, 
Interview, 21 July, 2016). However, while the attendees generally seemed to enjoy the 
pop-up event activities, the founders did not see them requesting future events: “People 
don’t make that leap and tell us, ‘Oh, this should be a permanent thing.’ But if we [say to 
them], ‘We want to have [this as] a permanent [event]’, they say ‘okay, I can see what I 
would do there” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
Posters and social media. The founders were also worried as to whether they marketed 
the event in the appropriate locations. The posters they put up were primarily accessible 
to university students, however they had hoped to attract a more diverse audience: “We 
went around putting posters on poles and on the street [near the university] and there are 
people who saw that and came” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
Furthermore, Startup B’s marketing through social media had less than a two percent 
conversion rate, where only about twenty customers bought tickets to the event: “It seems 
we were able to reach about 1,000 people on Facebook, of which something like 100 
commented and were engaged and shared. And then about 20 people showed up. 
Throughout the day, we had 30 people in the venue” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 
August, 2016).  
 However, when other stakeholders in the event – including the event space owner 
and performers - posted event specific information prior to the event on various social 
media platforms, people outside of the founders’ social circle became aware of the event: 
“People [that I didn’t know] started liking things [that I posted on social media]” 
(Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).  
2.2.12. Planned the second pop-up event.  
 With the first pop-up event over, by August 2016, Startup B had started planning 
their next event, incorporating the suggestions and observations from the previous event. 
The second event would take place in September 2016. They realized that to grow and 
justify establishing a more permanent location, they needed to increase the attendance 
numbers for this second event: “This time we want to do our marketing and bring a big 
crowd… And [give] more advanced notice for people” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 
August, 2016).  
Posters. While the founders said that they wanted to attract local, non-student 
populations to their events, much of the advertising and scheduling was organized around 




advertise in locations outside of the university: “I would like to see more children and 
parents coming out. I don’t think that was one of the markets we were able to reach 
through the ways we were marketing. Those people aren’t walking down the streets 
where we put posters. They’re not in the university. I think they’re much more easily 
reached with newspapers” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016). Despite this 
comment, no newspaper articles or ads were placed to promote the event. 
 Startup B also scheduled the event on a date that would specifically fit students’ 
schedules: “Which day of the week, which week of the month, and which month of the 
season matters. We’re heavily dependent on the school schedule it seems. One-third of 
this town is actually students” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016). It was 
important to the founders that the event be held in a student-accessible location, despite 
Startup B receiving suggestions to locate the events in a nearby city: “Practically 
everybody told us, ‘Hey, what you’re doing would be awesome in [other city.]’ The 
artists [that performed at our event] told us that. Other people that came to our event 
told us that. People who talked to us tell us that… But students simply do not travel to 
[other city], as students don’t have cars or they have to take the bus [very] far… and 
they’re one of our key markets for this” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).  
2.2.13. Lessons learned from second pop-up event. 
 In September 2016, Startup B had their second pop-up event. By this event, they 
realized that organizing individual events, rather than having a more permanent 
makerspace for the community, was not achieving the mission that the founders had 
hoped to achieve with their business: “We tried very hard to get the word out, make 
people enthusiastic about having a place where we can make stuff and come together, 
have a sense of belonging. We realized that events quite simply have a totally different 
format. Events don’t count as a sort of model of the space we want to create, especially 
from the perspective of people attending the events. If people think of it like a one-time 
[event], if they’re available on that one day for a piece of it, that’s what they’ll come out 
for” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 November, 2016). 
2.2.14. Had challenges finding permanent location for Startup B and closed business. 
 Startup B continued the search for a permanent location in September and 
October 2016, however they were still experiencing challenges securing a location. In 
particular, they were not managing to connect with the city counsellor who had initially 
offered to help find a public building that they could rent: “We met this councilor again 
at an event. It was very frustrating after four or five times. Every time I see her, she says, 
‘Oh, just e-mail me again about it.’ But then you email, and you call and she doesn’t get 
back to you” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 November, 2016). 
 By this time, the founders had also learned of other organizations that had tried to 




“The city, they’ve had these proposals over and over again… Somehow they spent a few 
million dollars [on a previous, similar initiative] and it didn’t work out… So there’s this 
over shadow of the [poor] experience in [local town]…. We see people have been trying 
[to do something similar] for eight years, and there’s a systematic way in which this has 
been pushed aside. We were sort of dissuaded” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 
November, 2016). 
 Additionally, Startup B learned of the challenges to gain significant attendances 
for events being held in the city. There seemed to be an apathy amongst the city’s 
residents that prevented them from attending local events - even those involving world 
famous figures such as the co-founder of Apple, Inc.: “A person is trying to run an [event 
space] over there. In October, Steve Wozniak had come down to this location to do a sort 
of talk. Almost nobody showed up! [He’s] so important… and barely like 150 people 
showed up. Even with free tickets for [university] students” (Startup B Founder, 
Interview, 28 November, 2016). 
 Finally, Startup B’s co-founders also realized that while there were a significant 
number of people who expressed interest in a makerspace, the lack of attendees to their 
events, a lack of funding to start the initiative, and the co-founders’ desires to have a 
steady income proved to be major obstacles to Startup B’s success: “I have no money. No 
energy to do it. It’s an amazing idea. It’s a brilliant and amazing idea, but nobody is 
paying us for it… I don’t think there’s a feasible way for us to do that right now 
essentially… We would have to meet somebody who could say, ‘Okay, here is $250,000 
for the next two years for you guys to really make this happen. The $250,000 covers your 
salaries for the next two years and you do this full-time.’ And then sure. We could 
launch” (Startup B Founder, Interview, 28 November, 2016). 
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. Startup B experienced cross-over between platforms for 
customer interactions predominantly through advertising to bring customers to their pop-
up events. These promotions took place through word of mouth at other events that they 
attended, in their own social network, social media through their own network and those 
of the performers at the events, and flyers around campus. From the data collected 
through interviews and secondary materials, there were no additional cross-overs of 
customer interactions between platforms. 
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
 Besides customers attending their pop-up events, the main stakeholders that 




events. These interactions are outlined above in the case. From the data collected through 
interviews and secondary materials, no additional stakeholder interactions were noted. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 All major challenges, including lack of engagement from customers and local 
government, and lack of available funding are detailed above. From the data collected 
through interviews and secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted. 
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017 
 With the challenges encountered to find and start a permanent location for Startup 
B, the co-founders decided to seek out other ways to make a steady income and put the 
venture on indefinite hold in November 2016: “[The business] really is on hold. But I 
don’t feel disappointed about putting it on hold at this point because I know we’re going 
to be in the community for quite a while to come. I feel like it will eventually come to a 






Appendix B3. Startup C 
“[By using the obituary data from scraping listings, I learned] there are 2.4 million 
deaths and no one is leveraging this information.” 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Initial Business Idea 
 In August 2015, the founder of Startup C started a business that “designed 
software to help realtors get leads [on people interested in buying and selling their 
homes]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  This software was based on 
software that he had previously developed for another business he had started three years 
ago – an online tutoring marketplace platform that connected university tutors and high 
school students.  
 Through personal contacts, the founder found that most real estate agents were not 
making enough sales in a year. To help combat this issue, the founder thought that this 
software that would help them access new leads, but that this software would only be 
useful if trust was established between all stakeholders for free flow of information to 
occur: “Eighty percent of agents in Canada made less than six sales this year. That 
means that the majority of them cannot make a living based on selling houses. The 
question is, how do I provide [realtors with] more leads of customers with strong intent 
to buy or sell a house in the next few months?… That is the problem we’re solving. Real 
estate is a relationship-driven business [though]. No matter what technology you use, the 
final thing you want to do is to establish trust. So, how you establish trust fast is with that 
face-to-face meeting. Technology helps to achieve that goal” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
 While real estate-related software was the original idea for Startup C, over time, 
the business idea went through several pivots, or adaptations, and sometimes were 
dismissed altogether based on a lack of validation from potential customers of the 
websites. The initial business ideas involved trying to get sales leads from others, while 
the latter business ideas involved providing sales leads for others via existing affiliate 
marketing channels.  As you will see in the detailed timeline below, Startup C changed 
customer and industry several times, as well as the ways in which they chose to interact 
with customers.  
1.2. Founder 
 The founder was a software engineer and formerly co-founded an online tutoring 
platform. His knowledge of real estate came from renting our residential properties, from 
his father, a real estate investor, and from the mother of his co-founder of the tutoring 




founder’s second language and the founder spoke relatively fast. This is noteworthy 
because customer interactions I saw suggested that they struggled to understand the 
founder’s accent and his message during the conversation. 
1.3. About the Customers 
 With the first business idea, the founder of Startup C focused on real estate agents 
as potential customers of the real estate software he was developing. If he brought a lead 
to a real estate agent, they would pay him a referral fee. Initially, the founder tried to find 
the leads on his own, however, as time progressed, he decided to seek out different types 
of non-real estate partners that were in contact with individuals who might also be 
potential home buyers or sellers. Startup C then intended to act as a facilitator to refer the 
leads to real estate agents. As a compensation for the referral, Startup C would offer these 
partners part of the referral fee he would receive for brokering the relationship: “Funeral 
directors, marriage directors, graduation – there are different service providers that we 
don’t think about being connected to real estate. Which makes sense. They shouldn’t have 
any connection with real estate agents. But those are the people I want to focus on. I need 
to do research, and I have to get conclusions” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 
2016).  
 While the founder of Startup C did not specifically refer to the terms, ‘supply-side 
and demand-side customers’, his initial business ideas involved trying to create a 
marketplace for real estate sales leads. In this business, the supply-side customers were 
those individuals or businesses that could provide leads about individuals looking to 
purchase or sell a home. The founder himself also tried to provide these leads at one 
stage, however decided to work with real estate industry-related partners (e.g. mortgage 
agents) and non-real estate industry related partners (e.g. retirement homes, funeral home 
directors) that might be aware of individuals looking to sell or buy a home. The demand-
side customers were the real estate agents seeking out leads, and who were willing to pay 
a referral fee to the supply-side customers. Startup C would take part of that referral fee 
as their transaction cost. 
 In later business ideas considered during the study period, until the end of 2016, 
Startup C was still try to get sales leads for real estate agents in different ways, as well as 
for contractors. Afterwards, the founder decided that rather than providing leads for 
others that had not originally sought out these leads, that they would instead provide sales 
leads to businesses that sought out partners through affiliate marketing programs - 
earning a commission by promoting other business’ products. These partners included 
home owners looking to sell their property, charities, wedding industry companies, 
lawyers, plastic surgeons, dentists, and costumes. The first businesses in which Startup C 





2. STARTUP HISTORY 
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016 
Founding Startup C - Idea #1: Leads for Real Estate 
Agents
Checked with real estate stakeholders about interest 
in CRM system
Sought out real estate leads by knocking on house 
doors
Sought out non-real estate partners to find leads for 
Idea #1 - Funeral homes, financial planners, 
retirement homes, obituary websites
Spoke with funeral directors as non-real estate 
partner for Idea #1 - Lack of interest
Idea #2: Web platform for home owners to learn 
about neighbourhood - Lack of interest
Continued use of social media to reach out to 
customers
Idea #3: Generating leads for contractors - Lack of 
interest
Idea #4: Creating one-stop address change website -
Lack of interest by realtors
Idea #5: Started affiliate marketing
Increased focus on scraping data from the Internet
Revisited Idea #4: Some interest by individual 
movers
Idea #6: Website to highjack other business' website 
traffic.
Revisited Idea #5: Success in 
affilate marketing in wedding 
industry
Continued Idea #5: 
Increased affiliate 
marketing in other 
industries
Data analytics to 
demonstrate success of Idea 
#5: Affiliate marketing




2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Founding of Startup C. 
Phone and email. As defined by the founder, Startup C was founded in August 2015, 
with the intention of providing realtors with software that acted as a customer relationship 
database, with information about potential customer leads: “I thought, why not apply the 
same technology that is already established in the tutoring industry and apply it to the 
real estate industry. I thought it was a great idea. Then I talked to a bunch of real estate 
agents that I’m connected with, and built it from there. That was August last year. It takes 
about two to three months to build a platform, and then I let the agents start using it… 
Part of our goal was to talk to users as early as possible. A lot of this affected the 
direction we decided to go” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).   
 The idea arose from real estate agents asking the founder to build business 
websites for them. He noticed that the websites that the agents had were not necessarily 
generating customers however: “In August when I got started, I saw that agents that I 
work with have asked me to build websites. However, the websites they asked me to build 
weren’t getting leads. So, I asked, why do they spend so much money on websites that 
aren’t generating customers? If they have problems that I can solve by leveraging this 
technology… that was my original assumption. But I didn’t do the research. Now I know 
that realtors are just building websites because everyone is building one. But even very 
successful agents, they find their website still only generates a few hits. It isn’t a strategy 
to find customers” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
2.2.2. Idea #1: Built customer relationship management system for real estate agents to 
access leads for sales. 
 The founder started building a customer relationship management (CRM) system 
in September 2015 that took a few months to build. The founder thought that these real 
estate agents (demand-side customers) could use the CRM system to help them to get 
leads. Multiple agents could access the system, and the founder would also have access to 
this system, allowing him to gather information about the sellers and buyers. 
 The founder started to build the system, and quickly discovered that the real 
agents were not interested in a CRM system: “What I’ve found was that a lot of old 
agents don’t use CRM at all. They just use their brain and their notebook to record all 
their customers. I thought that CRM would be quite beneficial but later, I realized I’d 
made a mistake” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
2.2.3. Checked with stakeholders in real estate industry about interest in CRM system. 
Email. Despite having talked to a few real estate agents early in the business, the founder 
felt that he had still not talked to the wider market affected by the real estate industry. In 




involved in real estate transactions (demand-side customers), and realized that he had 
mistakenly invested time building a software platform that would not be used or paid for 
by these customers: “One of the first mistakes I made was to just build a customer 
relationship management system. Why? The platform you’re seeing right now [in June 
2016] is not actually the direction that I’m heading. Over the last few months, I’ve been 
talking to 98 real estate agents, mortgage agents, financial advisors, and also, some 
accountants. It’s all about talking to users. The lessons I’ve learned is talking to users as 
early as possible. Think about how much information I can get from an agent with thirty 
years in real estate. I can try to squeeze all the information into a thirty-minute 
conversation. I wish I’d done that as early as possible to avoid doing those mistakes” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
 The mortgage agents and financial advisors that were part of the house selling and 
buying process were willing to offer a commission for the leads provided by Startup C, 
however they were not willing to share information about their own clients – information 
that Startup C was seeking to be able to learn more about buyers and sellers in the real 
estate market: “After talking to customers for one to two weeks, like talking to twenty to 
thirty agents, we see that it was a false assumption [that they would share information]. 
These professionals always want to get, but don’t want to give. So, if you give them leads, 
they may give you a high percentage of commission, but it is unlikely that they will give 
up clients. So, that model doesn’t make sense” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 
2016).  
2.2.4. Started to try to get leads for real estate agents independently by knocking on 
home owners’ doors to learn more about home buying/selling habits. 
In-person, door-to-door. By March 2016, the founder started knocking on house doors 
to learn about how likely it was that home owners would want to sell their homes. The 
founder wanted to collect data from them as to when they might want to sell their homes, 
and to provide this information to agents for a finders’ fee. As an incentive for home 
owners to share information about themselves, the founder had prepared free market 
assessment reports about different neighbourhood to share with them, however, still 
found home owners resistant to communicating with them: “We wanted to test if we give 
out market reports [about potential neighbourhoods that they might be interested to move 
to], can we gain their trust?... When they say they want to move, we ask a lot of questions 
– when would you want to move? After we get that information, we would want to sell it 
to the agents. Those are our initial assumptions, but after memorizing all these scripts [to 
say to home owners when knocking on their doors], and going out to them, I got rejection 
after rejection. Because they don’t have interest… And they ask my motivation, because 
they already know how these things work. And my answer does not make sense to them 
and they end up not being interested… They have not met me in the neighbourhood and 




owners] want to tell you the information. If not, you’re just wasting time trying to connect 
with agents” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).   
 Despite being turned down initially, the founder continued trying to knock on 
doors and continued to get negative responses: “I found that there was no response. ‘I’m 
cooking dinner or I’m eating right now [is what the home owners said]… What I learned 
during that process is that I really need to define a pinpoint for consumers to get trust as 
fast as I can. No one would release information unless they can trust me” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
2.2.5. Founder of Startup C decided that testing assumptions is important for him.  
 In early June 2016, the founder of Startup C became very reflective about how he 
would test the assumptions he had. He began to gather information and he decided that if 
people did not want to talk to him or did not want to commit as a customer, that his 
assumptions were not correct and that he would need to try out other idea: “It is 
important to learn and test my assumptions at the same time. We are talking to agents, 
and not just gathering information. They wouldn’t just talk to me if I gave them a call and 
told them the services I offer. I actually help with their needs and wants and at the same 
time, I provide them with information. And finally, I ask them to make a commitment. If a 
commitment is not made, then the assumptions I’m making are false. So, over the process 
of doing research, I keep testing those assumptions” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 
June, 2016).  
2.2.6. Decided to seek out new non-real estate partners to find real estate leads. 
 From his previous attempts to gain trust from potential home buyers and sellers, 
and others in the real estate industry (refer to 2.2.4), the founder thought however, that 
non-real estate partners would also know whether individuals were buying or selling 
property and would be able to provide leads about potential sales (supply-side 
customers). In early June 2016, the founder realized that potential non-real estate partners 
had already gained trust from potential home buyers and sellers: “Consumers need to 
trust us… We need to get consumer data and we talk to consumers ourselves to get that 
data. And then we sell this data back to realtors that would purchase the data. [The 
customers we would have] depends on the strategy. If you were to partner with data 
providers that give you data, the data would be given to real estate agents. Then we 
would have one customer. But we might need to talk to different people. Like, for example 
family divorce lawyers… If we were to maximize their underutilized data [about their 
clients], they could refer us to a [real estate] deal [from someone’s house being sold], 
then we could give them 50 percent commission if the house is sold. But then, divorce 
lawyers become my target client, because most likely, if someone is getting a divorce, 
they would sell their house… So, we don’t just look at customers. We look at why we are 
doing this and what problems I’m solving. We provide leads to agents... Every buying 




babies, graduation. All of those life events have a lot of service providers that can 
partner with us [and provide leads]. Yet, they don’t know the value of that data [that they 
have]… They don’t think about how to maximize their customers’ value” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
 This resulted in the founder’s goal, as of June 2016, being to learn more about the 
real estate ecosystem: “My goal for the summer is to figure out the ecosystem and develop 
partnerships with data providers. And really validate my biggest assumption – That by 
partnering with data providers that this can translate into leads, and then leads can 
translate into sellable data with the agent” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
2.2.7. Spoke with funeral directors as the first potential non-real estate partners, with 
the intention to find real estate leads. 
LinkedIn. By the second week in June 2016, the founder of Startup C had reached out to 
several funeral directors over LinkedIn as their first potential partner to find real estate 
leads (supply-side customers; refer to 2.2.6), however did not had much success: “I’ve 
been talking to funeral directors last week to see about that market. Two said no. The 
other eight had no response… LinkedIn is the best way to connect with other people. I 
have sent requests to 200 to 300 people. Thirty people accepted my requests and most 
people don’t respond at all… After thirty-three, there are only fifteen people who are 
funeral directors in Toronto. Of those fifteen, I got two rejections and two positive 
[responses]. What [they] told me is it is against company policy. I’m looking for a 
complementary partnership between real estate and funeral directors… This [is meant 
to] help funeral directors to generate new revenue streams through commissions with 
realtors” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016).  
 By mid-June 2016, the founder of Startup C had spoken with the two funeral 
directors and had received positive responses about providing leads for his real estate 
platform: “[I asked the funeral director] how many customers have been asking you 
about this after-care service? And then he said, about two to three clients per month. 
That’s pretty good…. We can get something done. [I asked him], do you think that’s good 
for us and he said yes… At the end of the call, he asked me to send him an email with a 
demo. But I don’t really have a demo. I just have testing. So, I [have] spent the last two 
days creating a demo video…. And the [other funeral director], he had already seen 
certain realtors doing that. He had been wanting to do this for years and asked me about 
my plan… So, once we create the video, I’ll probably push that out to him as well” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June, 2016). 
Phone. The founder was also concerned that perhaps the reason he was not able to 
contact funeral directors was that they were not on LinkedIn: “The majority of [funeral 
directors] are likely very old. And don’t see LinkedIn as a necessity to generate leads. So, 
maybe I need to contact them over the phone” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June, 




including calling them and visiting in person, was important to gain access to the market: 
“There are different levels of sales. Elephants, deer, rabbits, ants. Funeral homes are 
deer and elephants. If one is a $5000 opportunity, it’s a good opportunity and I can go 
there and have a conversation with them [in person]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 
June, 2016). 
 However, phone calls where not always successful for the founder. In a phone call 
with one of the funeral home directors in late June 2016, the founder of Startup C spoke 
fast to complete his sales pitch. The funeral home director could not initially understand 
what the founder was offering, particularly with the founder’s heavy foreign accent. 
Despite these communication challenges, in the end, the funeral director did want to learn 
more: “[I said,] ‘It would be a win-win situation for realtors and funeral directors. Does 
your group of funeral homes offer any after care service?’ Then he said, ‘Sorry, you’ll 
have to repeat that… Uh, are you a realtor?’ [He didn’t understand that] I’m not a 
realtor. I’m an entrepreneur. A data scientist. And what I do is that I found opportunities 
that are complementary for different industries. [I said,] ‘I’ve been working on this for a 
few months with realtors and funeral directors… The realtor provides up to 25 percent of 
the referral fee. They have expertise dealing with clients in that situation before. At the 
end of the day, I feel like funeral homes would need to have one-on-one conversations 
with the realtors… Once they sell the house, everything you can see in the CRM 
dashboard. After it’s sold, you’d get an instant notification.’… He said, ‘I think 
conceptually it makes sense. We have lawyers and people who do wills and life insurance 
people. I guess the realtor is one part of closing off the estate. I just don’t know how 
many opportunities there would be for you’” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 
2016).   
Email. By late June 2016, Startup C had received interest from three more funeral home 
directors about possible partnerships. He concluded however that having only five non-
real estate partners did not provide strong enough confirmation of business idea #1: “Five 
out of the twenty people that I contacted are interested. I think there’s some potential. But 
unless it’s validated and I get a strong confirmation – I still need to test [the idea 
further]” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
2.2.8. In touch with potential partner who also created market assessment reports. 
Email. The founder contacted another company’s founder that created market assessment 
reports similar to those that he had wanted to offer (refer to 2.2.4): “It totally blew my 
mind. He does neighbourhood reports… He is struggling to monetize... That’s why he 
approached me. He has already committed so much, and now wants to leverage this 






2.2.9. Lack of interest from potential non-real estate partners to share leads and from 
individual home buyers and sellers to share information. 
 By the second week in June 2016, Startup C had spent several months speaking 
with people who might provide leads about real estate sales. These included potential 
partners (refer to 2.2.6 and 2.2.7) that could provide leads, as well as individual home 
buyers and sellers. From these conversations, he learned that despite a few positive 
responses from funeral directors, most of the people he had contacted were not interested 
in providing information about potential real estate buying and selling leads: “I’ve 
already talked to ninety-eight professionals in the past two months, thirty something 
realtors, twenty something financial advisors, and twenty something mortgage agents… I 
found that no one wants to give up anything. People only want to get” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
Email. Rather than giving up the idea, the founder decided to continue to seek out other 
non-real estate parties that could be potential partners to find real estate leads: “This is my 
approach. I’m trying to diversify different sources of opportunities. I [won’t] heavily 
invest into one…. This is the fastest way to test MVP. And with those analyses, I learned – 
well, with retirement homes, those are not the people to talk to because they are a big 
organization and it’s hard to reach the CEO. Divorce lawyers – they are hard to talk to 
as they are very conservative and not open to conversation. Immigration lawyers and 
consultants – they may not be immediate partners. I want to identify who I can partner 
with… At the end, moving forward, I’d like to test [different options] and see how it goes” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 June, 2016). 
2.2.10. Idea #2: Explored whether individual home owners would be interested in a 
web platform to learn more about their neighbourhood houses. 
 In contrast to previous attempts to learn about the selling intent of homeowners by 
knocking on the doors of houses (refer to 2.2.4), the founder wanted to see whether 
individual buyers and sellers of homes would pay for information about different 
neighbourhoods: “[We want] to give consumers a transparent platform to make 
independent decisions. So, right now, if you want to buy a house, you never question why 
you need an agent. But if you had all the transportation information, would you still find 
an agent?” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 June, 2016).  
 On a new website platform, the founder wanted to see if homeowners would be 
willing to share information about their home and any renovations that they had done: 
“The purpose behind this was to see if homeowners would be interested to know how 
their neighbours maximized their property [through renovations]. This is the information 
that real estate people can’t really provide… You can put in a description [about your 





 The founder also realized that while real estate agents might prefer to not have 
this information be public, that it may actually help create more openness across the real 
estate industry and help facilitate discussions on home value: “The thing is, a lot of 
realtors are actually really scared. This would open up a lot of data [to the public]. But, 
it may be a good time to sell [the idea] to them – increase their defense. I could start 
discussions with the real estate board, that defends exclusivity of real estate owners… [to 
show them that] using the data I’ve opened up will get them a lot higher profit... It’s 
something that realtors can use that’s meaningful. It allows them to engage homeowners 
in conversation” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 15 June, 2016). 
Social media - Facebook. By late June 2016, Startup H had started reaching out to 
homeowners in homeowner Facebook groups to ask whether they wanted more 
information on housing prices in their neighbourhood: “One of the homeowners 
responded and is interested. I asked her some questions: ‘Would you be frustrated after 
spending money and effort after spending money on renovations and having no 
appreciation on your house?’ She said yes and gave me her email address to sign up for 
this.” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
 The founder found however that they were not getting enough of a response to 
make pursuing this project worthwhile: “But I see over 80 percent of people don’t 
respond to my message because they aren’t in the industry and don’t really care… Two-
hundred messages and seven positive responses. And ten rejections. But the rest of the 
people don’t care at all. There’s not a need… After I found out that, I thought, maybe it 
makes sense to stop, rather than putting in more effort validating this. I should change 
my gear and focus elsewhere. I can still work with these funeral homes [that I’m already 
in contact with], but I will stop contacting other ones” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 
June, 2016).  
2.2.11. Contemplating best method to reach potential customers.  
Social media. By late June 2016, the founder of Startup C started to question whether he 
was using the correct media to reach out to potential customers. He had been focused on 
using social media to have one-to-one conversations, and while these messages were not 
proving to be that effective to communicate with customers, he was skeptical that he 
would get better feedback from more open, one-to-many community forums: “I started 
thinking, maybe I should drop those strategies with Facebook and LinkedIn… I found it 
very difficult to talk to customers. Facebook – I did it. LinkedIn – I did it… And other 
channels – I’ve thought of it. Online [community] forums, Reddit, home improvement 
forums – I would invest too much time and the engagement rate is too low… And then 
these other channels, they aren’t going to be as effective as LinkedIn and Facebook. 
Those channels I can have one-on-one conversations and have maximum feedback and 




 The founder also ruled out ads as a primary mode to connect with customers: 
“Facebook ads and Google ads are worse. They are just yes or no [in terms of showing 
that people are interested” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
2.2.12. Idea #3: Generating leads for contractors. 
 Another idea that the founder of Startup C had in late June 2016 was to collect 
information about individual home owners’ renovations and intent to have renovations 
done on their house (refer to 2.2.10), and to make the data available to other stakeholders 
that might find it useful – such as contractors seeking out leads for renovation work: “I 
asked myself – Can we generate leads for contractors? It’s not much to identify that 
people have unfinished basements. But being able to get to know them, getting to know 
who wants to renovate. That’s more powerful. I [can do that if] I step forward and 
contact home owners… [We’re looking to see] how much the house value increases after 
renovation. I can create a professional document and deliver it to homeowners by 
knocking on doors…. I’m not too worried about figuring out how to make a commission 
yet though…. It’s best to provide it for free and get feedback. I can knock on the doors 
and tell the home owners that the goal is simple – I just provide this information for free 
and ask – do you think it’s important to make additional income for a rental property? If 
so, would you like to schedule an appointment with a contractor to get an inspection 
totally free? If they say yes, the monetization already happened. That’s the goal I’m 
trying to achieve here” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). Nothing came of 
this idea when contractors were contacted because the founder realized he was not getting 
the information needed from home owners for this to work successfully. 
2.2.13. Idea #4: Creating a one-stop address change website.  
 Also in late-June 2016, founder had another idea for a business. He realized that 
while exclusivity of information was important for realtors, that Startup C could possibly 
create a one-stop address change website – where individuals who were moving could be 
directed to how to change their address on various bills, services and official documents, 
such as drivers’ licenses. The founder saw this as an opportunity for realtors to offer this 
their customers as an incentive to work with them: “It may be helpful to provide them 
with a valuable package. There’s a lot of cost in relocating. You need a handyman, 
landscaping, cable, Internet, tech support, furniture. If I can provide a package and 10 
percent off, it could help the realtor get more leads. You are the only one why can 
provide this package and you can test it” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).   
Email. However, after emailing potential real estate agents to see their interest, there had 
not been much of a positive a response to validate this idea: “I know from the nine people 
I sent a message to [about this], only one responded. And not very promptly. Maybe he’s 
busy. The assumption is pretty good then – demand isn’t as high as I expected… I need to 
find more insights and feedback before going through these steps… The number one step 




reject this idea as fast as possible, rather than hoping it works and holding on [to an idea 
that won’t work]… I just assume that I will lose this opportunity. It’s better than hoping it 
works. Then I can reject this and move onto the next idea. If you hold on, you feel very 
discouraged. I’d rather get a rejection than get my time wasted. So, in terms of facing 
these opportunities, I know when to quit and when to move on” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 22 June, 2016).   
2.2.14. Idea #1 continued: One funeral home on board as a potential partner to find 
real estate leads. 
 At the end of June 2016, Startup C had one funeral home interested in offering 
referrals to real estate agents and six real estate agents willing to share a referral fee with 
them if directed leads (refer to 2.2.7).  
2.2.15. Idea #1 continued: Attempted to partner with financial planners, retirement 
homes, websites that host obituaries, and retirement planning websites to find real 
estate leads. 
Phone, email, LinkedIn. In late June 2016, the founder was still trying to connect with 
additional potential partners to find real estate leads (refer to 2.2.6 and 2.2.9) and 
received a limited number of responses: “I tried with financial planners. I sent out thirty 
letters and got three responses. They were positive and they want to chat with me… I 
want him to make a small commitment as to whether he would use a referral tracking 
system…. I also tried with retirement homes. I called and find that the concept is hard to 
explain. I was rejected by receptionists at funeral homes so I decided to use an email 
approach. I sent about ten to twenty emails and got one positive response. That response 
amazed me. She is quite interested in paying me a referral fee. I’ll give you 75 percent of 
the referral fee if you can get me clients. [That’s huge]… I also checked a ton of websites 
– obituary websites and retirement websites.. and I’m also contacting media companies 
starting companies for obituaries. Other partnerships I think will work include people 
like a retirement planner that I contacted via LinkedIn. There are two big value 
propositions but I think he’s taking his time…. The majority of people don’t seem 
interested, so I don’t really care [to follow up with those parties]… The thing is, if 
they’re not responding, they’re not responding for a reason. Maybe they’re busy. Maybe 
their company is too big. Many reasons. So, I’ll follow up and see what happens. If I see 
a pattern of them not being interested, then I’ll move on. I can’t conclude too many 
reasons. Maybe they don’t like to deal with me in general. Maybe it’s the approach that 
I’m taking…” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).   
 In the cases where the founder had received a positive response, such as when 
speaking with the COO of a retirement home in July 2016, he found it was not a large 
market: “[The COO of the retirement home] would offer me 75 percent of the referral fee 
for sending clients to the retirement home. She’s more interested in receiving referrals 




to move forward and help her do referrals, but I learned that it’s not a big enough 
market. There are only 53 apartments in those buildings. And there aren’t that many 
empty… I looked back and thought – should this be something full time? I realized, no, 
this may be an add-on” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).  
2.2.16. Phone call with real estate agent to explain referral fee process. 
Phone. By late June 2016, the founder of Startup C had five real estate agents (demand-
side customers) interested in receiving referrals for a fee. He still hoped to gain more 
interest from the real estate agents he had contacted, however was struggling to do so. 
After a phone call with one realtor, he realized several of the doubts that realtors may 
have been having: “She basically asked everything. She has doubts. She doesn’t 
understand the referral process. Eventually, I think she understood everything I said, but 
I think she still has doubts” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016).  
2.2.17. Idea #5: Started considering changing to a new business model – Promoting 
online retailers through affiliate marketing ads on customized websites. 
 With all the challenges with the real estate lead referral business model – Idea #1, 
accessing supply-side customers that could provide leads and demand-side customers, the 
realtors, interested in paying a referral fee, by July 2017 the founder had become 
frustrated and was starting to seek out other ways to earn money, such as affiliate 
marketing. With affiliate marketing, Startup C would build websites and refer visitors to 
other business’ websites: “I’m considering doing affiliation ads – that have higher 
revenue. I’m negotiating and they are offering me certain rates. So, I thought, it’s worth 
a try, even if it only counts if someone lands on a specific link, rather than on a while 
website… I [still] thought it may be a sustainable option” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 
29 June, 2016). Furthermore, the founder decided to focus on businesses that were 
already offering referral fees for affiliate marketing leads. 
Website. The founder started brainstorming websites and themes for the websites that 
could attract traffic: “I came up with four ideas to build my own website that would 
attract traffic… I can then partner with industry partners to get revenue from ads. And 
then, I can test these ideas out [by seeing who comes to the site], rather than spending 
lots of money on it” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 29 June, 2016). 
 Though affiliate marketing was new for the founder of Startup C, he was willing 
to experiment with these four websites: “The worst case scenario, none of these work and 
I use some marketing gimmick to create money… I want to start earning $2000 a month. 
I learned that I need to tie all my goals to revenue and set up the worst case scenario… 
Right now though, I just want to focus on this and try it out. I need to remind myself, it’s 
okay to quit. It’s about continuous learning to make a sustainable living” (Startup C 




Affiliate Marketing Industry #1 - Homes sold by owner. While he had no specific 
industry in mind, his experience in real estate lead him to initially think about creating 
real estate related websites: The first [website] is… for people who don’t want to sell 
houses through real estate agents because they don’t want to pay agents. We are putting 
the home owner first…. I built it on the weekend, so I can test it quickly. And [with other 
sites], I just change the images and text for testing and change the domain name” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 2016).   
Online classifieds and messaging. He then tried to attract people who were selling their 
house on their own to the website, however received limited interest: “I went to [the 
online classifieds] and mass messaged home owners with a message: ‘Hi, I saw your 
listing on [the online classifieds] and I understand the frustration that you must have 
putting pictures up and re-posting ads. At our site, we’ve been providing advice to home 
owners to sell their homes themselves. I’d like to invite you to check out the resources 
here.’ … I had only one response, and that was a realtor. That’s not a good sign. People 
aren’t interested. Maybe they already tried this approach on their own. They don’t want 
to spend the money on that. Or they have ugly pictures. It’s [just] not working” (Startup 
C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 2016).  
Affiliate Marketing Industry #2 – Charities listed on obituary websites from funeral 
homes. The founder also thought that people wanted to be able to do something special 
on behalf of people who had passed away, but are not always sure what to do. By 
scraping the internet for obituary websites, the founder was able to gain lots of 
information about individual memorial websites: “I built a website… I find a lot of people 
regret that they haven’t done enough for the people who have passed away. So, I wanted 
to create a way for people to express that on a website, say, send [the deceased person’s] 
kids to camp. [This] can be passed on to the next generation… I haven’t set up the 
payment part though because I want to first see if people will do it” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 7 July, 2016).  The founder however ran into road blocks with both 
administration on the obituary websites not approving his posts. Furthermore, most 
visitors only tended to visit obituary websites one time: “The problems I encountered 
were that 30 percent of the websites need an approval of the post. So, you won’t 
necessarily be approved… And then, another problem I found was the timing issue… 
People don’t come to the site more than once” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 
2016).  
Affiliate Marketing Industry #3 – Wedding industry. Email and web forms. The 
third industry that the founder wanted to build affiliate partnerships with online 
companies with affiliate programs in the wedding industry: “I’m building a wedding 
[website] by putting together information on registries from different websites. And then, 
I can partner with wedding planners, jewelry stores, etc. to capture people who go to the 




Affiliate Marketing Industry #4 – Lawyer registry. Finally, the founder also wanted to 
build a registry that allowed individuals to search through a database of lawyers. On these 
sites, lawyers could pay to be featured in a more visible area of the website: “For the 
ones that pay, they get promoted up in the listing” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 7 July, 
2016). He did not follow up on this avenue as later, another website was found that 
already did this (refer to 2.2.19).  
2.2.18. Realizing that timeline for affiliate marketing could take a long time.  
 In a discussion with his advisor in mid-July 2016, the founder of Startup C 
commented that it would possibly take too long to receive validation on the success of 
affiliate marketing with the industries that the founder had planned to build websites for 
(refer to 2.2.17): “The legal one and the wedding industry – [my advisor] suggested it 
would take too long to test the MVP… and he questions whether the real estate route is 
the best route. He doesn’t really see it as a possibility” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 
July, 2016).  
 As a result, the founder initially concentrated on other industries that he was 
familiar with, including funeral homes and retirement homes: “I think over 70 percent of 
the funeral home websites don’t have monetizing options on their websites. For example, 
buying flowers and lighting candles. Think about this - when you look at your colleague – 
you’re not likely to go to his funeral, but you may buy flowers online… And I also see 
retirement homes as competitive” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016). Nothing 
came of this exploration. 
2.2.19. Idea #6 – Building a website that rated realtors. 
 While building and testing the affiliate marketing websites in July 2016, the 
founder of Startup C stumbled across a website that featured and rated lawyers. Seeing 
this site validated his thoughts that such a website could be duplicated in other industries. 
Furthermore, he saw the potential to use these sites to also make money through affiliate 
marketing of legal services: “And there’s the potential to work with legal industries. You 
can never see lawyers’ success rates. But this website, you could see win rate and hourly 
rate. What I found was that hourly rate doesn’t really have correlation with the winning 
ratio. The company [that put up this website] already raised $100 million in a few 
years… But I came up with this idea before seeing this site. It wasn’t inspired by this. We 
have different industries, but similar tools can be used. I can look at various options for 
this solution. But it will take a long time to gather this. Maybe the MLS (an association 
for the professional services of realtors) won’t be happy with this [in the real estate 
industry]. They may shut down some publically available data. And maybe the consumer 





Data scraping. To capture the information for these websites, the founder turned to 
technology to scrape data from the Internet: “I can use machine learning to capture this 
information. [For instance,] I can connect this information to charities – charities right 
now don’t have any way to understand how to increase donations. [By using the obituary 
data from scraping listings I learned] there are 2.4 million deaths and no one is 
leveraging this information… [There could be] a lot of donations to a heart foundation” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 20 July, 2016).  
 The founder particularly wanted to create a real estate related website that showed 
the performance of realtors: “The top one [is] the realtor one. The open platform that 
shows real performance of all realtors… The number one option I want to test is with 
home owners. I can test it with people who own a house. Then push the prototype and test 
their reaction” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016).  
Email and Website. To test the idea for a website that rated realtors, the founder checked 
with home buyers and with realtors. When the founder tested the website with a few 
home buyers in his personal network, he received positive feedback: “I asked people for 
their feedback and a bunch of open-ended questions. And I asked them, have you seen 
something like this before. I’m trying to validate this process. I want to see if including 
statistics in the website would change your choices… what I’m finding is, this is 
something that hasn’t been done before. And they would 100 percent use this as a 
reference” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 20 July, 2016).  
Email and phone. However, by late July 2016, it was becoming obvious that realtors 
would not be willing to pay for a product that rated them: “Coming back to realtors, they 
have [shown] this fear of exposing this data. And if they don’t understand or trust the 
program – well, I’d be concerned. Because they are the ones that are supposed to pay us. 
If we don’t get their trust, how can I actually monetize the company? And if I can’t 
monetize, what I am I doing?” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 27 July, 2016).  
 Given the lack of interest from realtors, the founder decided that rather than focus 
on the realtors as customers, they would instead focus on home buyers and sellers: “I 
came up with a bidding platform that provides transparency. Where the seller uses the 
platform for free and then buyers can go to the platform. Everyone in the transaction can 
see what is happening…. It only takes us a day to build. I’m more worried about whether 
this is successful” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 27 July, 2016).  
 However, by August 2016, the founder of Startup C had dismissed the idea of 
building this tool for real estate. There was little demand from both home buyers and 
sellers and from realtors. His mentor had also said that the website was not going to be 
helpful: “My mentor told me that if you build up a tool for the public for real estate, 
there’s not really demand. No one is going to compare their realtors. They’re going to 




2.2.20. Decision to seek out fast validation for websites for affiliate marketing (Idea 
#5). 
 By July 2016, the founder of Startup C realized that he wanted to validate or 
discard the business ideas for affiliate marketing that he was working on (refer to 2.2.19) 
in a short time. From a book, he got the idea of how he could do this: “I’m reading a 
book about building a product and testing the validation in just five steps. It asks 
questions like – how can you deliver the product without making the product? I realized 
that I could make a quick prototype to test” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 
2016).  It was also important to the founder to receive validation from his advisors before 
proceeding: “First, I want to check with advisors to see what they think. All the ideas 
right now are biased” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016).  
Website online testing. The founder decided the best way to get fast validation was to 
test whether there was interest in the websites being built by finding several people 
online, rather than contacting individuals, one-to-one, in-person or over email to test the 
websites: “Another thing I found is, the cost of testing with mass audiences is a lot 
cheaper than testing with individuals. So, I realized, if that’s the case, can I test a lot of 
my assumptions in a short amount of time by launching these sites and see what 
responses I get?... By building a website, I can test for validation... If I spend all this time 
building a site, months in fact, how can I shorten this time?... What I’ve learned is, 
validation comes two ways – building a website and showing it to them, or talking to 
them first… They’ll be very critical of why this is needed. I need to provide as much 
information as possible to the individual consumer [so a website would be helpful]. But 
what I realized is, you don’t need to make the whole website. You just need to test one key 
assumption. If it’s tested and successful, you build on top of it” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 27 July, 2016).   
2.2.21. Revisiting Idea #4: Creating a one-stop address change website. 
 By August 2016, the startup had dismissed the idea that they would be building a 
real estate related site. By using Google Key Words, he filtered out potential ideas for his 
next website and decided to revisit the idea he had in June 2016 about the need to easily 
change addresses on various personal documents (refer to 2.2.13). Within a few days, he 
built a website that helped people change their addresses: “It’s a hassle changing your 
license, health card, and insurance. People treat it as a norm. But people don’t question 
the extent of the problem. And this is actually a great problem for me to solve… I’ve 
already built [the site]. I’m testing it very quickly to see if there’s a demand” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 19 August, 2016).  
Data analytics. Based on a book he read (refer to 2.2.20), the goal of the founder was to 
test websites quickly to see if they would be validated. He tried out different 
advertisement campaigns to test his address change website, and concurrently realized he 




reaching out to speak to visitors to the website, he was saving a lot of time: “Initially it 
cost me $25 to do this. I got Google’s platform for $100. And I got results right away. 
The three emails here are the people who signed up. I can see what they signed up for, 
cable, magazines, etc. Even their email address tells me a lot of information. Every day I 
get ten to twenty signups. I’ve gotten sixty-four emails and spent two to three days 
building the back end. This is amazing. [When I was] talking to professionals, [this 
process] took three iterations and three conversations to get to the point of, ‘Hey, I want 
to use this.’ It takes time to get action. But here [with this online method], I get action 
right away. And it tells us so much information about this. I can look at how long they 
stay on the site. Based on this, I can get a lot of information. You can never get this 
information, even talking to professionals. And, it’s extremely low cost. You get sales 
right away too… People are just giving their information to me. It’s just like interacting 
with customers!” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 19 August, 2016).   
 By September 2016, the founder of Startup C was on the third version of the 
address change website. Concurrently, he was still trying to get a partnership with realtors 
to use it as a tool for their customers. 
2.2.22. Idea #7: Building websites that highjack other business’ traffic and re-selling 
them back to original business owner as sales leads. 
Website and email. In September 2016, the founder built websites that mimicked other 
companies’ websites. When a Google search was done for the original business, traffic 
would also find Startup C’s copycat website. If a visitor landed on the copycat website, 
the founder of Startup C planned to sell these visitors back to the original business as 
sales leads: “I can highjack someone’s traffic and provide them with new leads. If they 
say yes, boom [this could be a great way to get referral fees]! This can apply to all 
businesses. Real estate. Lawyers. Plastic surgeons. Dentists. Funeral homes. Any 
[websites] with low volume [traffic] – I can help them convert [visitors into customers] 
faster” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 9 September, 2016).  
 By October 2016, the founder had tried building a copycat website based on a 
plastic surgeon’s name however the surgeon had no interest in the sales leads from 
Startup C: “I wanted to do lead generation with the plastic surgeon… So, for example, if I 
typed this doctor’s name into Google, my ad shows up before the real information 
appears… For five to ten plastic surgeons, I created a few leads. After a few weeks, I was 
trying to get responses and no one responded. Even when I gave the leads for free. I 
guess they don’t care because they have too much business already” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 24 October, 2016).  
2.2.23. Revisiting Idea #5 – Affiliate marketing of wedding industry product. 
Website. By October 2016, the founder of Startup C had pursued another affiliate 




on engagement ring purchases to potential grooms (refer to 2.2.17). This website had 
affiliate marketing partners that they featured on the website. The founder thought that 
through appearing as an impartial website, that individuals shopping for jewelry would 
feel more comfortable trusting the partners that he was suggesting. He ended up receiving 
positive validation for this assumption, and referral fees were earning him $2000 per 
month: “Using long-tale key words, I can advertise them, and do a pay-per-click 
business model. So, for example, this site is for men who are buying an engagement ring 
who want to propose. They usually struggle how much they should spend. There’s usually 
a goal of two to three months’ salary, and then there’s a question of style, insurance, 
etc…. This brings in $2000 per month… People who go directly to the online jewelers’ 
website – like James Allen – people aren’t necessarily convinced. They need a third 
party… I’m making on average $100 per day. I’m sure that could be increased. In one 
month, I made much more than the past eleven months. So, I’m quite excited about this 
opportunity to have more affiliation partnerships. Money is good validation. I think this 
idea is pretty much validated. And I want to continue to have millions to ensure that this 
is good” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 24 October, 2016).  
Data analytics. The founder decided that the number of clicks detected on the website 
would indicate visitor interest to the site, and that measuring these clicks provided better 
information than having actual conversations with potential customers: “I can see what 
people are clicking on and where they are. And if they don’t proceed, it’s an indication 
that they don’t feel comfortable with the information. It helps me analyze users’ behavior 
and do better integration… I save a lot of time by not talking to these people. Why are 
they not clicking? What pages did they visit? There’s no lie. I can see what actions [they] 
have [taken]. I can see different users, different countries, different devices. I can see that 
people don’t feel comfortable landing on [a certain] page” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 24 October, 2016).  
 Through creating a simple website quickly and making it live, the founder of 
Startup C was using this as an opportunity to test the market and his assumptions about 
the website: “Right now, I have two assumptions. Number one, they don’t feel 
comfortable giving information [on this webpage that they are not progressing beyond]. 
Two, they don’t like the page set up at all. The more clicks there are, it’s easy to validate” 
(Startup C Founder, Interview, 24 October, 2016).  
 With this positive validation of receiving referral fees, the founder realized that 
instead of creating his own businesses, of which he tried several different options, that he 
could instead focus on the affiliate marking to make money: “Over the [past] months, I 
kept promoting new ideas. But those are very dangerous. It takes me so much time to 
invest time into them. And there was literally no validation. And then, after I got 
validation, I had to sell it to individuals and get trust from them. And getting trust from 




individuals to purchase online. So, the question is, why am I creating new projects? 
There are merchants that desperately need help in creating sales. This thinking has made 
me evolve into a situation where I don’t create new projects. I just let them go. And 
[instead], I help merchants increase sales… This situation has been validated… Anything 
else, I’ll focus on it eventually, but there’s a lot of down time in those options. This option 
lowers the possibility of rejections. Right now, I’ll keep exploring other options to make 
this [, the affiliate marketing,] sustainable and lower the risk. Right now [the focus] is 
jewelry. What about cars? Online services? Wheelchairs? Supplements? I want to keep it 
diverse and see how that goes” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 24 October, 2016).  
2.2.24. Continued Idea #5 - Affiliate marketing with different industries. 
 By November 2016, the founder decided to continue affiliate marketing with 
other partners that have existing affiliate programs, such as with the engagement ring 
companies (refer to 2.2.2), rather than trying to create new affiliate partnerships with 
businesses not currently seeking out affiliate partners (Idea #1, real estate agents, refer to 
2.2.2; Idea #2, individual home owners, 2.2.10; Idea #3, contractors, refer to 2.2.12; Idea 
#4, realtors for address changes, refer to 2.2.13; Idea #6, plastic surgeons, refer to 2.2.22): 
“Instead of plastic surgeons [that were not seeking out new leads], I’m going after 
businesses that already have open affiliation programs. Amazon is one, for example. This 
is much easier” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).  
 While the founder worried that affiliate marketing partnerships could not be 
scaled, he felt websites could have multiple partners, or that several websites could be 
created as he continued to find new partners: “These link encryptions allow me to 
promote the business [within my websites]. I also keep finding more and more partners. I 
think it’s pretty much automated right now. So, [I’ll continue to] onboard new partners, 
optimize the process and make money” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 
2016).  
 He also decided that while his minimum viable product – the basic website – was 
enough to validate whether the idea worked for affiliate marketing, the websites would 
need to be enhanced to ensure increases in traffic in the future: “I also need to build up a 
bunch of engagement ring content [on the website]. The engagement ring is just one part. 
What process would I need to put on the website? Buying engagement gifts? Then they 
could go smoothly to one of my sites. Right now, they still see my site as an ad on Google. 
I want to give them more trust and lower their doubtfulness. [Providing more 
information] is one of the ways” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).  
Data analytics. Adopting the use of more detailed technologies allowed the founder to 
also see what visitors to his website were interested in: “I can use heat maps to see where 
people go on a website, and where they hover over. I can see that they explore different 




longer to find other resources… I can look for a pattern and promote it better” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).  
Advertisements. Once he knew there was interest in such a website, the founder started 
using more advertisements to promote the website through social media: “I can also 
promote on Facebook. I can be more diverse. Most people click on things because they 
think the page is innovative and that we have a different approach. They already trust 
what we’re providing to them” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 November, 2016).  
2.2.25. Used data analytics to demonstrate success of affiliate marketing websites. 
Website. By December 2016, the affiliate marketing websites were going well and 
referral fees were being earned by Startup C. The founder had realized that to test for 
validation of a website, it was simple enough to launch it see if there was a response. He 
prided himself on the site’s ability to get its own recognition: “I found I was spending too 
much time building the product. Not actually facing customers. Which is interesting. But 
the product doesn’t need to be perfect. It’s all about pushing the product. It will allow 
you to get more feedback and iterate from there. That’s the first mistake I made… Also, I 
realized there’s more profit to be had with a monopoly. You want to share little with 
others and you don’t need press to share your success” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 
December, 2016).  
Data analytics. He had decided that emails were also not necessary to communicate with 
potential customers – just using data analytics that reported Google searches, heat maps, 
and more: “I’ve tried to send people emails. But all this effort I’ve had, it can be undone. 
You don’t really need to [communicate via email] to validate your idea. You contact 
these people and you want to get their feedback and see if they have a demand to see if 
they’ll actually use your product. But right now, I can validate macro and microtrends 
using technology I have on hand to find out more. I’ve been making data-driven decisions 
– all the great ideas by founders are guesses. If all the business plans are guesses – what 
we need to do is use data to prove what’s right and what’s wrong. I’m using Google 
search volumes that indicate demand. The more long-tail keyword searches, the larger 
the demand… I spent so much time and created so little value [with my previous 
attempts]. Why would I go back to that now?” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 
December, 2016).  
 The data analytics also allowed the founder to fine tune the website to improve 
visitors: “I’m making iterations with different topics and different settings. And I want to 
see what the engagement rate is. I use heat maps and recordings to see how people with 
different interests have different interests in spending… This allows me to have a clear 
direction of how to go forward. It allows me to capture high engagement [of visitors to a 




2.2.26. Expanding on Idea #5 - New affiliate marketing website for costumes and 
continued focus on testing the market. 
 With the success of their existing websites and affiliate marketing (refer to 2.2.23 
and 2.2.25), the founder wanted to expand the creation of websites for affiliate marketing: 
“It will take me a long time to mine this direction… It shows it has become a sustainable 
business model already. And finally, I think the onboarding process. It’ll slow down in 
the future, but it seems there’s no ending to it [now]. I’ll do it until I have to stop… Even 
if there are exciting new business opportunities proposed by my advisors – I’ll focus on 
this. It’s much more important than others” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 21 December, 
2016).  The founder also noted that the mentors had no objection to him pursuing affiliate 
marketing for his startup: “No one is telling me to stop so that’s good advice” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 21 December, 2016).  
Website. He decided to focus on creating a website for costumes based on TV show 
characters: “There’s a particular market that I see there’s a business opportunity – TV 
shows. Say, you see something and you want to dress up like a character – like Misty – a 
Pokemon supporting character. IT ends up with low competition for costumes to deal 
with the market. There’s over three million visitors in traffic over two years. It’s simple. 
You click on a character and they show you the clothing item. They don’t have inventory 
at all though. They direct you to Amazon, and then anything you purchase, they take five 
to ten percent. It’s very clever. You make so much profit and create so much volume for 
Amazon. So many TV shows do this. They’re generating so much traffic” (Startup C 
Founder, Interview, 21 December, 2016).  
Data analytics. By the beginning of 2017, the founder of Startup C had already planned 
to validate the model to see whether there was interest: “A fancy website isn’t correlated 
with more traffic. That’s what I’m finding. I’ve been doing some research and then 
launching websites in a day. And then I can go out and validate… What I can do is 
scrape the data. And then, it gives me a huge advantage” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 
21 December, 2016).   
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. While Startup C at times had advertisements, and messaged 
potential customers through social media, emails, phone and in-person, all these 
interactions were meant to direct potential customers to a specific test-version of a 
website. From the data collected through interviews and secondary materials, there were 





4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
Mentors. In contrast to other startups in the sample, the founder of Startup C was heavily 
reliant on advice from his mentors: “I have one advisor at… the largest incubator in 
Canada. He is not just an advisor, but more committed. I have another [local advisor]. 
He has much more active commitments [to the startup]. We are three people working 
together on this. And I’m the one working full-time” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 1 
June, 2016).  
 At times, the mentors had opposing views however: “[Mentor #1] looks to money 
to validate. And [Mentor #2] is a long-term vision guy. He doesn’t’ really care about the 
money right now. I prefer [Mentor #2’s] solution. With him guiding me, I’m learning a 
lot, I can reflect” (Startup C Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016).   
 By late 2016, the founder had developed a partnership of sorts while working with 
these mentors: “[Mentor #1] has been working with me. We chat every week… He’s 
introducing new opportunities after seeing my hard work over the past year, and we’ve 
moved from monthly to biweekly meetings. He’s giving me direction now. Rather than 
general oversight. I think that means more dedication and flexibility” (Startup C Founder, 
Interview, 24 October, 2016). From the data collected through interviews and secondary 
materials, no additional major stakeholder interactions were noted. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 All major challenges are detailed above. From the data collected through 
interviews and secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted. 
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017 
 In early 2017, the founder continued with affiliate marketing. His biggest 
commissions remained with the engagement ring website he had built in October 2016 
(refer to 2.2.23), with a recent commission of $3500 from a single sale. The partnerships 
with mentors have continued, however the meetings with Startup C have decreased over 
time. While the affiliate marketing websites are successfully bringing in funds, the 
founder continued to explore starting business opportunities in real estate, however had 




Appendix B4. Startup D 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
First launched in November 2015 under a different name, Startup D was a marketplace 
that facilitated the connection of property owners of available downtown rental spaces, or 
venues (supply-side customers), to consumers needing a short-term rental for event 
purposes (demand-side customers). The founders considered Startup D to be part of the 
sharing economy – a peer-to-peer sharing of access to good and services – creating a 
marketplace akin to the ride sharing service, Uber, and AirBnB, the online marketplace 
and hospitality service.  
 Rather than launch in larger cities, Startup D wanted to predominantly operate in 
mid-sized cities. Not only were the founders familiar with the community needs of their 
own mid-sized city, they felt that Startup D would help foster economic development in 
these cities – one of their own personal goals: “Mid-sized cities are more receptive to our 
business because we’re more seen as an active and cultural stimulator, which is 
something that mid-sized cities are begging for, because they don’t have a lot of cultural 
activities or economic development growth. So, us going there is almost like a service to 
them, whereas in [large metropolitan city], they don’t really care because things are 
already happening there” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
 The idea for Startup D arose while the CEO and COO were working in the not-
for-profit sector and were unable to find affordable, interesting venues for events they 
were planning in the mid-sized cities they worked in: “Why can’t you rent a vacant space 
or an underutilized space for a lot cheaper, saving a lot of money, and be more 
interesting, more unique?” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). They 
also had the goal to improve the economic and cultural development in mid-sized cities – 
such as the city from where they originated: “What our platform does is, it actually 
enables cities to increase their cultural and economic activity because it allows 
entrepreneurs to get access to the spaces to bring their ideas to life, and allows for those 
that are looking to put together cultural events to actually make it happen instead of 
going through all sorts of bureaucratic processes. It’s sort of like, an engine for 
community, with the economic development, and that’s the way I really see this as 
making an impact” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). 
 They reached out to some event planners for their thoughts and found: “During 
the first months we reached out to some event planners, just hearing feedback from 
people, [and hearing they were interested” (Startup D, 2 June, 2016). The founders 
speculated that while right now, there was limited competition in the event rental space, 




and they would be able to grow Startup D and develop a name for themselves quickly: 
“So, [these cities] are developing, in this rapid growth phase. And developed cities are 
fully-developed. Like they’ve gone through all the things that a midsized city would go 
through… in the midsized cities, the opportunities are starting to bubble up or people are 
desperate to make sure those opportunities are bubbling up... I think we have the ability 
to gain huge market share because we have less competitors in this space… I think you 
can have a way larger splash or impact in those midsized cities” (Startup D Founder A, 
Interview, 3 August, 2016). However, Startup D was also unsure how open potential 
demand-side customers in these mid-sized cities would be to their business model: “In 
bigger cities, there’s much more acceptance of sharing economy style models and this 
unique business arrangement” (Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016).   
The three founders described Startup D as:  
a)“an online marketplace for short-term rentals or commercial spaces”,  
b) [a way for] people in [mid-sized town] that have great ideas, want to do great 
things, and… we enable those things to happen”,  
and c) “the marketplace to book, discover, and list pop-up events and art spaces. 
You’re kind of like un-limiting social entrepreneurs, artists and innovators in the 
city. It’s really about that, un-limiting the world. It’s making awesome spaces 
more accessible, making things more accessible for entrepreneurs to do cool 
things, allowing unique, creative spaces for artists to access” (Startup D Founders 
A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).  
1.2. Founders 
The company was co-founded by three serial entrepreneurs who met through a 
non-profit focused on economic development of small communities. The COO was aged 
27, the CEO was aged 23, and shortly thereafter, they were joined by a CTO and software 
architect/developer, aged 18. All three co-founders had other part-time obligations (either 
contract work or school), however, all three spent at least 50 percent of their time 
working with the startup.  
1.3. About the Customers 
Because this is a marketplace, there are supply-side customers offering goods or 
services, and demand-side customers, looking to purchase these goods or services. This 
section describes each of these customers for Startup D. 
1.3.1. Customers – Supply-Side 
 The supply-side customers of Startup D were owners or property managers who 
had unused space to rent out. These included a range of venue spaces in the city: “There’s 




galleries, restaurants, and shops and co-working spaces. You just have empty spaces 
sometimes. You have retail spots and then… there are just so many spaces [available]” 
(Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). The spaces available would range 
in size and characteristics: “We definitely want really big spaces, but we also want 
smaller spaces as well because needs are really diverse, so spaces have to be diverse at 
the same time to meet those needs” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
Several venue owners were interested to list their venue space with Startup D 
because they struggled with having underutilized space that was expensive to maintain: 
“We had a bunch of people try to list their space, so bunch of churches. Again, side 
revenue stream for churches, especially traditional ones that have enormous amounts of 
space with declining [interest]… And then some tech companies… they had some 
underutilized space, I think like 3,000 square feet that they didn’t need, and said, ‘well, 
we could rent it out for office or events, whatever it is.’ So yeah, super diverse set of 
people but it often is like underutilized space side revenue streams, small to mid-sized 
companies, like probably in the 1 to 20 person size”(Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 
July, 2016). 
 Initially, Startup D concentrated on securing large commercial supply-side 
customers. They thought it would be an easier way to get access to several properties at a 
time: “We always felt that we would have to launch with a lot of space already or else 
people would see [the web platform] and it would look empty and they wouldn’t be into 
it. So, we thought it would be a great idea to launch with a [commercial]partner who has 
a lot of spaces… But [they are] awesome in certain ways, but quite hard to work with. 
They have a much higher need for due diligence… and I think the money he is making out 
of renting spaces is little, relative to what he makes on being a property owner” (Startup 
D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).  
In contrast, the founders quickly found that they preferred working with small, 
independent property owners and managers. Throughout the interviews, a variety of 
reasons were given for this:  
• Negative past experiences working with large supply-side customers: The 
founders of Startup D were hesitant about working with large, traditional venues 
such as hotels and commercial real estate because of the negative past experiences 
they had when working with a large supply-side customer: “I have been finding 
that dealing with large commercial real estate on the supply side is actually a lot 
more frustrating than sole proprietors who just own a single space and want to 
rent it out to us”(Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).  In 
particular, they wanted to avoid the bureaucracy and formality that comes along 
with working with larger customers: “We’ll see if that ends up not working long-
term. I think it might work as long as it’s small, but if you ever get to the [large 




more process and policy. And in many ways, [Startup D] exists to undermine 
those companies” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016). 
• Interest in working with supply-side customers that were supportive of their 
goals: Startup D also preferred to work with people who had similar goals. When 
speaking of smaller, supply-side customers, they described them as: “those are the 
people who kind of get us. We thought it would be great, as I said before, to go 
after the [large commercial real estate company] of the world and onboard like 
40 to 100 spaces at once. And yeah, it just didn’t work at all. Not our segment. 
They don’t do this” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016). 
 While having supply-side customers on the site was important, it was 
particularly important to the founders of Startup D that the supply-side customers 
were invested in making the business model feasible. They realized that 
independent, smaller space owners would benefit more from being supply-side 
customers and typically had more unique spaces: With the larger supply-side 
customer, the commercial real estate company, he usually just says, ‘No, no 
music,’ and something like that. It made us realize that he doesn’t care about this 
revenue. The space costs $300 to rent. That is like realistically nothing… to a 
multibillionaire. So, it’s like he doesn’t care, so all of this bureaucratic stuff is 
just annoying him. Whereas [the smaller supply-side customer] is willing to do it 
because it’s like paying the lease of his space. He’s able to keep the space for half 
a year longer because we’ve been sending him rentals. So, it actually matters to 
him and he’s willing to make it work, and it’s a bit more personal…. So, it’s cool 
things, like the small art galleries, like a person who owns a single commercial 
space rather than a hundred [that we want to work with]. That was a big 
learning. We realized our supply side customer segment changed” (Startup D 
Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). 
• Preference for unique venue spaces: One of the goals of the founders was to 
create a database of unique event spaces, architecturally interesting buildings, 
which would differentiate their business from their competitors on the 
marketplace: “Because they’re all the same, they all look nice, they’re all small, 
they all look [to be] around the same price. So, unless you have huge demand, 
then all your value is lost” (Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016). They 
believed that having unique spaces for rent would be a big attraction to demand-
side customers: “We’re trying to have tons of weird and awesome spaces. So, it’s 
not just photography studios, it’s not just dance studios, but if we can get like old 
warehouses and if we can find air crafting which, of all things, we’re trying to like 
focus on right now. If we can get a farm filed, it doesn’t matter what it is, it 
doesn’t matter if people will ever use it. It’s just like making them keep clicking 




diversity of places. I think that’s what’s going to kind of set us apart from kind of 
these big competitors” (Startup D Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016). 
Furthermore, it was important to Startup D to have a diversity of unique spaces: 
“We [would] like to have a diversity of sizes. We definitely want the really big 
spaces, but we also want smaller spaces as well because the needs [of potential 
demand-side customers] are really diverse, so the spaces have to be diverse at the 
same time to meet those needs. So, yeah, it’s not like we’re pinpointing one, but 
we just want like, very unique spaces. Ones that would make you just say, ‘Wow! 
That’s really cool. I would want to do something in there.’ ” (Startup D Founder 
A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
 While the Startup D would make money through charging the demand-side 
customers a fee, the supply side customers were essential to attract to the web platform 
first: “Revenue is only generated through renters, the people using the space. But that 
doesn’t mean we don’t spend time trying to on-board properties onto the online market” 
(Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). The goal was to have at least 20 
spaces available in a city before launching. After this time, the interactions with supply-
side customers would then ideally only take 20 percent of Startup D’s time: “We want to 
make sure that every time we go into a city, we’re interacting with the supply side 20 
percent of the time…. Then we’re ready to just focus on the demand-side to make sure 
we’re actually generating activity [rentals] within the spaces” (Startup D Founder A, 
Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
1.3.2. Customers – Demand-Side 
 Demand-side customers for Startup D were individuals who sought out and paid 
to use the event spaces provided for hire through the web marketplace. The founders 
anticipated that these customers would be younger, internet-savvy individuals, from the 
ages of 18 to 40 years of age. They included: “not-for-profit executives and people who 
are planning events. Like, we’ve had a bunch of bridal showers in spaces. People doing 
music videos, photo shoots, pop-up retail. It’s actually a super diverse bunch of customer 
segments. So yeah, I’d say it’s that diverse. There are like the pop-ups, then there are 
events that are like large-scale fundraisers of small 30-person events” (Startup D 
Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). 
 The diversity of demand-side customer needs was particularly a focus for Startup 
D: “We have a whole range. We have musicians, artists, those who want to put up a 
retail store, pop-up retail store, maybe a restaurant or those who need co-working space 
or meeting spaces, those that need a hall to do a conference, those who need spaces for 
weddings. I mean the list goes on, right? So, there’s where a whole range of people we 
want to interact with. Our biggest customers would be on the demand side. That’s like 
80% of our focus because that’s where we generate revenue” (Startup D Founder A, 




2. STARTUP HISTORY 
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016 
Founded Startup D
Cease and Desist and Shut Down
Newspaper Article and Simple Online Web Form Put 
Online
Attracted Supply-side Customers through Word of 
Mouth and Personal Network
Growing Interest only from Demand-side customers
Pokemon Go/Startup D Map Promotion
Worked with Government to Develop Startup
Losing Loyalty of Supply-Side Customers
Testing First Live Transactions with Customers
Launch of Web Platform Marketplace




2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Founding of Startup D, First Month of Operation. 
Website and blog. The first time that Startup D launched was in November 2015, under 
a different name. At the time, the website was not yet established as they had envisioned. 
Startup D was not yet an autonomous marketplace, where supply-side customers could 
post their event space and demand-side customers could interact with supply-side 
customers directly through the site.  
Email. Instead, the founders had to manually match supply-side and demand-side 
customers: “The original platform was very manual. We literally shuttled emails back 
and forth between the space owner and the renter…. We needed the automated platform 
for it to actually be a good customer experience [though]” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, 
Interview, 2 June, 2016). At the time the website could be described as follows: “It was 
essentially just a map with the photos of the spaces and if you wanted to book it, you’d to 
email us and then we’d do it. So, otherwise, it was just like a fancy map, but even then, 
people thought it was like this incredible website” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 11 
November, 2016). 
Newspaper, blog, and social media. In their first weeks of operation, Startup D had 44 
commercial properties available for rent through one partner – a large local real estate 
and development company - and approximately 30 individual space owners looking to 
lease an underutilized spaces for events they were holding. The founders promoted the 
business through their network, a large media event and social media: “When we 
launched, I was asking everyone on Facebook… - essentially like, ‘You know, here’s a 
thing I’ve been working on. Give me some feedback on it.’ And some people gave some 
awesome feedback related to that. And then once we started having some customers 
going through [the platform], they’d say, ‘Oh, I wish the platform had this. I wish it did 
that.’ ” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016). They also had two 
articles written about them in a local newspaper and blog that gained them some 
publicity. 
Despite the manual nature of their current operations, in the first few weeks, 
Startup D had facilitated 33 bookings (connections between supply-side customers and 
demand-side customers), and had received customer feedback from both sides. By 
launching in November 2015, before committing to building a fully functioning online 
marketplace, Startup D could first test the concept of a venue marketplace. 
2.2.2. Startup D served a cease and desist by regional real estate board. 
 One month into operation, in December 2015, the startup was served a cease and 
desist by the not-for-profit organization that regulates the trade of real estate in the 




Business Brokers Act, and was receiving commission on real estate without a proper 
license.  
While receiving a seize and desist order was not favourable, the founders realized 
that at the rate of growth they had experienced during a few weeks, that operating the 
business manually would not be sustainable long term. The pressure to have an 
automated web platform intensified as their demand-side customer base increased, and 
the founders found it difficult to manage their needs through the manual temporary 
process they had in place: “It got so much interest, but we’re doing everything manually, 
and it was just getting a little out of control. We were all working other jobs and were not 
expecting the kind of manual work we’re doing. It’s almost like we would start dropping 
the ball a lot more. We needed the automated platform for it to actually be a good 
customer experience” (Startup D Founders A, D, M, Interview, 2 June, 2016).  
2.2.3. Shut down original business, started building web platform, and offline bookings 
continue. 
In December 2015, the founders shut down the website and planned to take six 
months (until June 2016), to re-brand, reorganize how they approached the business, and 
to create an autonomous marketplace platform. During this time, they brought on their 
technical co-founder, the CTO, to develop the software the business would need to scale. 
Despite this setback, the founders believed that the results of their initial launch 
demonstrated that Startup D could be viable and that their minimum viable product – a 
marketplace for event spaces – would attract both demand-side and supply-side 
customers.  
Rather than closing the business completely or pivoting to another business 
direction with this setback, the founders decided to partner with local government to 
better understand their concerns, start contributing to the discussion on regulations in the 
recently formed sharing economy, and ultimately, to reduce the likelihood that they 
would be affected by other setbacks in the future. In addition to their experience working 
with NGOs and in event planning, the founders had a background in local politics, and 
therefore, already had connections to start to work with local government.  
At the time, the founders still had customers approaching them to seek out spaces 
to rent. They continued to facilitate transactions manually, using email to match supply-
side and demand-side customers. While Startup D wanted to incorporate feedback from 
customer interactions into their web platform, at this stage, they were cautious as to what 
type of feedback was relevant. Most importantly, they did not want to over-cater to the 
needs of customers that were not necessarily representative of all customers: “We also 
didn’t want to overbuild towards one specific customer segment if we didn’t really need 
it. Because we don’t yet know if that kind of thing [that the supply-side customer is 





2.2.4. Newspaper article written about Startup D generates publicit and interest from 
customers. 
Newspaper article. By mid-June 2016, Startup D was already starting to get some media 
attention when a local newspaper wrote their second article about the founders; the first 
one being written about their initial startup. This attention created awareness from both 
potential demand-side and supply-side customers who subsequently reached out to the 
startup for venue hire. While the founders were happy with the article, they were still 
building the web platform and felt the pressure was on to launch: “We’re kind of nervous 
that this one was coming out before we’re launching, just because… we wanted it to 
happen under our own terms and we weren’t ready to launch it. So, it kind of forced our 
timeline, which actually is okay, I suppose... We’ve gotten a fair amount of exposure from 
it, but the problem is, we’re not live, so it wasn’t awesome timing” (Startup D Founder M, 
Interview, 22 June, 2016). 
2.2.5. Delay in second launch of Startup D’s web platform and continued manual 
matching of supply-side and demand-side customers. 
 By late June 2016, Startup D had hoped to launch but were experiencing several 
issues with the software development process and still needed to secure some supply-side 
customers with venues available to rent: “We’re finding some bugs. We worked through 
them last night and then we’re getting we’re getting potential spaces on board through it. 
But before we launch, we need at least 10 to 20 spaces so it doesn’t look empty when 
people go there” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 June, 2016). 
Online website form. In the meantime, while their web platform was not yet functional, 
they wanted to take advantage of the media attention they had received. Startup D created 
an online form on a simple website that helped the founders to facilitate booking event 
spaces: “Our website is basic... It goes to a Google form and you essentially fill in your 
space description.” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 June, 2016). While Startup D 
was predominantly focused on attracting supply-side customers before the web platform 
went live, they still had demand-side customers having events that were being attracted to 
their web form: “If we just look at our data, we have only events [and not other reasons 
why people are renting spaces]. But I think that is a localized phenomenon like [mid-
sized city name] and [other] mid-sized cities” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 June, 
2016). 
Data analytics. In the meantime, Startup D was using Google Analytics to capture 
information on visitors to their website: “We have pretty good analytics. Google 
Analytics is pretty good. It’s free. So, we can track the city, the demographics, gender 
and interests because Google loves giving up your personal data. But in terms of 
individuals, [we only get that information] if it’s a signup” (Startup D Founder D, 




 This manual matching of supply and demand-side customers continued into July 
2016. Even large events that could bring in substantial revenue were contacting Startup 
D: “It’s slowed down, but it still happens. We’re doing a booking in an airplane hangar 
[for the Fall, for example]. It’s a fashion show from New York that needed an airplane 
hangar so we found the perfect location” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 
2016). 
 A month later, in July, the Google form was still being used for supply-side and 
demand-side customers to enter their information about spaces and space needs into the 
simple website: “We sort of made that splash page just really quickly because we got the 
[local newspaper] article and we wanted to make sure that, in case people were going to 
our website that, we were able to capture their requests. So, we put together a Google 
Sheets type of thing, like questionnaire. And if you wanted space, you would just fill it 
out. We had seven requests from that article, even though we were anticipating 
nothing…” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
2.2.6. Received suggestion from customer to automate search for supply-side customers 
using technology. 
Word-of-mouth, personal network, databases, and email. Startup D had been bringing 
supply-side customers to their site from June 2016, predominantly through word-of-
mouth and personal connections in their town. They realized however that to grow, they 
needed to find a more automated way to find supply-side customers. With a suggestion 
from one of their current demand-side customers. Startup D explored the possibility of 
searching publicly available databases to find and automate the process of contacting and 
on-boarding supply-side customers: “And so we started finding all of these aggregators. 
Some of them are funded by government, not-for-profit. The list is like 10,000 
photography studios in America, in like maybe twelve different cities [that we could have 
as customers]. And so then [CTO developer] built an API (application program 
interface) which scrapes the database. Also, our competitors don’t protect their data, so 
we have all of their data as well… So, it’s an API that scrapes all the photography 
studios. And then the next part we have to build is their profile, and show what it would 
look like – the description, all the pricing based on all that stuff and their contact 
information is there. We send it to them and say, ‘if you wanted another distribution 
channel to get more bookings, this is what your profile would look like on [Startup D’s 
web platform]. If you’re interested and the information is correct, hit ‘yes,’ and that’s a 
supply immediately. So, it would be a way of like, very, very quickly getting supply. But 
we never would have thought of that if it wasn’t for [embedded independent supply-side 
customer] saying to us, ‘there are more of us in the world essentially.’ Yeah, customer 
feedback has been like the most valuable thing” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 22 
June, 2016). Despite excitement about this technology and the suggestion from a 




2.2.7. Testing of web platform with embedded supply-side customer.  
In-person. By July 2016, while the web platform had not publicly launched, Startup D 
had one supply-side customer that they had a strong relationship with that was willing to 
test the web platform from a customer perspective to assess what issues might exist: “We 
had one customer going through out site and trying to break it. It’s been awesome 
because he’s been giving us a ton of feedback and it’s like we can show him more 
unfinished product than we would probably [show] to the public…. I want him to look at 
it more so because he is the one that has seen it for so long… In general, he kind of gets 
this world and he gets the business and wants it to exist, wants us to succeed, and also, I 
guess he probably sees us like reciprocation for giving him so much business” (Startup D 
Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).  
2.2.8. Slow on-boarding of supply-side customers. 
 By July 2016, Startup D had ten supply-side customers and their details integrated 
into the web platform. However, because of the delays in launching the web platform, the 
founders had noticed that the supply-side customers were getting a bit restless: “We’ve 
started to pull back a bit [in talking to supply-side customers] because I think we’ve had 
so many interactions saying, ‘[the launch] is coming soon.’ It’s like I think some of them 
might be losing faith [that we’ll launch], and when that’s going to happen. So, I want to 
hold back [on interactions] until we can actually [launch] with them” (Startup D Founder 
M, Interview, 13 July, 2016).  
Personal connections. In the meantime, there were still a few personal contacts in their 
professional network, not-for-profit organizations, showed their interest in being supply-
side customers for Startup D. The startup was willing to take them on the web platform: 
“His space is like a pop-up retail incubator and an event space… He wants to list the 
unutilized space… and then there’s [other not-for-profit organization]… They have three 
other floors [in their building]… As that expands, and when there’s unutilized space, 
she’s going to list that on [Startup D]…. Another thing we have is the free option, [to 
offer spaces for free], as this started off to benefit the community. [Another not-for-profit 
organization] has a large boardroom that could probably hold 20 to 30 people. So, we’re 
listing a couple of free spaces too” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 13 July, 2016). 
2.2.9. Prioritizing building the basic web platform software, despite requests from 
supply-side customers.  
In-person and email. By July 2016, all founders of Startup D were concerned about how 
slowly the web platform was being built and they began prioritizing which features were 
being built into the web platform. The CEO found that some supply-side customers were 
asking for very specific features that not everyone would need, and started saying no to 
them: “I don’t remember what [the request] was, but it was tangential to our core goal… 




only going to benefit them. If you start to build software only for your big clients, you end 
up with very specific software code for their needs, and you lose mass market ability 
because you’re going to have such a focused feature set. So, we said no to them... I think 
a lot of software companies can get very caught up in their early client” (Startup D 
Founder D, Interview, 19 July, 2016).  
 The CTO was also concerned about the time it was taking to develop the web 
platform. The goal was to launch at the end of August 2016. For him, the most important 
focus became having a working platform, rather than focusing on special aesthetic 
features: “Although there are other features that may look nice if immediately shown to a 
client, it would be best to focus on the one that would prevent the entire platform from 
functioning” (Startup D Founder D, Interview D, 19 July, 2016).  
 There was in the meantime, substantial frustration between the co-founders on the 
delays: “We’re waiting for our CTO to finish the website. There are a few bugs that need 
to be taken care of. And a couple of other features that still need to be built out… One 
big, big, big challenge we’ve had throughout the past couple of months has been 
estimation time and being able to manage software development… You estimate like four 
to five days and then it takes two weeks. It’s kind of frustrating” (Startup D Founder A, 
Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
2.2.10. Potential on-boarding of unique large factory space as supply-side customer.  
 Late July 2016, Startup D was offered the opportunity to have a former large 
factory as one of their supply-side customers. The founders were excited for the potential 
of the location. It was both unique and historic, and could be revitalized as a rental venue: 
“It used to house 800 employees. It’s one million square feet, and has 30 buildings… It’s 
just incredible, the space…. The idea is that those spaces are going to be listed on our 
platform. And people who want to put together events or who want to use the office 
spaces out there for co-working or starting their own retail business [could]…. We’re 
looking at a very unique and niche end of the market” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 
20 July, 2016). This opportunity eventually fell through.  
2.2.11. Growing interest from demand-side customers. 
 Despite not yet launching the automated web platform, by late July 2016, 
demand-side customers continued to contact Startup D for spaces using the Google form 
through their simple website: “We had someone who wanted to open up a seafood 
restaurant… for two weeks. We had someone who wanted to do their organization’s 50th 
anniversary celebration.. a fundraiser… [and] there’s someone that wants to do a 
birthday party… Honestly, it’s all over the place” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 
July, 2016). 
 While Startup D accepted these customers, they decided however to not actually 




trouble we’re having right now is our product is still not launched. The beta is still not 
launched. And so, if we don’t have the product ready, we can’t necessarily go after our 
customers, which is unfortunate. But in the meantime, we’ve had the opportunity to really 
sit down and rigorously plan everything. I think that will go a long way. I think it’s really 
worthwhile because planning will give us like more of a structure and more of a clear 
path to be able to acquire the customers when the product is ready” (Startup D Founder 
A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
2.2.12. Discussions to include rental insurance on the web platform.  
Supply-side customers often requested that demand-side customers renting the 
space had insurance for the events that they wanted to hold in their venue spaces. 
However, it was generally challenging for demand-side customers to find insurance, 
particularly when they were organizing an event within a short period of time. This 
prompted Startup D to search for insurance companies to partner with on their web 
platform that would offer event insurance. The challenge was that customers expected 
that event insurance would be available almost immediately after filling out a form 
online. In response to this issue, the company actively sought potential insurance 
companies whom they could partner with to offer insurance quickly through their web 
platform during the application process.  
Within a few weeks, by mid-July, they were in talks with ten different insurance 
companies: “We’ve been able to strike a deal between ten different insurance providers, 
pulling in a certain amount of money to make this happen. So, it’s massive value for our 
company because it’s a value proposition that really does differentiate us with our 
conversation… [having insurance] created for a sharing economy company like us” 
(Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016).  
Seeking out rental insurance agreements also appeased the sharing economy 
regulatory body that the startup was part of. The agency found other sharing economy 
companies, such as Uber and AirBnB, had failed to address insurance needs and were 
pleased that Startup D had considered this: “They were also very impressed with the fact 
that we solved the insurance problem that other sharing economy companies haven’t” 
(Startup D Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016). 
2.2.13. Use of worldwide gaming phenomenon, Pokemon Go, to promote Startup D’s 
name. 
Supplementary website. In July 2016, there was a smartphone game, Pokemon Go, that 
was launched. The game blended digital and real worlds, where using GPS location 
features of the phone, individuals playing the game would walk around town, and with 
the phone detecting specific locations, they could ‘catch’ characters in the game. To take 
advantage of the excitement around the game, the startup temporarily launched a Startup 




scores in the game: “Everyone is playing Pokemon Go. Literally the entire globe is 
playing this thing… Everyone is freaking out because this [Startup D’s map] is really 
cool. Now, I can cheat my way through getting Pokemon [characters]. And then, we can 
use this for [promoting Startup D]… So, we’re getting all these people on board, why not 
just promote [Startup D also]?” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
2.2.14. Working with local government to develop Startup D.  
By July 2016, the government had put together a new committee to create 
regulations around businesses in the sharing economy, such as Startup D. Startup D, 
having connections already with the local government bodies, wanted to stay connected 
and to become part of the committee to ensure that they were contributing to the vision of 
the industry: “We’re looking to get an exemption from the council, which would be 
additional value if we have the government approval exemption of our company… We’re 
most likely also going to be on a sharing economy committee at a provincial level with 
AirBnB and Uber, coming up with legislation to take care of grey areas that involve 
companies like us. This will be huge value because the connections we get through the 
committee will be incredible” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 20 July, 2016). 
The next month, in August 2016, Startup D’s founders spoke with their local city 
councilor to put city’s unutilized venue spaces on their web platform, making the 
government a supply-side customer. This would benefit Startup D in gaining more 
spaces, as well as furthering one of their goals of improving local economic development: 
“So, the [provincial] ministry is like 100 percent supportive of our company. They want 
to help us out, they support us… We also recognize that the future is the sharing 
economy, and that the ministry and basically all these government departments in the 
province are moving to basically accept the sharing economy” (Startup D Founder A, 
Interview, 3 August, 2016).  
Word-of-mouth and media. The founders also believed that having support from the 
local government in their mid-sized town was likely to get media and word-of-mouth 
attention that would benefit their growth and that this was support that they would not get 
in a larger city: “In [our mid-sized city], when something is happening in the city that is 
now, you can get the support of the mayor and heads of all these Economic Development 
organizations, whereas in [nearby large metropolitan city], you’ll never even get to talk 
to those people… I think you can have a way larger splash or impact in those mid-sized 
cities” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016). 
2.2.15. Discovered that supply-side customers were advertising their space on other web 
platforms.  
Online various websites. By August 2016, Startup D realizes that their current supply-
side customers were posting their venue spaces on multiple competing platforms. To 




relationship, they focused their efforts on attracting demand-side customers: “I think 
that’s going to happen. We’re going to have a million competitors and everyone’s going 
to go all over the place. We’re going to steal all their competitors’ spaces. They’re going 
to steal ours. We’re going to do everything we can to stop them. I think, in the end, the 
ones who will win are the ones who can provide the most demand, like the most rentals 
for that space owner… Our priority is going to be on the demand-side. I think everything 
we’re doing is to ensure that we’re having like an 80 to 20 ratio [, demand-side to 
supply-side customer focus,] in terms of focus, time, resources, everything” (Startup D 
Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016). 
2.2.16. Reaching out to demand-side customers. 
Online advertising. To generate demand, in August 2016, they started trying different 
forms of marketing: “[We’re trying] many different marketing experiments. From 
CoolCall, we have Lead List doing some different promotions. Whether it’s events and 
promos using Google Ad Words, Facebook Ad Words, or the other ones on there. There’s 
a list of [options]... There’s more than a hundred” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 3 
August, 2016). 
Internet scraping for leads. Startup D also started to develop software that would 
automate the search for leads on the Internet of individuals who are looking for venues or 
have venues to rent out: “Imagine something that searches through Twitter and social 
media for people who are looking for a space… like a bunch of different keywords and 
phrases. It can [use a]… machine learning network to tell you whether there’s a lead or 
not… Then, it essentially is always scraping through the Internet, finding leads and then 
tweeting about them and Facebook messaging them…. They’ll always be automating 
demand and they’ll always be linking people talking about spaces to our space” (Startup 
D Founder A, Interview, 3 August, 2016).  
2.2.17. Delay of web platform launch and continued development.  
By late August 2016, the web platform still had not launched (see last delay in 
section 2.2.5). While Startup D had initially intended to launch in May, five months after 
the cease and desist, the founders did not believe that they had captured what the 
customers were looking for on their marketplace yet: “We haven’t had enough users to 
add features and get feedback on it. We’ve definitely de-scoped things. Our technical co-
founder has the tendency to make things over-complex. The thing is, it could have been 
more simple, taking a day, rather than a week” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 24 
August, 2016).  
Though their next launch date was scheduled for September 12th, 2016, they 
missed it. The delay was being attributed to the time it was taking to develop the 
software: “The software in general has been taking a ridiculous amount of time, but 




to hire and we don’t also have the ability to do programming ourselves and code 
ourselves. We just have one developer and we have to work with him to the best of our 
abilities. But we’re hoping that we can launch sometime in September, the beta” (Startup 
D Founder A, Interview, 8 September, 2016). 
Website. The same Google form on their website that had been used for the past months 
was still being used by Startup D in September 2016: “If you click on [‘I have a space’], 
a Google form would pop open so if you have a space, you could fill out exactly what you 
would fill out on the website. That way we have your information, and we know that if 
someone on the demand-side is filling up the form and saying, ‘I need a space for this,” 
we have a database of spaces already. It’s a lot of manual labour, but I think that’s 
something we have to do anyways because there’s no website” (Startup D Founder A, 
Interview, 8 September, 2016).  
Word-of-mouth and news articles. Even with the delays in launching the automated 
web platform, there was still interest from both supply-side and demand-side customers. 
The supply-side customers had spaces that they were keen to rent out, and demand-side 
customers were seeking spaces to hold events. Concurrently, word-of-mouth and news 
articles continued to raise awareness about Startup D. The startup had demand-side 
customers approaching them: “People are requesting a space and… it’s tough given their 
timelines to find a space where they can rent for a day” (Startup D Founder A, Interview, 
8 September, 2016). This early customer demand meant that the founders had to continue 
their manual customer-to-venue matching process in place of their yet to be developed 
automated process. 
2.2.18. Testing first live transaction with demand-side customer.  
By November 2016, Startup D still had not launched their web platform, however 
were ready to test their first live transaction with a demand-side customer that was 
seeking an event space. If the platform had not been nearly ready, the founders would 
have had to done the match manually: “We’ve tested everything and everything works. 
It’s just like it would be the first time a customer uses it and see how she interacts with it. 
Like, “what makes sense? What doesn’t? And integrate that feedback as well [before we 
launch]… Mentally, everything makes sense to us. Like we built it, but it doesn’t make 
sense to someone else the first time they see it and so we need to almost test that 
assumption” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 11 November, 2016). 
Online web platform and in-person. Startup D had six supply-side customers with their 
venue spaces posted on the web platform. They felt that this was enough for testing the 
interest and viability of the platform however: “I don’t think you need a lot more than 
that. We might do a couple of weeks of sales and to see if we can get a couple more 
spaces. But if we got up to 30, that would be more than enough, and then we’ll just go on 
demand as much [as possible], because that’s really what matters to getting money on 




for and where we have holes in our spaces [available]… I think right now, it’s about 
getting enough so the platform is useful and doesn’t look empty, and then go on demand” 
(Startup D Founder M, Interview, 11 November, 2016). 
2.2.19. Public launch of web platform marketplace.  
Online web platform. In December 2016, Startup D launched their long-awaited web 
platform marketplace. They had kept delayed launching it several times, until they 
realized finally that it just needed to work, even with a few bugs: “I had a friend tell me, 
if you wait until you're proud of it, you've waited too long. You need to get it out while 
you feel uncomfortable. You're going to change stuff anyway, so might as well get it out. 
It works, that's all that matters.” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 19 December, 2016). 
While they had a few initial bookings from demand-side customers, they did not have a 
flood of bookings at the beginning: “We have lots of people viewing profiles, some people 
trying to book. Not a ton. A couple” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 19 December, 
2016). 
In-person. At the same time, they also spoke with a friend, a potential large demand-side 
customer, who ran training sessions around North America. He was interested in making 
multiple bookings, two-thousand each year, for workshops across Canada. This was seen 
by the founders of Startup D as a potential opportunity to adjust their business model to 
one that is reliant on return business, rather than consistently new bookings: “While our 
current model is open, and if someone needs a space, then great. And maybe that’s cool. 
But maybe that’ll only be 20 percent of our revenue. And maybe we’ll be looking for 
these big clients that are huge space users. A bit more sustainability. So, it’s been 
interesting. I’m not going to count the eggs before they hatch. There’s a lot of things that 
could go wrong with this. It’s a cool opportunity though… But I’m trying to answer the 
question: when are you diverting and being distracted… or are you just following a 
business opportunity? Because if you go massively changing the site, the question is, do 
you even care about that 20 percent [, the originally envisioned customers]… It’s a shift 
in how we’ve been thinking about demand-side customers” (Startup D Founder M, 
Interview, 19 December, 2016). 
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. Startup D experienced cross-over between platforms for 
customer interactions predominantly through word-of-mouth and in-person discussions 
that drove customers to their website. While they had some advertisements, they were 





4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
 Besides customers on the supply and demand-side, the main stakeholders that 
Startup D interacted with individuals in the not-for-profit and government sectors in their 
local town council. These interactions are outlined above in the case. From the data 
collected through interviews and secondary materials, no additional stakeholder 
interactions were noted. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 All major challenges, such as the delays in developing the web platform, are 
detailed above. From the data collected through interviews and secondary materials, no 
additional challenges were noted. 
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017 
 By early 2017, Startup D’s web platform was still up and running. They were 
attracting lots of demand-side customers by experimenting with different types of 
marketing: “We started experimenting with marketing, different marketing channels just 
because we want to find out where we’re getting our cheapest price and therefore we can 
maximize that. So, we did that for about a month and kind of January and a bit of 
February and now we’ve kind of found that best is Facebook, or the best is Kijiji free and 
[we] built an auto posting bot… People freak out, they love some of these spaces, they’re 
discovering new areas of [the city] they didn’t know, they’re sharing it with friends, 
tagging their friends. There’s like a ton of engagement on their ads” (Startup D Founder 
M, Interview, 23 March, 2017). 
 The data that Startup D was collecting on the business using Google Analytics 
showed that growth was quite strong on the demand-side, however not as predictable on 
the supply-side: “We understand how to get demand pretty well now. I have measurable 
conversion rate and I predict. We spend this much money and we’ll get this much ish 
money back, which is really valuable as far as doing projections. So now, it’s not based 
on the BS. When people say, ‘It’s busy in the market. If only we had 1% and get all these 
spaces.’ Now, we actually have data and we can say if we can grow in this market, drive 
this much demand and probably get this much money. But supply side, it’s like chaos. I 
have no idea how replicable, repeatable way of getting supply. It tends to be very 
relationship-based” (Startup D Founder M, Interview, 23 March, 2017). 
In-person meetings, personal relationships, hand written notes, emails. In contrast to 
the online attraction of demand-side customers to Startup D, while a few supply-side 
customers came in through social media, most of them had to be hand-curated to the site 
using more traditional methods, including through personal relationships, in-person 
meetings, hand written notes and direct emails: “Hand signed letters, we send them out to 




and actually a bunch of small business lawyers, small business real estate lawyers and 
small business accountants and bookkeepers. I figured they see real estate transactions 
that are happening on the lawyer side or they know when there’s underutilized space or if 
their clients have rental income… Email and calls and LinkedIn and Facebook ads and 
Google ads - I think that’s everything we’ve tried with them. But it really - I don’t know. I 
kind of want to just hire a bunch of people who are usually political canvassers and just 
unleash them on a city because I think that might be what you need, because it seems to 
be you need to talk to a person, in-person about it. You need to see the space. People like 
to talk about their space. I don’t know. It stinks because it has this kind of small model 
but maybe that’s the model that works. So that’s what it is” (Startup D Founder M, 
Interview, 23 March, 2017). 
 The founders attributed this to the supply-side customers having different 
backgrounds than their demand side customers: “Yeah, [the supply-side customers] tend 
to be older, 40 to 55. I would say more conservative. It’s interesting. Demand side is all 
kind of liberal sided, creative, not always but mostly. And then yeah, supply side is much 
more kind of conservative business minded older adult like 40 to 55 I would say” (Startup 
D Founder M, Interview, 23 March, 2017). 
 Despite having growing competition in the large metropolitan cities, the founders 
of Startup D were conservative about their growth and want to continue to learn from the 
process of growing: “I think I’m like in this -- trying to be too safe and that’s like figure 
everything out in [our city] and then grow from there. Some [people] would give me that 
advice like, “Don’t try to grow too fast or you’re just going to spread yourself thin.” But 
I actually think we have enough information now. I have enough information from our 
customers right now that product roadmap wise, the next year I think I know what we 
need to build. Like from a text side, I don’t think, yes that will take longer to do. We don’t 
have a development capacity. But I think the most important thing to learn now is how 
other markets respond to us and how we can grow in them, because if we don’t know 
that, we don’t know how to grow a business. So, it doesn’t matter if we have a great 




Appendix B5. Startup E 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
Startup E was founded in April 2014 to develop a mobile phone application 
software platform (from here on noted as “app”) to connect online video game players 
(also known as “gamers”), playing team-based video games. The purpose of the app was 
to create a friendly community and to promote better and repeat interactions between 
online gamers: “[We want to be] creating better online gaming experiences for the end 
user and for connecting them. We want our users to meet new people – our motto is 
discover, connect and engage. It’s not about that one-time connection” (Startup E 
Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016). Another goal of Startup E was described 
as: “By connecting you with like-minded gamers whenever you choose to game, you are 
given the freedom to play your favorite games with confidence that the person you're 
playing with won't rage or have conflicting playstyles. Or at least has a mic.” (Reddit)  
 Previously, solutions to finding a gaming partner outside of an online gamer’s 
local social circle involved posting on computer desktop-based website forums. However, 
finding a gaming partner this way was considered time consuming and did not always 
yield a solution: “people would post on a forum – ‘I’m in EST, I live in Canada, I’m 20, I 
play these games, and like to play them in this way.’ You’d have to search through [the 
posted messages]. It may have taken you weeks before you found someone you were 
interested in playing with. This just didn’t work.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 
2016). Furthermore, in contrast to these computer desktop-based website forums, Startup 
E intended to be a mobile phone app. Individuals often had their mobile phones with 
them, and the founders felt that having a mobile-based app would increase interactions 
and messaging: “people playing Xbox on their couch can have their phone – and they 
don’t need to go to the computer to post something online. Or they don’t have to try to 
figure out a forum. And then you can also get notifications… The whole system made 
sense.” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
1.2. Founders 
Startup E was founded by two cofounders in their early 20s who met at college as 
roommates. Founder R was studying business administration leadership and Founder D 
was studying civil engineering and computer systems technology. They shared a common 
interest of playing videogames, and when they were both planning to move out of their 
residence, they shared a common issue: “We started to realize, I was going to go back 
home, and we weren’t going to have those places to sync up our play time as often to 




people in this world that are around the same age, and are going to connect the same 
way we connect. So, how do we find them?” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 
2016). 
1.3. About the Customers 
1.3.2. Customers – Demand-Side 
 The typical users of Startup E’s app were described as: “young males, aged 18 to 
late 20s, maybe early 30s… I define that community as people wanting to come together 
to play the game and discuss playing the games… We don’t want to reach out to anyone 
who would bring about a negative connotation to the brand… We’re trying to be a 
positive, community oriented [app]” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 
2016).  
 At the time of writing (early 2017), Startup E had over 100,000 registered users. 
By downloading a mobile app for personal use, there was an associated contract of terms 
and conditions, however no money was being exchanged to be a member of the gaming 
community.  
 The initial goal of Startup E was to build a large user base on the app to 
demonstrate validation of the idea for creating a community of gamers, and to observe 
how users of the app connected with the community. The monetization strategy had been 
developed at the time of writing, however it was not yet in operation. The terms customer 
and user were used interchangeably by Startup E. This use of terminology is reflected in 
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
 Though Startup E was founded in April 2014, it took a few attempts to develop 
the first version of the app from scratch, and several updates on later versions over time. 
Each time a new version of the app was built, it went live – in other words, became 
accessible online – and gained registered users.  
 The software development of the app occurred in stages. Until August 2014, the 
startup was pre-alpha – where the software had not yet been tested. The alpha version of 
the software – the first phase of the software that was tested - was available between 
November 2014 and March 2015. After March 2015, the beta version of the software was 
available (first closed and then released publically in May 2015). In the beta phase, the 
software still had some bugs in the software code, however, most of the features of the 
software were complete.  The software versions were noted in the process diagram by the 
term Going Live (GL) and by their version: GLα; GLα v2.0 Closed Alpha; GLα v2.5 
Public Alpha; GLβ0.1 Closed Beta; GLβ1.0 Public Beta; GLβ2.0 Public Beta. While 
there were incremental updates after GLβ2.0 Public Beta, the site rarely was non-
functional during them.  
 While most interactions with users of the internet-based mobile phone app took 
place through the Internet, there were a diversity of types of interactions – both online 
and offline - that occurred during the new venture creation process. These interactions 
were one-to-one interactions with users or one-to-many interactions with users – initiated 
directly by the startup, via affiliate partners that promoted the startup, or by users.  
2.2.1. Startup established. 
 Startup E was founded in April 2014. The two co-founders had lived together and 
when one friend was moving out of their residence, they realized that they would no 
longer have immediate access to someone to play team-based video games with. After 
searching for options online and finding limited options besides posting messages on 
desktop website forums, they decided to develop their own app. At the start, both co-
founders worked on the startup part time - with one co-founder working, and the other 
still in school.  
2.2.2. The first version of the app (GLα) was designed and built and created business 
plan. 
By May 2014, the cofounders had designed a prototype for the app, however 
needed to hire someone to code and develop a working app. The initial search for 
developers involved the use of an online classifieds website. While a first version of the 
app was built from May to August 2014, the developer used was not reliable and did not 
work for the startup for long: “We’re not developers. I can piece something together, and 




We drafted up a business plan and drafted out what we wanted staff to look like, and 
started reaching out to people. We started off on [large online classifieds website], trying 
to get quotes from people. We had no idea… literally no idea. We settled on the first 
guy… we had a terrible experience with him, where he just took our code and didn’t give 
it back to us. And said, ‘I want $7000 now.’ So that was a bad experience. And so, we 
realized, we can’t just get people on Kijiji… we need to find people who are in this to be 
part of our team. Not just people who want that lump sum of money” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 8 June, 2016).  
2.2.3. GLα – Alpha – version of the app went live and was promoted to hardcore 
gamers. 
Website, mobile app, blogs, online community forums. At the end of August 2014, 
GLα, the Alpha version of Startup E’s app, was launched (Reddit.com/r/[Startup E]). 
After promoting the site on gaming blog sites and online community forums associated 
with playing video games, the alpha version of the app received 300 downloads before it 
stopped working. Even with this setback of the app not working, the initial downloads 
offered validation to the co-founders that there was a community of gamers interested in 
their app: “We were reaching out to a lot of different gamers, just on blogging sites, 
Reddit and what not. They were really interested in what we do, though we didn’t have a 
product. We ended up getting a couple hundred users before it broke completely… at this 
point, we had a bit of validation, so we said, let’s try again” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
 The online community forums were set up with the intention of specifically 
gaining feedback on the app: “this Subreddit [sub-forum] will be used to obtain, share 
and discuss feedback on Startup E’s personal matchmaking app, a better way to find 
gamers. Startup E is being made with a clear but ambitious goal; to improve the online 
gaming experience of every game that has a multiplayer or co-op mode. This isn't going 
to be easy (but someone has to do it) and we'll need to constantly get feedback from you 
guys to make sure we really are making online gaming fun for you again!” (Reddit).  
2.2.4 The second version of the app (GLα v2.0) was developed and built. 
 In September 2014, Startup E hired the second developer to build the next version 
of the app, GLα v2.0, however this developer only worked with the startup until 
December 2014. 
2.2.5 Startup E engaged with Steam – an online community forum - and release of 
GLα v2.0 - Alpha version 2.0. 
Private network, website, mobile app, blogs, online community forums, social 
media. Startup E continued to engage with gamers to test out their gaming app. To 
connect with users, they posted their first gaming-related picture on social media in 




Steam – a multi-player community gaming platform that is computer desktop-based: “We 
went on there, and we created our own community and connected with other gamers. And 
we started inviting people to this group and started talking about the app with them. And 
a lot of them were like – ‘hey, I’ll meet new friends. Cool.’ So, we kind of reached out to 
people in these different communities. It was kind of the goal to bring them on, and it was 
kind of spammy, in a way, but we were really personal about it. We customized our 
message” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).  
 In November 2014, GLα v2.0 of the app was launched. It was first tested with 
private testers for bugs in the software, and then promoted in two online community 
gaming forums: the forum used to promote version 1.0 of the app, and another, larger 
online multi-player gaming community forum. This resulted in the user base for Startup E 
to grow to 1500 users.  
2.2.6 One co-founder committed full-time to Startup E. 
 With this validation of users, in December 2014, Co-founder R decided to quit 
his current job and commit full-time to work on Startup E. 
2.2.7. Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign and public release of GLα v2.5 - Alpha 
version 2.5. 
Website, mobile app, online crowdfunding platform, social media, online 
community forum. In January 2015, Startup E built its Kickstarter campaign with two 
new developers. The public version of the new app, GLα v2.5, was released in February 
2015, and from February to March 2015, Startup E held an unsuccessful crowdfunding 
campaign where they had aimed to raise $20,000, but had only managed to attract 10 
percent of that: “Honestly, we spent so much time building a great campaign, we forgot 
about marketing our campaign ahead of time... Lesson learned. I guess if we did a 
campaign today, it would have been so much better, but we looked like so many 
campaigns. We had a professional video and some content that we wanted people to see. 
We just had no strategy to get people to look at the campaign and [get them to] back us 
during that month... We thought, wow, people are actually wanting to see something. It 
was pretty exciting but disappointing because we didn’t get the money. We got zero. Just 
a bit of exposure and some hyped gamers that are still on our platform today” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
2.2.8. Startup E moved to a startup accelerator, received angel funding and released - 
GLβ0.1 - Closed Beta version. 
Family and local entrepreneurship network, in person and news articles. In March 
2015, Startup E moved to work out of a local startup accelerator. They also received 
$20,000 in angel funding from family and an $1000 college associated entrepreneurship 




Website, mobile app, social media, online community forum. The startup released 
their beta closed version of the app for testing with a small group of gamers (Online 
community forum). 
2.2.9. Won annual university pitch competition. 
Pitch competition, in-person, and news article. In April 2015, Startup E won $5000 in 
a local university pitch competition (Company website/pitch competition website). While 
they had an alpha version of the software developed, the founders pitched the next 
version of their app based on potential market size: “our beta platform was basically not 
there yet. At this stage, we had research; market research saying we surveyed x amount 
of gamers. I don’t know how many people [cofounder] reached out to, maybe 500 
gamers… We basically sold them on market size. So, 300 million gamers. And now, we 
know that number better. [There are] about 220 million North American gamers [that we 
can target]” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
2.2.10. Release of GLβ1.0 - Public Beta version. 
Website, mobile app, social media, online community forum. In May 2015, Startup E 
released the public version of their beta software (Online community forum). 
2.2.11. Accepted into entrepreneurship program and second angel funding investment. 
Family and local entrepreneurship network and related news articles. In June 2015, 
Startup E was accepted into an entrepreneurship program and received a $30,000 grant, 
and another $30,000 angel investment from family (Startup E’s website).  
2.2.12. Received grants and loans from various organizations. 
Local entrepreneurship network and publicity, national entrepreneurship network 
and elated news articles, and national (government) business development bank. 
July to September 2015, Startup E received a $2500 grant from the local entrepreneurship 
centre and $50,000 in loans from two different national funds (Startup E’s website).  
2.2.13. Release of GLβ2.0 - Public Beta version. 
Website, mobile app, social media, online community forum. In August 2015, Startup 
E released the public version of their beta software, Version 2.0 (Online community 
forum). 
2.2.14. Local grant received. 
Local entrepreneurship network. In October 2015, Startup E received a $5000 grant 
from the local business development bank. 
2.2.15. Change in app format to increase user engagement. 
 In December 2015, Startup E realized that they still not attracting enough users on 




app. They realized that while they wanted to have users find a gaming partner in real 
time, they needed to grow their user base. However, to do so, they first needed to attract 
users to the site by providing a functioning platform that mimicked the old list-based 
forums for finding gamers to play with: “This whole real-time aspect, where you pick all 
these options, and get matched with people – we realized will never scale unless 10,000 
users come on tomorrow. [Otherwise,] you would be searching forever. Not that we were 
naïve, we knew this, but we needed at least one game that [gamers could successfully find 
other gamers to play with on the app]. This was our plan. But we had this platform that 
wasn’t taking off because we couldn’t get people there at the same time. And we literally 
started [proposing to users that they] ‘post stuff’ and you could filter with hashtags. We 
had specific criteria [for hashtags], like [a way to specify other gamers’] skill level. We 
went away from real-time and went back to list-based. As much as it felt like we were 
stepping back, it definitely changed things completely, and worked so much better. We 
think we can add back some kind of matching system in the future, [when we have] 
enough users…. It was still a challenge because sometimes people wouldn’t post for a 
day… It’s picking up, but…we’re still needing more users” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
2.2.16. Increase in one-to-one and one-to-many social media use. 
Family network. Startup E had told their angel investors that they would have one 
million users on the platform by May 2016. However, with the rate of user signup, that 
was not looking likely and they did not want to lose the angel investment offer of 
$200,000 from family, contingent on meeting their target number of users. This was the 
push they needed to try to increase users on the platform by both connecting directly and 
widely with users on social media.  
One-to-many social media posting. Startup E had their first Facebook post in June 
2014, first Instagram post in August 2014, their first Twitter post in January 2015. Their 
social media posts gradually increased over 2015, and by December 2015, Startup E had 
moved from re-posting text and articles from others to posting unique gaming images on 
their Facebook page (Startup E’s Facebook page), and increased their Twitter posts in 
January 2016 (Startup E’s Twitter page).  
Social media direct messaging. To get more users on the platform, Startup E realized 
they needed to increase awareness of their app with the gaming community – an age 
category that was highly connected with social media. Already, several users interacted 
with Startup E using direct messaging on social media: “It’s a lot of private messaging 
actually. On the Twitter account, on the Instagram accounts. Not so much on the 
Facebook account…. They send us private messages. And it’s interesting because it 
allows us an extremely close and personal type of communication with our audiences 




 Startup E experimented with accounts on an array of social media platforms – 
Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat. They also created different accounts on 
these social media platforms, sometimes for different games: “We started with one 
account, and then one day, we said, why don’t we just have more accounts? And now we 
have over seven Instagram accounts, reaching out to hundreds of gamers daily. That’s 
when we brought the interns on. One day we had over 400 [users] to get back to. We 
were like, this isn’t possible. This is too many people. But these are people that if we talk 
to them, they may download the app. We want to be very active, but it was crazy. At that 
moment, before it got out of control, we were bringing on 100 new users a day. And it 
was scaling. It was 20 percent more users – it was brilliant. It just hit a point where we 
capped out… so we’re wondering if we can scale things further” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 8 June, 2016).  
 It was challenging and time consuming to focus on one-to-one direct and 
personalized messaging with users. To make messaging easier, Startup E tried to 
streamline the process by creating scripts for communications: I came up with this entire 
script for Instagram. It’s worked out so unbelievably well…. I look for their profile, I look 
for their name, if they have a full name. I’ll call them by their first name or by their 
profile name. And I came up with a script with all the different responses for all these 
different situations… I’ll look at people’s photos that they’ve uploaded and I’ll make a 
comment to show that we care about them. And maybe they’ll care about us. I was talking 
to this guy last week and he was the father of a son about to go into high school. I was 
looking at his profile and there were pictures of his son’s graduation. And I 
congratulated him. And he said, ‘wow! Thank you so much. He’s going to be doing this.’ 
And that’s how we connected. So, it’s helped so much in that sense” (Startup E Marketing 
Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016). Personalization of the messages online was still 
important though: “People are saying, this can be automated, but we want the personal 
touch too. And people have asked, is this a bot? And we like to tell them no. But the 
question is, will this scale? People want shout outs, but we don’t always have time for 
that… We don’t go through comments [on these sites], we prefer direct messaging” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
 By June 2016, Startup E’s social media strategy had been successful in 
developing strong relationships with users that they connected with: We’ve been able to 
understand our users. Talking to users on Twitter and Instagram. If they haven’t tried 
[the app] out, I ask them if I can explain. If they have tried it out, I ask them if I can 
explain, and if they’ve tried it out, I ask them how it went. We always receive some good 
feedback… It’s a bit more time consuming, though I personally enjoy it… It is also the 
most cost effective way to onboard new users and retain existing ones” (Startup E 
Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). They could also target different types of 
customers on the different social media platforms: “We are compiling a list of Facebook 




want to be part of these communities. We could look at it as infiltration and that we are 
coming in. But it is what it is. It’s something that should work… Snapchat has really, 
younger people using it. But do a lot of gamers use it? We don’t know [and want to find 
out]” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).  
 By June 2016, the startup had 7500 users and was growing at 100 users a day. 
However, these users were not regularly interacting with the app: “If we had 7000 people 
on and live and active on the site, we’d have a stream of content going up on the app. 
Which it isn’t. It’s more like staccato. Every hour, every two hours, you’ll get something 
posted” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016). 
 Throughout the summer of 2016 though, having one-on-one relationships with 
users was still very important to Startup E: “We’re still growing, we’re establishing 
relationships. People just like to reach out to talk. It’s like a friendship in some way… the 
one-to-one is still very important…. People aren’t going to care about your product [if 
you try to push it out there fast]. You have to sit down and learn who they are and talk to 
them. Otherwise, you’re just going to be another tech company with an app” (Startup E 
Marketing Manager, Interview, 7 July, 2016). 
 However, by December 2016, interacting with individual users directly and 
frequent messaging were not scaling to substantially attract users: “we couldn’t get over 
100 to 200 users a day, and we can never get a steady rate coming it…. We still managed 
to get to what we were doing and at the end of the summer, had 14,000 to 15,000 users” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
2.2.17. YouTubers and Twitch streamers were initially unsuccessful affiliate partners. 
Startup E realized that customized one-to-one messages, while somewhat 
effective, were not helping them to reach out to a larger audience in a time-effective 
manner: “We’re doing this one-to-one approach now. And that’s pretty tiring. You reach 
out to people, talk to all these individuals in one day, depending on what you’re doing, 
you may talk to 50 to 60 people. At least half of them will probably be converted to the 
app. But it’s time consuming. The benefit is, it’s personal. It’s very established. You get 
relationships with people on a personal level. But, this one-to-many approach allows us 
to just promote the app. And instead of us hitting one person at a time, 80,000 people can 
see it all at once. This is valuable in terms of efficiency” (Startup E Marketing Manager, 
Interview, 7 July, 2016).  
To access a larger customer base, Startup E wanted to partner with affiliate 
partners that would recommend their app to gamers. The startup believed that videos 
were a better way to reach their target market than written blogs: “As sad as it is to say, 
people enjoy videos instead of reading. And if you’re a video gamer, you’re going to be a 
very visual person…. This is more conducive than getting someone writing a blog post 




that they share. But with YouTube, there’s an ease of accessibility. It doesn’t take that 
long for a YouTuber to say something about us. They can just upload something in the 
same day and say something about us. So, that’s where we’ve been focusing” (Startup E 
Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).  
The startup focused on working with streamers and video bloggers. Streamers 
were video game players who stream video of the video game they are playing live, often 
with live chat options that allowed for communicate between viewers and streamers. 
Video bloggers, also known as gaming Youtubers, were personalities or celebrities that 
have gained popularity from videos on games on the video-sharing website, YouTube. 
  They decided this focus on using bloggers, streamers, and YouTubers to reach 
more potential users was essential: “we’ve been trying to push the product every day now. 
Now, we’re focused on that one-to-many approach. We are reaching out to bloggers to 
reach one-to-many rather than spending that time talking one-on-one to gamers. We need 
to scale. Our challenge is… we wish we did these things sooner. But instead of looking 
back, we need to look forward. So, it’s been great. And now, our product is there. We 
haven’t updated our product in the past month” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 
2016). 
Streamers. In January 2016, Startup E partnered with its first streamers. This was not 
successful however: “We realized, we couldn’t get a million users one-on-one or talk to 
them. That would take forever. But what we could do is talk to 200 streamers each, and 
get them to take on 5000 each, because they all have tens of thousands of followers… We 
created this streamer feature in the app. So, people can connect with these streamers 
when they weren’t live streaming. We thought it was great… We poorly executed though. 
We had five streamers – honestly, one really big one… and it came down to that we 
weren’t ready for someone like him. They weren’t interacting with the app the way we 
wanted… We’re removing it now because it’s so dead… They weren’t bringing people on 
because maybe they didn’t see the value [of connecting with users]… it just wasn’t 
working the way we wanted… we didn’t update the feature at all and we [still] needed to 
fix the rest of our core platform for the new features and stuff” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
Video bloggers. While bringing streamers onto the app was not successful, Startup E did 
not give up on the one-to-many approach of attracting users to the app. By mid-June 
2016, the startup tried another approach to reach a wider audience of gamers by working 
with video bloggers on YouTube that pre-recorded videos about video gaming: “Looking 
at competitors and stuff, why they grew so much was actually that they had partnered 
with YouTubers that had subscribers that posted content frequently… We wanted to do 
these partnerships with people and it’s just a matter of the product not being ready. And 
now our product has been ready for the past couple of months… These are YouTubers 




if we were plugged at the end of the video or if we had a banner anywhere, even in the 
description, that would be huge for us. We’ve been spending all this time on Instagram, 
one-on-one, trying to get our 50-100 users a day, but it doesn’t scale. That’s our biggest 
challenge. We are therefore, spending this time making this partnership. If we have 100 
users watching a video, we can reach them… That’s what we’re pushing right now. 
That’s what we need to work” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
Famous video bloggers had the most viewers, however, it was a challenge for 
Startup E, as a relatively unknown company, to gain their attention: “[Video Bloggers] 
who have 10 million or 100 million [users], these people never reply to [our messages]. 
So, we’re going to just go for people who are approachable. We watch their videos and 
stuff and we want people who will interact. We want people who are there, because they 
like the community… and we’re going after specific [popular] games” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). Furthermore, it was challenging to get these video 
bloggers and streamers as engaged partners without an allocated budget to pay for them: 
“You still need to help out these Youtubers in some ways. And it’s tough when you don’t 
have a revenue stream coming in” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 7 July, 
2016). 
To attract video bloggers, Startup E developed a processed search to connect with 
their ideal audience of potential users: “Basically, I go through and see their publications, 
see if they’re relevant and then contact them. It’s heavy on PR. I ask them if they want to 
conduct a review on our website… We call this a one-to-many response. It saves us so 
much time. [And] we could have some clout. If someone writes something good about us, 
not only are all these eyeballs going to be seeing it, it could be hugely influential. They 
will see people they read [regularly] say something huge. Ideally, it would be tech media 
websites that conduct reviews or feature articles of gamer-related services… We are very 
aware of the fact that they can write a negative review and they may be critical. But we 
want them to be. We are still in beta and it’s not a full complete product yet, so there will 
be bugs. Our experience so far is that people can be critical. You have to look at these 
websites to know who they are writing for though. There are a lot that are garbage” 
(Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). There was also a question of 
how many YouTube channels was appropriate: “For now, we want to be on a variety of 
YouTube channels. In the future, if we had a really big deal with one person, we wouldn’t 
say yes to other YouTubers” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 7 July, 2016). 
YouTubers and streamers typically attracted teenage boys however – younger 
than the average video game player that Startup E had been targeting: “we used to have 
an average [user age] of 23 years of age, but after this push for new users, I think it will 
be different, [much younger]… I think the younger generation is likely to share the 
information in high school and with their friends. But I don’t necessarily want to ruin the 




don’t want someone in their late 20s to keep getting paired with these young people and 
have a bad experience [on the app]. We have a way to take care of that – like add a 
hashtag for adults only. Or mature, or whatever. So we have a strategy to handle it” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
By September 2016, the startup only had about 14,000 users, very far from their 
goals of 50,000 users. They had hoped that using video bloggers would help reach that 
goal by the end of the year: “If we bring that formula forward and bring it on, by the end 
of the year, we’re on track to hit 50,000 a few days after Christmas. That would be 
awesome because that was our goal in September. And now the goal is getting away from 
us and we were frustrated. On social media, Instagram, we couldn’t scale it. So, the 
Youtubers started coming and we’re getting closer” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 
December, 2016). 
Startup E was still struggling to find video bloggers or live streamers willing to 
partner with them however: “We tried reaching out to people, but people would never get 
back [to us]” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). The problem was that 
they still needed to figure out how to incentivize streamers to promote their app. Initially, 
they tried to unsuccessfully pay per demonstration: “the conversion was terrible. We 
didn’t think it would be that bad” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
This resulted in deciding to pay them a bonus payment to streamers for promoting their 
app, “to show that we’re serious” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
To improve their search for streamers, Startup E hired someone who had 
experience working with streamers: “The guy we brought on, he’s really trying to be 
really good at it. He understands the role of the whole e-sports side… He scaled what we 
were currently doing, basically tenfold. It was crazy! He took it to the next level, so we 
were getting way more users. It was crazy! It was ten times the results and ten times the 
accounts. We were doing alright. It was less quality, but it was more quantity” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). They ended up bringing on a streamer who was 
quite successful in attracting users: “he brought on 500 people watching him live, and he 
brought a hundred people or so [to our app]” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 
December, 2016).  
However, they felt as the streamers they were engaging were typically not the 
right match to find users: “We have to pick the right person to be a brand ambassador for 
us. This one guy was amazing!... but we reached out to ten people, and [the others] just 
weren’t that good… So then we tried others, but they were so inconsistent in replying 
back. I thought maybe it was about the money, but we couldn’t figure it out” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
This prompted them to change to focus back to video bloggers that recorded their 
videos and the videos stayed published online. To incentivize the video bloggers to 




realized is that we needed to provide them with a signing bonus to make them 
comfortable… [The Youtuber will] post a video basically, there’s a signing bonus, and 
then affiliate pricing [every time they mention us]. And, once the contract is over, the 
video is still on YouTube and we’re going to get views. But then, we’re not paying for it” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). Within a few months, by November 
2016, their first successful YouTuber had brought in around 5000 users.  
Paying video bloggers was expensive however and Startup E realized that they 
needed to figure out how to gain the most returns on these affiliate partnerships: “We’ve 
never had a marketing budget. We’ve never had a marketing budget. This month, we’ve 
spent some of our money to see if this [marketing strategy] is possible and it is. So, we 
need more money to do that. Our plan is to be spending $200,000 on YouTubers, and 
essentially have 50% of them stick around. Our goal is to go after 200,000 active users 
and have 100,000 of them stick around each month. Sure, some of our users will drop off, 
but there will also be some viral people that will share with friends” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
2.2.18. Increased focus on receiving feedback on app. 
Email. While Startup E did not regularly use email to contact users, users were sending 
them emails regarding issues that they were having: “We do a support e-mail [address] 
that they could reach us at. We say, any need for help, you can just e-mail us. So that’s 
where a lot of feedback on bugs and issues comes in. I would say [that is a] big way we 
understand what our users want” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 
2016). User interactions were also evaluated through the trial and error process: “Our 
approach to them is pretty much the same with the email template we’re going with. But 
we need to switch that up as well to see what works. Then, based on people who respond 
– [we] go with the one that’s working” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
Survey. Startup E also put out a survey for their users to complete: “Oh, also surveys. 
Surveys are something we’re putting out more recently… The questions basically have to 
do with different features we’re thinking about. [We want to ask:] ‘What do you think of 
this? What can be done with it?... What would make it worth your while? Would you want 
to see it? Would you not?’” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
 The survey went out Mid-June 2016 to get feedback from all users that had 
downloaded the app: “Four hundred responded. We gave away a copy of Overwatch, [a 
popular video game,] to one person as incentive…. And [with] 200 people, each one had 
a sentence for these features. So it took hours to go through them. It was amazing 
feedback… To be honest, it was a lot of re-assurance that we were doing okay. We knew 
what we wanted to do, and they kind of reinforced that these are features they did want. 
People pay so much for feedback and the fact that we paid $70 for one copy of the game 
– It was so worth it. We’re really happy with that” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 




 The survey not only generated feedback, it also generated interest in the app: “We 
had 1000 people open our app that day. Which was really good. We typically have 300 
people on the app in a day. And a lot of good messages back to admin. That was pretty 
crazy. The community that we’ve built is really good. And the feedback we’re receiving is 
really positive” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). The founders also thought, 
“It will make us look like we really do listen to consumers” (Startup E Marketing 
Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). 
2.2.19. Organizing in-person gaming events.  
Gaming Events and Social Media. Being present at and hosting gaming events that 
promoted virtual interactions between users and Startup E – either within the app or on 
social media - was another way for the startup to gain awareness about their app.  The 
startup hosted their first gaming event in June 2016, associated and sponsored by a car 
company. The event was “not so much to get new users, it was to connect with users” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).   
 After the event, they started thinking more about putting on their own events, and 
partnering with others holding events, “but it’s a lot of work we put into these things, but 
not a lot of return” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). The benefits however 
were “being on the ground floor and talking to these people, one-on-one. And I think 
what helps, and what we learned is, to put a face to a brand, makes people trust you 
more… One thing we noticed is that the interactions seemed greater when we uploaded 
photos after the event. People could see us and interact with us. An event was conducive 
to far greater community and awareness about your brand” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 22 June, 2016). This affected their decision to target future events towards 
serious gamers and to promote it on social media: “because of the style of the game, you 
don’t really find casual people just dipping their toes in. For future events, ‘we’d address 
these [serious gamers] and market it in a way to get at their desire to get a prize, to beat 
other people. Their desire to be featured by [Startup E] in some way. We’re going to be 
posting all this stuff on our social media networks… we have some idea of tagging them 
in the photos – it’s a really interesting way to engage with the community, in the now. 
Talk to them, reach out to them on Facebook” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 
9 June, 2016). 
Video game testing event. Startup E also chose to go to a game testing night. At this 
event, video game developers were offering the ability to test out games before they were 
released: “I can’t think of one negative that comes out of it. I see it as a free pass to get 
the company visible. Get our name out there” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 
23 June, 2016). 
Gaming Meetup Groups. There were also groups of gamers that gathered socially to 
play video games together in-person, rather than independently at home. These were 




city: “There are meetups that meet in the local area. It’s pretty neat. Gaming is a fairly 
isolating activity. A lot of people want to make new friends. It’s interesting with these 
communities. We go in often and say, hey, you guys enjoy games. Why don’t you check 
out our app?” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). 
2.2.20. Incorporating customer feedback. 
Email, in-app messaging, social media messaging. Incorporating user feedback into the 
app was particularly important to the cofounders. By June 2016, Startup E had received 
so much feedback through emails and personal messaging that they needed a way to 
organize how they evaluated it: “We always have suggestions coming in. And when I talk 
to them personally, I just keep track of how many repeats of suggestions. So, we have this 
person looking for this. And then the next five people will say something similar to what 
the first person said. We have these suggestions come up repeatedly. So, the only thing I 
can say in terms of defining what is important or isn’t important is frequency of 
suggestion…. Ideally, we should go by frequency, but the reality, to be honest, right now, 
it’s what the team wants to put in” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 9 June, 
2016). 
By mid-June 2016, Startup E had started to include features in the app that users 
requested, such as: “when you go to play, you’re limited by the number of tags you can 
use. When you go to actually request to play with someone, there’s actually just one 
button of that app to send a person a request. You can’t actually explain why you want to 
play with them or why you’re a good match for them. So we’ve added in that feature as 
well. That one is probably the most important [user recommendation]” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). 
While early versions of the app were built and re-built a few times, as the app 
gained users, the founders began to face challenges of deciding how much more they 
could adapt the app: “We built the [product web] site for hardcore users, and now we 
find we are attracting casual ones that want certain features. Right now, the system 
doesn’t allow you to change features, so we have to decide whether we want to rebuild it 
or not [for these other potential users].” (Startup E’s event, July 2016.) This finding 
played a role in triggering innovation in Startup E to develop a way for different types of 
video gamers to distinguish themselves from players that may not be similar or 
compatible. 
2.2.21. Users promote business. 
Advocate users. By July 2016, Startup E had attracted a few users who wanted to act as 
advocates for them: “People ask things like, can I promote you on my Facebook or on my 
Twitter? They’re promoting it to people online or in-person. I say, ‘absolutely, any and 




that on our own accounts so your profile has thousands of eyeballs” (Startup E Marketing 
Manager, Interview, 7 July, 2016).  
User generated content. Gamers used the app as a platform to show off and demonstrate 
their gaming skill. This ends up being a great way to gain exposure and awareness about 
the app: “We want our own users to generate content themselves. It’s gotten a lot of great 
user feedback… We have ‘Spotlight Focuses’ on a person and a game. Not only the 
person who’s post you posted is excited. You have the community engaging, saying, ‘this 
clip is awesome. Wow! That was cool.’ And people tagging their friends saying, ‘check 
this out.’ It’s a different attempt at community relations” (Startup E Marketing Manager, 
Interview, 7 July, 2016). 
2.2.22. Focus on improving retention of users through in-app interactions.  
 While the number of registered users was growing, the challenge for Startup E 
was retaining users and having them return to the site. By December 2016, the startup 
was saying: “We think we can hit 25,000 by the end of the month. The thing is, we have a 
lot of users coming on. So, we’re classifying them as monthly active. But they’re just 
joining. But of our registered users, 50 percent are monthly active” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 13 December, 2016). To improve retention, Startup E started new features that 
promoted user interaction including, in-app push notifications and campaigns.  
In-app push notification. Even as Startup E grew and adopted more one-to-many 
communication methods, in-app communication – both reaching out to users and the 
ability for users to submit feedback continued to be important for the startup. The push 
notifications could be sent at any time: “You don’t use the app for four days, we can send 
an alert to say, ‘hey, we missed you…’” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 
2016).  
 In December 2016, Startup E started push notifications to prompt users to engage 
with the app, however found that a very small percentage were actually reacting to these 
notifications: “We sent the notification and they replied to it. Those were good results. 
The challenge is, we sent 300,000, and 0.3% of all replies [approximately 900 replies] 
were actually influenced and [had individuals] react because of that notification. That is 
terrible…. What was interesting is that the power user doesn’t mind seeing that many 
notifications. And, what was interesting was, the feature stuff worked, it was just sending 
too much irrelevant data. So, we stopped [sending many notification]” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
In-app personalized, direct messaging. Despite limited responses to in-app push 
notifications, personalized messages sent directly to users were still well received: “I 
personally reply to everyone on the app. And getting that feedback and understanding 
what my customers are saying, directly to me. I think that makes a difference… I mean, I 




founder is talking to me? That’s insane!’ And indirectly I get so many people to rate the 
app because I’m talking to them. It’s just crazy. It’s not scalable. But getting feedback as 
the founder at the stage that we’re at, it’s still manageable. It’s not that crazy. I just did 
it, [I messaged a user,] on my phone, on the go” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 
December, 2016). 
In-app campaigns using push notifications. The startup tried to run a few campaigns to 
encourage users to invite other users to download the app in exchange for features to 
enhance your in-app profile. These campaigns were not that successful: “We’re only 
getting 30 [people] a day through this link [for the campaign]” (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 13 December, 2016). Despite this setback, Startup E started another campaign 
in December 2016 that prompted challenges to users to get badges for their gaming 
profile. These badges were considered a sign of status to motivate users to complete the 
challenges: “We can have push notifications… it basically allows us to have these 
campaigns and re-engage with our users in a way we never had access to before” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
2.2.23. A drop in e-mail use. 
 By December 2016, the use of e-mails had dropped substantially: “We used to 
send e-mails. We haven’t done that in a while. We should probably send another survey, 
just asking people to rate the app” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
2.2.24. Use of data analytics to understand how users interact with the mobile app.  
Use of data analytics tools. From early 2016, Startup E started to analyze some of the 
data based on how the gamers have interacted with the app: “we will have all these 
backend insights that we can mine the data from. And actually, we’d love to plug the 
technology into the games itself. So, if you’ve never played this shooter game before, but 
you’ve played other shooter games, [we can promote that] you’re going to have this 
amazing experience” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016). 
 Using analytics software, by June 2016, Startup E gained a new way of learning 
how users interact with the app. For example, when referring to a feature in the app that 
Startup E was excited about: “It’s our core feature – but looking at the stats, only 20 
percent of the people have used it. But what else can you do? We noticed it was buried in 
communities. [But] we want it to be the very first thing that people interact with on the 
platform. The next thing we want to look at is why do users post that they want to play 
today, and then not post that they want to play tomorrow or the next day? Is it that they 
can’t find people to play with? It’s more difficult to analyze, but something we want to 
understand. The only thing is, the average user, 40 percent, posts once. And then the 
high-end user posts 30 times. And that’s really good. This new analytics software we’re 
using – it’s $600 a month, but the tool itself, literally records people’s screens…. It 




ask for anything better than that! [It also] tracks where they mis-clicked… It’s the most 
intense software we ever came across” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
 Having access to so much data on their customers’ interactions with the app was 
exciting but also overwhelming at the start: “[The analytics software] doesn’t present it 
in a way that’s very understandable. We haven’t been able to create a bundle of users 
that convert… But we see 20 percent of people aren’t actually completing the signup 
process. A lot of those things we didn’t see [before]. But now, we can actually see it. 
There’s so much data, it’s really overwhelming. So, I’ve spent a lot of time looking at that 
and I guess the insights on that have been really good” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 
June, 2016).  
 However by December 2016, the founders were more aware of how to use 
analytics to learn about their users and their interaction with the app: “We looked at data 
from the past… We started to look at patterns. We are developing an algorithm to see 
why different players play together” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
2.2. Types of Customer Interactions Noted to be Missing by Participants 
Paid advertisements. Much of Startup E’s contact with customers does not involve paid 
advertisements: “We haven’t put out any ads recently. Money is the biggest thing now 
though [and it is important to conserve]. We have incredibly small resources” (Startup E 
Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016). 
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 All user interaction activities were undertaken with the intention of getting the 
user to engage with Startup E’s app. However, certain platforms for user interaction 
triggered users to interact with the startup in additional ways. For example, the gaming 
events that Startup E had were great to gain brand awareness, and an opportunity to re-
promote the event on Facebook afterwards: “We found that there was a benefit of being 
on the ground floor and talking to these people one-on-one. I think it helped putting a 
face to a brand – makes people trust you more… One thing we noticed is that the 
interactions seemed greater when we uploaded photos after the event. People could see 
us and interact with us” (Startup E Marketing Manager, Interview, 23 June, 2016).  
 However, Startup E also missed opportunities to reach out to potential users 
across platforms for interaction. For example, they did not remember to take the time to 
inform users about the launch of their Kickstarter funding campaign: “our challenge was 
we spent so much time on building a great campaign, we forgot about marketing our 
campaign ahead of time” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 8 June, 2016).  
Startup E also emphasized the importance of timing interactions with users in 
online community forums with the release of new video games: “Every time we’ve 




maybe we weren’t with our heads into it… Someone posted that there’s a [competing] 
tool that people can use [to find other players to play a particular game with]. So, we 
missed that opportunity. And we can’t miss opportunities like that. So, they’ve become 
known for that. And if we post afterwards, we become known as the second guy. So, it’s 
impactful. Timing is everything. I think, we just, we talk about it all the time, and we’re 
not there. And this [particular game] is the biggest game! Other games are coming out, 
and we’ll try to be there. But we’re putting everything into this game because we think 
it’s going to be pretty big for us” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). 
Speaking with the moderators enabled the startup to have their own dedicated 
Reddit forum for feedback and communication with users: “If you’re part of the [online 
forum] community, then you make the post and then post about your service later… it 
depends on if your timing is right. Right now [because we’re not part of the community], 
we look like another service. It’s not the best. And we come off as spam. No one really 
likes it when you spam your own stuff… [But then, we] asked the moderators. It really 
blew up, in a good way. So now, we’re looking at stuff like how do we get users on our 
platform” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
4.1. Family investors 
 At the time of writing, the startup had gained substantial investment from family 
and friends and funding from a few entrepreneurship or startup incubator programs, even 
before the app had gained traction amongst users. The one stipulation given for 
investment was from family, that wanted to see an increase in users on the platform 
before investing. This provided incentives for the startup to think of new ways to attract 
users that they had not considered before: “before December (2015), we wanted to have 
something done or we would run out of funds. So my uncle, we started taking to him. He 
wanted to go in, but he wanted to see results. He wanted to see users on the platform to 
prove this is worth it. And then my dad said he’d match it. It was a good motivation 
boost. It was a fair chunk of change... They were both going to put in $100,000…. But we 
realized we couldn’t push those results anymore, we couldn’t even push it because it was 
in a state where we weren’t ready to launch the update yet. So, while at the end of 
December, we were happy with the product and could start marketing, it wasn’t going to 
be crazy – we weren’t going to get users right away. It still would have taken time... But 
then we realized, we couldn’t get a million users one on one or talk to them. That would 
take forever. But what we could do is talk to 200 streamers each and get them to take on 
5000 [users] each, because they all have these tens of thousands of followers. [The family 






 Competitors were not initially a major concern for the startup. Most competitors 
served gamers on desktop platforms, rather than on a mobile phone. On these platforms, 
it was time consuming to find a potential person to play a game with, and served one 
specific gaming platform (e.g. Nintendo, Microsoft Xbox, or Sony Playstation). 
However, when a big gaming company announced at a gaming conference that they were 
looking to create a way to find other players through their gaming system, Startup E took 
notice: “We take it as a really positive thing because now, an industry leader is seeing the 
value in the stuff we’re doing… it’s identical. It’s too similar. We’re scared that when we 
launch ours, that they’re going to say, ‘what are you guys doing?’… And if we wait, we 
won’t get heard of and [gaming company] blows up, and we look like a copycat of their 
service” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
Overloaded with tasks. Throughout development, Startup E struggled to prioritize tasks: 
“There are so many things that need to get done. So, prioritizing things that need to get 
done first. Those media channels, we’ve said we wanted to reach out for so long, but we 
haven’t been doing it. And it needs to be started… We can’t keep waiting and waiting to 
say we’ll do it, until it’s too late… With competition wise, there’s no one we’re afraid 
of… [but] if we sit on this and don’t do anything, we’ll lose that arm chair to XBox” 
(Startup E Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016).  
 Furthermore, with a lead developer leaving the startup in November 2016, and 
one of the co-founders back in school, the other co-founder took on more responsibility in 
the business: “Without [the co-founder] there every day, I had to manage the team. That 
was my responsibility. We needed [the co-founder]. But now, with him going back to 
school, my focus almost has to be that again. But the problem is, this time, I need to focus 
on fundraising. That’s where I need to focus my attention. So, the problem is, how can I 
do both?... There’s too much I’m doing and I need to focus on other stuff” (Startup E 
Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). 
Technology updates. At the time of writing, Startup E was still regularly coming up with 
updates to the app. This meant that the platform was sometimes inaccessible. The 
founders were concerned that this would affect user retention: “This is a time where we 
have to turn off all users completely and have some down time [in the app]. Which we 
don’t do very often at all. So, it’s a pretty big update in that sense. But we’re definitely 
trying to take it slow so we don’t overlook anything. It’s been multiple months since 
we’ve done stuff like this… [When we did this before], it was going to be down for an 
hour, and then it’s down for two days. Results wise, we didn’t have the users to have an 
impact [then], where people might leave because they got upset, or whatever, but now, 




Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016). To handle challenges with updates, Startup E decided 
to start using a new server that would provide a backup during updates, and would limit 
disruptions in user access to the app. However, this server was not yet in operation at the 
time of writing.  
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING 
 Startup E had over 100,000 registered users by March 2017 (Startup E Founder, 
Interview, 14 March, 2017). The latest focus of the startup was how they would monetize 
the app. They had been debating options in December 2016, however by March 2017, 
had not settled on a monetization plan: “So, say you’re scrolling and one of these items 
would be a promotion for a new gaming keyboard or a new controller…. No banner ad, 
no popup. Another idea is to have a separate area on the app completely dedicated to 
game promotions” (Startup E Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016). This would be a 




Appendix B6. Startup F 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
 Startup F was started with the intention of being “a search engine for loans from 
private lending organizations… for loans that are unsecured under $50 grand... in other 
words, a loan marketing agency” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). “Our job 
is to connect borrowers with lenders and basically create value for the borrower through 
getting them connected with cheap, quick, and efficient loans that best match their 
personal needs and financial situation” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016). 
 The idea for Startup F arose in March 2015, when the founder was in the waiting 
room of a doctor’s office and he saw another patient with an emergency medical bill that 
he was unable to pay. Curious about the availability of emergency funding options, when 
the founder got home, he attempted a few web-based searches for personal loans, and 
found that there was no easy way to: 
• search through and aggregate available loans for a particular set of 
circumstances, and 
• to get a quick answer to the loan request from loan providers. 
 This planted the seed of opportunity in the founder’s mind to develop an online 
loan aggregator - a loan search web platform where a loan seeker could perform an online 
search for a loan, and gain access to an array of lenders with competing interest rates and 
terms. The idea was: “Why search [for] one [loan] when you can search many? That’s 
kind of our slogan” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). 
 The founder envisioned that building an online loan aggregator platform would 
require Startup F to sign contracts with several fintech loan providers (supply-side 
customers). These loan providers would be integrated into an online platform to 
streamline the application process for loan seekers (demand-side customers). This would 
mean that when a loan seeker visited the startup’s website, they would complete one short 
loan application with their personal details and the loan amount that they were seeking. 
Their credentials and credit rating would be verified and could be assessed for loan 
eligibility based on the lending criteria provided to the startup by the fintech loan 
providers.  
 A high level of integration between the startup and the fintech loan providers 
would allow Startup F to immediately report whether the loan seeker was eligible for a 
loan, as well as the loan options and associated terms and conditions available to them. 




fintech loan providers’ online loan platform – rather than having the loan seeker re-enter 
information on each loan provider’s website. A partnership with Startup F as a loan 
aggregator site would also help fintech loan providers, who in a relatively new industry, 
could gain visibility among loan seekers that were not familiar with fintech, and would 
ideally help provide credibility and security to the transaction.  
1.2. Founder 
 Startup F was started by a sole founder, male, in his early thirties based in 
Ontario, Canada. The founder started off his career teaching English in China, and 
quickly became a serial entrepreneur, taking on a business development roles 
predominantly in the software and online marketplace industries. While he founded 
Startup F, early in the new venture creation process, the founder brought in co-founders 
and employees to help build the business. 
1.3. About the Customers 
 There were three types of customers in Startup F. There were supply-side 
customers, offering loans, and demand-side customers, seeking loans. The third type of 
customers were intermediaries – local businesses through which a loan could be offered 
in a consumer finance transaction.  
1.3.1. Customers – Supply-Side 
 For Startup F, a supply-side customer was a financial institution that provide 
loans to individuals. While the initial goal was to work with banks and traditional 
financial institutions, the founder found that it was taking a long time to create these 
partnerships. He instead decided to work with emerging fintech loan providers that were 
using technology and innovation to disrupt personal and commercial finance: “All these 
fintech companies are coming out and disrupting the banking business. So, we thought, 
why wouldn’t BMO or Scotia [established banks] or somebody want to compete in this 
area? Wouldn’t we want the banks to be able to come out and account for some of this 
type of business? But it takes forever to get to talk to someone at the bank. [That person 
that you talk to] doesn’t make decisions. There are three other people that need to be 
involved in that decision. It takes a few months before that happens. I’m not playing this 
game. It takes too much work” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016).  
 By May 2016, the founder of Startup F had found eleven potential fintech loan 
providers interested in being part of the loan aggregator platform. The number of lenders 
grew to twelve lenders by September 2016. While interest from the banks continued, their 
integration would require additional work and changes in government regulations 
associated with the financial industry. By December 2016, banks had still not committed 





1.3.2. Customers – Demand-Side 
 The direct to consumer model focused on individual loan seekers (demand-side 
customers) looking for a short-term loan for a variety of reasons, including: “people 
looking for money for weddings. People looking for money for home renovations. People 
who want to go on vacation. That sort of stuff” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 
2016). The ideal type of demand-side customer for Startup F were individuals in their: 
“mid-20s males, with relatively good income. Computer savvy. A go-getter. Someone 
that’s keen and thinking on their feet. Women the same age. Research is showing that 
they are not people that go to a bank teller. [The ideal customer] doesn’t go to a bank 
and doesn’t know who the person [behind the counter] is… So really, anyone who can 
get on the web and is looking for a loan – we want to serve them” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 19 May, 2016). 
 Startup F was not worried about attracting loan seekers: “People who want money 
will do anything for it. That’s what we’ve been learning through our market research. 
People want money and they’re going to search, ‘I want money.’ That’s why you see the 
line up at cash money – 550%. And that’s just insane. And people go for it” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016). However, once the web platform went live in July 
2016, Startup F saw that the typical demand-side customer was in a lower income bracket 
than originally anticipated: “[they have] poor credit, which is something I kind of 
expected, but not as much as I’ve seen. I’d say probably about 85 percent of applicants 
are coming from poor credit. Typical age is 30s, equally male and female…. A lot of them 
are coming from Hamilton, Burlington, Brampton. Outside of Toronto” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016). By September 2016, the same tier of customer was 
still approaching the website: “those with terribly abysmal credit scores – who’ve applied 
to hundreds of places, and have been declined… They troll, and they’re looking for 
money, anywhere they’ll get it” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016).  
1.3.3. Customers - Intermediaries 
 In addition to their direct-to-consumer business model, Startup F was interested to 
partner with local businesses (intermediaries) to offer their customers consumer finance 
loan options. These businesses would include industries such as home renovations, 
veterinarian clinics, dentist offices, and wedding planners – all industries where an 
individual might need a short-term loan. 
 The founder explained that partnering with local businesses such as veterinary 
clinics as intermediaries would involve offering a commission to the local business: “Vet 
clinics are perfect because if you’ve got a sick dog, you’re going to pay. Whereas if it’s 
another business, they maybe need to wait for it and there could be the loss of the sale. 
So, we’re really thinking vets are perfect. They’re really a low-hanging fruit there. 
Somebody comes with a sick pet – ‘Here are your options.’… Do they offer financing? 




would be] providing their clients with options to pay for the services [by finding a loan 
with our loan search engine]. The vet clinic is able to do the surgery, they make more 
money. And the individual [pet owner typically] gets a loan that’s cheaper than what a 
credit card can [offer] and [they] get immediately approved to cover that... and they’re 
happy because their animal is getting better… And [this relationship with the startup 
means that] vet clinics - for every sale that goes through - that’s 50 bucks [that they 
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2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Face-to-face interactions seeking intermediary businesses for consumer finance. 
In-person meeting. Shortly after coming up with the business idea, in October 2015 for 
Startup F, the founder spoke with local businesses (intermediaries) to see if they would be 
interested in offering their customers consumer finance loan options. In June 2015, the 
founder physically visited local shops and offices in his home city, such as home 
renovators, veterinarians, and wedding planners, to see if they would be interested in 
offering their customers the ability to search through a range of loans available to them 
through the startup’s loan search engine. Offering a loan search engine would be an 
alternative way for customers to purchase on credit – in comparison to traditional, 
formulaic financing options offered at shops, using credit cards or other loans. The 
founder received positive feedback from business owners during these visits: “I drove 
around [town] and tried to speak with business owners. [I] thought that home renovators 
would be [the] best [partners to work with] because [they] have easy to access [to] the 
[home] owner [that may need a loan to complete renovations on their house] … [The 
issue with current consumer financing options is] declines. And rates that aren’t 
agreeable [for their customers].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)  
 While businesses showed interest in Startup F’s idea, because the web platform 
was still not ready yet, to reduce potentially damaging partnerships with intermediaries, 
the founder held off on further developing these relationships: “Maybe launching [to 
businesses] might be something I want to wait on because [otherwise] I have a business 
owner who’s logging on the user service and they’re having a bad experience. I don’t 
want to lose all future potential business from that business because of the issue…. It’s a 
little bit of a different risk if it’s the odd guy who’s coming here looking for a loan.” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) 
2.2.2. Fintech loan provider search, follow-up and creation of business partnership. 
Social media. By October 2015, Startup F had set up a local office to work from and 
started contacting potential fintech loan providers (supply-side customers) via LinkedIn: 
“Every lending company I could find, I’d search in LinkedIn and on Google to find 
companies and find out what’s going on and who doesn’t have traction yet. Let’s get 
them on there. X person can lead me to Y. I’m in a fin tech cluster group on Linkedin, so 
I’m there and am kind of working on that. I have eleven vendors that I’ve contracted. So 
that’s pretty cool.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016) 
Phone and emails. These messages were followed up by phone calls and emails to see if 
the fintech loan providers would be interesting in supplying loans in an aggregated loan 
marketplace. The startup’s goal was to get at least twelve loan providers signed up to be 




2.2.3. Startup web platform development began.  
In December 2015, development of the loan aggregator web platform began in 
India. Startup F initially intended to launch in mid-May 2016, when they joined a sales-
focused startup incubator, however there were several delays in launching due to 
technical difficulties during the web platform development process and integration with 
loan providers’ online systems.  
2.2.4. Loan provider integration began and technical challenges encountered. 
 Loan provider integration began around March 2016, concurrent to the web 
platform development.  
Phone. While Startup F communicated with the web developer and loan providers by 
email, it was easier to have phone calls to clarify any issues: “On the other side [of the 
call] was a [website] developer from one of our lenders.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 
13 July, 2016) These calls were not always easy though: “That was a hell of a call on 
Friday to get, especially when we [thought] we were ready [to launch].” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016) This came from the challenges associated with 
integrating the IT infrastructures of the loan providers and the startup. In May 2016 the 
startup found, “a number of our lenders have some infrastructure in place and we’re 
working with them to connect with their infrastructures. And then, a lot of lenders don’t. 
So, we’re working on that and it’s been a challenge.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 
May, 2016)  
Phone, in-person, e-mail. While many fintech loan providers were open to meeting and 
working with Startup F, they also faced resistance from some loan providers that were 
skeptical of the necessity to integrate with the startup: “one of our lenders has tried to put 
us to the grinder in terms of not wanting to do any integration. They don’t want to invest 
in any type of [web platform] developing until we can show them [that we are getting] a 
return on investment, until we can show them [that being a loan provider on our site] will 
be valuable for them. And we’re trying to create value on our site – but these people just 
want us to send the [loan seeker] over to them, and they would have to re-enter 
information onto their site. There’s no real integration. So, that’s an ultimatum.” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016)  
2.2.5. Online advertising starts and focus on search engine optimization. 
Paid online advertisements - Google. In May 2016, Startup F began marketing directly 
to end consumers through Google Adwords. Their initial goal was to have a soft launch 
in Southwestern Ontario before expanding to other markets: “[We’re working with a] 
marketing agency. We’ve committed $5000 towards [reaching our target market].” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016) While Startup F worked with a marketing 
agency to develop their ads, they were uncertain whether this was the best agency to 




spend ad dollars well enough to create conversions or really get some traction and I only 
have limited funds. So, do I put money with them and go with them, because I’ve been 
working with them, or do I consider dropping them and go with this team who already 
has experience with lenders and working online?” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 
July, 2016)  
 One of the goals of hiring a marketing agency was to ensure that loan seekers 
understood that Startup F was a loan search engine, and not a lender: “This guy I’ve been 
talking to. He still gets confused and still thinks [a lender] is a search thing. How do I get 
people to know who we are [and how we are different]?... We need to shift the site to 
better let people know that we’re a search engine. So, how do we do that?” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)   
In its first week live online in July 2016, Startup F did not have much initial 
traffic visit the site. The founder attributed this to the marketing agency they were 
working with: “the marketing agency that we’re working with to do all of our Google 
advertising kind of dropped the ball. So, they’ve spent about a thousand dollars, and 
from the thousand dollars, a bunch of people went to the site but they didn’t actually 
convert. They went there and left.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) The 
founder also concluded: “Google is not a good revenue channel for us.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
Paid Ads - Facebook. Poor results with the former marketing agency triggered Startup F 
to hire a new marketing agency before the end of July 2016. This agency began targeted 
advertisements through Facebook and briefly considered video advertising on YouTube. 
They started to look at ways to reconnect with potential loan seekers that visited their 
web platform by experimenting with remarketing: “The other thing we need to develop is 
the re-marketing program. So, anybody that goes to our site and does something, we now 
need to follow them around the internet with ads…. We have to develop that... My hope is 
that we’d be able to convert them through this, and bring them back to the site. You 
remind them what is going on and you show them value. All that sort of stuff… We have 
to play around to find the right ads that cause traction.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 
29 July, 2016)  
This switch to Facebook resulted in more visits to the web platform, however the 
potential customers were not the clients that Startup F had anticipated: “we’re seeing 
again the high volume to get to the app[lication], but we’re seeing [a limited number of] 
conversions. So, something’s better about Facebook…. [but then we started getting 
people with] very, very, very terrible credit. A higher volume of terrible credit. What’s 
going on? We can’t operate like this. We’re a loan placement agency and we’re not 
placing any loans.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
Search engine optimization. Another challenge was understanding how search engines, 




aggregator. As of July 2016, Startup F did not feature prominently in these search results: 
“right now we’re on page 18. So, what we want to do is show up when somebody says 
search loans, find a loan, that sort of stuff… One thing is going to be getting the site 
registered on different databases to find [our] location. So, [we need to] register on Yelp, 
Yellow Pages, Google Business, TomTom Maps.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 
2016) 
 By October 2016, Startup F began further optimizing their search engine 
placement: “We’re creating better fine-tuned ads, so that we’re getting our ad position 
higher. And we’re doing search engine optimization – SEO - work and getting a showing 
in results. I’ve hired a company in Moldova who’s doing SEO work for me. I’ve paid 
them $250 or something…. And they’ve basically created all this content. Now, Google 
indexes it over time to better place the website [in the search engine results]… They 
create all this content and they post it for the Google bots to find. And the Google bots 
find it as actual content.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)  
 In November 2016, Startup F continued testing to see what was the best way to 
get loan seekers to look for loans on their web platform and then, to convince them to 
complete the loan application: “But yeah, it’s about growth, right? We’re doing 500 
bucks a day in marketing. It’s growing… the sky is the limit. Where can we find the max 
amount for the best conversions based on the search volume? And then, where can we 
better mine other opportunities that may not be in search – that are banner ads or other 
types of ads that people are getting? So [we’re] building, and [will] see what happens.” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
Paid-Ads – Google. After a month of trying with Facebook ads and continued search 
engine optimization, Startup F started promoting themselves with Google ads again: 
“Here’s what I’m thinking happens. Right now on Google, we’re extremely relevant… If 
somebody is searching personal loans… and they see your ad at the top and they go for 
it… We get them there and one-third of them convert to completing the application, which 
is really cool… It’s about volume, right? We receive good search volume, we sell out to 
people looking for loans, and we’re an alternative.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 
November, 2016) 
2.2.6. Web platform testing involving family and friends – “Dummy” consumer testing. 
In-person. By late May 2016, Startup F had hoped to launch their web platform. 
However, the initial version of the web platform was still not completed. The founder 
also wanted to test the loan aggregator with family and friends before it went live 
publically to loan seekers: “We’re launching on Wednesday. Over the next week and a 
half, anyone I know, I’m going to try to get on the site to test and see where our issues 
are. [Our goal is] to come up with a big document that says this is what we need to do. 




3. So basically, the 1st of June, maybe another week after that, [we’ll be ready], 
depending on how the testing goes.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 19 May, 2016) 
Word-of-mouth by family and friends. Testing the web platform also increased word 
of mouth about Startup F through personal relationships with family and friends. Even 
before the platform was launched, the founder was approached by personal connections 
looking for loans: “I have a lot of people asking me for loans now. A lot of people are 
coming up to me independently, ‘oh, so you’re here to get a loan?’ They’re like, ‘Yeah, I 
need a loan.’ My sister knows someone who needs a loan. He’s been waiting for me to 
get Startup F up. There’s a need.”(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)  
2.2.7. Checking for web platform integration - Additional web platform technical issues 
found. 
Email, phone, web platform. By June 2016, Startup F encountered more delays in 
launching the loan aggregator – both from technical issues in developing the web 
platform and from the fintech loan providers. There were frustrations dealing with bugs 
on the web platform and in the ongoing integration with loan providers’ web platforms: 
“It’s nerve-racking getting these lenders onboard, [and I’m] concerned that our systems 
aren’t working correctly. We already brought one lender onboard a few weeks ago and 
the whole system crashed…. So, we had to rebuild it again. Basically, we had to delete all 
the lenders and re-add them… What other glitches are hiding in the system if that’s 
there? How do we test for that?” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)  
 Startup F had been focused on integrating the fintech loan providers into their 
website, but there were also delays on the side of the lenders: “My whole sprint has been 
[to] get the lenders signed up, [and to] influence them to invest time [for] the integration. 
But now, one of the lenders is saying it is going to be six weeks for them [to integrate]... 
The issue is that they’re on a completely different [web platform] system that we can’t 
hand off [data] to.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) This led to frustration 
over ongoing delays in launching the business: “Yeah, we’re supposed to launch – it’s 
been a couple of times, right? On the 15th of May, that didn’t happen. The 1st of June, that 
didn’t happen. Last Monday, and this past Monday [we didn’t launch], and the next 
Monday [we won’t launch].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)  
 At the time (June 2016), Startup F had four loan providers that had integrated into 
their startup’s web platform. With these delays in the integration process, the founder 
wondered whether it was an option to launch with fewer lenders than had been 
anticipated: “maybe we’ll [wait to have all lenders integrated to] do the whole thing, or 
maybe we’ll wait for six weeks, or maybe we’re going to have just a smaller number of 
lenders. So, instead of launching with twelve, we may launch with four, and then bring 
the other guys on as they’re ready to integrate. I’m kind of leaning towards that [last 




 However, the founder was also worried that launching too quickly, with a lack of 
loan provider integration or challenges arising when potential loan seekers accessed the 
web platform would be perceived negatively by loan seekers, and that this would affect 
their potential commitment to a loan: “If there’s an issue, we’ll see drop off at that point. 
But that customer typically won’t be back – at least anytime soon. Maybe they’ll come 
back after a year or two.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016)  
Phone and web platform. By mid-July 2016, one of the loan providers discovered 
security issues with the site: “It’s even worse that we didn’t find it [ourselves], and one of 
the coders from our main lender found it. Yeah, [this is] trouble… We did some digging 
and we found other huge liabilities… Now I’m having to deal with follow up with one of 
our lenders. They want their guy to look over all of our code.” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 13 July, 2016) Not only did the security issue result in another delay in 
launching the loan aggregator, Startup F worried that it affected their credibility with the 
lender: “[This lender] is the first company that fully integrated with us. They’re at the 
highest level of integration, so they’ll pre-qualify all the information… They’ve been 
really keen this whole time. If something happens there [and they become dissatisfied the 
web platform], then I feel there’s some damage [to our relationship].” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016)  
2.2.8. Startup F’s web platform goes live and loan seekers attempt first loans. 
Through the web platform. The web platform went live online at the end of July 2016. 
Startup F launched with twelve loan providers signed up to work with them and six 
integrated on the website.  
E-mail and newsletters. To capture e-mail addresses for future contact, by July 2016, 
the startup had implemented a pop up window on their website that offered a newsletter 
about personal financial management: “It’s cool because now, we’re capturing addresses 
of people who didn’t sign up. So, those people will go into another bucket of people that 
we’ll market to, obviously... You use it as a lure to bring people back to the site. You send 
them interesting tidbits of information about something in the loan industry.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) 
2.2.9. Initial integration issues with loan providers became more obvious and needs 
testing. 
Data analytics. When the web platform was first launched in July 2016, Startup F started 
to track how many loan applications were completed using data analytics tools, and at 
what part of the website did visitors disengage using data analytics tools. The founder 
started observing several issues with the loan aggregator platform that made visitors not 
complete a loan application. These visitors were termed ‘lost customers.’ First, while 




application: “a bunch of people went to the site, but they didn’t actually convert or do 
anything.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)  
 Furthermore, data analytics told Startup F that most visitors to the web platform 
were on mobile devices: “87 percent of the people coming to our site are on mobile… 
Mobile conversion is much different sometimes.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 
2016) These tools were used to study how visitors to their web platform interacted with 
the interface: “And then, I can see whatever you type… I can click on this and it’ll take 
me to the exact page you’re at. It won’t take me to where you’re entering all the 
information, but it’ll show me exactly on the site where you are... So, I can track people 
through the site. I can see where they drop off.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 
2016) “We’ve implemented heat mapping on the site... You get all these analytics to learn 
what’s going on.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016) 
 In addition to the insights from data analytics, issues created by a lack of 
integration with loan providers became more obvious. If loan seekers needed to enter 
their information multiple times, both on Startup F’s web platform and on the selected 
loan provider’s website, Startup F observed: “If they go through our application on our 
site and then they have to click a link to the lender – and then have to start the 
application process again – [there is a] huge drop off [in completing the loan 
application]. So, what [the lenders] are seeing on their site is that the people who have 
clicked on [lender name] are getting to their landing page, and they’re not doing sh*t [to 
complete the next application].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)   
 Third, another integration issue arose when the criteria given to Startup F resulted 
in a loan provider pre-approved all applicants on Startup F’s web platform but then 
declined loan applications when loan seekers re-entered information on their own 
websites: “They [,the loan provider,] approve everybody [on our site], without asking us, 
without telling us anything… Then, they [,the loan seekers,] apply, they get declined, and 
they don’t come back to the site. So, there’s huge drop off actually. We’ve sent through 
about twenty different applications [that the loan provider pre-approved on our site], and 
every single one of them was declined… From those declines, we didn’t get a conversion 
at all. So, they weren’t coming back to our site, or they were and were basically seeing 
an increase in rates, and saying, ‘Wow! That’s a pretty sh**ty rate drop’ and they’re not 
[completing the application].”” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) 
 Fourth, a lack of integration also occasionally resulted in one single lender 
showing up in the search results: “When somebody is coming in with good credit and 
they’re searching for a good creditor, the only option that’s showing up for them is [one 
loan provider]. So, it’s not really a search engine then.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 
22 August, 2016) 
 Finally, without integration, Startup F was not always getting paid their referral 




through other lenders because they are not specifically integrated to the degree we 
wanted them to be integrated at yet… So we’re just kind of in a bit of an interim situation, 
where it’s difficult to bill. We’re just sorting through what is the best way we can – just 
sending people emails and saying, ‘What’s going on? Who’s been approved?’” (Startup 
F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016) 
Web platform and email. By August 2016, one month into the web platform’s live 
operations, loan seekers were still facing challenges on the web platform due to poor loan 
provider integration. Though some loan seekers dropped off the site without 
communication, some contacted the startup with complaints: “They sent me an email 
today to say, ‘It’s really disappointing. We thought you guys were going to be ready for 
the end of June. Now it’s the end of August, and now you’re telling us September.’ We’re 
having a fall off with people. They’ll go through the app and they’ll get the good credit 
option and there’s only one lender shown. What the heck is this? I thought this was a 
search engine. I thought it was going to show me a number of options. So, that’s a 
burning fire I need to deal with.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016) 
Web platform. Despite incomplete and rejected applications on the web platform, as of 
September 2016, the lack of integration was not affecting new potential loan seekers from 
coming to visit the site: “They’re coming. They don’t know [about the level of lender 
integration].” At the same time, Startup F was still waiting to get more of their lenders 
fully integrated: “Really, we only have one primary lender who’s up right now. So, it’s 
kind of hokey…. One kept telling us that they were getting their website built, but it’s 
taking them forever to get that working.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 
2016) In general, however, the lenders were seeing this partnership as an opportunity: 
“the lenders are all really keen and excited about where we’re at and what’s going on.” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016)  
2.2.10. Follow-up on incomplete and rejected applications – Hired call representative.  
Phone. The founder believed that these integration issues were what limited the number 
of applications being completed in July 2016. When Startup F noticed that there were 
potential loan seekers that visited the web platform and were being declined, or that they 
did not complete their application, they decided to follow up with these ‘lost customers’ 
over the phone: “We do have all the applicant’s email addresses and contact 
[information] for members. So, next week, I’m going to have this guy that I hired to call 
all of them, email follow up after a couple of days, and then call again to figure out what 
led them to our site, why then they went through the application, and ultimately got 
declined… [I want to] tell them, ‘Well you can come back. We have other loans 
applicable to you.’ We’re trying to sell and close to those people, right?” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) Following up with ‘lost customers’ was personally 
important to the founder and Startup F hired its first employee to phone who had 




going to follow up with and hopefully, be able to convert a quarter of them.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016) 
 However, there were a few challenges in doing this. First, it would take 
manpower and time to contact these loan seekers – and Startup F had limited resources at 
the time. Furthermore, the startup only captured email or phone contact details if the loan 
seeker had started an application and entered this information into the web platform. 
“This [list of loan seeker contact information] is only the people who have gone through 
the search. So, they’ve come to the site, they’ve clicked on the button saying, ‘Let’s 
search loans.’ They’ve entered all their information and completed the profile. They’ve 
checked the button that says, ‘Okay for [startup name] to contact me and I agree to all 
the terms of privacy.’ And Boom, they’ve gone and seen results... Those are the folks [we 
can follow up with].” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)  
 The goal of reaching out via phone was to create a relationship with the demand-
side customer: “One thing is gratitude. Let them know that we’re grateful for their 
business. We appreciate that they came here and picked us instead of going over to 
independent lenders. Help educate them and, have them maybe talk to other people about 
what we’re doing.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016)  
 By August 2016, a salesperson had been hired to phone the loan seekers who had 
initiated an application, but had not yet completed it: “His job is not to help close those 
people. He’ll get a commission for every sale that gets closed that he’s dealing with.” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016) This was an unexpected expense for 
Startup F: “I really wasn’t thinking that we’re going to have a lot of people come to the 
site and not complete the application. It just never really crossed my mind as to how we 
were going to manage that and what we are going to do about them. My idea was, 
they’re going to come through – it will all be automated. They don’t get touched by 
anybody and there’s no salesy person on the other end dealing with that. But there are a 
huge number of people that are coming on and not moving forward.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016) 
 Even into September 2016, Startup F was still experiencing issues with potential 
loan seekers not completing their application: “So, we see a lot of people coming to the 
application and dropping off right away. So, our biggest issue is [that they are] not 
completing [the application]. Once they’ve completed the application, we tend to be… 
really good at following up and getting them placed. There are a lot of folks in the 
pipeline… At some point within those steps of the application, they’re falling off, the vast 
majority – so maybe 90 percent. And 10 percent are going through and completing [the 
application], right? So, we do see there’s an interest… They’re looking for a loan… And, 
we’re learning that people are inherently lazy, right? They really don’t want to enter tons 
of personal information. They want something that’s quick, easy, and done.” (Startup F 




2.2.11. Visiting businesses interested in providing consumer finance.  
Phone, in-person meeting. In July 2016, the option to work with business owners who 
wanted to offer their customers consumer finance loans was revisited. Starting with 
phone calls, Startup F quickly learned that communication with businesses that may be 
interested in offering consumer finance loans were much more successful if conducted in-
person: “I haven’t had time to talk to the companies that I talked to last summer. I had the 
interns call, but they didn’t have a good experience. It’s hard to talk to [these small 
businesses] on the phone. People think you are trying to sell them a loan, and they close 
off. Really, the key is going and visiting a business, like a furniture store, bringing a 
laptop, and saying, ‘we talked last summer. The website is up and we want to get you set 
up. I’m talked about bringing on commission-based sales people to help with this.” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016) By August 2016, Startup F was organizing 
to develop their consumer finance arm of the business: “Getting a sales team together to 
help me connect with businesses across the country who basically want their clients be 
able to cover the costs of services.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 29 July, 2016) 
Conference networking. In September 2016, Startup F attended a veterinarian 
conference to connect with businesses that might be interested in consumer finance 
options for their customers: “we have a booth there. We’re going to go and talk to a 
bunch of vets.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 September, 2016) 
2.2.12. Self-promotion through owned media. 
Self-published articles on website. By June and August 2016, Startup F had published a 
couple of articles on their web platform that explained the industry and purpose of the 
business. “I published a couple of articles on [not going to Pay Day lenders] on my blog. 
I have these articles on the site.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016)  
Press release. The startup also had a press release in August 2016, with the intention to 
raise awareness about the business. “It went across the country. So, it’s on Yahoo News, 
on National Post, that sort of stuff.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 2016)  
2.2.13. Meeting with lenders. 
In-person. While most discussions with lenders were via phone, by August 2016, one of 
their lenders had requested a meeting to offer suggestions on ways to improve traffic and 
secure loan seekers coming onto the site: “They were going to be there and said, ‘Come 
up, we can meet at Starbucks. We’ll have a chat about the future of financial technology.’ 
So, I kind of dressed down… and I showed up and they’re like, ‘Actually, how about you 
come up to the third-floor boardroom?’ They come back in, I sit down, and the COO, the 
CEO and three of their investors are there.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 August, 
2016) This meeting in particular solidified to Startup F that they had lenders that were 




resources. They’re committed to us being successful.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 
August, 2016) 
2.2.14. Using a family and friends focus group to understand site issues. 
Focus group with family and friends. By September 2016, Startup F’s founder decided 
to hold a focus group with about twenty-five family and friends to understand some of the 
key challenges and bugs in the software that may be affecting conversion rate: “I’m going 
to have some people doing it on their phones, as well as on their laptops. And then, we’ll 
glean some insight from that – what people are struggling with, what is bothering them, 
and then basically, we’ll be fine, based on that.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 
September, 2016)   
 In this session, they learned of issues with the web platform that they had not 
heard before, such as incompatibility with hardware and length of time to complete an 
application: “We realized the app [version of the software] isn’t working in Android 
phones. And the vast majority of people who are coming to our site are on Android 
phones [not to the desktop version of the website]. And nobody has told us that the app 
isn’t working. ‘It doesn’t work? I’m not going to tell them. I’m just going on somewhere 
else.’ So, we were lucky we had that event where we could see that’s what was going on. 
The other piece was ‘The app is too long! You’re asking too many questions! I don’t 
understand this part. It’s hard to estimate credit score. So, we decided, okay, let’s 
revamp. And we hired this company… to revamp the app, using input from our meeting 
here and analyzing other people that lend online (competitors). For me, the main goals 
were deconstructing, pull[ing] apart what is needed, what isn’t needed, and strip out as 
much as we can to make it as short as possible.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 16 
September, 2016) Furthermore, how the user-friendly was the website was also a 
consideration: “Look[ing] at how the mobile setup works, you’ve got to kind of scroll to 
click on the spot where you click select. [It’s not easy]… So, we added an “apply” button 
[in a pop-up] window [so it would be more visible.] It’s just huge [for getting people to 
complete the application on their mobile device]!” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 
November, 2016) 
 This feedback greatly improved the percentage of completed applications for 
loans by demand-side customers by 16.5-fold: “[Of people who visited the site, those that 
were completing the application made up only] 2 percent every day… Now that we’ve 
redone [the web platform], 35 percent of the people who land on our site complete the 
application!” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
2.2.15. Earned media attention. 
Magazines. Even before launching, Startup F was interested tofeatured in traditional 
media: “[The incubator] has some very good tools that I could utilize to help me with the 




(Startup F Founder, Interview, 13 July, 2016). Eventually, once they’d launched, the 
founder and Startup F were featured in the October 2016 issue of a local business 
magazine. The article triggered both local businesses and individuals to contact Startup F 
into November 2016: “We’ve got a number of leads from the city who are interested, 
because we’re doing two things, right? We’re doing the direct consumer lending, but 
we’re also doing the business financing that’s helping business owners supply their 
clients with financing cover. So, we had some leads coming through that – which is 
cool.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016)  
2.2.16. Expanded customer service call centre to follow-up on ‘lost customers’.  
Phone. Startup F realized they needed more than one individual making phone calls to 
handle call-backs, required due to the volume of incomplete or denied applications on the 
start-ups website: “We only have a phone system. I’ve got to get a system set up for a call 
centre. If we can do it on the small scale, we can do it on the big scale… [Following up 
with visitors to the site] - That’s just money. Like free money.” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
2.2.17. Revisiting consumer finance. 
Web platform, email, phone. By November 2016, the next focus for Startup F was the 
consumer finance model that they saw to be essential for growth of the business: “We do 
one sale, we sell to a company. They do sales for us all day long. We partner with these 
consumer finance partners and we can come in and we don’t have to sell anything to 
anybody. We webshare and create a system that looks great!... [With direct-to-consumer 
we] had to show, obviously, that the volume was working, it’s a scalable business. And 
we’re there… But for us, we’re understanding now, [there’s a] cost to acquire one-for-
one. There’s a cost per acquisition for everyone. If we go with scale, small businesses – 
great – veterinary clinics, home renovators, mom and pop furniture stores. But if we just 
do sales to big companies… [they] bring us in as a financing alternative.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
 While the primary focus of Startup F was still on direct consumer lending, they 
had started building individualized application platforms for businesses for consumer 
finance: “We haven’t launched the formal beta of the consumer finance stuff yet. We’ve 
been really focusing on the other side. But that’s happening in the New Year now. So, we 
built out the application, the system works, it’s live. We are just going to launch it with a 
few home renovators and get them to test it over a few months, and obviously, work out 
the kinks before we do a full rollout.” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 
2016) For example, specialized websites were created for veterinary clinics: “the site 
changes based on the type of industry. So, the background image will show a 
construction worker, or show something else [that is relevant to this business].” (Startup 
F Founder, Interview, 22 November, 2016) By November 2016, Startup F had also 




consumers could request instant loans at checkouts of retailers: “We create a connected 
payment portal that you can do through our system. It’s plugged in.” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 22 November, 2016) 
2.2.18. Change in loan providers to meet loan seekers needs. 
Web platform and data analytics. In the meantime, by the end of November 2016, 
Startup F observed that changes in their advertising strategy had resulted in an increased 
volume of applicants. However, these applicants were still individuals with poor credit 
scores: “We receive good search volume. But we thought we might exist more in the 
prime space. We haven’t found that. We’re really in the subprime space. So, we have a 
few prime lenders that don’t see many loan applications, [while] our subprime lenders 
see a lot… [For those that] are declined, we need to send them to a credit consolidation 
company. So, we’ve got to get the setup done really quick.” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 22 November, 2016) This prompted Startup F to adjust lenders and processes 
in the business so that they could satisfy this tier of customer: “So, it’s creating the 
system and the pipeline that works, that we’re on it fast enough.” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 22 November, 2016)  
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. Interactions with the loan providers (supply-side customers) 
and intermediary businesses were initiated to secure partnerships and improve the 
experience on the web platform. There was cross-over between various communication 
tools such as messages on LinkedIn, phone calls, e-mails, visiting conferences, and in-
person meetings during the process of on-boarding loan providers and intermediary 
businesses. 
 Interactions with loan seekers (demand-side customers) were predominantly 
advertisement based, followed by phone calls or e-mails if they had visited the site. Initial 
testing was done on family and friends that visited and interacted with the web platform. 
Startup F also used articles, both self-published and earned media (magazine article) to 
gain attention to draw potential loan seekers to the site. From the data collected through 
interviews and secondary materials, there were no additional cross-overs of customer 
interactions between platforms. 
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
 Besides the three types of customers, there were family and friends, competitors, 
mentors and incubators noted by Startup F. From the data collected through interviews 





4.1. Family and Friends 
 Much of the demand-side testing, both before the website was live and after, was 
done by family and friends. 
4.2. Competitors 
 They currently do not have competitors in Canada, but do have them in the U.S. 
Time to launch and gain brand recognition is the largest concern over competitors. 
4.3. Mentors 
 Mentors motivated the founder to connect with clients over the phone, rather than 
relying on online communication technologies: “He said, when he first started, he called 
every single one of these clients directly. He called them. I mean, a phone call from the 
CEO. That’s a big deal, right? So, they call, [and] talk. He’ll talk to them and make sure 
everything is going okay and working well, even with that many people.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) He also pushed the founder to stop worrying and to 
focus on growing the business: “He said, ‘Just focus on growing. Every tech company’s 
dream is to grow quick. So, get out there and do whatever you can and do it well. Stop 
worrying about that kind of crap.’ That was kind of cool. I mean he really kid of got me 
focused on just getting to market. So, trying to push for that.” (Startup F Founder, 
Interview, 22 June, 2016) 
4.4. Incubators 
 In June 2016, the founder was in a summer startup incubator. While he received 
guidance, he also felt pressure to have sales, particularly in comparison to other founders 
in his cohort: “I’m hearing other startups that are gaining traction… one guy on 
Kickstarter just got 18 grand in like a day. That sort of stuff is happening.” (Startup F 
Founder, Interview, 22 June, 2016) The founder also secured a place in an incubator in a 
larger, nearby city associated with fin-tech and marketplaces in October 2016 through 
reaching out to his entrepreneurial network. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 All major challenges are detailed above. From the data collected through 
interviews and secondary materials, no additional challenges were noted. 
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017 
 At the time of writing, Startup F was expanding their Google marketing to 
increase the volume of applicants to the web platform. Most of the applicants were: 
“Typically males… I think their average age is around 35… Mostly, poor socioeconomic 




interesting because when we launched, we thought we’d be really getting a lot of prime 
applicants. And what we understand is that the cost is very expensive to get those people. 
Everybody else is trying to get those people as well. So, we’ve really been able to fit in 
down here where we can help monetize those people that these other businesses can’t” 
(Startup F Founder, Interview, 17 March, 2017). To increase access to this market, they 
were trying out offline marketing tactics, including direct mail for less expensive 
acquisitions in lower income neighbourhoods. 
 By March 2017, Startup F had undergone several recent changes to change the 
types of customers that they attracted, as well as the volume. More specifically, the 
startup had started bringing in lenders (supply-side customers) to meet the needs of 
businesses seeking loans, developed partnerships for the consumer finance side of their 
business with doctors in the U.S. and veterinary clinics in Canada, and wanted to start 
partnering with larger brands: “[We want to be] partnering with brands that people trust 
in order to actually let people feel that they can trust us” (Startup F Founder, Interview, 
17 March, 2017). They were also developing a mobile phone app that facilitated the loan 
seeking process on the go.  
Appendix B7. Startup G 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. & 1.2. Business Idea and Founder 
 Startup G was a founded to produce a product that could brew coffee on the go. 
The product had been called a portable travel brewer mug, pressure brewer, and a coffee 
press, with the founder describing the product as: “an all in one pressure brewer and 
travel mug that allows you to brew very high quality coffee and take it with you on the 
go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).  The idea for the product arose from 
the founder’s love of coffee and his experiences operating canoe trips. He found that he 
wanted great coffee on the go, but struggled to find a way to brew it while camping.  
 In Summer 2015, as a coffee enthusiast with a Masters in Engineering degree and 
specializing in thermodynamics, the founder realized that he could probably solve his 
own problem: “I was making coffee one day in the lab [with a competing product], and I 
thought, why can’t I just drink out of this? And that’s where it kind of came from. I drink 
coffee every day. I’m in thermofluids. I know what [good coffee] is and how the actual 
brewing works” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).  He developed a 
prototype, and upon the urging of his business course professor, patented the design in 





1.3. About the Customers 
 The individual consumers initially targeted by Startup G were similar to the 
founder – outdoor enthusiasts that enjoyed good coffee. However, over time, during 
online community forum discussions with potential customers and camping and coffee 
enthusiasts, the founder realized that there were other potential markets that would be 
seeking out good coffee, on the go, such as commuters: “Probably just general 
commuters [would also be interested]. People commuting every day. They want their 
coffee. Someone asked me that on my post. Why are you targeting campers? What about 
commuters? I said there’s no sub-Reddit (an online community forum) for commuters, 
sadly. So, I’m just starting off in these niche spaces and building my reputation among 
cool people. Outdoor enthusiasts. They are more willing to adopt new technologies if it 
helps their camping. And then, [after] showing that it works for camping, it could work 
for everyday life. [So, we are] starting off in niche areas and then growing into a mass 
consumer market” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).  
 Although Startup G wanted to partner with independent coffee shops, online 
stores that offer gadgets, and distributors of coffee related products, the startup did not 
look at these businesses as customers: “I guess [name of small independent coffee shop], 
if I’m selling through them. [Competitor product] will sell their product through retail 
locations or small coffee shops. So, in that sense, they’re a customer. But I’d say the end 
user [is our customer]. Because [name of small independent coffee shop] won’t be 
buying these to brew in their cafes, but they will be selling to people who enjoy their 
coffee on the go... It would be great to sell to that store, but it would be really great to 
sell to the distributor, who is going to each of those stores to sell my product” (Startup G 




2. STARTUP HISTORY 
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016 
Product idea and prototype development
Tested prototype with in-person network
Started getting feedback from online community 
forum
Entrepreneur pitch competition
Met local café to test product
Contacted blog writers
Used social media to self-promote & radio show, 
blog, magazine, and newspaper features
Continued feedback with online community forum
Kickstarter campaign launched
Feedback and Interactions with customers -
Crowdfunding website, online community forum, 
social media, blogs, data analytics, local cafes, radio, 
newspapers, ads, email
Started hashtag SEO campaign
Continued promotion of Startup G - Social media 
ads, blogs, newspaper, university promotion
Visit to manufacturer in China
Observed positive results from 
promotions




2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Idea for product, prototype developed, and patent filed. 
 While the idea for creating, manufacturing, and selling this product – a travel 
pressure brewer – arose in Fall 2015, the goal of creating a coffee press was not new for 
the founder: “I was already working on something. I had an idea for a self-stirring 
French press” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). The founder developed a 
prototype, and upon the urging of his business school professor, he filed a patent. 
2.2.2. Started testing prototype with personal network. 
Personal network, in-person. Without waiting for the patent to be approved, in January 
2016, the founder decided to start acquiring potential customer feedback on the prototype 
and the coffee it produced. At this stage, he still did not have a product – just the single 
prototype he made in the laboratories on university campus.  
 He began taste testing the coffee with personal contacts. He emailed the 
engineering students on campus, offering free coffee as an incentive to get users to give 
feedback on the brewing technique. The comments he received back were both the taste 
of the coffee and on the process: “There’s always people that say, why don’t you do this 
or that. Small things. But really, it’s just taking their feedback and trying to incorporate it 
into their design… A lot of people said they didn’t even need milk with my coffee” 
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).  
2.2.3. Started receiving feedback from online community forum. 
Online community forums. In March 2016, the founder started using various online 
platforms to raise awareness about his potential product and to learn what types of 
features in a coffee press were important to potential customers. He started by reaching 
out to individuals on Reddit.com - an online community where topics of all types can be 
discussed - and asked community members on three forums, coffee, tea and camping 
gear, what they thought of the portable coffee brewer mug that he was developing: “I did 
the same post [in each forum] – ‘Hey, I have this coffee press. What do you guys think? 
I’m really not trying to advertise anything. I’m really just looking for feedback.’ So, that 
worked out for me. I posted there three times. And I have three of the top six most 
popular posts” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016). The forums ended up 
receiving 478 comments total (including his responses).  
 Such interactions made the founder realize the importance of certain features for 
potential customers. For example, a leak proof product was highly requested: “Even from 
the Reddit post – my latest lid – everyone from the Reddit forums said this has to be leak 
proof or they won’t buy it. So, I had to go a few other design changes to make a fully leak 




 The comments received in the online community forum were somewhat 
anonymous and often, quite critical. The founder looked at the comments but was 
generally not aware of the identity of the community members making the comments: “I 
read every comment. I think the best ones are the people asking critical questions. At first 
I thought, these people are just being mean. But I realized they are just being interested. 
And if you reply to them well, then… you’ve just built a relationship with that commenter. 
To know who these people are – that’s the hard part. Reddit is completely anonymous. 
You can’t... they don’t have a profile or anything. Just a user name” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 27 May, 2016).  
2.2.4. Entrepreneur pitch competition.  
 In April 2016, Startup G participated in and won a pitch competition that raised 
awareness about the business, gave the startup some funding, and provided valuable 
consumer feedback that validated the concept of a leak proof lid, proposed by the online 
community forum (refer to 2.2.3): “This is actually right after [name of pitch 
competition], trying to get some traction and then just testing this design. The big thing 
everyone asked was is the lid leak proof, which it wasn’t. So then, that’s where I came 
back and now have a leak proof lid” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
2.2.5. Met with local café to test product. 
In-person. After visiting with one café in May 2016, the founder of Startup G learned 
that there were different ways in which they could describe the coffee to different types 
of potential customers: “Before, I would say [the coffee] is strong, yet incredibly smooth, 
but no bitterness. But now, when I’m describing it, I can say, with a medium roast, you 
get flowery aromas and a very clean crisp taste. With a dark roast, you can get bold 
flavours without being hidden by the bitterness. This is important because I’m targeting 
those coffee connoisseurs, and those crossover connoisseurs, and outdoor enthusiasts 
that want real quality brew when on the go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 
2016).   
2.2.6. Decided to crowdfund the manufacturing of the product and work with 
distributors.  
Online crowdfunding platform. Even though the pressure brewer was still under 
development, by May 2016, the founder decided that he was going to promote the 
product on Kickstarter - an online crowdfunding platform in mid-June 2016. The funding 
on Kickstarter required creators to set a goal amount that they wanted to raise within a 
certain time period. At a minimum, this amount would need to be pledged by backers for 
a project be funded. If this minimum amount was not met, the project would not be 
funded. 
 The founder wanted to pre-sell the product to raise funds to start a first batch of 




forward. It also gives me traction to approach these distributors to say, hey, I sold x 
amount in a 30-day campaign. What can you sell to your customers?” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).   
Working with distributors. Startup G also started thinking seriously about working with 
distributors and direct-to-consumers around this time, to facilitate getting their product 
out to shops and cafes: “We have a launch date of mid-June. And that will be a 30-day 
campaign. And then after that it will take about six months to production – or actually, to 
delivery of the products. And during the six months, we [will] reach out to distributors to 
get more pre-sales if possible” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).   
2.2.7. Startup G proactively contacted for blog writers. 
Blogs. By May 2016, at least two blog articles had been written about the product – a 
coffee blog and an outdoor gear blog. The founder of Startup G had proactively contacted 
writers and editors to get featured in these articles: “I searched for blogs, messaged the 
editors, and they got back to me. I tried to make it as easy as possible to write the article. 
I gave them a paragraph, kind of explaining what [Startup G] is. Another one explaining 
why it would be good for their blog. Another four quick points about what it brews. Why 
it’s better, and a bunch of pictures to make it as easy as possible for them” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 27 May, 2016).   
2.2.8. Using social media to self-promote and landed a visit to a local radio show. 
Twitter social media and radio. In June 2016, the founder of Startup G used Twitter to 
reach out to a local radio station. This interaction resulted in Startup G being offered a 
guest slot on the radio’s morning show the day before their crowdfunding campaign 
began: “[My mom] needed something from the grocery store in the morning, so I just 
walked over, and the radio station was broadcasting it from there. It’s actually a radio 
station I follow on Twitter, and I’ve tweeted at them, before they’ve tweeted back. So, I 
said, ‘Hey, you guys have tweeted me before.’ And they said, ‘Oh, why was that?’ I said, 
‘Well, I’m actually an inventor of a coffee maker.’ And I explained it all to them. ‘It’s 
actually just over at my house right now, like a two-minute walk. Would you mind if I 
come over and brew some coffee for you?’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 
2016).   
2.2.9. Continued interaction with online community forum – Building community and 
obtaining emails. 
Online community forum. There were several posts of communication between Startup 
G and community members in the online community forum by June 2016 (refer to 2.2.3). 
The founder had posted a video to provide a visual aid of how the product worked, and in 
addition to the forum posts, there was also a lot of individual messaging between the 




Interactions with potential customers in the online community was the founders’ 
preferred way to receive feedback: “Well, with Reddit [, the online community forum], I 
can actually communicate with people and there are probably over 500 accumulated 
comments right now. You can’t get that with Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram, or 
anything like that because Reddit is really set up for the comment section. That’s where 
they have the main post but the main part of Reddit is the comment section, so that helps 
a lot” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
Startup G engaged with the online community platform daily: “I literally just 
watch [the forum] all day and when someone comments, I’ll reply back, just because 
people get more engaged if I’m commenting and they all know they’ll get an answer right 
away. So, they’re more likely to actually comment” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 
June, 2016).  Furthermore, these interactions were translating to having visitors to Startup 
G’s website, and for them to share their email addresses to continue to receive 
information about the product: “125 comments of this post actually got me 200 email 
signups in two day. Yeah, so you can actually start to see a conversion rate between the 
number of people who actually like it and the number of people that actually [sign up for 
email updates]. We had 768 [likes on the forum at one stage]” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
Speaking to community forum members also helped the founder distinguish how 
their product is different from similar products: “I’m not saying anywhere on my website 
that this is like a travel [similar coffee brewing product] but when people ask me on 
forums, I say, ‘yeah, I use my [similar coffee brewing product] a lot.’ It just wasn’t the 
greatest for taking on the go” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
2.2.10. Media coverage before the crowdfunding campaign for Startup G. 
Blogs, magazine, and newspaper. Just prior to the Kickstarter launch in June 2016, 
three additional articles were written by other blogs and magazines, plus one by the 
university newspaper. The founder concluded that the increased awareness about Startup 
G, predominantly from their presence on the online community forum, Reddit, and 
associated blogs (refer to 2.2.3, 2.2.7, 2.2.9), were prompting the writing of these new 
articles. Validation for the product came however, not through potential readers and 
customers, but through the authors of these articles. Startup G’s founder believed that 
having an article written about the product would create positive attention about it: 
“There are not as many comments on things like that… The best feedback I get is from 
the blog writers themselves. If they say, ‘Yeah, that’s a cool thing. We’ll write about it.’ If 
they’re not, they’re only going to write about it if they like it. The fact that they like it and 
they write about it, that’s good, because then, people will trust them, which is why I’m 





2.2.11. Crowdfunding campaign launched and started receiving feedback almost 
immediately. 
Crowdfunding campaign webpage. Late June 2016, Startup G launched their 
Kickstarter campaign to raise money to manufacture the first batch of product (refer to 
2.2.6). The target goal set by the founder was to earn $40,000 in a month. On the first day 
of the campaign, the funding levels were not as high as the founder had expected 
however. This was attributed to the high shipping costs that customers were dismayed 
with: “Day one was a little crazy. I think in the first 24-hours, from like 3:00 pm until 
midnight, we raised over $16,000, which we were expecting a bit more. We got a lot of 
pushback on our shipping costs right now, which I wasn’t expecting. To be honest, I think 
we lost probably $30,000 of sales that first day” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 
2016). 
The founder thought that the customers on Kickstarter were willing to buy 
random items: “A lot of people that are just on Kickstarter. They just like random pieces 
of stuff. I do think a lot of them were not the high-end coffee people, but just kind of that 
in-between person [who says,] ‘Yeah, I don’t want to go to Starbucks, but I also don’t 
want to spend too much on a full espresso machine or something. I just want to be able to 
brew my own coffee.’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).  
Online community forum. Feedback also came through the online community forum. 
While there were also suggestions about changes in material and size, the founder 
justified his reasons for why the product would not change from the current design: 
“Yeah, someone wanted a carabiner thing [attached to the coffee press]. And that’s 
another thing – if we get a lot of money, we can start adding those things. But, I mean, 
every change – especially the stainless steel version one, that’s a whole other product, 
right? It has to go through a whole other development stage. These products took me a 
little under a year to develop, right? I think now that we have the first product, we’re not 
going to take as long with the stainless steel one to make, but still, it’s just a whole other 
product that will have its own challenges with manufacturing” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 28 June, 2016).  
 Customers also messaged the startup to ask for discounts during the Kickstarter 
marketing campaign: “Some people are messaging us saying, ‘Why aren’t you offering a 
better deal on this? Why are you only offering 10 to 20 percent off what you’re expected 
retail is?’ I said, ‘Well, because that’s all we can offer. We’re just a small company. We 
can’t afford those margins.’ Companies that are offering 50 percent off retail, they have 
their funding already. They’re just using this as a marketing campaign” (Startup G 






2.2.12. Promotion of online crowdfunding campaign. 
 Spreading awareness about the Kickstarter campaign to potential customers took 
place through social media, blog articles, and on the online community forum that Startup 
G had been corresponding with (refer to 2.2.3, 2.2.7, 2.2.9, 2.2.10, 2.2.11).   
Social Media. Startup G used social media to promote the Kickstarter campaign. Both 
posts on Facebook, Twitter or Instagram were used (Startup G’s Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram pages, accessed 3 March, 2017), as well as paid advertisements to promote 
Startup G. 
 During the Kickstarter campaign, social media was used to target specific 
markets, however was not as effective in creating sales as the founder had expected: 
“We’re getting a ton of engagement on our Facebook posts. I think one of them has over 
100 likes when we just released it yesterday at 5pm. But it’s not turning into purchases. I 
think it turned into two purchases so far” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).   
Blog articles and online community forum. Blogs were used during the Kickstarter 
campaign in June to boost sales: “[We are] just kind of experimenting right now, seeing if 
we can get that boost and then also looking into still reaching out to more blogs because 
we think that would be a big thing. We’re just looking at other Kickstarter campaigns 
when there’s a blog post that tends to pump you up just a bit” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 28 June, 2016). 
 The founder speculated that early blog articles and raising awareness on the 
online community forum were largely responsible for the initial list of email addresses 
that Startup G could contact regarding the Kickstarter: “It’s kind of hard with the way we 
set it up, to actually figure out exactly where because I think most of our sales are really 
coming from that initial email list of about 1000 people. So, we probably go, in the first 
day, or first two days, probably about a 20 percent conversion rate from our email list, 
which is pretty good. I don’t think you could ask for much better, and that’s what we 
were kind of looking at. And then, that email list was generated from a combination of 
Reddit and blogs and everything” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).  
 Furthermore, once sales had been initiated in the online crowdfunding platform, 
potential issues with the product or sales process started being discussed on the forum. 
The founder speculated that this was because the community was considered a safe place 
to have a discussion: “The way that I really figured out shipping costs wasn’t through 
Kickstarter comments, because we weren’t getting that. We got maybe two or three 
comments or messages. It’s from the Reddit post, because, once again, Reddit is a place 
where people feel free to comment and that’s where I got a lot of comments say, ‘What’s 
up with the shipping cost? Why is your shipping cost so high?’ ” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 28 June, 2016).  Over the previous few months, the founder of Startup G had 




When Startup G was criticized for high shipping costs, loyal community members ended 
up defended the startup and co-founder: “At the same time, because I was engaged with 
Reddit and people knew me, people started defending me… A lot of people complaining 
about shipping costs got really down voted, and people were saying, ‘Don’t cry about it. 
Your view of shipping costs have been ruined by Amazon. This is what small companies 
go through’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).  These veteran community 
members had been long-standing members in online community forums and were 
regularly posting to them: “Especially with those niche forums, a lot of the defending is 
from the smallest other SubReddits that I was using. If you’re posting on there, you’re 
likely a fairly active poster to actually engage in a small SubReddit like that” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).  
2.2.13. Use of data analytics to track crowdfunding website traffic. 
Data analytics. With the Kickstarter campaign in June 2016, the founder begun using 
SimilarWeb - a digital market intelligence platform that allows for tracking and 
comparing website traffic statistics and analytics: “You can literally go onto any website 
and then see what their global rank is, what their category is… you can compare [your 
website traffic] directly to other Kickstarter campaigns and see how you kind of compare 
to see what your traffic level is, and then maybe do some quick calculations as to 
potentially how much you can make based off of that” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 
June, 2016).  
 Once launched, Startup G learned where their customers were physically located 
using online data analytics: “It’s mainly from the U.S., actually probably 60 percent from 
the U.S. in total. Then, it’s Canada and then I think Britain and then just kind of similar 
countries. We have a fair amount in Japan right now. I think we have ten sales in Japan, 
so mainly in the U.S.” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).  In Canada, where 
the startup was founded, there seemed to also be a friends and family effect. More 
purchases were made in the hometown area of the founder: “I’ve got a couple of people 
just emailing me after saying, ‘Hey, I heard you on the radio,’ and they’re just asking 
about where they can buy [the product]. They had some questions… I think [hometown] 
is one of our higher [selling] cities, but at the same time, like I’m from there. So, I don’t 
know if it’s just my friends or people listening to the radio” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 28 June, 2016). 
 When looking at purchases, by July 2016, based on names, most of the purchases 
were made by males: “Our market, by far, it’s like 80 percent males. We’re not hitting the 
female market at all. We’re not so good at that. Maybe because we’re just a team of 
engineers? No, I’m not sure. I mean, I think our product definitely isn’t super 
aesthetically pleasing. It’s very functional. So, not to be stereotypical or anything, but 




complementary to any fashion or anything. It’s a very functional device” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).  
2.2.14. Visited local cafes for feedback on product and to connect with their customers. 
Local cafes in-person. The founder reached out to local coffee roasters and cafés to get 
their feedback on the coffee press. The cafes were initially found through personal 
contacts, however, as awareness about the product grew, other cafes became more 
interested in meeting with Startup G. The types of cafés that he focused on were: “kind of 
the single, small local ones, because that’s where the coffee enthusiast will be going. 
Those are the people that really care. If you’re going to a roaster to buy your coffee, then 
you really care about your coffee. Those are the people that it’s going to be the easiest to 
sell to initially, and those are going to be kind of, the influencers, you know. These people 
know their coffee. They can actually explain why this is better” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 14 July, 2016).   
 Startup G specifically only targeted one coffee shop in each smaller city to 
maintain relationships with the cafes: “I mean, [other cafes,] that’s their competition. 
And I want to keep that relationship with them. I mean, I can do it, but they’re going to 
say – they would want kind of more of an exclusive thing at this point” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).  They also use the cafes’ social media followings as 
an important customer source: “It’s great because they did have that coffee gear plug that 
they’re trying to start up. So that was definitely mutually beneficial, because it gives them 
more content for their blog, but also gives more press for me” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 14 July, 2016).  
 The founder also arranged with another café to offer taste tests of his product, and 
to get feedback, to customers already visiting the coffee shop: “I just had a table set up 
and I was just giving out samples and letting people try it. So that was pretty cool” 
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016). The founder wanted to maintain a strong 
ties with local cafes to maintain his ‘local’ identity: “I think probably just doing more of 
the [local] stuff, mainly because I like trying different coffees. There are a lot of really 
cool coffee shops in [local city], and a lot of cool different roast varieties. But then, I also 
like that it helps build my story of local inventor in [local city]” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 14 July, 2016).  
2.2.15. Continued promotion of crowdfunding campaign.  
 During the Kickstarter campaign, the founder of Startup G used several methods 
to interact with potential customers, including radio, social media and advertisements. 
These are described as follows: 
Traditional earned media - Radio. A local radio morning show reached out to Startup 
G in July 2016, however, the interview did not go as smoothly as hoped. The founder 




the visuals required to properly demonstrate the coffee press did not work with radio - an 
audio-only form of media: “Radio is not worth it. I don’t think it’s the target audience I 
want, because it’s very hard to explain how it works, just over the radio, for a very visual 
thing. Yeah, radio doesn’t take much” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).  
Traditional earned media - Newspapers. Newspaper articles, both university and local 
papers were also timed to highlight Startup G in June (O’Kruk, 8 June, 2016) and July 
2016 (Caudie, 11 July, 2016). 
Online cross-promotion of crowdfunding campaign. In addition to promoting their 
own Kickstarter campaign (refer to 2.2.12), the founder of Startup G also discovered that 
cross-promotion of another Kickstarter campaign (where Startup G promoted someone 
else’s product and they reciprocally promoted Startup G’s product) could be beneficial to 
boost interest in their own product: “We’ve had people reach out to us and say, ‘Hey, if 
you share our project and update, we’ll share yours.’… At first, we were kind of put off, 
and then we found one with a good amount of backers and it was kind of in the same 
market as us. It was a camping gear product. So, we did it and it probably got us like six 
sales within the half hour of them sharing it. So that’s something we’re going to try for a 
while” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).   
Advertisements. Later in the Kickstarter campaign, the startup used paid ads as an 
additional stream, but with minimal success: “In general, paid ads don’t seem to do 
much. It is really just getting us on the popular page on Kickstarter, that’s great…. But 
yeah, like daily ads and stuff doesn’t” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).  
 Despite the outreach to potential customers, not much consumer feedback was 
received during the Kickstarter campaign: “Some people are just asking, clarifying about 
how some stuff works. Some people are still complaining about the shipping” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).   
2.2.16. Finishing crowdfunding campaign. 
Online advertising. During the month-long Kickstarter campaign, Startup G advertised 
to potential customers daily: “We are making sure to do ads almost every day. We had 
that momentum, but I mean, that was very, very time consuming” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 3 August, 2016).   
Online crowdfunding campaign website. One week into the crowdfunding campaign, 
Startup G had raised $32,000. Just over three weeks into the campaign, they had passed 
their original goal of $40,000, and reached $50,000. When the campaign ended in July 
2016, 865 backers had funded 154 percent of their original goal at $61,643. Out of these 
backers, “65 percent of the people had never bought on Kickstarter before” (Startup G 




Email. To keep their Kickstarter supporters informed once the crowdfunding campaign 
was completed, Startup G continued to update individuals who contributed funding (i.e. 
backers) with email updates on the manufacturing process of the product/invention: “The 
money should be transferred to us on Thursday. So, then, once we have that, we’re going 
to say [to our backers, ‘It’s been two weeks. I just wanted to let you know what’s going to 
happen. We already have the tooling design started. I got an email on that today. I 
wanted to give you an idea of the timeline. So, tooling will take five to seven weeks. Once 
we have that, we’ll be able to actually give you guys some updates on what the final 
product is going to look like” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).  
2.2.17. Initiatives after the crowdfunding campaign. 
 By August 2016 after the Kickstarter campaign had concluded, Startup G began 
several different initiatives to continue to gain traction for the product and to continue 
sales, namely: 
Newspaper articles and social media. After the Kickstarter campaign, the founder of 
Startup G continued to raise awareness about the product with various media sources – 
both newspapers and online. In September 2016, they met with a university newspaper, “I 
was meeting with [university newspaper] to do another article. I mean, there are already 
enough articles with my face on it, but, yeah, so then, this one, hopefully, we can share 
this and then maybe say, ‘By the way, you can still buy our product.’… There’s one in the 
[local city] Business Magazine thing, and that someone contacted me and said they’d 
love to hear about the product. We have [a local newspaper article] that just kind of 
synced some more attraction on Facebook and stuff. … Right now, it’s not really helping 
sales that much. I think it’s helping get some connections, which is good, and then, it just 
kind of fills our social media page, because you need to do that” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
Indiegogo. Based on the success of the Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign, Startup G 
decided to launch an Indiegogo campaign (i.e. another crowdfunding online platform) in 
late July/early August 2016: “After the Kickstarter, we’re going to be launching an 
Indiegogo campaign. Indiegogo has their in-demand campaign where if you’re a 
successful Kickstarter or successful Indiegogo pre-order campaign, then you can just 
continue your pre-orders on their in-demand site. We can just transfer our entire 
Kickstarter page over to them and don’t have to change any of our content. So, it’s a very 
simple setup. We might wait a week and then say, ‘Hey, we got picked up by Indiegogo,’ 
get another kind of boost in sales there, and then just leave that for the entire 
manufacturing stage until we have our own e-commerce website set up” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).  Startup G did not market their second crowdfunding 
campaign: “We haven’t actually done any marketing for that, but we’ve already had 12 




Hashtags and social media. Using an online tool, Startup G starting to send out 
automated direct messages that are relevant to individuals on social media platforms to 
drive visitors to their website: “We’re setting up Evergreen posts, so just kind of generic 
posts that we kind of cycle through. So, I don’t actually have to be posting every day or 
every two days. We have this kind of post, and we can change that like if we find that one 
is not doing as well and we could just take that out and put a new one in the cycle” 
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).  These posts would trigger replies such 
as: “‘Yeah, your product looks awesome,’ and then [people are] buying it on Indiegogo” 
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).   
 This proprietary online tool was meant to use different hashtags in social media to 
experiment and identify different topics and markets and to make Startup G’s content 
discoverable and create the chances that potential customers would engage with them – 
either through social media or through Startup G’s website: “We’ll be posting it to our 
Instagram, Twitter and Facebook with different hashtags to figure out which ones will 
work. Because before we were doing like hashtag campaign and stuff like that, it was 
really easy to get the outdoors’ market. But now, how do we get the commuters? 
Commuters are a harder market to define. With camping, I can just go to camping gear 
topics. There’s no commuter topics. No one is going on a forum, talking about their daily 
commute. So, I think it’s a little harder to reach out to them. So, that’s where we want to, 
play around with hashtags – as much as I hate saying that” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
Social media for communication. Startup G also used social media to directly 
communicate with potential distributors around the World. The founder’s goal was not to 
sell to them right away, but instead, to learn from them as to what they were looking for: 
“I reached out to some coffee roasters in Australia I just got a list – I found out all the 
buyer contact information, reached out to them, got a few of them back to me to set up a 
call” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  This approach was not meant 
to be a direct sales pitch, however: “I think just reaching out to them and just say, being a 
friend with this point [is important]. I never said, ‘Hey, I want to sell this to you.’ It was 
always, ‘I have this product. It did some good sales on Kickstarter in your market. I want 
to learn more about your market.’ They’re not going to be on the defense in saying, ‘Why 
are you selling me this product? Give me all the specs.’ They’re just there to help me. It’s 
almost similar to what I did with the Reddit posts. I’m not directly selling to people. I’m 
just learning from people. And I think people are more open when they’re not being 
directly sold to. I mean, it’s never intentional. I think that’s just me right now. I’m not a 
huge salesperson. I just like learning that thing” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 





2.2.18. Continued promotion about Startup G. 
 Throughout October and November 2016, Startup G continued have the business 
promoted through advertisements, blogs and, also, a national newspaper. 
Social media and advertisements. By October 2016, Startup G had begun to use 
targeted Facebook and Instagram advertisements and working with a digital marketing 
agency: “We’ve learned some more ways of being able to actually use our email list and 
our followers on Facebook to create an audience within the Facebook ads. And then, that 
would allow us to have a more targeted campaign where before, we were just saying, ‘all 
right, let’s just type in a bunch of coffee keywords and then see if that gets us stuff” 
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).   
Blogs. By the end of 2016, at least eighteen blogs had been written about Startup G. With 
sales going well, the founder attributes many of the sales to awareness raised by the 
bloggers’ articles: “that’s what drove our sales, is the fact that we had so many articles 
and stuff written about us. We just kind of keep that. I think it’s much easier to sell to 
someone through someone, rather than me going and just posting, ‘Hey, buy this thing 
that I made’ Instead, a blogger says, ‘Look at this thing. This is awesome. You guys 
should check it out.’ Because those [blogging] people already have followers. People 
already trust them. I don’t have to earn people’s trust if someone else already has their 
trust” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).  
Newspaper. By November 2016, a large national newspaper had also learned about 
Startup G and had written an article about them (Stanley, 2016, 8 November).  
Poster on university campus. Startup G’s founder was also being featured a successful 
graduate on different posters on campus: “It’s in the engineering building. In the 
[entrepreneurship centre]... Sometimes I feel like I’ve a lot of pressure on me. Like 
everyone’s [said,] ‘Oh look at this, he’s really successful.’ I’ve only made two presses so 
far and one of them broke as I was trying to brew coffee. Yeah, there’s a lot of pressure. 
But at the same time, I don’t know. It’s good. It’s good publicity for me, right?” (Startup 
G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
2.2.19. Visiting manufacturer in China. 
 In November 2016, Startup G visited their manufacturer in China: “We went 
over… and had to have lunch with them in a restaurant right by the factory. And then we 
did a tour of the factory. The factory is nice. It’s really good. A lot of it is automated… 
It’s definitely safe” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
2.2.20. Seeing positive results from promoting startup. 
Social media. By December 2016, Startup G had begun to see positive results of their 
social media strategies: “I think really after playing around with Instagram, it seems like 




outdoor gear group than the coffee group.” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 
December, 2016).   The founder attributed the increase in product sales to their targeted 
Instagram strategy: “Indiegogo picked up the last few weeks. I think it was the Instagram 
strategy going more towards the outdoor gear stuff. We also started targeting the people 
that follow our competitor, just to see if we could get people saying that they would 
switch from our competitor to our product. This last week has been our best week since 
Kickstarter!” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. Startup G experienced cross-over between platforms for 
customer interactions through various platforms including: individual in-person 
interactions, email, social media, and blogs. Furthermore, more community driven 
platforms such as crowdfunding websites and online community forums triggered 
potential customers to visit Startup G’s website or other platforms on which they were 
featured.  
Online community forum, blogs, Kickstarter, email, social media. The founder 
anticipated a cross-over of users between online media platforms to raise awareness about 
the invention: “That’s where I’m feeling pretty good about it. I have Reddit [the online 
community forum]. I’m starting to get some social media attraction and I’m starting to 
get some blogs and articles written about me. When the day comes for the Kickstarter 
launch, I have all those outlets to reach out to. So, my e-mail list, probably, will get like a 
10-20 percent conversion rate on that. But then, I also have Reddit where maybe some 
people on Reddit saw the post, they liked it on the day of the Kickstarter, I’ll re-post it, 
and then that might get more people that didn’t initially signup to my email, but they’ve 
seen it on social media too” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
Reddit and Kickstarter sales. Furthermore, online community members on Reddit had 
developed a bond and trust with the founder. This may have influenced their decisions to 
make purchases on Kickstarter: “I think a lot of it was from the Reddit post, like people 
were saying they tend to stay away from Kickstarter because they think it’s too scammy 
[sic] or it’s risky, but since I started early on Reddit, a lot of people were saying that this 
probably is going to be the first Kickstarter project that they backed” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 3 August, 2016).  
Local cafes and Kickstarter sales. The startup also cross-promoted the local cafes he 
was hoping to partner with. The intention of this was if he promoted their products, that 
they would reciprocate and promote his product. The products he promoted included 
coffee from coffee roasters and other in the travel gear or coffee gear category: “Every 
time I go to one of his [café] places, I’ll Tweet out or Instagram, doing Instagram shots 




they do the same. Yeah, it works, it works out quite well” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 
14 July, 2016). 
Local cafes and social media. These cross-promotions with partners also generated new 
content on social media: “I think we did get a few sales from that, and that was like, a 
free thing. I didn’t have to pay for that… [and I’m] kind of doing a favor as well for the 
coffee shop that helped me early on. They share our stuff on social media. We share their 
stuff. Yeah, it just gives everyone a piece of the pie, I guess... I don’t think we’re 
competitors at all. I think we’re in the same space and I think my backers would be 
excited about your [products] and your backers would be excited about mine. I don’t 
understand why at this point, we’re both a startup, and cross-promotion doesn’t steal 
sales either. They just share sales” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016). 
Personal networks and social media. Personal networks and professional use of social 
media overlapped in how Startup G was being promoted: “We all have kind of our own 
networks, but also a lot of overlapping networks. All three of us were on Engineers 
without Borders. A lot of people from there were also Frosh Leaders. So, we kind of have 
an in with them too. And then, they’re really good with social media. Even with [Startup 
G], when we first launched our social media, I just asked in their Facebook group, ‘Hey 
guys, can you share this post?’, and they shared it. So, we have those abilities” (Startup 
G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016).  
Social media and blogs. There was also cross-over between social media and blogs, 
where social media raised awareness on Startup G in another part of the world, and 
information about it was promoted on a blog: “We had really good traction from South 
Korea for all our Facebook posts, but that didn’t really translate into sales on 
Kickstarter. Maybe we got five or six sales at South Korea, but we had so many people 
from South Korea liking our posts. And then a Korean coffee blog picked us up, and 
actually did a story on us, which once again, got tons and tons of likes, more so than any 
other articles that they had at the time. So then, I reached out to that blog, and said, 
‘Hey, I don’t really know the South Korean coffee market. Would you be able to share 
any information on some roasters or cafes that may be interested?’ And then they just 
gave me a list” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
Manufacturer. Initially, Startup G approached local Canadian manufacturers to make his 
product in April 2016. However, two months later in June, he was still struggling to get a 
quote from them: “Every time I went to meet with them they would always find something 
wrong, and then they’d always say, ‘Uou know, this is going to be really hard. A lot of 
people have failed at this. You’re probably not going to meet your priority because you 
have too low volume for us right now.’ I said, ‘Okay, well can you at least just give me a 




with them every week and just nothing. They always say, ‘Sorry, we’ve got some other 
projects. We’re really busy. We’ll try to get something to you another week.’ [Then, I 
hear] nothing” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).   
 By September 2016, this impasse with the sourcing an appropriate and effective 
local Canadian manufacturer still held: “[There was] even a place in Ontario that said 
they would get the molds manufactured in China, and then bring it over and make the 
parts here. Like, I said, ‘yeah, their prices were great.’ They took ten weeks, [a long 
time] to get a quote. So, I’m not going with them. ‘Sorry, if your prices are great but 
you’re not able to deliver on anything, and you tell me that I’m not a priority, okay then, 
I’m not going to work with you.’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
 In contrast, when the founder contacted a manufacturer in China, he encountered 
little resistance and a willingness to partner on the project: “I sent them my drawing. 
Three days later, I received a quote. And then they’ll say, ‘Okay.’ It’s very obvious that 
they know they’re working for me. They’ll ask me things. Some stuff isn’t what they’re 
used to and then they just ask, ‘Okay, we usually do stuff like this. What’s the reason for 
you doing this?’… They’ll work with you to figure out some other options” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).   
 Once the Kickstarter was completed in July 2016, the designs were sent to the 
Chinese manufacturer to proceed with the tooling designs required to manufacture the 
product in their factory: “They’re just designing the actual tooling now. They just take my 
designs and design a tooling on it… That’s where they’re at now. They should be done 
with that by late next week. Once that’s done, they then actually start manufacturing the 
tooling. They’ve quoted me 35 business days. So, seven to eight weeks. And that’s just the 
first round. And then they do a few tests. I’ll probably get over to Hong Kong at that 
point and actually see the products that come off of that tooling” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 3 August, 2016).  
 By the end of October 2016, the tooling for the project was completed and a few 
revisions were still needed prior to the commencement of manufacturing. Working with 
the Chinese manufacturers was going well and Startup G was considering building longer 
term relationships with the manufacturers: “I think it’s developing that relationship … it’s 
a worthwhile investment that [shows] you’re not going anywhere and future sales are a 
possibility” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).  By visiting the Chinese 
factories, in November 2016 and meeting the manufacturing stakeholders face-to-face 
over a series of meetings, the founder managed to build a relationship and efficiently 
resolve remaining issues to finalize the production process. The efficiency of these 
meetings was in stark contrast to the previous meetings held via Skype with the 
manufacturers: “We got a lot of work done that would have taken us weeks to do over 




big. We actually brewed coffee for them in the prototype to show them exactly how it 
worked – they don’t get coffee” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).  
Distributors. Early partners that approached Startup G in June 2016 included wholesale 
online stores: “They’d give us a purchase order, we’d make it, ship the bulk package out 
to them, and then they’d take care of shipping over there. So yeah, that’s pretty good… 
Something like that would be a good one to kind of get the ball rolling, get [the product] 
into the hands of some people, then from there, kind of move onto more conventional 
distribution channels” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016).  Working with 
distribution partners however was not possible until the product was manufactured: “I 
haven’t really approached any stores or anything. We got another store from the UK, 
another online store that sells a lot of coffee stuff, that said they would be interested in 
having it on their site. But at the same time, I have to say, ‘Yeah, I’m interested.’ But it’s 
not going to be until like February that I can actually do this. So, now, it’s kind of 
playing the game of keeping them engaged with us, so by the time February comes, we 
can set it up right away” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 June, 2016). 
Email and social media. During the Kickstarter Campaign in July 2016, Startup G 
experienced increased interest from retail coffee-related stores, receiving messages from 
them via email and social media (Twitter and Instagram): “We have been getting a lot of 
contacts from distributors from all around the world, which is kind of cool. So, we had 
one from South Africa, just yesterday. We have one from Iran. One from Israel, Australia, 
New Zealand, UK, Sweden, and a lot of local shops around here too” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).   
 Even with an increased interest in their product, Startup G still did not want to 
start focusing on solidifying business from the retailers and distributors that were 
contacting them until they had started manufacturing: “A lot of people seem interested. 
We’re not really moving on anything. Right now, we’re just kind of compiling a list of 
people that have contacted us, because we’re not in any shape right now to be saying, 
‘This is what our price is going to be. This is how many units we can deliver.’ So that’s 
going to be more once we’re back into the manufacturing phase and then my team can 
kind of split into me focusing on engineering, and the other guys focusing on business 
development and marketing stuff. That’s when they’ll start taking a look at what we can 
offer and which distributors seem good” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 14 July, 2016).  
 Once the Kickstarter campaign had been completed however, the founders started 
reaching out to distributors that had shown interest: “So, now we’re actually like 
reaching out to the people who have shown interest and we’re going to see what their 
ideas are. ‘Like, you reached out to us, what are your expectations?’ And then we’ll say, 
‘This is where we’re at. What do you think of that?’” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 
August, 2016).  They also saw working with these distributors as a way to continue to 




invoice in the Fall, once we have our final cost and then you would pay 50 percent right 
away, and then 50 percent upon arrival. So then, they’re totally fine with that! So, that’s 
interesting – before giving anyone products, we could still start collecting money and 
actually use that to keep funding us without having to get [outside] investments – which 
is pretty cool” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).  
 By October 2016, the founder had undertaken more in-depth conversations with 
potential distributors and received valuable insight as to how he should price his margin 
level, though manufacturing had not yet begun: “I actually went to a coffee conference in 
Montreal last week and was able to talk to a large distributor that distributes a lot of 
coffee gear to just small coffee shops throughout Canada. It was interesting. I learned his 
margins may not work for us. In his ideal case, he would buy it from us and sell it to the 
retailer for twice as much as he bought it from us, and then the retailer would sell it to 
the customer for twice as much as he bought it from him…. I mean, that’s too much. We 
then need to take a much smaller margin at the beginning, which if he bought thousands 
of units, then that could be okay with us. If not, then the business model might change, 
and we become our own distributor” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).   
 However, these discussions, made Startup G realize it was important to be 
cautious in connecting with too many potential distributors: “Not too much right now, just 
because I know where the conversation is going to go. I’d be much happier to reach out 
to someone once I have a working product. And then, if they like it, then I could say, ‘Oh, 
yeah. I’ll send you one right now.’ And again, much better on us and being much easier 
to sell” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).  
 By December 2016, discussions with potential distributors continued via personal 
contacts with buyers in Sweden: “They’ll do their own online sales but then, they’re also 
kind of a middle distributor. They specialize in bringing unique products from Canada 
and the U.S. to the outdoor gear market in the UK and Scandinavia” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 13 December, 2016).  However, because manufacturing had not been started, a 
lack of product samples to share with distributors remained a problem: “We just need the 
samples. Yeah, that’s kind of what the bad part is. It’s some of these delays in the 
samples. I told people I could be getting samples by November or December. I also don’t 
want to send them a sample that doesn’t work. I mean, like a lot of people that have 
worked with Kickstarter and stuff before, they know there are delays and everything” 
(Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 December, 2016).   
Government. In August 2016, Startup G applied for startup seed funding through the 
government: “If we get the [grant], then we don’t have to take loans or anything. We can 
literally just – with that money, do all of our initial orders and then go to be a revenue 
generating company after that” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 3 August, 2016). In 
September 2016, the funding of $60,000 was awarded, which allowed Startup G to 




campaign: “[We have the] potential to actually do a larger order, larger than the 
Kickstarter without getting any initial deposits from distributors or anything, kind of 
generate more inventory and see what we can do with sales. So, it gives us a little more in 
options... We’re not going to have to be as lean as a startup. We’re still going to be lean, 
but just, we can do a little more” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
Shops/Cafes. In August 2016, Startup G also began exploring the possibility of direct 
selling to stores (i.e. eliminating the role of the distributor): “If I can just reach out to 
them directly…I could just go to every coffee shop and say, ‘Hey, do you want to buy our 
product?’ But it’s a time commitment for that. I guess, it’s a tradeoff between how many 
individual sales could I do, or if I just get in with them, they already have sales people 
and they can move a lot more product than I can. If it’s still within our margins, we can 
afford that middleman, luckily” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).  While 
independent coffee shops were preferred, they were also open to working with large 
chains: “Maybe like a Starbucks – I would not turn down Starbucks. I’m not afraid of 
selling out to Starbucks” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 17 August, 2016).  
 This made the founder of Startup G began to think about the possibility of having 
an online store and holding inventory, or that they could work with a medium sized 
chain: “I want to go to something like [mid-sized coffee chain], something that has 
enough stores and they can actually buy a large enough quantity and then kind of grow 
from there. Once we have them, then we can take a lot more inventory and sell it to the 
smaller ones too, but kind of focus on those larger [cafes] that sell or that can buy 
enough and sell directly to customers” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 28 October, 2016).  
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 While Startup G reached out to potential customers early, in-person and in the 
online community forum, to gain awareness about the needs and interests of potential 
customers, the founder wondered whether the individuals who provided initial input on 
the product would return as buyers: “At this point [before the Kickstarter, when we talk to 
them], we’re not really offering something. Maybe those people on the day of the 
Kickstarter, they’ll remember, ‘Oh yeah, I saw this. This looked interesting.’ Then they’re 
more likely to go to Kickstarter” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 9 June, 2016).  
 Secondly, the boundaries between advertising, seeking feedback on a product, and 
media reviews were easily blurred – particularly in the online world. These interactions 
with potential customers were public in community forums. As a result, there was little 
awareness about community members that read, but did not post comments, as well as 
little awareness about how the existing posts were influencing silent community 
members. Furthermore, while the founder of Startup G did some basic data analytics 




information available to be collected about customers without using more powerful 
analytic tools.  
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017 
 By early March 2017, the manufacturer was already testing the product. While 
there were a few setbacks encountered, customers expressed that they were fine with the 
delay: “We ran into a few issues with our lids. They came out not quite leak-proof, which 
is fine. We caught it early in the production so we didn’t ship everything out… Luckily 
though, our Kickstarter backers were fine with it, and even happy about it… When we 
updated them on that, we basically said, ‘Yeah, this was something that, because of our 
quality control, we were able to catch this early. So, we’re not giving you guys a product 
that’s faulty. It’s unfortunate that it’s delayed slightly, but it’s really in an effort to make 
sure you guys get the product that was promised to you.’… They usually comment… 
Some people email me directly saying, ‘Hey, it sucks that it’s delayed, but I’d rather have 
this working product.’ ” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).  
 Startup G also signed their first agreement with a distributor in early 2017: “We 
just finalized our first distribution agreement with $90,000 U.S. minimum. It’s pretty nice 
knowing that we’re going to have that revenue. They reached out to us after the 
Kickstarter… We’ve had to cut our margins a bit on this one, but basically, we’re still 
making money off of it…. It’s really dependent on volume which is why we’re really 
trying to get as many wholesale deals as we can. Then we can go to our manufacturers 
and say we’ve got all these deals” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).  
 While Startup G was predominantly focused on manufacturing in early 2017, over 
the past months, they had learned how potential audiences reacted to posts either on their 
company page or advertisements. With advertisements, they decided that there was no 
need to repeat ads with the same audience: “Once you’ve reached everyone in that 
audience, and then all the people that want to buy your product from that audience buy it, 
then there’s no point in continuing to run ads” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 
2017).   
 To find new customers, they created new lists of potential customers on Facebook 
by taking the email addresses of the same people who they had been in contact with 
before their Kickstarter campaign and ones that purchased the product: “We still have the 
email list from the premarketing campaign, and now everyone that’s bought on 
Kickstarter and everyone that’s bought on Indiegogo. I put that email list into Facebook 
and then found I create a look-alike audience [to reach out to]” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 13 March, 2017).  
 However, with posts on Startup G’s social media pages, the founder, through trial-
and-error, found that the best responses to the product came through the social media 




useless. There’s so much happening on Twitter all the time and it’s just completely run by 
bots… As soon as people realize that you can make money doing it this way, then it will 
go the same way. Basically, Instagram is less saturated right now [with sales]. Facebook 
is good… but just using my Facebook Ad, rather than trying to get people to my 
Facebook page and getting them to like my Facebook page” (Startup G Founder, 
Interview, 13 March, 2017).  
 Using the proprietary online tool for promoting the business using hashtags (refer 
to 2.2.17) was not getting them the returns that they had hoped for: “I had found just like 
nothing was going on with it. Like the results were getting worse and worse over time… 
He was not doing any work on it to optimize, as he said. That made me feel taken 
advantage of” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).  
 Startup G also learned to create and use custom URLs in social media posts. 
When used, these custom URLs informed Startup G of where the customer originally saw 
a message: “If I send someone a link through direct message on Instagram, they can’t 
click through. So, either they have to copy-and-paste it… I’ll send a custom URL so I 
know that if someone uses that URL, that it was for an Instagram account” (Startup G 
Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).  
 Finally, Startup G’s social media was also gaining the attention of small coffee 
shops: “A lot of small coffee shops are still reaching out. I mean, that’s another great 
thing about Instagram. A lot of small coffee shops are on Instagram and then, if you 
follow them, then all of a sudden they say, ‘Oh, you guys! I can sell you in my shop.’ 
”(Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 March, 2017).  While these cafes were not large 
enough to deliver to independently, these shops had the potential to be reached with 
distribution companies in the future, as long as the startup was willing to take lower 
margins: “We know there’s one [distributor that we could work with]. It’s pretty hard. He 
wants high margins… So, we either have to lower our costs or find a distributor that’s 
okay with taking 10 percent to 20 percent margins” (Startup G Founder, Interview, 13 





Appendix B8. Startup H 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
 Startup H was a web platform designed to provide comprehensive, personalized 
resources for mental health - all online. The founder wanted the business to be: “helping 
students discover and access the mental health resources that are best fitting for their 
individual situation” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 The idea for Startup H arose in June 2015 when the founder realized that many 
individuals, individuals who require it, do not seek out help for improving their own 
mental health for students. Furthermore, he noticed that there was often a stigma and lack 
of conversation on mental health issues with family and friends: “The idea came from 
learning about my friend’s mental health situations and correlating it with my own. I 
realized that we never really talked about it and [could have] helped each other. We only 
discussed it after the fact” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016).  
 The goal of the web platform was to increase access to information and stimulate 
discussions about mental health: “There are things that we can do… to address the issues 
and provide a better experience for people going through mental health difficulties…. 
Whether it’s reading about someone else’s experiences, looking for online self-help 
resources or counsellors or online peers. There are solutions for that. Or, [our site could 
help with] booking a professional. Those are the things that I try to help students find and 
[locate] what is most appropriate for them” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 
2016).  
 From founding, the business underwent several pivots in terms of how they would 
approach this issue and the ideal potential customer for the web platform software. 
Initially, the web platform was pitched to university counseling services departments, 
with the intention that it would improve on-campus mental health and alleviate some of 
the backlog that the counseling services department had that caused students to often wait 
weeks before getting access to a counseling appointment. The web platform would 
provide articles on mental health, an overview of the on-campus services available to 
students, and would offer online e-counseling services to students. Furthermore, it would 
be built and customized for each individual university counseling services department.  
 After a few months, due to challenges of maintaining confidentiality and 
accessing e-counseling staff, Startup H adapted the web platform so that it no longer 
offered e-counseling, but instead, provided an online chat service to university students to 
facilitate searching for customized access to resources on mental health. The experience 




on coping with specific mental health issues, relevant to an individual student’s needs, 
information on what types of on-campus counseling services and activities exist for 
students, and information on additional off-campus counseling services that specialized in 
student needs. By the end of data collection for this study (end 2016), Startup H had 
pivoted once more. Insurance companies were being explored as potential customers, and 
instead of a human chat function, Startup H was developing a chat bot that simulated a 
human - so that the insurance companies’ customers could access a customized and 
personalized search for mental health resources 24 hours a day, seven days a week 
through the insurance company’s website.  
 1.2. Founder 
 The founder of Startup H was in his mid-20s when he started Startup H. 
Previously, he had a business that promoted physical activity among youth. Having had a 
period of depression during his undergraduate degree in Business and Psychology, the 
founder noticed that there was not a comprehensive resource available to students to 
access knowledge on mental health. He had personally experienced long wait times to 
access counselors on campus through university health services, and found this to be a 
major issue, given mental health affects daily life of individuals. By the time the founder 
started his Masters in Entrepreneurship, he was determined to create a web platform to 
improve access to mental health resources for students. 
1.3. About the Customers 
 When Startup H was founded in September 2015, the initial business model that 
the founder was focused on, comprised of platform users – university students, and the 
demand side customer of the software – university counseling service offices. University 
students were the targeted web platform users. While they are not customers of the web 
platform, their interaction with the platform both justified its existence, as well as 
affected the content on the site. University counseling service offices were the initial 
demand-side target customer for Startup H. These offices provide a range of programs 
and services appropriate to student mental health needs. These offices can make decisions 
on spending on resources to improve student welfare. During the case, the founder was a 
student and integrated into the local university community, and believed it would be easy 
to access the necessary decision makers: “I decided to focus on universities because they 
have the money and it’s a closed system… Although it’s not easy, it’s still easier than 
going to a municipal or provincial government to try to sell them software as a service 
solution” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 However, by August 2016, Startup H had pivoted towards an advertising based 
revenue model. While having students as the user of the web platform stayed the same, 
the demand side customer became psychologists that purchased ad space on the web 




Psychologists would be secondary customers that I would pursue after getting the school 
[as a customer]. But now, the psychologists would be the primary customers. The schools 
would be a marketing channel. And the students would [still] be the user” (Startup H 
Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016). 
 By January 2017, the founder had moved away from the sole focus of students as 
users, to reach a more general population of users. To do so, he began contacting 
insurance companies as potential customers for his web platform. Furthermore, he began 
to develop a chat bot – a computer program that conducted conversation via text and 
simulated a human conversational partner – that could be integrated into the insurance 
companies’ websites and designed as a tool for their customers to better access 




2. STARTUP HISTORY 
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016 
Founded Startup H
1st meeting with University #1
Spoke with mentors of potential student 
users
Started building web platform
Feedback on web platform prototype from 
mentors
2nd meeting with University #1
Spoke with non-university online counsellors
3rd meeting with University #1
1st meeting with University #2
4th meeting with University #1 & cold 
calling universities
5th meeting with University #1
1st meeting with University #3
Switched customers to psychologists 
advertising on web platform
Promotion of web platform to users at 
University #1
Chat bot development began
Switched customers to insurance companies




2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Founding Startup H. 
 As mentioned above, the idea for Startup H began in June 2015 and was founded 
mid-September 2015.  
2.2.2. First meeting with University #1 Counseling Services (potential customer) and 
research on current mental health solutions. 
In-person meeting. In September 2015, the founder conducted an initial solo literature 
research on gender and mental health and discovered that men have more difficulty 
seeking help for mental health than women. This lead him to the initial idea of Startup H 
to help men access better mental health resources.  
 However, a discussion with a university-based mental health counselor in October 
2015 led the founder to change several thoughts on the business, including widening the 
target market to both men and women: “[From our discussion, I realized that] this is not 
going to just be targeting men. Nobody is going to buy something that targets half of their 
own customer” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 The mental health counselor also suggested that Startup H should offer tools to 
facilitate online counseling through the web platform: “They liked it. What stood out most 
from that conversation was that we’re moving towards online counseling and whatnot…. 
And then they identified a bunch of challenges like, ‘Are we going to need more staff? 
Who’s going to be using the chat? What are the confidentiality issues? How do we secure 
it?’ So, [they brought up] very logistical based challenges. It wasn’t so much [that they 
were saying], ‘This idea isn’t going to work because of this and this [reason]’” (Startup 
H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
2.2.3. Checking to see if the web platform would attract users. 
In-person discussions with an on-campus mentors, psychologist, and informal 
counsellors on campus. The founder initially proposed the idea of having separate web 
pages in the web platform to meet the mental health needs of different types of users: “I 
thought we needed a [web page] for athletes, because they experience different problems. 
We needed a [web page] for entrepreneurs specifically because they experience different 
problems. We need a [web page] to split up men and women, different faculties, different 
residences, and whatnot” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). However, while 
Startup H could develop in several potential directions, the founder first wanted to see if 
there would be users interested in using the web platform: “I already had a bunch of 
ideas floating around… I needed to talk to all of these people to see if this was something 
that they agree with, or have the money to pay for” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 




 In October and November 2015, the founder went to speak with individuals 
outside of counseling services (including a psychologist) who were in different 
mentorship or informal counselling roles on campus and whom were frequently in 
contact with students. The individuals were not demand side customers that would make 
purchasing decisions on accessing the web platform, but represented students’ 
perspectives: “We were getting the user perspective from them, not so much the customer 
perspective. The customers were counseling services, the Associate Director, and the 
psychologist that I first spoke with” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 What the founder learned from these on-campus mentors initially validated his 
thoughts that the different student groups needed customized mental health platforms: 
“So, I talked to the residence life coordinator, athletic director and different faculty staff - 
there’s a counselor in the faculty of engineering. They were all saying, ‘Students connect 
better with students who are like them. Athletes connect better with athletes because 
they’ve been through these things. Engineering students talk to other engineering 
students because they’re taking the same courses…” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 
June, 2016).  
 Despite receiving confirmation to proceed with these customized mental health 
platforms, the founder decided that one uniformed web platform was more likely to 
appease the university customers: “What occurred to me was that would be way too 
siloed and too scattered. So, we would have to aggregate everything and break down the 
communication barriers between all of these groups [to have] free-flowing information 
between everybody on campus… But… it just limits the diversity [of information being 
shared] and I don’t think that’s beneficial to what I’m trying to do… [I also] realized that 
the people we were talking to were not going to be the ones paying specifically for [the 
web platform service]. So, it would need to have to be broad enough to [meet the needs of 
campus-wide counseling services]” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
2.2.4. Starting to build a web platform. 
 By December 2015, the founder started to build a website to support the web 
platform for mental health. 
2.2.5. Online live prototype and returning to get feedback from mentors as 
representatives of users. 
In-person web platform prototype demonstration. In January 2016, the founder 
brought a prototype of the web platform to show to the students’ mentors he had spoken 
with before (in 2.2.3): “It had a homepage [with a few articles]…. There was also a map 
of where the [mental health] service locations were [on campus], and also the chat 





 Startup H received positive feedback on the web platform from the mentors and 
faculty of students that could be implemented: “They said, “This looks really good. It 
looks welcoming, relaxing and inviting. It makes you feel welcomed.’ They threw out 
[ideas on] features they would like to see. ‘Hey, maybe an article about this would be 
great for this group of people.’ So, I took [those suggestions] and put them on a list and 
am looking for an article to include [on the web platform on that topic] later on…. 
[Another person was interested in] online booking…. And when we’re ready to launch, 
we can help promote it. Stuff like that” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 Having received positive feedback, the founder decided to move forward, 
planning a pilot test version of the web platform that could go live in July 2016: 
“Hopefully this will be in partnership with counseling services. [We’ll promote it with] 
email campaigns. Putting up signage in the [student centre]…. Let’s say July [the 
product will be ready.] And then [in] September we can target the first years coming in, 
whether through an actual pamphlet or something during frosh week, some kind of 
presentation, something to get them thinking [about mental health]. I haven’t thought 
about what that is specifically because I’m still grappling with getting the pilot going 
sometime in July” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
2.2.6. Attempted and unable to access student user feedback. 
In-person. By January 2016, while the founder had received input on what student users 
might be looking for from their mentors, when the prototype was built, he had only 
received positive feedback from his inner circle of university friends. His plan was to 
have a wider group of students test the product, however the student groups he was trying 
to work with kept backing out of their commitment to provide feedback on the web 
platform: “That’s what I want to do with the pilot to just put it in the students’ hands and 
see how they interact with it. I thought about doing focus groups, but then that didn’t 
really happen because of the way the term kind of went… I contacted student volunteer 
groups… that address mental health awareness. I reached out to them and their 
engagement was surprisingly low. But because they’re student groups, they’re dealing 
with midterm exams, assignments, and this is something they’re doing on the side. [I 
asked them at an event that they were holding,] ‘Hey, this is something I’m working on. 
Can I come and get a focus group going?’ [They said,] ‘Yeah, that’s cool.’… And then, 
they’d [cancel] – ‘Oh, sorry. We were all busy with midterms and assignments.’ ” 
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 The founder also realized that obtaining feedback on the web platform in face-to-
face interactions with students on campus would be a challenge, given the topic of mental 
health: “I guess I could have just cold talked to people [walking around on campus]. But 
I don’t think that is going to be the best way of going about it. I’m not sure how helpful 
the insights would be and how willing people would be to participate…. Some feedback I 




thing? The student groups [we are trying to talk to] would be easy because they’re all 
about mental health awareness. But whether the general population would do something 
like that is yet to be seen. The whole point of the system is to be discrete about getting 
treatment and possibly discovering what you need” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 
June, 2016). 
2.2.7. Second meeting with University #1 Counselling Services (potential customer). 
In-person. It was Mid-March 2016 before the founder met again with the university 
counselors. The discussion suggested that Startup H was developing a web platform that 
would be of interest to them, however that some fine tuning was still needed. They urged 
Startup H to learn from existing competitors: “What the meetings entailed was, ‘This 
website looks pretty good. They’re impressed by the amount of work you have done. 
These are the challenges that we need to address. Go talk to people who are 
implementing similar solutions. Find out what they are doing and bring that back to us to 
see how we can best implement this” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
2.2.8. Speaking with non-university online counseling organizations. 
Email and phone. After the meeting with the counselors, from April 2016, the founder 
began contacting other organizations with online counseling capabilities to understand 
some of the challenges which they had: “[By] talking to them, [I was able to ask 
questions such as], ‘How do you navigate challenges like geographical distance? And 
how do you navigate confidentiality? How do you balance that with the need to know 
who these people are in case of a crisis situation?’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 
June, 2016). 
 These discussions led the founder to start to question whether having their own 
online counseling on Startup H’s web platform was going to be a distinguishing factor, 
given there were already several companies offering these services. From a student’s 
point of view, he understood that the problem that students experienced was trying to 
identify, locate and contact these online resources and believed having an online chat 
function with an actual person on the other end built into the website would still be 
helpful to facilitate this: [From these discussions], I figured out that… the best way to do 
things was simply to use the chat as a customer service type thing. It wouldn’t be to 
provide treatment. It would be to direct people towards treatment. It’s not that the 
challenges cannot be overcome… the market for that is already saturated. So, on a 
business standpoint, it doesn’t really work out…. There are companies out there that 
offer video counselling…. But the problem remains of how would somebody find this? 
How would they overcome the stigma of reaching out to this? Yes, you don’t have to 
leave your house. You don’t have to physically walk into a clinic and risk being seen. But 
to find out that this is here and to pay for it – it’s addressing some aspects of the problem, 




service provision. It just doesn’t seem as helpful” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 
2016). 
 The founder also realized that Startup H could possibly partner with existing 
online counselors to provide additional options for services to the student users of the 
platform, and added value to the overburdened university counseling services: 
“Partnering with local private psychologists or other agencies that provide help [would 
be important to improve access to qualified counselors]. If a student has to wait three 
weeks to speak with a counselor on campus… they could go to a private practitioner, 
right?” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). These private psychologists could 
then advertise their services on the web platform: “I have 30,000 new students on my web 
platform. If there are 20 percent experiencing mental health difficulties, but the wait time 
is too long – there are around 10 percent not getting help. This is a huge sales 
opportunity to advertise on this platform” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
 Rather than selling an advertising partnership directly to psychologists, the 
founder believed that he would need to first build and promote a web platform to users. 
Once there were users on the platform, he believed he could attract advertising from 
psychologists: “I think [these psychologists] would say right now, ‘Well that’s cool. 
Come back to me though when you actually have value to me. When people are actually 
looking at your website.’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
2.2.9. Third meeting with University #1 Counselling Services (potential customer) and 
first with its Peer Support Group. 
In-person. In May 2016, the founder met with the Director of Counseling Services for a 
third time and was told that they would be interested to move forward with having the 
pilot version of the web platform software developed by Startup H. This pilot however 
would be on a trial basis and no payment would be exchanged at this time.  
 The Director of Counselling Services also connected the founder with the on-
campus Peer Support Group - a group of volunteer students who were studying for 
degrees in clinical psychology, counselling or social work and who worked with campus 
counseling services. The Director proposed that these students help implement the online 
chat function (involving a human respondent) of the web platform. However, the Peer 
Support Group was opposed to this option, and informed the founder that they felt it 
would not be feasible to have the chat function, due to staffing restraints: “‘We don’t have 
enough staff for this. We’re not going to go ahead,’ is what they said. So, that’s where I 
am at currently. Trying to explain to them that this does not require more staff. In fact, it 
requires less staff” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 2016). 
Email and phone. While the founder did not need the assistance of the Peer Support 
Group to make his web platform a success, having their support could be helpful. To 




function, and demonstrate its efficacy himself: “[I could] either try to explain to them 
how this will work, or just disregard them and go ahead. I don’t need counseling 
expertise with this new direction [that just points individuals to different resources on 
mental health]. I can be on the chat myself or find somebody else to do it. I can just go 
ahead, launch, market it, promote it to see how it works, or start building the 
technological features. So, it’s either continuing to get them on board, disregard them 
and do things myself, or simply build and demonstrate efficacy [of the web platform]… 
[I’ll follow up with them] within a week, just emailing. And then the next week, it’ll be 
calling to say, ‘hey, I emailed you to set up a time to meet?’ It would be on a weekly basis 
because I want to get something going by July” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 June, 
2016). 
2.2.10. First meeting with University #2 Counseling Services (potential customer).  
Email and In-person. In June 2016, Startup H had its first meeting with an external 
university counseling services department, University #2. The founder had contacted a 
range of nearby universities at this stage: “It was just [me] kind of picking which schools 
would give me a good representative picture of all the different schools… The small one 
probably didn’t follow up because they’re small and don’t need my service… I think there 
are a lot of different variables… that I’m not even considering what’s playing a part in 
that…. A bigger school has different departments that you have to align with and make 
sure that everybody is onboard before moving forward” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 
20 June, 2016). 
 In contrast to the informational meetings that Startup H had with University 
Counseling Services #1, where he had hoped to both learn about the mental health 
counseling needs of the university and sell them a product, this was their first official 
sales meeting that Startup H had with an independent university: “I say that this is a sales 
meeting, because prior to this, [my meetings with universities] were to understand the 
problem…. Going to [University #2], it was strictly [to sell the product to] the university. 
This is what I can do. I can reduce cost. I can improve student experience, and I can 
demonstrate a commitment to student health. This is the solution that I have. What are 
your thoughts on this? It was more of a sales pitch than it was [with previous 
discussions]” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
  While the sales meeting with University #2 was well received, the founder was 
surprised by the length of time it would take for the university to respond to him about 
signing a contract: “[The meeting] went well, but it puts things into perspective in terms 
of the length of the sales cycle. She said, ‘I’ll get back to you at the end of July.’ So, a 
month and a half [later]… There’s just so many other people that she has to go back and 
talk to… I’m not the only [competing business] that she’s talking to. They’re looking to 




different projects… I think I did a good job of explaining the value that I bring and my 
differentiation though” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
 Despite the delay, the potential offer of a contract gave Startup H confirmation 
that it was worthwhile to explore further sales avenues with other schools: “I’m going to 
start contacting more schools because, from this conversation [with University #2], I got 
a lot of valuable information. I think I can really start opening up that sales funnel 
without worrying about messing up too much now. I think I have a good hold of how to 
pitch and what to pitch. And what value I’d bring to increase the likelihood of making a 
sale” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
2.2.11. Meeting with non-university e-counselor online community.  
Email. From browsing online in June 2016, the founder of Startup H learned that there 
was a government body and an online community of e-counseling. The existence of this 
community provided further validation that there was interest in e-counseling.  When the 
founder emailed individuals in the online community to start a discussion however, he 
learned that e-counseling was still in its rudimentary stages: “They’ve recognized that 
things have to start moving online. They’re not sure how to do it, so it’s kind of very early 
stage there…. They’re even earlier than what I’m doing because they’re still figuring out 
what training is needed for their staff and what that solution is going to look like” 
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). 
2.2.12. Meeting with potential psychologist partner.  
In-person. Since October 2015, the founder had been in regular contact with a 
psychologist about the plans of Startup H. By June 2016, the psychologist was keen to 
move ahead with a more concrete partnership, however it was unclear to the founder how 
they would define this partnership: “I met with a psychologist who’s really interested in 
what I’m doing. He wants to collaborate and cooperate, and I’m just not sure in what 
ways. I’m trying to figure out what I actually want to get from a potential relationship 
going forward if I actually want to collaborate with him or cooperate with him at all... It 
didn’t seem like he was very clear on what he wanted. We’re meeting again in early July 
because... we both believe that this is something good, but it wasn’t very clear in terms of 
[next] things to do. We’ll meet again to find out what our expectations are if we were to 
cooperate. Right now, I’m not sure, does he want to be a cofounder? Does he want to be 
an adviser? Does he want to be an investor?... Does he want to be a customer with his 
private practice? I don’t know… [I’d like it if I was] just given money and I could say 
that I have a psychologist on board. But I don’t think that’s feasible. It would have to be 
either advisor, an investor, a customer or a business partner” (Startup H Founder, 





2.2.13. Follow up meeting with head of Peer Support Group at University #1.  
In-person. In May 2016, Startup H had received resistance from the members of the Peer 
Support Group that was meant to help implement the chat function of the web platform 
(2.2.9). To better understand their position, towards the end of June 2016, Startup H met 
with the Head of the group to try to understand both the resistance from students as well 
as to confirm whether the department would reconsider partnering with them: “What I’m 
trying to do is see whether she’s still onboard with providing these students to the peer 
support program. [If they say yes,] I can go back to counseling services and say, ‘you 
brought up issues of support. It can be solved right here if we partner.’” (Startup H 
Founder, Interview, 20 June, 2016). After this meeting however, there was no change in 
the decision of the Peer Support group to not participate in the online chat function of 
Startup H.  
2.2.14. Fourth meeting with University #1 Counselling Services (potential customer). 
In-person. After speaking with University #1 Counselling Services earlier in 2016 (see 
2.2.2, 2.2.7, 2.2.9), Startup H followed up again with the Assistant Director in early July 
2016 to discuss how to move forward to start a pilot development and launch of the web 
platform software: “She’s the main decision maker. If she says yes, basically, everything 
is a go… With this pilot, I hope to measure how many people are using the platform and 
to draw conclusions about whether it’s actually going to help people. I also hope to use it 
as some kind of reference for other schools and say, ‘Hey, we did this for [University #1]. 
This is how it works. These are the stats. This is what we can do for you as well.’ It is 
also a way to justify having [University #1] paying me for a fully developed version of the 
product.” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). 
 Startup H was particularly anticipating the feedback from University #1 because 
while they were a potential first customer for their web platform, they were also willing 
to collaborate with Startup H to build and test it. This meeting gave them the starting 
point for more detailed discussions: “Even if the pilot doesn’t work the way we want it to, 
I don’t think they’re just going to [say], ‘No, we’re done with this.’ It’s going to be like, 
‘Okay, let’s figure out what you can do to make it better and then come back to us and 
we’ll see if this aligns with what we’re doing and what we decisions we need to make 
from there.’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). 
2.2.15. Started sending cold emails to other universities. 
Emails. With the pilot version of the web platform software about to be implemented, the 
founder of Startup H thought that this was also a good time to begin following up with 
other leads with universities he had in July 2016, having found their contacts online: 
“Cold email seems to be working quite well. Phone calls don’t seem to be working as 




follow up in the same email thread if they don’t reply and if they have something to check 
back on” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 4 July, 2016). 
2.2.16. Fifth meeting with University #1 Counselling Services. 
In-person meeting. In mid-July 2016, the fifth meeting that Startup H had with 
University #1 Counselling Services set a timeline for launching the pilot during 
orientation in first week of the school year in September 2016: “It looks like Frosh Week 
[orientation] would be a pretty solid timeline because that gives us August to figure 
something out” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). While the meeting helped 
University #1 to make decisions about the web platform features that were in line with 
Startup H’s vision, it also raised issues that would create more delays in launching the 
pilot at University #1.  
 One of the outcomes of this meeting was the interest of having Startup H develop 
a chat bot program – simulating a human - on the web platform that would eliminate 
issues of hiring humans to interact with users on the web platform: “[Counseling 
services] realized there are confidentiality [issues]. That’s a whole mess. We’re going to 
use it for customer service and admin stuff. And then they said, ‘we don’t have enough 
people for this.’ So, now they’ve moved on to an online booking system. And … a chat, 
like a Siri chat bot, intelligent AI type of thing, great… [It’s] weird because that’s what I 
was pitching [the chat bot] to all the other schools [to solve quick questions] but it 
seemed that [University #1]  wanted to use a chat, so I said, ‘yeah, we can go ahead with 
that.’ Eventually, things worked out to my own vision of how the product would fit into 
their service offerings” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
2.2.17. First meeting with University #3, Dean of Students.  
In-person. Startup H also met with University #3 for a sales pitch in July 2016. While 
they received positive feedback, the university was cautious to proceed due to a previous 
negative purchase experience: “I went to go meet [other local university]. They like the 
idea and they want to see how the pilot goes with [University #1 Counseling Services]. 
Previously, they bought a similar solution from an insurance company, but nobody used 
it because it’s from an insurance company… They’re very cautious now” (Startup H 
Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
2.2.18. Partnered with health researchers at University #1 to test web platform during 
pilot.  
Email. In July 2016, Startup H’s founder found researchers interested in using his web 
platform to perform academic research. The research would aim to improve access to 
counseling services in student populations, where the health researchers would monitor 
users of the web platform when it was launched in September 2016. The founder was 
excited for this opportunity to have research to test the efficacy of the web platform: “I 




their own research… It’s like free primary research right here for me to say, ‘okay, yeah. 
It just works” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
2.2.19. Sales on hold to other potential university customers. 
 In July 2016, Startup H decided to stop contacting other potential university 
counseling services customers. The universities that they had been in contact with wanted 
to first wait to see how the pilot with University #1 (see 2.2.2, 2.2.7, 2.2.9, 2.2.14, 2.2.16) 
went before making a decision to purchase access to the web platform: “The feedback 
that I’ve been getting is that everybody is just waiting to see how [University #1] is going 
to do. Once I mention a pilot, they’re like, ‘great, yeah.’ They want to know how the 
metrics are before they take a look… So, I’m going to do the pilot, I’m going to focus on 
this, and then, go back or not go back and open up the sales funnel so that I’ll have a 
more robust sales pitch and that would speed things up on that side” (Startup H Founder, 
Interview, 21 July, 2016). 
 By August 2016, the other universities that the founder had reached out to had 
still not responded to him: “I talked to [a range of regional universities]. They haven’t 
gotten back to me… It was one of those [scenarios] where they said, ‘Give me a brief 
description.’ I did, and I got no reply. I didn’t follow up with them because I was working 
on the pilot with [University #1] and I just forgot about them…. I really want to see how 
the pilot goes here [University #1]. And then iterate on what we currently have before 
going off to the other schools. I can’t really just accelerate the process that we have until 
it’s more refined” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016). 
2.2.20. Use of data analytics.  
 By July 2016, the founder has started to track visitors to the site, even though he 
was not yet promoting or advertising it: “I can check page views but I don’t know where 
they come from…. So, 31 page views. I have no clue. Yesterday it was eight. Today, we’ve 
had four already. Who are these people?... We can’t capture it with this software. That’s 
what the pilot is going to do” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 21 July, 2016).  
2.2.21. First change in customer type - Making web platform free to universities and 
switching to an advertising-based business model. 
  Despite several meetings with University #1 and other universities they met with, 
over the past 10 months there was a lack of commitment from universities to purchase 
access to the web platform (see 2.2.2, 2.2.7, 2.2.9, 2.2.10, 2.2.14, 2.2.16, 2.2.17). Instead 
of pursuing university counselling services as potential customers, in August 2016, 
Startup H began considering to offer access to the web platform free as a service to 
universities so that they could promote it to their students: “I think with the way that 
things are going with schools, it might just be better to offer them something for free. 
They are open to the idea [of the web platform for mental health], but I think making a 




of all, why would a school pay for this? It has to be different enough and has to have 
value.’… This would require overhauling their entire system… I didn’t see that as a 
feasible next step. To try to simplify [the software], I thought, instead of having a 
customizable software package for the school, it would just be a site – ‘here are the 
features. These are what the students can do with it. Can you help promote it?’ That 
would be an easier sell and wouldn’t cost them anything. They just have to see it and 
agree that this is potentially something that could help their students” (Startup H 
Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).  
Phone and email. To generate revenue, Startup H would instead allow local 
psychologists and therapists to advertise on the web platform: “[We’re] taking a slight 
pivot [to have] advertising by psychologists and therapists as… a primary revenue 
stream... One of the psychologists here, working for counseling services, is about to 
retire. He’s willing to pay a bit of a fee to advertise for September…. This is an 
opportunity to provide recommendations for psychologists and therapists and clinics 
outside of the school. I think that would provide value to private [mental health] 
practitioners. [But], I have to contact a bunch of local practitioners to get their opinion 
as to whether this is something that they would be willing to pay for. The first 
[psychologist]… he likes me, and there’s no doubt that he’s going to be putting down 
money. But is that representative of everybody in the market? Not really sure… I’ve 
compiled a list and [I’ll] start making calls or emails maybe tomorrow” (Startup H 
Founder, Interview, 16 August, 2016).  
2.2.22. Promoted web platform to users during student orientation at University #1. 
 Though the business model had changed to provide the web platform free to 
universities, it was still important to assess whether student users at universities were 
interested in using the web platform.  
Business cards, posters, fliers. Startup H intended to devote much of advertising time to 
raise awareness of the web platform within University #1 community during first year 
students’ orientation week in September 2016. This would include posters, business 
cards, and fliers being circulated on campus: “I think it’s critical [to promote the web 
platform during this period] because these are fresh students who do not know that this 
didn’t exist before. So, it would just be in their minds that this is something we have here 
[at the local university]…. It’s going to start at orientation… That will be like a soft 
launch and we’ll iterate on that. And in the first week of school – it would be like, boom! 
Everywhere…. It won’t be the full features. The chat function won’t be there, but it would 
be a page that… directs people towards counseling services or different health or 
wellbeing services. It will be really useful to… see how many people visit the site, what 





2.2.23. Developing chat bot software and attempted to increase user adoption. 
 By October 2016, Startup H had brought in a technical co-founder to develop the 
chat bot suggested by University #1 Counseling Services (in 2.2.16). While the software 
was still under development, there was a demo developed to allow users to see how it 
would function.  
Posters and business cards. In December 2016, Startup H began working with student 
residencies to increase the user adoption of the web platform by the students on campus: 
“The residence life coordinator has been really interested in what I’m doing. She’s been 
putting posters up in her residences and printing business cards to leave in random 
places. Students can, if they’re just sitting around, can pick them up and become curious 
about it. I’m trying to push user adoption, and then on the financial side, be able to 
[show to customers], ‘this is something that you would be interested in looking into. Here 
are our results.’” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 2017). 
2.2.24. Second change in customer type - from universities and advertising to 
insurance companies. 
 In December 2016, Startup H begun to broaden their customers and users of the 
web platform. Rather than continuing to focus on universities and advertising, they turned 
to insurance companies as potential customers of the chat bot. If successful, Startup H 
would incorporate the chat bot into insurance companies’ web platform. This would 
allow the chat bot and customized mental health resources to be accessed by a larger 
group of users, not just students. The founder believed that reducing costs to access 
mental health resources would be of interest to insurance companies that often paid out 
expensive claims for mental health treatments. The founder believe that these cost 
savings would provide a business rationale for insurance companies to purchase this 
software: “Insurance companies are in it to make money. They have these resources and I 
can decrease your payouts for insurance claims to psychologists because psychologists 
cost a lot. So, if I were to address the problem quicker, then you don’t have to pay out as 
much” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 2017).  
Phone and email. They met with one insurance company (Insurance Company #1) and 
received positive feedback from them on the general idea of the web platform and chat 
bot, however by December 2016, the web platform still needed further development: “So, 
I just called and emailed [the insurance companies] and said, ‘Hey, I’m working on this 
web platform… They were immediately interested. They contacted me back and said, 
‘Hey, we’re actually looking into building something similar on our own. We want to 
know how you’re tackling it from the AI side…. We can focus on the user side and the 
user interface and then you focus on the AI.’ They said that we were a bit too early stage 
[though]. I think their presumption of our technology was that it was actually… an 
intelligent chat bot… They thought it was a lot dumber and more of a search function 




misconception was a huge factor in why they decided not to move forward…. But the 
technology just isn’t there. The best AI chat bots are still messing up from time to time…. 
And I just don’t have that expertise. But in the future, yes. I do want to be pushing that 
piece. But at this point in time, we don’t need to have an actual intelligent software 
program. It just needs to respond adequately” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 
2017). 
 Another insurance company (Insurance Company #2) however was not as 
convinced about the added value of a chat bot and wanted to learn more: “They asked, 
‘Why do we need to add a chat bot to this online platform?’ I am not sure if most 
companies are worried about [a chat bot], unless they are very forward thinking…. 
Because our technology is so new, they don’t really see the value yet. That’s something 
that needs to be communicated… The main thing I want to convey is that my technology 
is valuable and I can deliver on my value proposition of reducing cost to provide service 
that increases the health of their clients” (Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 
2017). 
 If insurance companies were not a feasible customer however, it was uncertain to 
the founder of Startup H as to what other types of organizations would be appropriate to 
approach next: “I’m not sure what would be the next step… if the insurance thing falls 
through… I’m not sure where to go next. But the feedback I’m hearing is that the 
technology is too early still based on that conversation with [insurance company]” 
(Startup H Founder, Interview, 6 January, 2017). 
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 Most of the discussions that Startup H had with potential customers used 
traditional methods – phone or email to establish initial contact, followed up by in-person 
discussions. One-to-one contact with these potential customers allowed the interaction to 
be more personalized, and allowed the founder to both gain feedback and assess the needs 
of the customers and to personalize the sales message. Startup H had minimal online 
interaction besides its own website and a series of articles re-posted on Twitter.  
 Interactions with potential users were also more traditional – through business 
cards, e-posters, and television posts on campus. While the founder began tracking visits 
to the website, at the time of writing, few decisions on Startup H were made based on the 
data analytics collected. 
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
 Interactions with potential customers (university counseling service offices, 
psychologists interested in advertising on the web platform, and insurance companies) 
were important to develop sales and to have regular meetings that contributed to the 




Startup H had several stakeholders that it interacted with to get a better idea of what users 
were looking for and what features to offer on the web platform. 
 To better understand potential users of the website and what they would be 
interested in, the founder reached out to both student users, as well as the mentors and 
informal counsellors outside of counselling services that students may interact with and 
confide in. These included faculty members, student residence life coordinators, and the 
campus athletic director – individuals who interact with a variety of students on campus. 
 University #1 Counseling Services encouraged an on-campus Peer Support Group 
to work with Startup H. Their resistance eventually lead Startup H to move away from 
offering online chat functions, with an actual human individual on the web platform, to 
developing a chat bot. 
 To test the web platform and gain structured feedback on its potential efficacy, 
Startup H also started a partnership with on-campus health researchers. If successful, 
Startup H would be able to demonstrate a positive impact of the web platform to potential 
customers. 
 Finally, interactions with other psychological and counselling services shaped 
how Startup H changed and adapted their business. To better understand what other 
online counseling organizations were doing, the founder both emailed and phoned other 
e-counsellor online communities, and interactions with a psychologist triggered the idea 
of a business model where psychologists and therapists could advertise on the web 
platform. This psychologist, along with a potential partnership with not-for-profit mental 
health organizations, would help bring legitimacy to Startup H. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 The biggest challenge faced by Startup H was not being able to gain commitment 
from potential customers at the university without first demonstrating the efficacy of the 
web platform.   
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING 
 By early 2017, Startup H had scheduled two demonstrations in April 2017 to 
demonstrate the chat bot they were developing. The demos were with two health 
insurance companies that were interested in wellness. While the chat bot was still under 
development, the meetings were to verify interest in the software and the potential to use 
it in their current client web platforms. While (Insurance Company #2) (referred to in 
2.2.24) wanted more information, Insurance Company #1 was urgently seeking out such 
technology. The founder however was concerned about being rushed to deliver a quality 
product: “[I’m worried] that companies would make a commitment and we would need to 
deliver quite quickly to match their schedule. I’m hoping though that we have a bit more 




 Furthermore, Startup H believed that getting their first customer secured would be 
the most important for the business to survive: “It’s important for us to get that first 
customer. We think that after that, things will start snowballing. I don’t think it really 
matters who that first customer is. Most of these insurance companies will be beneficial… 
There are only a handful insurance companies so right now, it’s not about sitting on the 
phone and opening up that sales funnel at this time. It’s more about getting that first 




Appendix B9. Startup I 
1. ABOUT THE IDEA, CO-FOUNDERS, CUSTOMERS 
1.1. Business Idea 
Startup I was founded as a website design company in May 2015. Over time, their 
vision adapted to become “a full suite marketing service that offers tangible results doing 
analytics integration. We connect our clients with the right people so they can build the 
businesses that they want to” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).   
 One of the initial goals of the business was to have open communication and 
collaboration with potential customers: “When you deal with your customer, that’s when 
the changes happen. Because if you’re resenting your customer or they’re resenting 
you… there’s a problem. And if there’s miscommunication – anything goes wrong, I’ll 
make a note of it… Our whole business is collaborative and adaptive. Because if there’s 
one thing that’s going on, I want to make sure it’s collaborative and adaptive to run 
smoothly. Some of our worst projects were because we hit roadblocks and I wasn’t able 
to adapt. But now, our goal is to be an integrated process where they give us money and 
we get things done” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).   
1.2. Founders 
 Startup I was founded by two males in their early 20s. After a bout of drug use 
and depression, Founder T sought out help from family and friends once back on his feet, 
he went back to school and showed talent for web design. He was offered the opportunity 
to build one of the university team’s website’s. After several tries, he realized he could 
start a business making websites. The founder applied to the small business program and 
met a co-founder at a small business summer company program. In 2015, they decided to 
create a partnership to work together on Startup I. Co-founder T had a background in 
media information technology and interactive media design. Prior to founding Startup I, 
he was a freelance writer and a competitive athlete. Co-founder A had a background in 
graphic design and animation. He had also started his own animation business that was 
running concurrent to Startup I. The two co-founders believed that they had a strong 
partnership from the beginning: “I think what brought us together is that both of us work 
extremely hard and [co-founder A] is very talented and I’m talented at what we do. We 
get along, and we’re friends, though [when we met] we weren’t really friends at that 
point… It’s a great partnership and we complement each other very well in that sense” 





1.3. About the Customers 
When asked to describe their ideal customer in May 2016, the founders replied: “I 
would like someone that has $200,000 of revenue, and who isn’t trying to nickel and dime 
me, someone who understands what we’re doing. Someone who’s business savvy” 
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).  The founders really wanted to 
have business savvy clients: “I think we should try to hit people who are 30 and over 
because they know business. They have more experience…. We need to be picking clients 
who are dedicated, who are creating content, who are doing cool stuff because we say we 
work with them. They have their own traction, instead of us [creating it for them]” 
(Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
From founding, the founders sought out clients3 that they could grow with and 
learn from: “Our whole motto is ‘Let’s succeed together.’ So even though we’re trying to 
make money and run a business, we want to pick the right clients we’re going to grow 
with. We’re past the point of ‘hey, if you give me some dollars, I’ll do it for you.’ Now it’s 
“Are you guys going to keep growing? Are you going to be a business in two years and 
why are we going to invest our time into you?’ ” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 
19 May, 2016).  
However, the actual clients that Startup I had were very different. Most came 
through the founders’ personal network or referrals, and these potential clients often had 
limited funds and knowledge about digital marketing. This difference between the actual 
clients they had and the ideal customer that they desired created substantial frustration for 
the co-founders, as highlighted in the case. 
                                                 




2. STARTUP HISTORY 
2.1. Summary of Startup Timeline Until the End of 2016 
Founded
Full-time commitment to startup & reliance on 
personal network for clients
Desire to attract high-end customer
Starting projects too early, Being declined by 
potential customers, Lack of funds to improve 
website
Continued reliance on personal network for clients
Started emailing project proposals to potential clients
Started to question marketing industry, declining 
non-target customers, and started waiting for signed 
contract from clients
Designed new company website
No change in client type
Started proactively seeking new clients
Moved into a new office
Built technology and processes to minimize client 
communication
Started tracking website visitors and client emails
New website launched




2.2. Customer Interaction Processes 
2.2.1. Founding Startup I. 
 Startup I was founded in May 2015. They built their website for their business, 
but for an entire year, until the following May, both co-founders were working on the 
business part time as they finished up school and work obligations.  
 2.2.2. Launched only ad campaign and received traditional media coverage. 
Paid Media. From May to September 2016, the startup ran their only ad campaign (as of 
March 2017): “I did one ad campaign that started… last summer and that was it… Right 
now, I don’t know why I’d drive ads for… my site… There’s… nothing to capture [client] 
information or make them engaged or anything right now. That’s why we haven’t really 
done too much of that because it’s pointless right now” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 
September, 2016).   
Newspaper, magazine and television. In August 2015, one of the co-founders was 
featured in a local newspaper article about his personal life and Startup I. The startup was 
also featured in a local business magazine in June 2016, alongside some of the startups in 
the summer incubator that they were in. Later in December 2016, the founders were 
asked to be on a local television talk show that interviews guests in the local community. 
2.2.3. Full time commitment to Startup I.  
 For a year, the founders had been working on Startup I part-time (refer to 2.2.1). 
However, when they were accepted into a university-base incubator, as of May 2016, 
they committed to working on the startup full-time. 
 After a year of operations, Startup I had developed processes on how they 
interacted with customers, both before they became clients, and during the website 
development process. These exchanges were often time consuming. 
Printed proposal packages. In May 2016, Startup I was hand-delivering customized 
printed proposals to potential clients for marketing projects. Creating customized 
proposals took time, and there was no guarantee that the client would accept it: “We had 
taken a whole week to put together this booklet. We staged a photo shoot inside here 
where we took all the whiteboards and made a long panoramic photo where we covered 
the whiteboards with algorithmically businessy [sic] looking things, and art things as 
well. I thought it was really cool. And we put all this energy into a project proposal… He 
said the proposal was very impressive, very nice looking. It obviously didn’t do its job in 
my opinion. If it had, [the potential client] would have said yes” (Startup I Founder A, 
Interview, 7 June, 2016).    
Email. Much of the communication with potential clients took place over email: “I use a 




spent on email), we schedule a phone call, and then get together in person.  Email is my 
favourite because I can create templates and do some copying and pasting for similar 
situations so it is more scalable” (E-mail exchange with Startup I founder, 4 April, 2017).  
Phone calls and in-person meetings. Phone calls and in-person meetings were often 
used as a follow up on on-going conversations: “Phone calls and in-person get-togethers 
require you to be fully present and engaged. The in-person meetings can also require 
travel and more stress than email or phone but are obviously the most effective for 
closing sales.  I do obviously enjoy the person-to-person relationship as well, so the final 
meetings in person are great.” (E-mail exchange with Startup I founder, 4 April, 2017) 
While these meetings were an excellent way to learn a lot about the clients, they took a 
lot of time: We’re meeting clients and see what they like and don’t like, and then we take 
a week, make the changes and then see what happens” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 
24 June, 2016).  
2.2.4. Startup I relied heavily on personal networks for clients. 
Personal networks, phone, email. For several months, the founders at Startup I relied 
heavily on their personal network to find clients, and often took on clients that 
approached them, rather than seeking out new ones. By May 2016, they had a regular 
stream of clients approaching them: “A good and diverse range [of customers contacted 
us]… I’ve never cold called a person in my entire life… [This one client], I’ve known him 
for six years. That’s what I mean. The more I do – I’ve planted so many seeds with 
people. They keep seeing what we’re doing and they’re eventually going to ask [for us to 
do a site for them]. I could easily do six sites for $1000 right now” (Startup I Founders T 
& A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).   
2.2.5. Desire to change target customer and business model. 
 Despite having access to a number of potential clients in their network, several of 
these clients were seeking inexpensive websites. The founders constantly felt under time 
pressure and undervalued for their efforts: “Most of the time, we do [websites for] clients 
for $1000 and we have to scramble to get all of them done. And it ends up with us staying 
for late nights, hurting ourselves, and putting ourselves into a state of duress. I still enjoy 
the grind but it would have been nice to finally have that client [that pays us more so we 
can] say, ‘Hey, we made it.’ ” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).   
 In May 2016, Startup I’s co-founders set their sights to attract wealthier clients 
that wanted higher end, more expensive web-based marketing services, such as digital 
marketing and data analytics. Startup I wanted to offer high end, data analytics software 
tools to their customers to improve their understanding of their online market and visitors 
to their websites. However, the customers that were approaching them, those in their 
personal network, were not knowledgeable about such higher end marketing services: 




numbers into the game. Because when it’s a [web]site and it’s not something you can 
grab onto, people don’t understand why it’s worth so much. So, I’m trying to prove the 
value through the numbers [that show how their performance improvements]... If people 
can see a number they will be happy…. I was trying to explain to one of my old clients 
though, about engagement rate, click-through-rate, and he said, ‘I have no idea what that 
means.’ And that really clicked with me that I need to come up with a really simple 
explanation of how this stuff works” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 
2016).   
 The co-founders wanted to become more selective in accepting clients: “We’re no 
longer taking on $1000-$1500 websites anymore. We kind of… we can’t. We phased that 
out. At a minimum, we’re looking at clients that can spend $7500… We’re fine enough 
not to take a bunch of crappy clients that are going to take up our time. We can work on 
our own brand – which is worth more. There’s no point in working on a crappy brand” 
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). Despite these wishes, they did not 
change their processes at this stage. 
2.2.6. Desire to improve Startup I’s company website. 
 A year after their first website was built, in May 2016, Startup I decided that they 
wanted to build analytics into their own website to demonstrate to potential clients that 
there was value in using data analytics software tools. In addition to adding in high-end 
tools, the founders believed that their current website was still fairly basic and did not 
reflect their capabilities as web designers: “I made [our site] last May. It’s terrible. Well, 
it’s not terrible, but it’s not good. I don’t want to market [Startup I] too much before I’m 
happy with [our website], because I don’t want my client to come onto it and [get the 
wrong impression]. Not that it’s bad. By all means, it’s a very nice site, but it needs to be 
more than that… Working on our own site [and improving it] is going to help bring 
better clients. I want people to go on the site and get goosebumps” (Startup I Founders T 
& A, Interview, 19 May, 2016). Despite talking about improvements, they were not made 
at this time. 
2.2.7. Starting on projects before contract commitment and declined proposals. 
Email, phone, project proposal. For example, in June 2016, Startup I would sometimes 
start projects for potential clients, even before they accepted a proposal for them to work 
on a website: “Even though they didn’t pay us yet, I was already designing the website, 
taking photos, setting it up, and animating a few pages to see what it would look like. 
Stuff like that. Poured my heart out really, so that the moment they say yes, I’m like, 
‘check out everything we got.’” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).  This 
happened with several clients, including a musical instrument manufacturer: “The 
proposal will be out to him this Friday, but I’m already in contact with all my rock star 
friends to say, ‘Hey, [there are great instruments here.]’ We obviously need to pay people 




really cool. It’s very clean, but it’s also radical… So, I’ve poured a lot of hours into that 
already” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).   
 While the co-founders at Startup I knew that that starting these projects before 
receiving client confirmation was not a wise business decision, they continued to do it: “I 
wish I could stop. I do it for every client. Prospective clients. Clients we haven’t even 
talked to yet. I just see their logo, their branding. I get an idea for them, and I make it. 
And low and behold, four hours go into this logo and they don’t even want to meet with 
us” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).   
 However, in June 2016, three of the printed proposals that they put together for 
larger clients were declined. These potential clients had contacted them through personal 
connections. The founders believed that they were looking for a discounted price: 
“[Founder]’s friend’s dad owns [big potential client’s business], and that fell through. I 
think they wanted someone that would do a website for $500. Then… another proposal 
went to [big local beverage company] and one to [big real estate agent]. The real estate 
agent would rather give it to us, as [a competing marketing agency] said that they would 
do it for $5000, but he thought [we were going to charge him] $500-$1000. And 
unfortunately, [big local beverage company], we heard from him yesterday. He took what 
we said back to the other guys we were competing against and they undercut us even 
more [and didn’t give us the contract]” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).  
 Despite these declined proposals, the co-founders believed that they just needed to 
find the right customers to work with: “I think we’re on the right path… we’re putting 
together great stuff. But it’s just a matter of time before we find that person who will trust 
us to put together something for them, and they align with us. And if they give us money 
we’ll do a nice job... There are people that want to hire us every day, but I want to work 
with better budgets and what not” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 June, 2016).  
2.2.8. Startup I continued to rely predominantly on personal networks for clients. 
 Over the Summer 2016, Startup I’s cofounders increasingly demonstrated their 
aversion to the engagement in traditional sales methods – especially the concept of “cold 
calling. They continued to rely on clients approaching them from their personal network 
(refer to 2.2.4): “The big thing for us is lead generation. I don’t want to be cold calling 
people. It’s not what [Startup I] is about. I thrive more on connections, meeting people, 
networking events. I know it’s a numbers game and you have to keep calling and stuff. 
But it’s also a matter of reputation management too” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 
June, 2016).   
Networking events, in-person. However, most clients were found through personal 
networks, Startup I’s founders realized that they should start reaching outside their 
personal network, and wanted to create new relationships to find potential clients. By 




them about their business before seeking them out as a client: “I want to know the 
companies and hopefully have a connection [with them]…. There’s a ton of meetup 
groups that put on events here…. I’ve probably gotten five contracts just doing stuff like 
that… Not obviously right away. But people ask where they’ve met me, and they can see 
what we’re doing. It’s a lot easier to do that then to cold call people and break into their 
sphere and they don’t know you. It’s a lot easier, even four months down the road and 
they say, ‘oh, I met this guy and he’s obviously doing good things.’ I think it’s a much 
more natural way to grow your business” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 8 June, 2016).  
2.2.9. Started emailing project proposals to potential clients. 
Email. By late June 2016, the startup had learned that hand-delivering proposals that they 
were creating (refer to 2.2.3) were not cost or time effective: “We don’t give out 
proposals in-person anymore. We were dropping off proposals and not getting a 
response back early enough. And we’d hear back a month or two later” (Startup I 
Founder T, Interview, 24 June, 2016).  
2.2.10. Lack of funds to improve Startup I’s own company website. 
 By June 2016, Startup I was focused again on improving their website. The co-
founders wanted to hire developers, however, did not have the funds: “We have a lot of 
people asking for work, but we’re just two people… We’re at capacity for our work. It’s 
almost a chicken and egg thing. We need bigger budgets, but then I need a bigger team so 
we feel comfortable getting that budget” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 24 June, 2016).   
2.2.11. Founders of Startup I show preference for email and minimal interest in social 
media. 
Social media and email. Despite the increasing trend of using social media to promote 
businesses, Startup I’s co-founders were not keen to use it: “I was never that extroverted 
on social media. Facebook isn’t Facebook [to me]. I just use it to play Mousehunt. It 
doesn’t click with me to have followers in Twitter and Instagram. I want to come off as a 
professional, but not just because we have a lot of followers. If social media wasn’t 
around, I don’t think I’d care about it. Unfortunately, I have to leverage my way through 
and have to navigate through” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).  
From founding, Startup I had accumulated only few original social media messages 
across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The main communication with potential clients 
remained email: “I spend [a lot of time] behind the scenes dealing with things, and 
sending email is huge” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).  
2.2.12. Started to decline taking non-ideal clients.  
Phone and email. In July 2016, Startup I was still being approached by potential clients 
that did not have much money and wanted inexpensive marketing services: “The not-for-




be a bitter person. And I don’t want to be a bitter person” (Startup I Founders T & A, 
Interview, 6 July, 2016). This passive approach to getting clients was a was a point of 
pride for Startup I: “I’ve never done that much outreach. I’ve never once reached out to 
somebody and cold called in my life. I have gotten here by not doing it. I think it speaks to 
the business. The work speaks for itself… People have every opportunity to come to us... 
I’m not going to waste time working for free. I’m not going to do that stuff if they’re not 
interested” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).  They were still taking 
on clients in their personal network: “We’re also doing [a website for] a company I’ve 
worked with for a long time,… and then a good friend I went to school with who has a 
pending patent on a product” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).   
They were however having some negative interactions with their current clients: 
“Some clients are trying to undercut us. They’re not paying their invoices on time. It’s 
just not that much fun. That hasn’t happened that many times, but it’s happened enough” 
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).  This motivated the founders to start 
turning away close contacts that were seeking their services, but that were not in their 
target market: “I’m going to have to turn away friends and people that know me. I mean, 
cool, we’re friends. But how does that help me [professionally]?” (Startup I Founders T 
& A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).  
2.2.13. Started to question being in this industry. 
By July 2016, the co-founders started to question whether being in digital 
marketing was the right industry for them. In addition to the growing competition that 
they faced, the potential clients that they were interacting with did not understand the 
analytics component of the business and the founders themselves were struggling to learn 
the technology: “At the beginning, I wanted to become a marketing agency, and now, I’m 
seeing every problem with that… I’m finding all these issues with research that 
marketing firms are facing, with client relationships and stuff. I feel like my vision has 
kind of come off, even with the response I’ve had with some of my clients. I was trying to 
get into some of the analytics with my clients, and she stopped me and said, ‘I have no 
idea what you’re talking about.’ Because she said that, that really hit me. [Also], the deal 
is, I don’t [even] know what the click-through-rate is. I’ll talk about that stuff, but I don’t 
know… And literally, clients don’t [know about that stuff]… [They] don’t care about the 
click-through-rate… [And with] project management tools, I haven’t seen a solution for 
people yet. I’ve seen people with more money than me that are still trying to solve that 
problem” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 July, 2016).   
2.2.14. Designed new company website for Startup I. 
Website. By July 2016, the improvements that Startup I had wanted to implement in May 
had still not been completed (refer to 2.2.6). With the challenges that they had been 
having attracting new business, they launched into building the new site right away: 




lot of stuff since then. And we’ve been talking about re-doing it since May… a long time, 
and last weekend, something just snapped and I started working on it… This is going to 
be a really nice tool for us… Now every piece on the website has a reason and it feels a 
lot more professional.. It’s going to be a lot easier to have people come to us… I’m 
waiting for the new site to capture the leads” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 6 
July, 2016).    
 While the website design was sent off to developers by the end of the July, it still 
did not meet the original vision of providing advanced data analytics on site visitors and 
options for collaboration with their clients, however: “Essentially, [we’d like to have] a 
real time, live collaborative dashboard that you can go back and forth and basically talk 
back and forth with clients to build a landing page that you agree on… What I would like 
to transition to is a software service, basically… But [current customers] can’t pay me 
enough to manage it. So, we need to have bigger clients [before we] can do that” (Startup 
I Founder T, Interview, 22 July, 2016).    
2.2.15. Started waiting for signed contract from client before starting project. 
Email. While Startup I had been starting projects for clients before they received a 
commitment from them, in July 2016, they made the decision to actively wait for a 
deposit and a signed contract before starting work for a client (refer to 2.2.7): “We have 
taken a more stern approach to dealing with clients. Rather than being loosey goosey. 
We’re no longer relying on promises. We will wait until the contract is signed, and we’re 
no longer working until we have a down payment. No ifs, ands, or buts about it. If the 
client asks, ‘Why haven’t you gotten started?’, we will say that we didn’t get a down 
payment. If we don’t get anything, you don’t get anything” (Startup I Founder A, 
Interview, 22 July, 2016).  
 The co-founders also started completing projects based on the clients’ specified 
needs and budget, rather than putting maximum effort into creating a cutting edge 
website, even if it was not asked for and found that the clients and themselves were more 
satisfied: “Before, I thought, top down. They need everything… Now, I say, what is their 
budget and what gives them the best bang for their buck?... Now, I do my research and I 
get the feel for that audience and tailor it to that audience. It feels more custom and more 
deliberate” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 22 July, 2016).  
2.2.16. No change in client type. 
 The co-founders believed that clients would continue to approach them: “We 
don’t work at getting clients. They come to us. I don’t do any advertising and people 
listen to us” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 22 July, 2016).  Even though relying on 
their personal connections and community to bring them clients was not currently 
bringing them the growth that they had desired, the founders believed that this approach 




working. I’m really embedded in it. Right now, we may not be reaping rewards as much 
as we want, but people [in the community] are going to be ambassadors for us” (Startup I 
Founder T, Interview, 22 July, 2016).  
By September 2016 however, Startup I was still working with clients that they did 
not find ideal: I’d like to be working with different clients who have money, who are 
invested and are having growth and want more growth… [Our current clients are] a little 
unprofessional. And then we built up this nice thing for them, and they’re just not going 
to use it. We’re like, ‘they don’t have enough money to either pay us to continue using it 
the right way or, they don’t have the understanding or dedication to do it 
themselves…[We] can’t go broke trying to help other businesses succeed when we have 
our own business to make succeed” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
2.2.17. Started to proactively seek out new clients. 
 Even into September 2016, the co-founders found that they were too focused on 
satisfying existing customers’ needs, rather than attempting to develop new sales leads: “I 
should be calling people… to try to start up our new projects but I’m so focused.. on our 
old ones... But that’s one thing that we definitely do need to focus on, lead generation…. 
A lot of our stuff really just comes to [us through] referral and we don’t really do that 
much marketing” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
 The nature of the business model, whereby clients were being referred to Startup I 
through their personal networks, often left the co-founders conflicted in two ways: 
• A feeling of obligation to take on low value contracts out of loyalty to personal 
network, and 
• Prevention from being exposed to higher value contracts. 
 
“I think the problem is [that] those referrals are still not the projects that we 
want to take on. We want to get [into] that bigger atmosphere… Poor people 
hang out with poor people, or successful business people hang out with other 
successful business people. It’s just the way it works. So, we need to get out of 
that [poor] sort of circle…” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 
2016).  
 They decided it was important to actively start reaching out to their list of contacts 
on their database to begin generating new business leads: Thursdays, we’re going to do 
more of a lead generation day. So, whether calling leads that we have in our CRM 
already, or actually going to network downstairs [in our office building… to connect with 
the community” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
 By October 2016, when they had moved into a new office building, Startup I also 




had aspired to have: “Here, it gives us an opportunity to be with people in the city… 
Everyone in here is just really well-connected. It’s definitely a really good opportunity 
for us” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
2.2.18. Started to build processes and technology to minimize client back and forth 
communication. 
Website. By September 2016, the founders were still spending a lot of time 
communicating with clients before they had committed to work with Startup I (refer to 
2.2.3). They decided that to become more efficient, they would build Startup I’s website 
to be the primary point of information and interaction for customers: “This will give us a 
lot more help moving forward. Once everything is set up, [the website] gives us an actual 
system… If you want to go through the site and tell it what you’re looking [for]…. It’s the 
machine that gives you the number [price]. It’s not me… That’s [our way of telling the 
client that] this is our system and these are our prices” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 
September, 2016).  The founder anticipated that having the website set up would even 
minimize email contact: “[The content for inbound marketing], once it’s set up, we don’t 
have to be sending out manual emails out to every person that comes to our site. It’s 
already set up. I really like that… The results that people are getting from it are really 
incredible if it’s done the right way” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
 However, by November 2016, Startup I was still working towards building a more 
automated website. They realized that they need to continue to take on available clients, 
corresponding in-person and via email, to continue to survive: “I don’t want to take a 
bunch of money from [this potential client] when I know he’s starting his business and 
just getting traction. I don’t think that’s right. I would much rather just help out… 
There’s where I struggle because we’re still one foot into building a technology platform, 
and one foot into doing our [regular] services” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 
September, 2016).   
2.2.19. Started in-bound marketing by creating media content online. 
Web content – Articles and videos. In September 2016, Startup I began creating articles 
and videos to eventually post on their new website, including workshops and tutorials. 
The founders hoped this content would be indexed in Google’s search results and would 
draw more visitors to the website – a technique known as inbound marketing: “We’re 
creating a lot of content and Google is indexing that content, and [this inbound 
marketing is] just a different way of basically getting leads and actually getting clients, 
[in contrast to] a lot of other people who are focused on cold calling or Facebook ad 
campaigns… Once they’re done, it’s sort of done. You have to pay for Google 
AdWords… Once you stopped paying, you lose that…. [Instead with having content], 
you’re basically holding up your site with all these key words and just a ton of content 
that eventually, when it’s big enough, when someone searches anything, it will be 




 The founders also believed that clients were indirectly asking for features of 
inbound marketing for their own websites: “I realized [they were saying], ‘we want a 
better search engine optimization, we need content, and we need a blog. We need more 
traffic on our site.’ All of this can be achieved with inbound marketing” (Startup I 
Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).  They believed that having inbound marketing 
on their own site offers credibility to them as a business: “I think there’s still a little bit of 
education process and we’re doing that sort of with our site too. How can we recommend 
doing that stuff if we don’t do it ourselves? It’s hypocritical” (Startup I Founder T, 
Interview, 7 September, 2016).  
Social media content. By September 2016, Startup I had also started to increase their 
presence on major social media sites (Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram). Their social 
media sites were often associated with the content that was created and posted on their 
website, and also included content such as photos of the co-founders on a photoshoot: 
“When you’re creating content, create more content, like take an Instagram post that 
we’re creating content” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 7 September, 2016).    
2.2.20. Startup began tracking website visitors and client emails. 
Data analytics and email. While they still needed to incorporate analytics technology 
into their website (refer to 2.2.5), by November 2016, Startup I started tracking customer 
interactions by looking at clients’ interactions using email and the website. The 
cofounders began paying close attention to how visitors interacted with each page: “[We] 
can see [visitors’] IP addresses and can see how long they spend on each page and look 
at every page. I can see even where they left or why they were halfway through the 
checkout with all their information entered, but, they’ve left. But I don’t know why, you 
know what I mean? It could have been that they didn’t want to buy, they had second 
guesses or they didn’t have money, or their kid distracted them and they had to leave” 
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 2 November, 2016).  With current clients, email 
remained a major form of communication that they could get data from: “I track my 
emails so I can tell when [the potential clients are] looking at [the proposal we sent]” 
(Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 2 November, 2016).  
2.2.21. New website launched with different business model. 
Website. In December 2016, Startup I’s new website launched. One of the main goals of 
the website was to remove the client project proposal process, typically seen at marketing 
agencies: “No more big retainers. No more lengthy onboarding process. No more agency 
overhead built into our pricing. Our team delivers top-of-the-line on-demand marketing 
services so you can grow your business” (Startup I’s website. Accessed 1 February, 
2017). 
 For months, the founders had wanted to use technology of a new web platform to 




communication, face-to-face and email, that they have been working with customers on. 
This new website had the goal to simplify the pre-contract process and communication 
with potential clients: “I’d still be dealing with clients and stuff. But this is where my 
tiredness and pay is coming from. If [we have this] software, I’m not limited by dealing 
with people face-to-face” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 24 November, 2016).  
 The co-founders incorporated an e-shop, detailing marketing services and prices: 
“We have built it all into our site, just like you are browsing on Amazon” (Startup I’s 
website. Accessed 1 February, 2017). The founders have also created articles as content 
on the website with the intention that it brings people to the website: “We have tons of 
content and free resources. Check them out” (Startup I’s website. Accessed 1 February, 
2017). 
3. CROSS-OVER BETWEEN PLATFORMS FOR CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS 
 This section explains where one type of customer interaction triggered another 
type of customer interaction. With the exception of a few publicity pieces, Startup I 
experienced little cross-over between platforms for customer interactions as most clients 
approached them for services. Only in late 2016 did the founders of Startup I start 
seeking out clients in-person and through email contacts. Eventually, when their new 
website was built, and content (articles, blogs and videos) that they had created became 
more searchable. Potential customers could then buy services through the website, after 
which the founders would contact them directly.   
4. OTHER STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
 Besides the data collected through interviews and secondary materials in this case, 
no additional stakeholder interactions were noted for Startup I. 
5. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE STARTUP 
 Startup I had challenges connecting with their ideal type of customer: “I want to 
choose the right ones. I want instead ten ones that are helping cover costs, plus their 
growing businesses, not twenty-five small ones that may not be there in ten years, and 
that are eating up my time and not making me money. So, that’s sort of where I’m at right 
now” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 19 May, 2016).  They also often felt that they 
lacked capital to grow: “We make enough money, pay for our own expenses and stuff, but 
we can’t scale up. We’re not making enough to scale up” (Startup I Founder T, Interview, 
24 June, 2016).   
 The founders also held back from fully engaging with potential customers out of 
fear and out of pride. An example of a fear was: “The one thing we are very scared of is 
that we get an answer from [large local company] – he says yes [that he wants to work 




[local musician] – who says yes. And all of them want the biggest packages. I’ll admit, I 
already had that fantasy” (Startup I Founder A, Interview, 7 June, 2016).  They have 
voiced fear that they would not be able to complete projects for these clients: “I’m scared 
to approach big clients right now, knowing that our process isn’t strong enough” (Startup 
I Founder T, Interview, 24 June, 2016).   
6. STARTUP STATUS AT TIME OF WRITING, EARLY 2017 
 In early 2017, Startup I continued to create websites and marketing for their 
clients. Startup I’s business continued to be stable into 2017, however they still sought to 
find bigger clients: “I don’t complain about our clients, our clients are fine. It’s just I’m 
looking for a little bit more, I’d love to get into more scalable companies where we help 
from the start. They can reach to thousands or a million dollar in revenue and we build 
up with them” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).   
 While Startup I was well known in their network, the co-founders realized that 
they wanted to build a more public reputation online to attract more customers: “Even 
with this platform, I’m really trying to build that trust up. So, if you know, you’re 
purchasing a package or whatever, it’s getting fulfilled. We’ll have the reviews on the 
site, testimonials. It’ll be very, very seamless, very transparent, and no question that 
we’re up to the task if it’s going happen” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10 
March, 2017).  
As part of their growth, rather than continuing as a marketing agency, the co-
founders began referring to Startup I as: “the world's first technoculture company. With our 
full production studio, we provide services that embrace innovative technology to deliver 
authentic, original content” (Startup I’s Facebook page. Accessed 3 March, 2017) The 
content created on Startup I’s website included informational articles and videos, focusing on 
topics such as step-by-step how-to video processes to creating a website, meant to serve as 
examples of the content that the startup could create for their clients.  
The e-store interface on the new website – through which services could be 
purchased directly through their e-store - also allowed Startup I to collect more data on 
their customers; information that the founders had been keen on accessing: “I can track 
everyone who’s bought a blog post from us, so every single person who bought a video 
from us and everything. So, it gives me so much more power to understand that. I’m 
pretty excited about that” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).  
 As hoped (refer to 2.2.17), Startup I was also being referred to new, higher-tier 
clients through people in their new office building: “There was a lawyer who was on the 
fourth floor with us. So that was a referral. She wasn’t actually involved with that. She’s 
part of the law association, … just saw us working up there and really liked us and then 
brought that guy in, the actual guy who runs it. So that was still I guess I consider it a 




heard of us from being in the [office] space” (Startup I Founders T & A, Interview, 10 
March, 2017).  
 Despite growing substantially over the past few months, the founders of Startup I 
still worried about growing too fast though: “My big fear is that we’re going to have a 
client that could change our life who comes to us and we’re not ready and we screw up 
the project. That’s my greatest fear right now, that we take on too much, we mess up, we 
wreck our reputation or wreck someone that I wanted to work with who could have 
connected us to more people and we’ve tarnished that reputation” (Startup I Founders T 
& A, Interview, 10 March, 2017).  
 To alleviate some of the burden as they grow, the founders had hired one 
employee, and decided that their next steps with Startup I would be to create an online 
marketplace to connect freelancers and individuals seeking digital marketing services: 
“So, my idea is to basically do that and we will provide resources for both the 
companies; the contractors and freelancers to get better at their craft, and then the 
companies to actually understand what we’re doing. Connect them in the middle. I have 
much more of on-demand service model. When we finish this, you’ll be able to come to 
the site and just actually basically it’s like going to Amazon you can purchase a service. 
It’s like checking it out. So, you can just buy a blog post for 150 bucks” (Startup I 





APPENDIX C. PARTICIPANT TERMINOLOGY DEFINITIONS 
Note: There are several terms used by entrepreneurs, particularly in the technology 
sector, that may not be familiar to everyone. I have included definitions of some of that 
terminology here. 
Alpha testing – the testing of the first versions of software that may only have basic 
features. The software may be unstable at this stage.   
Affiliate marketing: A type of marketing in which an individual or business earns a 
commission by promoting other people’s products 
App – short for an application software, especially as downloaded by a user to a mobile 
device. 
Application programming interface (API) – the tools and protocols needed to build 
application software for end users 
Beta test – the final stage of testing for software and other computer products before a 
product is released commercially. Beta testing follows alpha testing. 
Blogs – an online website that allows for informal commentary on a particular topic 
Chat bot – A computer program used over the Internet that simulates human 
conversation 
Customer – person or organization with whom a contract for a sale of goods or services 
has been agreed upon4. 
Customer knowledge development – the process of learning about customer 
preferences through various interactions and observations, including probing and other 
activities (Joshi & Sharma, 2004). 
Customer participation - the extent to which the customer is involved in the creation of 
the business 
Crowdfunding – A request, to a large group of people for a monetary donation, typically 
using web technologies that facilitate transactions. This donation may be to fund an 
idea, or may be in exchange for a future reward, service or product (Gerber et al., 
2012). Individuals making the donations are funders. Examples include Kickstarter, 
Indigogo and GoFundMe. 
Customer interaction: communication event between organization and customer 
                                                 




Earned media – free exposure generated by the startup, including press releases, 
articles, blogs, fliers, features on radio shows and other “guerilla marketing” tactics 
(Blank, 2012) 
Facebook – an online social media and social networking site 
Fintech business – an emerging type of financial institution using technology and 
innovation to disrupt personal and commercial finance. In the context of this thesis, 
this business is a supply-side customer to one of the startups that that provide loans to 
individuals.  
Funders - Individuals who support crowdfunding campaigns with the intention to 
support creators, engage in a community, or who want to obtain rewards.  
Gamers: Individuals who play video games 
Gaming: Playing video games  
Go live (computing) – to become operational 
Growth Hacking – A process of experimenting with both product development and 
marketing channels to increase users/customers of a business, and often involves using 
less traditional marketing channels such as social media, blogs, and viral marketing 
Instagram – an online social photo sharing site 
LinkedIn – a social networking site that connects people based on business and 
employment oriented interests 
Operational and tactical feedback – responses or information received from others that 
affects the everyday activities that an organization uses its resources to achieve their 
objectives 
Online Community forum – a virtual community over the internet where members 
interact, post, comment, and collaborate 
Paid media – when exposure to media is purchased, in terms of advertisements that are 
online, mailed out, TV or radio, in-store promotion 
Search engine optimization – A process that changes how visible a website is in a web 
search engine’s results.  
Social Media – Technology used through the Internet that creates networks and 
communities, and facilitates the sharing of ideas and information.  
Stakeholder – an individual or group who can affect or is affected by an organization’s 
ability to achieve its objectives (Freeman, 1984; Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato, & 
Amezcua, 2013) 




Strategic feedback – responses or information received from others pertaining to any 
aspect of the business that affects the business concept and overall scope and direction 
Streamers – video game players who record their game and stream the playing live, 
often with live chat options to allow for communicate between viewers and streamers, 
and with gaming–  
Traditional Earned Media – These include radio, television, newspapers and magazines 
Twitter – an online social media and news site communications are limited to 140 
characters 
User: a person who does something with a computer, software, or service with the goal to 
accomplish a task or do an activity 
XBox – a home video game console manufactured by Microsoft 
Youtuber - personality or celebrity that have gained popularity from videos on games on 





APPENDIX D. PROCESS MAPS OF STARTUP’S NEW VENTURE 
CREATION PROCESS 
 Nine process maps, one for each startup in the sample were created to better 
understand the process. Note that the process maps are too large to be stored and printed 
in a single sheet of letter sized paper. They have been saved as a separate supplementary 
content file for this dissertation. Business Process Modeling (BPMN 2.0) software 
(https://bpmn.io) was used to create the process maps of the startups in this sample. 
Basic symbols used in the process maps are noted below. 
Exclusive Symbol - Used to denote when a decision is made to pursue one path over 
another. 
 
Parallel Symbol – Represents when two tasks are taking place at the same time in a 
process. 
 
The objects are connected by connecting objects in the BMPN diagram. These may be 




Artifacts – Artifacts denote information in the model. Examples of artifacts used in the 
process maps of the startups in the sample are noted below. 
Data objects -  Includes data in the process.  
 
Data Input Symbols – Indicates that data needs to be include in the business process 
 
Data Output Symbol – Indicates that data was produced during the business process 
 





APPENDIX E. EVENT LISTING MATRICES FOR NINE STARTUPS IN 
THE SAMPLE 
 Because this study is process-oriented, I generated a time-ordered event listing 
display that allowed for the transforming of data, condensing, sorting, and linking it over 
time (Gheradi & Turner, 2002). For each case, a crossing of two lists helped in 
understanding flow, location, and connection of events. The matrices are event listings – 
a series of concrete events listed over a chronological time period. 
 Note that the event listing matrices are too large to be stored and printed in a 
single sheet of letter sized paper. They have been saved as a separate supplementary 





APPENDIX F. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS META-MATRIX 
 A cross-case analysis is meant to deepen understanding and explanation of a 
scenario (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A mixed strategy, involving stacking comparable 
cases was used. Using the within-case analyses that have a standard set of variables, 
matrices and other displays were used to understand each case in depth.  
  The case-level displays were stacked into a partially ordered meta-matrix, where 
the data from several cases is brought into one big chart, condensing it further using a 
standardized format that allows for systematic comparisons to be made and pattern 
clarification. Further analyses were conducted based on what patterns were seen in this 
meta-matrix. 
 Note that the cross-case analysis meta-matrix is too large to be stored and printed 
in a single sheet of letter sized paper. It has been saved as a separate supplementary 
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